Cornell v. Jim Hawk Truck Trailers, Inc et al

Filing 44

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 32 Motion to Quash. See text of Order for details. All records produced by any current or former employer of Cornell shall be treated as "confidential" pursuant to the stipulated protective order (Doc No 37 ) that has been entered in this case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Leonard T Strand on 2/20/14. (djs)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
LISA CORNELL,
Plaintiff,

No. C13-4022-DEO

vs.

ORDER

JIM HAWK TRUCK TRAILER, INC.,
et al.,
Defendants.
____________________
I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff has filed a motion (Doc. No. 32) to quash subpoenas duces tecum and for
protective order. The motion raises issues concerning document-production subpoenas
certain defendants have served on plaintiff’s current and former employers.

The

defendants that issued the subpoenas have filed a resistance (Doc. No. 38) and plaintiff
has filed a reply (Doc. No. 41). I conducted a telephonic hearing on February 7, 2014.
The motion is fully submitted.
II.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Lisa Cornell filed this case on February 22, 2013. Her complaint, as
later amended, asserts claims against Jim Hawk Truck Trailer, Inc., Sioux City Jim Hawk
Truck Trailer, Inc., and Shawn Corbett.1 See Doc. No. 15. Cornell alleges that she was
hired on February 7, 2011, to be the office manager of the Hawk Defendants’ Sioux City
branch.

1

She further alleges that Corbett was the general manager and her direct

I will refer to Jim Hawk Truck Trailer, Inc., and Sioux City Jim Hawk Truck Trailer, Inc.,
collectively herein as the Hawk Defendants.

supervisor. She contends that Corbett started sexually harassing her about three months
after her employment began. She contends that the harassment took place both in the
office and outside the office, via text messaging. Her amended complaint includes
detailed allegations concerning Corbett’s alleged comments and actions. Doc. No. 15 at
¶¶ 19-26.
Cornell alleges that when she did not respond favorably to Corbett’s sexual
advances, he began treating her differently.

She further alleges that she reported

Corbett’s conduct to members of the Hawk Defendants’ management team but her
complaints were not acted upon. She contends she was then fired a short time after filing
complaints with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. Id. at ¶¶ 27-47. She asserts claims of sexual harassment,
discrimination and retaliation under the Iowa Civil Rights Act and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
All of the defendants have filed answers denying various allegations and denying
liability to Cornell. Among other things, the Hawk Defendants contend that Cornell’s
employment was terminated for legitimate, performance-based reasons. On December
12, 2013, counsel for the Hawk Defendants sent a Notice of Intent to Issue Subpoenas
Duces Tecum (Notice) to Cornell’s counsel, attaching subpoenas to Cornell’s current and
former employers, dating back to 1992. The Notice indicated that the Hawk Defendants
would be demanding production of five different types of documents, culminating in “All
other documents in your possession, custody or control pertaining to the employment of
Lisa Cornell . . . .”
Cornell’s counsel spoke with counsel for the Hawk Defendants about the Notice
on December 16 and 17, 2013, and requested that the Hawk Defendants narrow or
withdraw the proposed subpoenas. Cornell’s counsel asked that the Hawk Defendants
delay service of the subpoenas until the parties could obtain guidance from the court
through a Motion for Protective Order. Apparently, no agreement was reached on this
issue, as the Hawk Defendants proceeded to serve the subpoenas on five different entities
2

on or about December 31, 2013. As served, the subpoenas demanded that each recipient
produce the following documents:
A.

Personnel Records. Any and all personnel records, including, but
not limited to, starting and ending dates of employment,
applications, resumes, job descriptions, performance evaluations,
disciplinary reports;

B.

Payroll & Attendance Records. Any and all payroll and attendance
records, including, but not limited to, W-2 forms, records of
earnings and compensation, time and attendance logs, and any other
records illustrating dates and hours worked, vacation time, and sick
time;

C.

Benefits Records. Any and all benefits records, including, but not
limited to, all records relating to plaintiff’s medical insurance, shortterm disability, long-term disability, leaves of absence, retirement
contributions and life insurance;

D.

Medical Records. Any and all medical records, including, but not
limited to, reports of physical or mental examinations conducted as
a condition of employment, work excuses, physician’s notes, and
disability and workers’ compensation records; and

E.

Any other documents in your possession, custody or control
pertaining to the employment of Lisa Cornell, DOB: (redacted),
SSN: (redacted).

On January 6, 2014, Cornell’s counsel learned that the subpoenas had been served.
Cornell’s motion was filed the same day. As of the date of the telephonic hearing, the
parties had resolved nearly all issues concerning the subpoenas. Among other things, the
Hawk Defendants had made the wise decision2 to narrow the scope of the subpoenas
dramatically. Indeed, and except for the language emphasized below, the parties have
agreed that the subpoenas can properly request the following documents:

2

This was a wise decision because the original scope of each subpoena was ridiculous in light
of the issues present in this case.

