Huston v. Smith et al
Filing
43
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying in their entirety 5 Pro Se Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus and 22 Amended Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus. No certificate of appealability shall issue from this court in this case. Signed by Judge Mark W Bennett on 01/11/2016. (src)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
PAUL MICHAEL HUSTON, a/k/a
PAUL MICHAEL BLAISE,
No. C 13-4063-MWB
Petitioner,
vs.
JASON SMITH, Superintendent of
Cherokee Mental Health Institution,
BRAD WITTROCK, Deputy/Acting
Superintendent of Cherokee Mental
Health Institution, and CHARLES
PALMER, Director of the Iowa
Department of Human Services,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER REGARDING
PETITIONER’S AMENDED
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254
Respondents.
___________________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION........................................................................... 3
A.
Factual Background ............................................................... 3
1.
The criminal case .......................................................... 3
2.
The first civil commitment trial and appeal ........................... 4
3.
The second civil commitment trial ...................................... 6
B.
Procedural Background ........................................................... 8
1.
Huston’s pro se petition................................................... 8
2.
Huston’s amended petition and the respondents’
answer ........................................................................ 9
3.
The oral arguments ...................................................... 10
II.
LEGAL ANALYSIS ...................................................................... 11
A.
Standards For § 2254 Relief .................................................... 11
B.
Claims Pressed By Counsel ..................................................... 15
1.
The right to effective counsel in civil commitment
proceedings ................................................................ 15
a.
Arguments of the parties ....................................... 15
C.
D.
E.
III.
Analysis ............................................................ 17
b.
2.
Counsel’s failure to preserve speedy trial rights .................... 20
a.
Arguments of the parties ....................................... 20
b.
Analysis ............................................................ 21
3.
Counsel’s failure to obtain a bifurcated trial ....................... 24
a.
Arguments of the parties ....................................... 24
b.
Analysis ............................................................ 26
Claims Pressed By Huston Pro Se ............................................ 29
1.
Huston’s “Padilla claim” ............................................... 29
2.
Huston’s religious claims ............................................... 30
a.
Arguments of the parties ....................................... 32
b.
Analysis ............................................................ 33
Other Claims ...................................................................... 37
Certificate Of Appealability ..................................................... 37
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 38
Is Paul Michael Huston (a/k/a Paul Michael Blaise), an inmate of the Civil
Commitment Unit for Sexual Offenders (CCUSO) in Cherokee, Iowa, entitled to habeas
relief from his civil commitment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254? Huston’s habeas counsel
contends that Huston’s civil commitment counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing
to secure a bifurcated trial and in failing to preserve Huston’s right to a speedy trial.
Huston asserts additional claims pro se, including a “Padilla claim”1 that his trial counsel
1
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
2
in his underlying state criminal case failed to inform him that a collateral consequence of
his guilty plea to a harassment charge might be his civil commitment as a sexually violent
predator. The respondents deny that Huston has a clearly established federal right to
effective assistance of counsel in civil commitment proceedings, but if he does, that his
claims are without merit.
I.
A.
INTRODUCTION
Factual Background
Huston’s legal odyssey involves a predicate criminal conviction and two civil
commitment trials, post-conviction relief proceedings on his criminal conviction, and
appeals of his civil commitment. I will lay out the milestones in that journey, as described
by the Iowa appellate courts.
1.
The criminal case
In its decision on Huston’s direct appeal of his civil commitment, the Iowa
Supreme Court described the circumstances leading to Huston’s predicate criminal
conviction as follows:
As S.E. walked through River View Park in Fort
Madison in October 2005, Paul Blaise [a/k/a Huston], who
was collecting cans in the park, approached her and began
asking her questions. He asked her if she was married, if she
was sexually active, and if she would engage in anal sex. He
wondered if she had ever been the victim of a violent crime,
if she would use lubrication to have anal sex, if she would
take her clothes off or have sex if someone asked her or
threatened to hurt her. Although S.E. grew increasingly
uncomfortable and quickened her pace, Blaise kept up with
her while continuing to ask “hypothetical” questions. S.E.
tried repeatedly to change the conversation and eventually ran
away from Blaise and asked another pedestrian to walk her to
her car. After warning another female pedestrian that “there
3
was someone in the park talking about rape and guns and all
kinds of sexual stuff,” S.E. called the police. Officers located
Blaise in the park and discovered he was carrying a gun.
Blaise ultimately pled guilty to first-degree harassment and
received a two-year sentence.
In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d 310, 313 (Iowa 2013). There does not appear to be
any dispute that Huston’s criminal counsel never advised him that a possible consequence
of his conviction or guilty plea to the harassment charge was civil commitment as a
sexually violent predator pursuant to IOWA CODE CH. 229A. See, e.g., Blaise v. State,
801 N.W.2d 627, 2011 WL 2078091, *1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 25, 2011) (table op.) (final
state court decision on Huston’s appeal of denial of his petition for state post-conviction
relief from his criminal conviction).
On December 6, 2005, Huston was convicted on his guilty plea and sentenced to
two years of imprisonment. State Court Documents, Sealed Exhibit 31 (Judgment Entry
of Iowa District Court For Lee County At Fort Madison). Huston’s criminal conviction
was final prior to his application for state post-conviction relief in May 2007.
2.
The first civil commitment trial and appeal
The next step on Huston’s legal odyssey was his first civil commitment trial. As
the Iowa Supreme Court explained, “While Blaise was incarcerated for the harassment
offense, the State sought to have him committed as a sexually violent predator (SVP)
under Iowa Code chapter 229A.” In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d at 313. There does
not appear to be any dispute that, prior to Huston’s first civil commitment trial, his civil
commitment counsel, appointed pursuant to IOWA CODE CH. 229A, moved the trial court
to bifurcate the trial.
His civil commitment counsel argued that Huston’s entire
background, including details about all of his past criminal acts and other matters, would
be superfluous and, in fact, prejudicial to the jury’s ability to decide the first question
before them, that is, whether his harassment conviction was for a sexually violent offense,
4
as defined in IOWA CODE CH. 229A, but the motion to bifurcate was denied. In re Det.
of Blaise, 770 N.W.2d 852, 2009 WL 1066767, *1 (Iowa Ct. App. April 22, 2009) (table
op.) (intermediate appellate court decision on Huston’s appeal of his civil commitment).
As the Iowa Supreme Court also explained, “After a trial in January 2007, a jury found
Blaise was an SVP and he was ordered committed for treatment. Blaise appealed.” In
re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d at 313.
There were further proceedings, in both the trial court and the appellate court, on
the state’s first attempt to civilly commit Huston. As the Iowa Supreme Court explained,
In December 2007, Blaise sought a stay of his appeal and filed
a motion for a new trial in the district court, alleging the
doctor who had testified for the State in his SVP trial was an
“admitted mentally ill pedophile with serious difficulty
controlling his behavior.” On February 28, 2008, we granted
the stay and issued a limited remand which provided:
The motion for limited remand is granted for a
period of sixty days to allow the district court to
address the respondent’s motion for new trial and the
State’s resistance. Counsel for the parties shall
promptly inform the district court about this order.
The clerk of district court shall transmit a
certified, file-stamped copy of the district court’s
remand ruling to the clerk of the supreme court. Within
fourteen days of the date of the district court’s remand
ruling, the parties shall file statements with the
supreme court addressing the status of this appeal.
Further appellate proceedings in this case are
stayed during the above-stated limited remand period.
This court retains jurisdiction.
On remand, the district court granted Blaise’s motion
and set a new trial date for August. The State appealed from
the district court’s grant of new trial. On July 14, Blaise
5
executed a speedy trial waiver, which was filed with the
district court on July 28. On July 31, we combined the two
appeals, stayed the proceedings in the district court, and
transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of
appeals issued its decision on April 22, 2009, affirming the
district court’s grant of a new trial. Procedendo issued on May
21.
In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d at 313-14 (footnote omitted).
3.
The second civil commitment trial
Before Huston’s second civil commitment trial, his civil commitment counsel,
again, moved to bifurcate his trial, this time “basing his argument on potential ‘jury
confusion,’” but that motion was, again, denied. In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d at
314. The Iowa Supreme Court detailed the evidence presented at the second trial, as
follows:
During the trial, the State offered extensive testimony
from Blaise about his prior misconduct. The testimony
included a wide range of past bad acts starting with behavior
when he was a child, including setting a vehicle on fire,
shooting another child in the face with a BB gun, and sexually
assaulting a roommate while institutionalized. The State
questioned Blaise about his sexual fantasies, such as exposing
himself to women, anal intercourse, sexual intercourse with
virgins, and assaulting female prison staff members.
The State also offered Blaise’s testimony about his
conviction for sexual abuse of a nine-year-old girl, and
burglary and criminal mischief charges. The details of each
of these crimes were revealed to the jury, including how he
forced himself on and held down the nine-year-old and
digitally penetrated her vagina with enough force to cause
scarring, and how he damaged the burglary victim’s car
because she refused to have sex with him. The State also
elicited testimony about his arrest for lifting a girl’s skirt on
6
the street, as well as charges of identity theft and theft in the
fifth degree.
In addition, the State elicited his testimony about
threats he had made to staff while he was in jail for sexual
abuse and read from an extremely violent and vicious letter
he wrote to a female staff member, which threatened to torture
her unless she had sex with him. The State’s questioning of
Blaise covered dozens of institutional infractions, including
harassing female staff members, defecating on the floor,
exposing himself, threatening to rape women, throwing
semen at staff, masturbating in the presence of staff, and filing
a lawsuit against a staff member requesting she wear different
clothes so he could “see her butt.”
Regarding his conversation with S.E. in the park,
Blaise testified he was “looking for a date” when he first
began talking to her, but that as soon as he found out she did
not have sex “on the side” he was no longer interested in her
sexually.
The State’s expert, Dr. Amy Phenix, testified that the
conduct resulting in Blaise’s harassment conviction was
sexually motivated. She also testified that Blaise suffered from
various mental abnormalities and that he will more likely than
not commit sexually violent offenses if he is not confined.
Blaise’s expert, Dr. Stephen Hart, testified that he could not
be sure that Blaise’s interaction with S.E. was sexually
motivated. Dr. Hart’s opinion relied on the fact that there was
no evidence that Blaise was sexually aroused during the
conversation and on the notion that Blaise’s bad behavior and
sexual acting out was a way for Blaise to express anger and
frustration rather than a way to seek sexual gratification.
In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d at 314. The second civil commitment trial ended with
the same verdict as the first, that is, Huston was found to be a sexually violent predator
and was ordered committed. Id.
7
On Huston’s direct appeal of his civil commitment, the Iowa Supreme Court
rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on failure to secure his speedy
trial and failure to secure bifurcation of the trial, as well as his claim that the prosecution
had prejudicially misstated the evidence. Id. at 315-25. The Iowa Supreme Court also
stated, “We have also considered the arguments raised by Blaise in his pro se brief and
find them without merit.” Id. at 325. Consequently, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed
Huston’s commitment pursuant to IOWA CODE CH. 229A. Id. These federal habeas
proceedings followed.
B.
1.
Procedural Background
Huston’s pro se petition
On June 28, 2013, Huston filed pro se motions to proceed in forma pauperis and
for counsel to assist him with his § 2254 case. See docket nos. 1 and 2. In his pro se
Petition, which was attached to his Motion To Proceed In Forma Pauperis and later filed
at docket no. 5, Huston asserted the following claims for § 2254 relief: (1) denial of
religious freedom of expression, arising from his purported religious basis for comments
to S.E.; (2) violation of due process of law through ineffective assistance of his criminal
trial counsel for failing to advise him of all possible consequences of a guilty plea;
(3) violation of due process of law through ineffective assistance of his criminal appellate
counsel for “refus[al] to raise anything”; (4) violation of due process of law through
ineffective assistance of civil commitment counsel in (a) failing to call a religious expert,
(b) failing to request bifurcation effectively, and (c) failing to preserve his speedy trial
rights; (5) violation of due process of law through ineffective assistance of post-conviction
relief counsel in failing to address cases raised by the Iowa Court of Appeals in its
decision and refusing to seek discretionary further review; (6) violation of due process
of law of post-conviction relief appellate counsel for failing to raise additional claims;
8
and (7) violation of due process of law and equal protection, because he is a Messianic
Jew, so that he should not have been prosecuted for his conduct toward S.E., but should
have been forgiven.
In an Initial Review Order (docket no. 4), filed October 24, 2013, United States
District Judge Donald E. O’Brien, to whom this case was originally assigned, granted
Huston’s Motion To Proceed In Forma Pauperis and his Motion For Appointment Of
Counsel. Judge O’Brien also directed the Clerk of Court to file Huston’s pro se Petition
and directed habeas counsel to file an amended § 2254 petition within 45 days.
2.
Huston’s amended petition and the respondents’ answer
After extensions of time to do so, habeas counsel filed both Petitioner’s Amended
Petition For Writ Of Habe[a]s Corpus (Amended Petition) (docket no. 22) and
Petitioner’s Memorandum In Support Of 2254 Application For Habeas Relief
(Petitioner’s Memorandum) (docket no. 23) on May 19, 2014. The Amended Petition
ostensibly incorporates, by reference, all of Huston’s pro se Petition, but then states the
grounds for relief as follows:
3. That the grounds for Petitioner’s Habeas Corpus Petition
are that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution in the following regards:
Trial counsel failed to effectively seek and
receive a bifurcated trial.
Trial counsel failed to file a motion to dismiss
and enforce the violation of Petitioner’s speedy
trial rights.
The Petitioner was denied rights to Equal
Protection, Due Process and Effective
Representation of Counsel in violation of the
Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.
9
Amended Petition at ¶ 3. In Petitioner’s Memorandum, however, habeas counsel argues
only the grounds set out in subparagraphs a) and b). Habeas counsel then explains that
Huston had expressed a desire to raise a “Padilla claim,” among other issues, in a
separate pro se filing, rather than have habeas counsel file an Anders argument on those
issues. Petitioner’s Memorandum at 12-13. Huston did not file a pro se brief.