3

A.

Personnel Records. Any and all personnel records, including, but
not limited to, starting and ending dates of employment,
applications, resumes, job descriptions, performance evaluations,
disciplinary reports;

B.

Payroll & Attendance Records. Any and all W-2 forms and records
of earnings and compensation; and

C.

Benefits Records. Any and all benefits records, including, but not
limited to, all records relating to plaintiff’s medical insurance, shortterm disability, long-term disability, leaves of absence, retirement
contributions and life insurance.

See Doc. No. 41 at 1. Thus, the Hawk Defendants no longer seek production of time
and attendance logs, records illustrating dates and hours worked, vacation time, sick time
or medical records. Moreover, the Hawk Defendants have agreed to limit the subpoenas
to documents and information generated or occurring since January 1, 2007. The only
remaining disputed issue concerning the scope of the subpoenas is whether the Hawk
Defendants have the right to obtain performance evaluations and disciplinary reports from
Cornell’s former and subsequent employers.

In addition, Cornell raises an issue

concerning the appropriate method for obtaining information from her current employer.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Are Performance Evaluations And Disciplinary Reports From Other Employers
Discoverable In This Case?
Cornell and the Hawk Defendants have cited numerous cases supporting their

respective positions. I have reviewed those cases, and others. As I mentioned during
the hearing, however, I find other cases to be of limited value with regard to an issue of
this nature because each case turns on very specific facts. The general legal principles
that apply to the scope of discovery in the course of federal civil litigation are wellknown. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize broad discovery. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that
4

is relevant to any party's claim or defense.”). “Discovery Rules are to be broadly and
liberally construed in order to fulfill discovery's purposes of providing both parties with
‘information essential to the proper litigation of all relevant facts, to eliminate surprise,
and to promote settlement.’” Marook v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 259 F.R.D.
388, 394 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (quoting Rolscreen Co. v. Pella Prods., 145 F.R.D. 92, 94
(S.D. Iowa 1992)). Discovery requests are typically deemed relevant if there is any
possibility that the information sought is relevant to any issue in the case. Penford Corp.
v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 265 F.R.D. 430, 434-35 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (citing Davis
v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., No. 4:07CV00521 BSM, 2008 WL 3992761 (E.D. Ark. Aug.
26, 2008)). The party resisting production of requested information bears the burden of
establishing the lack of relevancy, unless that lack of relevancy is obvious. Marook, 259
F.R.D. at 394-95.
Here, the Hawk Defendants contend that performance evaluations and disciplinary
reports from other employers are relevant because it is their position that Cornell was
discharged due to performance issues.

During the hearing, counsel for the Hawk

Defendants stated that Cornell’s job duties were expanded to include some accountingrelated tasks and that she proved to be incapable of handling those tasks. They believe it
would be relevant to discover whether other employers have reported Cornell to have job
performance issues.
Cornell denies that performance evaluations and disciplinary reports from other
employers have any potential relevance. She also notes that many courts have recognized
privacy interests regarding personnel records and suggests that those interests weigh
against permitting discovery of those records absent a compelling need. Finally, she
contends that the Hawk Defendants’ arguments in favor of relevance are based on nothing
but their sheer speculation as to the contents of the requested documents.
I will first address performance evaluations with regard to both prior and
subsequent employers, as I find that the issues are identical with regard to both types of
5

employers. As for disciplinary reports, I find that the analysis differs as between prior
and subsequent employers. As such, I will address each type of employer separately.
Performance Evaluations (Prior and Subsequent Employers). Based on the
Hawk Defendants’ explanation of alleged relevance, and in light of the broad scope of
discovery permitted in federal civil litigation, I find that performance evaluations
prepared by other employers since January 1, 2007, have enough potential relevance to
be properly discoverable in this case.

Because Cornell has agreed that the Hawk

Defendants may obtain job descriptions, it is foreseeable that performance evaluations,
when matched with those job descriptions, might demonstrate whether other employers
reported Cornell to have performance concerns similar to those alleged by the Hawk
Defendants. If so, that information could be arguably admissible at trial or, at least,
could lead to the discovery of additional, relevant evidence.
Of course, because the contents of the performance evaluations are not currently
known, it is also possible that they will contain no relevant information. However, the
Hawk Defendants have articulated a sufficient, logical explanation of potential relevance
to permit discovery of those evaluations from both prior and subsequent employers. I
will deny Cornell’s motion with regard to these documents.
Disciplinary Records (Prior Employers). By contrast, the Hawk Defendants have
not come close to explaining the potential relevance of disciplinary records, at least with
regard to prior employers. If the Hawk Defendants claimed that they discharged Cornell
because of insubordination, theft, poor attendance or some other, specific disciplinaryrelated reason, perhaps they would have a valid argument for discovering whether similar
issues were reported by other employers. But that is not the case here. The Hawk
Defendants have not articulated a reason as to why disciplinary reports from prior
employers could have any possible relevance to any issue in this case. As such, I will
grant Cornell’s motion with regard to those documents.
Disciplinary Records (Subsequent Employers).