On June 27, 2014, the respondents filed their Answer To Section 2254 Petition
For Writ Of Habeas Corpus (docket no. 27) and an appendix of state court documents
(docket no. 28). After an extension of time to do so, the respondents filed their 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 Merits Brief (Respondents’ Brief) (docket no. 35) on September 15, 2014. The
respondents argue that there is no clearly established federal constitutional right to
counsel in civil commitment proceedings; that, if there is such a right, the Iowa Supreme
Court reasonably rejected Huston’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as to
bifurcation and speedy trial rights; that Huston’s additional pro se claims are abandoned,
waived, or unexhausted and procedurally defaulted; and that, even if Huston’s pro se
claims are properly before the court, they are without merit.
3.
The oral arguments
Eventually, on July 7, 2015, Judge O’Brien held telephonic oral arguments on
Huston’s § 2254 claims. See Hearing Minutes (docket no. 42). Before he could issue a
ruling on Huston’s Amended Petition and pro se claims, Judge O’Brien passed away, and
this case was reassigned to me. I have reviewed all of the briefing and other documents
submitted in this case as well as an unedited realtime transcript of the July 7, 2015, oral
arguments before Judge O’Brien.
Prior to the oral arguments, habeas counsel and respondents’ counsel had
conferred in an effort to narrow the issues and expedite the proceedings. Thus, habeas
counsel and respondents’ counsel, first, expressly addressed the respondents’ argument
that, in a sexually violent predator civil commitment proceeding, the alleged predator is
10
not entitled to effective assistance of counsel under the United States Constitution.
Assuming that Huston can assert federal ineffective assistance claims, habeas counsel
and respondents’ counsel also argued Huston’s two ineffective assistance claims
concerning bifurcation and speedy trial. 2 Huston also pressed additional pro se claims,3
to which the respondents responded.
Specifically, Huston argued that he was “in
custody” pursuant to his criminal conviction into his civil commitment for purposes of a
“Padilla claim,” which is that his criminal trial counsel had not advised him that civil
commitment was a possible consequence of his guilty plea to harassment. He also argued
that there was a free speech and religious aspect to his alleged harassment crime, so that
it was not sexually motivated, if it could be considered a crime at all.
II.
A.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Standards For § 2254 Relief
I must consider Hutson’s claims in light of the standards for § 2254 relief. Since
the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
habeas review by the federal courts of state court convictions and the state courts’ denials
of post-conviction relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is limited and, at least ordinarily,
deferential. Specifically, if a claim has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court,”
a federal habeas court may not grant relief unless “the adjudication of the claim . . .
2
Huston also made pro se arguments that federal due process rights entitled him
to effective assistance of counsel in civil commitment proceedings and that his civil
commitment counsel was ineffective as to bifurcation.
3
Judge O’Brien explained at the telephonic oral arguments that he was permitting
Huston to make pro se arguments, even though he is represented by counsel in these
proceedings, because Huston and his counsel were not in the same location for the
telephonic oral arguments. Thus, he explained, they could not confer to make sure that
counsel addressed all of the issues that Huston wanted addressed. For the same reasons,
I will consider Huston’s pro se arguments at the telephonic oral arguments.
11
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Johnson v.
Williams, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013) (quoting § 2254(d) (citations
and quotation marks omitted)). As the United States Supreme Court has explained,
This Court, time and again, has instructed that AEDPA, by
setting forth necessary predicates before state-court judgments
may be set aside, “erects a formidable barrier to federal
habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been
adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ––––, –
–––, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013). Under
§ 2254(d)(1), “‘a state prisoner must show that the state
court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court
was so lacking in justification that there was an error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” White v. Woodall,
572 U.S. ––––, ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702, 188 L.Ed.2d
698 (2014) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103,
131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011)).
White v. Wheeler, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 456, 460 (2015). “[R]eview under
§ 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the
claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
As a consequence of the limitations on relief under § 2254(d)(1), “[t]he starting
point for cases subject to § 2254(d)(1) is to identify the ‘clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ that governs the habeas
petitioner’s claims.” Marshall v. Rodgers, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1449
(2013); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S.
111, 122 (2009). “Clearly established law” means “‘the holdings, as opposed to the
12
dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions.’” Howes v. Fields, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132
S. Ct. 1181, 1187 (2012) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 412)).
Once the “clearly established law” has been identified, the court must consider
both the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1), because
they have “independent meaning.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 405. A state court decision is
“contrary to” clearly established federal law, within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1), “if the
state court ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court]
cases.’” Lafler v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1390 (2012) (quoting
Williams, 529 U.S. at 405)). “A state-court decision will also be contrary to [the
Supreme] Court’s clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts
that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e] Court and nevertheless
arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 406. A federal
court’s belief that it might have reached a different result is not enough to show that the
state court decision was “contrary to” established federal law, where the state court
applied the correct standard under established Supreme Court law. Id. A state court’s
decision involves an “unreasonable application” of federal law, within the meaning of
§ 2254(d)(1), only if “‘there was no reasonable basis for’ the [state court’s] decision.”
Cullen, 563 U.S. at 188 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011)). Thus,
“‘an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of
federal law.’” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (emphasis in the original) (quoting Williams,
529 U.S. at 410).
Even if a petitioner establishes that the state court’s determination was “contrary
to” or an “unreasonable application of” federal law, within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1),
that determination does not, standing alone, entitle the petitioner to relief. Rather, it only
entitles the petitioner to de novo consideration by the federal court of the petitioner’s
underlying constitutional claim for post-conviction or habeas relief. See Johnson, ___
13
U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1097 (“Even while leaving ‘primary responsibility’ for
adjudicating federal claims to the States, AEDPA permits de novo review in those rare
cases when a state court decides a federal claim in a way that is ‘contrary to’ clearly
established Supreme Court precedent.” (internal citations omitted)); Lafler, ___ U.S. at
___, 132 S. Ct. at 1390-91 (holding that, where the state court’s decision was “contrary
to” clearly established federal law, because it failed to apply the Strickland standards to
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the federal court “can determine the principles
necessary to grant relief” and apply them to the facts of the case); Richter, 562 U.S. at
100 (stating that § 2254(d)(1)’s exception “permit[s] relitigation where the earlier state
decision resulted from an ‘unreasonable application of’ clearly established federal law”);
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (stating that, when the state court’s
adjudication was “contrary to” federal law, within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1), “[a]
federal court must then resolve the claim without the deference AEDPA otherwise
requires”); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) (performing the analysis required
under Strickland’s “prejudice” prong without deferring to the state court’s decision,
because the state court’s resolution of Strickland’s “deficient performance” prong
involved an “unreasonable application” of federal law, and the state court had considered
the “deficient performance” prong dispositive).
Section 2254(d)(2), authorizing relief where the state court’s adjudication of a
claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2),
also requires some further explication. Specifically,
[a federal court] may not characterize these [challenged] statecourt factual determinations as unreasonable “merely because
[the federal court] would have reached a different conclusion
in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 130
S.Ct. 841, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010). Instead, § 2254(d)(2)
14
requires that [the federal court] accord the state trial court
substantial deference. If “‘[r]easonable minds reviewing the
record might disagree’ about the finding in question, ‘on
habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial
court’s ... determination.’” Ibid. (quoting Rice v. Collins, 546
U.S. 333, 341–342, 126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006)).
As we have also observed, however, “[e]ven in the context of
federal habeas, deference does not imply abandonment or
abdication of judicial review,” and “does not by definition
preclude relief.” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340,
123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003).
Brumfield v. Cain, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015). Thus, the question
is whether the federal court’s “examination of the record before the state court compels
[the federal court] to conclude that [the state court’s] critical factual determinations were
unreasonable.” Id.
I will apply these standards to Huston’s various claims for § 2254 relief.
B.
Claims Pressed By Counsel
As explained, above, Huston’s habeas counsel expressly argues only two of the
various claims originally set out in Huston’s pro se Petition. Both of those claims are
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in Huston’s civil commitment proceedings, one
based on failure to preserve Huston’s right to a speedy trial, and another based on failure
to obtain a bifurcated trial. The question ante, squarely raised by the respondents, is
whether Huston had a federally protected right to counsel in the civil commitment
proceedings at all.
1.
The right to effective counsel in civil commitment proceedings
a.
Arguments of the parties
Hutson argues in his Memorandum that the Iowa Supreme Court ruled in In re
Detention of Crane, 704 N.W.2d 437 (2005), that, as a threshold matter, individuals who
15
are the subject of Chapter 229A civil commitment proceedings have a right to effective
assistance of counsel. He then argues, with no citation to any authority, “This right is
guaranteed to Huston through the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
Petitioner’s Memorandum at 12.
In their Brief, however, the respondents take issue with Huston’s bald assertion.
The respondents argue, “Ineffective assistance of counsel in civil commitment hearings
is not a clearly established right under any decision of the United States Supreme Court.”
Respondent’s Brief at 14. The respondents acknowledge that, if presented with the
question in the future, the United States Supreme Court might well conclude that the
Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel extends to individuals facing civil
commitment—and this court and many other courts might believe that to be true.
Nevertheless, they argue, only the United States Supreme Court can “clearly establish”
such a right for purposes of § 2254 relief. The respondents also point out that the explicit
language of the Sixth Amendment states that the right to counsel applies to “criminal
prosecutions.” The respondents assert that, in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), the
United States Supreme Court declined to find a right to counsel, guaranteed by the due
process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, in non-criminal involuntary
commitment proceedings.
At the telephonic oral arguments before Judge O’Brien, Huston’s counsel argued
that In re Detention of Crane is “dispositive” on this issue, because the Iowa Supreme
Court held that individuals in civil commitment proceedings are entitled to effective
assistance of counsel defined by the standards in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). Huston amplified counsel’s argument by asserting that he has a federal due
process right to effective assistance of counsel, where counsel is required in civil
commitment proceedings as a matter of state law. The respondents reiterated that, while
a court considering the issue might well conclude that there is a right to counsel in civil
16
commitment proceedings, there is no such right “clearly defined” by the United States
Supreme Court.
b.
Analysis
Contrary to habeas counsel’s argument, In re Detention of Crane, 704 N.W.2d
437 (Iowa 2005), is a long way from “dispositive” of this issue, for three independent
reasons. First and foremost, In re Detention of Crane is a state supreme court decision,
but § 2254(d)(1) makes clear that a § 2254 petitioner must demonstrate that “the
adjudication of the claim . . . (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). Neither
Huston nor his habeas counsel has cited me any United States Supreme Court decision
clearly establishing a federal constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in civil
commitment proceedings.
Second, in In re Detention of Crane, the Iowa Supreme Court did not, in fact,
hold that there was a federal constitutional right to effective assistance in civil
commitment proceedings pursuant to IOWA CODE Ch. 229A. Rather, the court explained,
As a threshold matter, we note that in this appeal the
State concedes that respondents in chapter 229A proceedings
have the right to effective assistance of counsel. Both parties
therefore analyze Crane’s first claim according to ordinary
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel jurisprudence. For this
reason, we do the same.
In re Det. of Crane, 704 N.W.2d at 438-39 (footnote omitted). The Iowa Supreme Court
explained, further, in a footnote,
The State makes this concession notwithstanding the
fact that chapter 229A proceedings are civil and not criminal
in nature, and therefore the Sixth Amendment is not directly
implicated. The State posits that because a respondent in a
17
chapter 229A proceeding has a statutory right to counsel, see
Iowa Code § 229A.6(1), due process demands the appointed
counsel provide effective assistance. This appears to be
consistent with precedent. See In re D.W., 385 N.W.2d 570,
579 (Iowa 1986) (applying similar reasoning in termination of
parental rights cases); Patchette v. State, 374 N.W.2d 397,
398-99 (Iowa 1985) (postconviction proceedings).
In re Det. of Crane, 704 N.W.2d at 438 n.3. Plainly, adhering to a party’s concession
is not an independent determination of the issue by the court. Furthermore, noting the
reference to “due process” in a party’s “concession” is plainly not a determination that
“due process” applies or that the “due process” in question is based in the United States
Constitution, rather than Iowa law.
Finally, the Iowa Supreme Court’s determination that a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel in civil commitment proceedings must be proved according to the
standards stated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984),4 is not a
determination that the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel at issue in Strickland
also applies. It is only a determination of the standards for proof for a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, where IOWA CODE CH. 229A provides a right to counsel.
4
The pertinent part of the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in In re Detention of
Crane is as follows:
To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim, a defendant must prove (1) trial counsel failed to
perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. State v.
Stallings, 658 N.W.2d 106, 108-09 (Iowa 2003) (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984)). Failure to prove
either element is fatal to the claim. See State v. Dalton, 674
N.W.2d 111, 119 (Iowa 2004).
In re Det. of Crane, 704 N.W.2d at 439.
18
As to this issue, Huston’s pro se argument that the right to effective assistance of
counsel is a matter of federal due process, where the right to counsel arises from state
law, has more initial traction than his habeas counsel’s arguments. This is so, not because
In re Detention of Crane expressly refers to a “due process” right to effective counsel in
such proceedings (at least under IOWA CODE CH. 229A), but because the United States
Supreme Court has observed that “[o]ur case law originally derived that right [to effective
assistance of counsel] from the Due Process Clause, and its guarantee of a fair trial.”
Lafler, ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1392 (citing United States v. Gonzalez–Lopez, 548
U.S. 140, 147 (2006)). As the Court explained, however, “[T]he seminal case of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), located
the right within the Sixth Amendment.” Id. As the respondents point out, the Sixth
Amendment defines the right “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence” as
pertaining to “all criminal prosecutions,” U.S. CONST., Amend VI, not to all proceedings
involving possible deprivation of “life, liberty, or property.” See U.S. CONST., Amend
V, Amend. XIV.
Even that is not the end of the matter, however. As the United States Supreme
Court has also recognized (in a case cited by respondents for other reasons), “We have
repeatedly held that state statutes may create liberty interests that are entitled to the
procedural protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Vitek
v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980). The Court also reiterated,
We have recognized that for the ordinary citizen, commitment
to a mental hospital produces “a massive curtailment of
liberty,” Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509, 92 S.Ct.
1048, 1052, 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972), and in consequence
“requires due process protection.” Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 425, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1809, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979);
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580, 95 S.Ct. 2486,
2496, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975) (BURGER, C. J., concurring).