The Hawk Defendants have

presented a somewhat-better theory concerning disciplinary records maintained by
6

subsequent employers. There is no dispute that Cornell’s earnings after being discharged
are relevant to the issue of damages in this case. Evidence suggesting that Cornell failed
to act reasonably to mitigate her damages is also relevant.

See, e.g., Fiedler v.

Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 1982) (a wrongfully discharged
claimant must use reasonable efforts to mitigate his or her damages).

The Hawk

Defendants argue that disciplinary records of subsequent employers could, potentially,
show that Cornell’s earnings have suffered because of disciplinary issues. For example,
if she was denied a raise or promotion due to misconduct of some nature, evidence of
that denial may be relevant to her damages.
Again, this is a lot of speculation, but without knowing the actual contents of the
records I cannot find that they have no possible relevance. The Hawk Defendants have
articulated a sufficient explanation of potential relevance to render disciplinary records
of subsequent employers discoverable in this case. As such, I will deny Cornell’s motion
with regard to those records.
B.

Is Cornell Entitled To Additional Protection With Regard To Her Current
Employer?
Cornell argues that she faces possible prejudice if her current employer, Unity

Point Health, is required to respond to the Hawk Defendants’ subpoena. She cites “the
very real threat that her current employer would negatively perceive her involvement in
litigation against one of her former employers.” Doc. No. 41 at 4. It is somewhat ironic
that after repeatedly complaining that the Hawk Defendants have engaged in improper
speculation as to the contents of personnel files, Cornell engages in the same kind of
speculation concerning her current employer. She does not claim, let alone point to
evidence, that her current employer is inclined to treat employees differently if they are
involved in claims against prior employers. Nonetheless, she argues that a “very real
threat” of negative consequences exists if Unity Point Health is required to respond to a
subpoena.
7

Of course, as I noted above, some amount of speculation is a natural part of the
discovery process. Thus, I will not reject Cornell’s argument simply because it is
premised on future events that may or may not occur. It is at least foreseeable that some
employers may react negatively when being compelled to participate in an employee’s
litigation against a prior employer. As such, I find that Cornell is entitled, if she so
chooses, to utilize an alternative method for providing her Unity Point Health personnel
records to the Hawk Defendants. Cornell has the right, under Iowa law, to obtain a copy
of her personnel file from Unity Point. See Iowa Code § 91B.1. She may elect to do so
in lieu of having Unity Point Health respond to the Hawk Defendants’ subpoena.
However, if Cornell chooses this option, she must provide the entire file to her counsel
without removing or deleting any of its contents. Her counsel must then provide the
entire file to counsel for the Hawk Defendants, again without removing or deleting any
of its contents. Of course, this option may result in the discovery of information that is
beyond the scope of the subpoena duces tecum. Cornell must weigh that disadvantage
against her concerns that Unity Point Health may respond negatively if it is forced to
respond to a subpoena in this case.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. No. 32) to quash subpoenas duces tecum and for
protective order is granted in part and denied in part, as follows:
1.

The motion is granted in that, with regard to former employers (i.e.,

Cornell’s employers prior to the Hawk Defendants), the Hawk Defendants are not entitled
to discover disciplinary reports.
2.

The motion is denied in that, with regard to subsequent employers (i.e.,

Cornell’s employers after the Hawk Defendants), the Hawk Defendants are entitled to
discover disciplinary reports.

8

3.

The motion is denied in that, with regard to all of Cornell’s other

employers, the Hawk Defendants are entitled to obtain performance evaluations prepared
by those employers at any time on or after January 1, 2007.
4.

The motion is granted in that Cornell may elect the alternative method,

described herein, for producing her Unity Point Health personnel file to the Hawk
Defendants. If Cornell elects that alternative method, then the subpoena issued to Unity
Point Health shall be quashed and no defendant shall serve an additional document
production subpoena on Unity Point Health in this case without first obtaining leave of
court. On or before February 28, 2014, Cornell’s counsel shall notify counsel for the
defendants as to whether or not Cornell will use the alternative method to produce her
Unity Point Health personnel file. If Cornell elects not to use that alternative method,
then the Hawk Defendants may proceed to enforce a subpoena duces tecum with regard
to Unity Point Health in accordance with this order.
5.

All records produced by any current or former employer of Cornell shall

be treated as “confidential” pursuant to the stipulated protective order (Doc. No. 37) that
has been entered in this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 20th day of February, 2014.

________________________________
LEONARD T. STRAND
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

9