19
Vitek, 445 U.S. at 492. Ultimately, however, a majority of the Court concluded that
even a person suffering from a mental disease or defect requiring involuntary commitment
was not entitled to “a licensed attorney,” but only to “competent help” at the commitment
hearing. Id. at 497 (although four justices would have held that “such a prisoner is more
likely to be unable to understand or exercise his rights,” so that “it is appropriate that
counsel be provided to indigent prisoners whom the State seeks to treat as mentally ill,”
the holding of the Court was limited by Justice Powell’s conclusion, in a separate
concurring opinion, that such a person was only “entitled to competent help at the
hearing,” but not to “a licensed attorney to aid him”). The United States Supreme Court
has never overruled Vitek or expressly held that a person facing civil commitment is
entitled to effective assistance of counsel in the commitment proceedings.
Thus, Huston’s claims premised on a right to effective assistance of counsel in
civil commitment proceedings are subject to dismissal, because there is no “clearly
established” federal law requiring effective assistance of counsel in these circumstances,
as required for relief pursuant to § 2254(d)(1). Notwithstanding this conclusion, I will
also consider, in the alternative, whether Huston’s claims of ineffective assistance of civil
commitment counsel would have merit, if there were a federal right to effective assistance
of counsel in such proceedings.
2.
Counsel’s failure to preserve speedy trial rights
One of the “ineffective assistance” claims argued by Huston’s habeas counsel is
that Huston’s civil commitment counsel was ineffective in failing to preserve Huston’s
speedy trial rights before his second civil commitment trial. The respondents argue that,
assuming that there is a federally protected right at issue, this claim is without merit.
a.
Arguments of the parties
Huston argues that, pursuant to IOWA CODE § 229A.7(3), a person subject to civil
commitment proceedings has a right to a hearing within 90 days of the determination of
20
probable cause, and that the failure to meet this “speedy trial” requirement dictates
dismissal, unless there is a waiver or good cause not attributable to the person. He also
argues that, after a successful appeal, speedy trial rights begin again from the date of the
procedendo. He contends that his waiver, filed in 2008, while his first civil commitment
verdict was on appeal and during a “limited” remand, was ineffective as to his new trial
in 2009, because the “clock” had started over with the issuance of procedendo by the
Iowa Supreme Court affirming the grant of a new trial and because the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to set a new trial prior to the issuance of procedendo.
The respondents argue that the “speedy trial” right at issue was a matter of state
statutory law, not a federal right. The respondents also argue that the Iowa Supreme
Court was not unreasonable in its conclusion that Huston’s civil commitment counsel did
not perform ineffectively in failing to preserve Huston’s state statutory “speedy trial”
right. The respondents point out that the Iowa Supreme Court confronted and rejected
the arguments that Huston now makes, holding that Huston’s waiver was effective as to
his new trial after appeal and that the trial court had jurisdiction to set Huston’s new trial
during the “limited” remand.
At the telephonic oral arguments, Huston’s habeas counsel expanded his argument
by asserting that apparently contrary positions of Huston’s civil commitment counsel—
opposing a stay of proceedings, but seeking a waiver of “speedy trial” rights—cast doubt
on whether Huston ever really wanted to waive a speedy trial.
b.
Analysis
It does not appear that Huston ever claimed before the state courts that his waiver
of a speedy civil commitment trial was “involuntary” or that his civil commitment counsel
was ineffective in somehow “coercing” him into waiving his speedy trial rights. Thus,
such a claim—offered for the first time at oral arguments before this court—is
procedurally defaulted, Huston has not attempted to show “cause and prejudice” to
21
excuse such a default, and the claim, thus, cannot provide a basis for relief. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (a § 2254 claim cannot be granted unless “the applicant has
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State”); Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181
(“Sections 2254(b) and (c) provide that a federal court may not grant such applications
unless, with certain exceptions, the applicant has exhausted state remedies.”).
The Iowa Supreme Court did hear and reject Huston’s claim that his civil
commitment counsel was ineffective in otherwise failing to preserve his speedy trial
rights. Specifically, the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that the district court had acted
within the scope of the “limited” remand, because “the district court ruled on the issue
for which the case was remanded and did not, by setting a new trial date, do anything to
jeopardize the appeal still pending.” In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d at 316-17. Indeed,
the Iowa Supreme Court concluded, where the district court knew that the parties were
required to report back to the Iowa Supreme Court on the district court’s ruling, “the
district court was well aware that the trial date could be stayed after the supreme court
decided what to do with the information gained from the parties’ status reports.” Id. at
317. The Iowa Supreme Court also concluded that the district court retained jurisdiction
over matters “collateral” to the appeal, that Huston’s waiver of speedy trial was one such
“collateral” matter, and that the timing of the waiver did not affect the merits of the
appeal, so that “the district court acted within its jurisdiction when it accepted [Huston’s]
waiver.” Id.
Next, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected Huston’s argument that his speedy trial
right “renewed” upon the issuance of procedendo after the appeal was completed. Id.
The Iowa Supreme Court explained,
In this case, [Huston’s] waiver executed on July 14, 2008,
clearly addressed his new trial. It was executed and filed after
the district court granted his motion for new trial. Although
the original appeal concluded and procedendo issued after
22
[Huston’s] waiver, procedendo did not restart the speedy trial
clock for the retrial because [Huston] had already waived his
challenge to its timeliness. [Huston] had the ability to revoke
his speedy trial waiver after the original appeal had
concluded. But he never exercised the ability.
In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d at 317 (emphasis in the original). Consequently, the
Iowa Supreme Court concluded that Huston’s speedy trial waiver was valid and that his
civil commitment counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to move for dismissal on
speedy trial grounds. Id.
Finally, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected Huston’s argument that his civil
commitment counsel was ineffective for allowing him to execute an “unnecessary”
speedy trial waiver, where the State had appealed the order granting a new trial. Id. The
Iowa Supreme Court concluded that Huston had failed to demonstrate that he was
prejudiced by the waiver:
In the proceedings below, all parties—the State, [Huston], and
the district court—operated under the belief that [Huston] had
waived his right to a speedy retrial. What might have
happened had the court and the parties not understood
[Huston] waived his speedy trial rights is conjecture. We
cannot speculate that the State would not have commenced the
retrial of [Huston] within ninety days had the waiver not been
executed.
In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d at 317.
Huston has reasserted the same arguments, here. What he has not done, however,
is attempt to show how the Iowa Supreme Court’s adjudication of any of those arguments
“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Johnson, ___
23
U.S. at __, 133 S. Ct. at 1091 (quoting § 2254(d) (citations and quotation marks
omitted)). Huston has not identified any United States Supreme Court decision that is
contradicted by the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision, see Lafler, ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S.
Ct. at 130, nor any United States Supreme Court decision involving a set of facts that is
materially indistinguishable to his and involving a different result, see Williams, 529 U.S.
at 406. Where the belief of a federal court that it might have reached a different decision
is not enough to afford a petitioner relief pursuant to § 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” clause,
see id., it is also clear that the petitioner’s belief that the state court should have reached
a different decision is not enough. Furthermore, I conclude that there was, indeed, a
“reasonable basis” for the state court’s disposition of Huston’s speedy trial claim, as a
matter of state law—as the Iowa Supreme Court explained—so that no relief is warranted
pursuant to § 2254(d)(1)’s “no reasonable basis” clause. Cullen, 563 U.S. at 188.
Finally, I cannot say, from my examination of the record before the state court, that I am
“compel[led] . . . to conclude that [the Iowa Supreme Court’s] critical factual
determinations [in disposing of this claim] were unreasonable,” such that Huston is
entitled to relief pursuant to § 2254(d)(2).
In short, Huston’s claim that his civil commitment counsel was ineffective in
failing to preserve his speedy trial rights is denied.
3.
Counsel’s failure to obtain a bifurcated trial
The other claim pressed by Huston’s habeas counsel is that Huston’s civil
commitment counsel was ineffective for failing to effectively seek a bifurcated trial. The
respondents contend that Huston is not entitled to any relief on this claim.
a.
Arguments of the parties
Huston argues the he was “certainly” entitled to a bifurcated trial, because it was
highly prejudicial for the same jury to hear evidence about his prior conviction for
sexually assaulting a nine-year-old girl, evidence of his prior sexually motivated conduct
24
towards corrections staff, and other misconduct while considering whether his 2005
harassment conviction was “sexually motivated.” He argues that such evidence of prior
crimes and misconduct could have improperly influenced the jurors. He relies heavily
on the dissent in Barker v. State, 877 So.2d 59 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004), as showing
why bifurcation was necessary and appropriate, as a matter of constitutional fairness and
federal due process. He also contends that the state’s expert testimony, which relied, in
part, on such evidence, should not have been admissible as to the question of the “sexual
motivation” of the 2005 harassment conviction.
He disputes that jurors could
“compartmentalize” the evidence and findings to decide this question fairly.
The respondents argue that Huston’s civil commitment counsel had argued
“prejudice” of the evidence as a basis for bifurcation before his first trial, before the
same judge, but that the judge declined to bifurcate the first trial. The respondents point
out that the judge concluded, before the second trial, that Huston could receive a fair,
non-bifurcated trial, where the judge was aware of all of the evidence in question from
hearing the first trial. The respondents also point out that civil commitment counsel did
move to bifurcate both trials, and that the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that Huston
was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to argue the “bifurcation” issue differently or
better, because the evidence on the question of whether the 2005 harassment conviction
was “sexually motivated” was overwhelming. The respondents also argue that it is likely
that the “bad acts” evidence in question was relevant and not unduly prejudicial as to the
question of whether the 2005 harassment conviction was “sexually motivated,”
particularly where Huston’s sexual motivations or propensities were relevant to the
second required finding for his civil commitment, that is, whether he was likely to commit
future sexually violent crimes.
Huston’s habeas counsel’s only additional contention at oral arguments was that
the “cursory” way in which civil commitment counsel raised the bifurcation issue before
25
the second trial, when Huston asked him to, demonstrated that civil commitment counsel
was not really “invested” in raising the issue. The respondents argued that the same
circumstances showed that civil commitment counsel knew the issue was unlikely to come
out his way, so that he was “invested” in pursuing issues with more likelihood of
benefitting Huston, as a matter of professional judgment.
b.
Analysis
The Iowa Supreme Court rejected Huston’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel as to bifurcation. The Iowa Supreme Court explained, first,
To establish [Huston] was subject to commitment under
chapter 229A, the State was required to prove two elements:
that [Huston] was convicted of or charged with a sexually
violent offense and that he suffers from a mental abnormality
making him likely to commit further sexually violent offenses
if he is not confined. See Iowa Code § 229A.2(11).
In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d at 318. The court noted, further, that, because Huston’s
“harassment” offense was not listed as a “sexually violent offense” in IOWA CODE
§ 229A.2(10)(a)-(f), the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
harassment offense was sexually motivated. Id.
More specifically, as to the ineffective assistance claim concerning bifurcation,
the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that the matter could be properly resolved on the
“prejudice” prong of an ineffectiveness claim subject to a Strickland analysis. Id. at 318.
This was so, because the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that the general principle that
counsel is not deficient for failing to raise a meritless claim is not easily distinguished
from the principle that counsel’s failure to raise a claim lacking merit will not ordinarily
be deemed prejudicial, nor could the principles be neatly separated in Huston’s case. Id.
Next, the Iowa Supreme Court agreed that some of the evidence of Huston’s “bad
acts” was not relevant to the determination of whether his harassment of S.E. was
26
“sexually motivated” and created a risk of prejudice. Id. at 321. Nevertheless, the court
concluded,
[W]hen we consider the evidence of Blaise’s interaction with
S.E.—standing alone and apart from any evidence of Blaise’s
prior conduct—we are convinced that any reasonable person
could only find Blaise’s conversation with S.E. was sexually
motivated.
In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d at 321. The court turned to analysis of the “prejudice”
prong of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel only after first carefully considering
evidence of whether or not Huston was “sexually aroused” during his conversation with
S.E.; whether such arousal or lack of it was dispositive of the “sexual motivation” of
Huston’s harassment of S.E.; the extent to which the state’s expert could properly rely
on past “bad acts” evidence; and Huston’s evidence intended to demonstrate the
“religious” nature of his discussion with S.E. See id. at 321-23. On the “prejudice”
prong, the court explained,
In this case, when we disregard the evidence of [Huston’s]
prior bad acts and consider only the remaining evidence, our
confidence in the outcome of the proceeding is not shaken.
The graphic sexual nature of the statements made by [Huston]
to S.E. is overwhelming evidence that the statements were
sexually motivated, especially considered in conjunction with
Dr. Phenix’s testimony that [Huston] was aroused by and
admittedly fantasized about nonconsensual sex. [Huston’s]
expert testimony presented to contradict the testimony of the
State’s expert on the issue of sexual motivation does not
preclude our determination that [Huston] has failed to
establish prejudice. See Kenley v. Bowersox, 275 F.3d 709,
712–14 (8th Cir.2002). Because in our view the evidence of
[Huston’s] statements to S.E.—standing alone and apart from
any other acts evidence—overwhelmingly established
[Huston’s] sexual motivation in the harassment offense, we
find no room for debate regarding whether Strickland
27
prejudice resulted from any breach of duty by counsel.
Accordingly, we conclude [Huston] was not prejudiced by his
trial counsel’s failure to adequately argue the trial should have
been bifurcated to protect [Huston’s] due process rights.
In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d at 324. The Iowa Supreme Court clarified that it did
not “wish to be understood as disapproving of bifurcation of trials under chapter 229A,”
and, indeed, relied on the dissent in Barker, on which Huston relies, as showing the
“wisdom and value of bifurcating a trial in cases requiring the state prove both mental
abnormality and sexual motivation.” Id. (citing Barker, 877 So.2d at 67 (Farmer, C.J.,
dissenting)).
Again, Huston has reasserted the same arguments, here, that he presented to the
Iowa Supreme Court. Again, he has not attempted to show how the Iowa Supreme
Court’s adjudication of any of those arguments “(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision
that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133
S. Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013) (quoting § 2254(d) (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
Huston has not identified any United States Supreme Court decision that is contradicted
by the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision, see Lafler, ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 130,
nor any United States Supreme Court decision involving a set of facts that is materially
indistinguishable to his and involving a different result, see Williams, 529 U.S. at 406.
Indeed, it is clear that United States Supreme Court (and Eighth Circuit) precedent
permits rejection of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel solely on the basis of
failure to satisfy the Strickland “prejudice” prong, as the Iowa Supreme Court did here.
Worthington v. Roper, 631 F.3d 487, 498 (8th Cir.) (citing Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 763 (2011); accord
28
Hyles v. United States, 754 F.3d 530, 533 (8th Cir. 2014) (“Failure to establish either
prong of Strickland ‘is fatal to a claim of ineffective assistance.’” (quoting Morelos v.
United States, 709 F.3d 1246, 1250 (8th Cir. 2013))).
Again, Huston’s simple
disagreement with the conclusions of the Iowa Supreme Court on this claim do not satisfy
the requirement for relief pursuant to § 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” clause, any more than
my own simple disagreement would. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 406. Furthermore, I
conclude that there was, indeed, a “reasonable basis” for the state court’s disposition of
Huston’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as to bifurcation, as effectively stated
by the Iowa Supreme Court, so that no relief is warranted pursuant to § 2254(d)(1)’s “no
reasonable basis” clause. Cullen, 563 U.S. at 188. Finally, I believe that much of the
Iowa Supreme Court’s analysis of this claim is based on either factual determinations or
mixed factual and legal conclusions. I cannot say, from my examination of the record
before the state court, that I am “compel[led] . . . to conclude that [the Iowa Supreme
Court’s] critical factual determinations [in disposing of this claim] were unreasonable,”
such that Huston is entitled to relief pursuant to § 2254(d)(2).
Huston’s claim that his civil commitment counsel was ineffective in failing to
obtain bifurcation of his second civil commitment trial is denied.
C.
Claims Pressed By Huston Pro Se
As I mentioned, above, Huston also asserts pro se claims, including a “Padilla
claim” and a claim that there was a free speech and religious aspect to his alleged
harassment crime, so that it was not “sexually motivated,” if it was a crime at all. The
respondents argue that these claims are waived or without merit.
1.
Huston’s “Padilla claim”
Huston argues that he was “in custody” pursuant to his criminal conviction into
his civil commitment for purposes of a “Padilla claim,” which is that his criminal trial
29
counsel had not advised him that civil commitment was a possible consequence of his
guilty plea to a harassment charge. As interesting as Huston’s “Padilla claim” might be,
as well as his argument that he remained “in custody” pursuant to his predicate criminal
conviction on into his civil commitment, I need not reach those issues. Huston’s habeas
counsel was correct when he advised Huston that this claim was not cognizable. This is
so, because the United States Supreme Court held in Chaidez v. United States, ___ U.S.
___, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013), that Padilla is not retroactive to cases on collateral review.
___ U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1107. The Court concluded that “Padilla . . . announced
a ‘new rule,’” id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1111, but, “[w]hen [the United States Supreme
Court] announce[s] a ‘new rule,’ a person whose conviction is already final may not
benefit from the decision in a habeas or similar proceeding.” Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at
1107. Huston’s criminal conviction was final prior to the filing of his application for
state post-conviction relief in May 2007. However, Padilla was not decided until March
31, 2010, see 559 U.S. at 356, long after Huston’s criminal conviction was already final.
Huston’s “Padilla claim” is denied.
2.
Huston’s religious claims
In his pro se Petition, Huston also asserted three claims for relief based on what
he alleges was the “religious” aspect of his encounter with S.E. Those grounds for relief
are pleaded as follows:
1.
Denial [of] freedom of Religious Expression: The
state mocked the fact my religious beliefs on
forgiveness go to the extreme that you cannot press
criminal charges on someone if you are forgiving them
of the offense/harm done to you.
The police
incorrectly interpreted my comments as a threat to rape
S.E. This was at both Criminal Hearing and Civil
Commitment proceedings. I believe Jesus (Yeshua)’s
teachings on forgiveness go to the extreme you cannot
forgive someone and press criminal charges on them
30
too. 1st Amend. USCA. Freedom of expression and
religion. I signed a statement with police to this fact
before conviction.
***
4.
Due Process of Law Through Ineffective Assistance
of Civil Commitment Counsel: . . . Counsel had an
essential duty to request testimony of a religious
expert: To testify to whether or not my comments
were religious in nature regarding Jesus[’] doctrine of
forgiveness. (That such an extreme doctrine exists is
true and would have shed new light on the alleged
crime.) The victim asked my religion and what I
believed. I told [civil commitment counsel] that we
had to give the jury proof that the part of my
conversation where the alleged crime happened, was
religious in nature. He refused, saying we didn’t have
to prove anything, that we were going on the basis I
had an obnoxious personality and conversation. This
shows he was derelict in his duty, not once but
twice. . . .
***
7.
Due Process of Law: I am denied the equal
application of the laws because I am a Messianic Jew
and believe in the extreme view of forgiveness that to
have true forgiveness, one must not press criminal
charges on someone who wronged them. Because
sending someone to prison is seeking revenge and is
condemned in the New Testament. Revenge is the
Lord’s prerogative.
Messianic Judaism and
Christianity are very similar. We both accept Yeshua
(Jesus) as the Messiah (Christ). Seeking a date and the
initial sexual questions S.E. consented to answer were
not criminal acts and when she changed the subject and
we talked about religion, I am a licensed minister: see
Blaise Vs. Nix and Emmett 4:92-CV-20101 Hon.
Celeste F. Bremer U.S. Magistrate presiding, June 7,
1993 Memorandum Opinion and Judgment. She
31
accepted the testimony that I am an ordained minister.
Testimony by prison Chaplain who was a state
employee at time of testimony.
Pro Se Petition at II. Grounds, ¶ 12, sub-¶¶ 1, 4, and 7.
a.
Arguments of the parties
Huston’s pro se contentions at oral arguments concerning these claims was as
follows:
The other thing that I was going to state was that I have stated
all along that this was a free speech and religious issue as far
as where the alleged crime come into play on the harassment
case and therefore for purposes of the civil commitment
they’re relying on my comments by themselves as sexually
motivated when religion, if you’re using [parables] to prove
forgiveness can’t be considered sexual, especially when
they’re forgiveness angle and not for intention of getting sex
or any of that because that wasn’t what was even being talked
about at the time. The first part of it wasn’t even considered
a crime which yeah, I can see that being considered sexual.
But the free speech and free religion exercise is -- that’s
tantamount [paramount (?)] all throughout the United States
that it’s been well established long before my case.
Unedited Realtime Transcript of July 7, 2015, Hearing, 48:10-24 (bracketed edits by the
court).
In their Brief, the respondents argue that these claims were abandoned or waived,
because they were not repleaded or briefed by habeas counsel. As to the merits of such
claims, if the court decides to consider them notwithstanding waiver, the respondents
assert that Huston’s argument means that the state could not enforce any criminal law
against him or members of his faith, which they argue, of course, is not correct. Rather,
the respondents argue, the state can protect its citizens from overt acts, even those
undertaken pursuant to religious principles or beliefs, if the actions pose a substantial
32
threat to public safety, peace, or order, which Huston’s acts toward S.E. did do. Thus,
the respondents argue that Huston’s civil commitment counsel did not perform deficiently
by failing to raise a meritless argument. The respondents also construe Huston’s religious
arguments as an improper collateral attack on his underlying conviction.
b.
Analysis
The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision on Huston’s civil commitment appeal gives
little indication of these “religious” claims. The first reference to a “religious” claim is
the following:
[Huston] testified that although he was initially looking for a
date with S.E., once he found out she did not “fool around on
the side” he was no longer sexually interested in her. He
characterized the rest of the conversation as a “religious”
discussion, in which the questions were meant to be parables
and stated that he did not think she would be offended by the
questions about anal sex because she was a nurse.
In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d at 323. The only other possible reference to a
“religious” claims is the Iowa Supreme Court’s disposition of Huston’s “other
arguments,” as follows: “We have also considered the arguments raised by [Huston] in
his pro se brief and find them without merit.” Id. at 325. Huston’s Pro Se Final Brief
before the Iowa Supreme Court, see State Court Documents, Appellant’s Pro Se Final
Brief (docket no. 28-11), however, is rife with contentions that Huston’s civil
commitment counsel should have presented a religious expert; that evidence of his
religious views would have undermined any finding that the “criminal” part of his
conversation with S.E. was sexually motivated; and claims that he could not be convicted
of a crime because of his “extreme” religious view of forgiveness. Thus, Huston did
attempt to present the “religious” arguments that he now makes before this federal court
to the state’s highest court, pro se, on direct appeal of his civil commitment.
33
Ordinarily, when a state appellate court affirms a lower court’s decision, in its
entirety or as to a particular claim or issue, without explanation or reasoning, a federal
court on habeas review must “look through” the silent opinion and apply AEDPA review
to the “last reasoned decision of the state courts.” Worthington v. Roper, 631 F.3d 487,
497 (8th Cir. 2011). Here, however, there is no “last reasoned decision of the state
courts,” because the intermediate appellate decision of the Iowa Court of Appeals does
not mention Huston’s “religious” arguments at all, see In re Det. of Blaise, 770 N.W.2d
852 (table op.), and the Iowa district court’s decision was simply an entry of judgment
on a jury verdict. State Court Documents, Appendix (docket no. 28-7) at 252.
Where there is no “last reasoned decision of the state courts,” other federal courts
have concluded that the federal habeas court must independently review the record to
determine whether the state court unreasonably applied federal law to the claims in
question, but the federal court must still consider whether there was a “reasonable basis”
for the state court’s disposition. See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011)
(“Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas
petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the
state court to deny relief.”); Fenenbock v. Director of Corrections for Cal., 692 F.3d
910, 919 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The state supreme court denied the state habeas petition
without explanation. We must therefore ‘independently review the record, [but] we still
defer to the state court’s ultimate decision.’” (quoting Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,
1167 (9th Cir. 2002)); Samayoa v. Ayers, 649 F.3d 919, 928 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because
the California Supreme Court denied the ineffective assistance of counsel claim without
explanation, we independently review the record to determine whether the state court
unreasonably applied Strickland.”); Brown v. Gibson, 7 F. App’x 894, 910 (10th Cir.
2001) (“On direct criminal appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals concluded,
without explanation, the evidence did not warrant a second-degree murder instruction.
34
Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude this determination is
reasonable.”).
On my “independent review,” I conclude that Huston’s “religious freedom” and
“equal protection/due process” claims, based on his religious belief that prosecuting him
or committing him, rather than forgiving him, was unconstitutional, fail as a matter of
law, under clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent. As the Supreme
Court has explained,
The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly
closed against any governmental regulation of religious
beliefs as such, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303,
60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213. Government may neither
compel affirmation of a repugnant belief, Torcaso v. Watkins,
367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 6 L.Ed.2d 982; nor penalize or
discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold
religious views abhorrent to the authorities, Fowler v. Rhode
Island, 345 U.S. 67, 73 S.Ct. 526, 97 L.Ed. 828; nor employ
the taxing power to inhibit the dissemination of particular
religious views, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63
S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292; Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S.
573, 64 S.Ct. 717, 88 L.Ed. 938; cf. Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660. On
the other hand, the Court has rejected challenges under the
Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain
overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for
‘even when the action is in accord with one’s religious
convictions, (it) is not totally free from legislative
restrictions.’ Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603, 81
S.Ct. 1144, 1146, 6 L.Ed.2d 563. The conduct or actions so
regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to
public safety, peace or order. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244; Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643;
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88
35
L.Ed. 645; Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 67 S.Ct.
13, 91 L.Ed. 12.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963) (emphasis added). Thus, there was
nothing “contrary to law” or “unreasonable,” as a matter of United States Supreme Court
precedent, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2), about the Iowa Supreme Court’s implicit
conclusion that Huston could be civilly committed for sexually-motivated harassment,
even if Huston believed that committing him, rather than forgiving him, was contrary to
his religious beliefs or principles. His sexually-motivated harassing conduct, without a
doubt, posed a substantial threat to public safety, peace, and order. Sherbert, 374 U.S.
at 403. There is not one whit of evidence in the record that Huston was civilly committed
by the state in order to penalize or discriminate against him or Messianic Jews as a group
because they hold religious views supposedly abhorrent to the authorities. Id. at 402.
The Iowa Supreme Court’s implicit conclusion that Huston’s civil commitment
counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to present a religious
expert also is not “contrary to law” or “unreasonable,” as a matter of United States
Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). As explained, above,
the Iowa Supreme Court expressly concluded that Huston could not satisfy the
“prejudice” prong of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as to bifurcation,
because the evidence of the sexual motivation of Huston’s conduct toward S.E. was
“overwhelming.” See In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d at 324 (quoted, in pertinent part,
above, a page 27). The Iowa Supreme Court also expressly noted that Huston was
allowed to present to the jury his argument that his conversation with S.E. was religiously
motivated, rather than sexually motivated. Id. at 323. Nothing but speculation suggests
that, had Huston’s civil commitment counsel called a “religious expert,” doing so would
have somehow overcome the “overwhelming” evidence of sexual motivation for his
harassing conduct and convinced the jury or the state courts that his harassing conduct
36
was not sexually motivated. Because my independent review leads me to the conclusion
that failing to call a “religious expert” was not prejudicial, the Iowa Supreme Court’s
implicit conclusion that civil commitment counsel was not ineffective in failing to do so
was not “contrary to law” or “unreasonable.” See, e.g., Worthington, 631 F.3d at 498
(United States Supreme Court precedent permits rejection of a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel solely on the basis of failure to satisfy the Strickland “prejudice”
prong (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984); accord Hyles, 754
F.3d at 533 (“Failure to establish either prong of Strickland ‘is fatal to a claim of
ineffective assistance.’” (quoting Morelos, 709 F.3d at 1250)).
Huston’s “religious” claims for habeas relief are denied.
D.
Other Claims
To the extent that Huston has or has attempted to assert additional claims for
§ 2254 relief, either through counsel or pro se, I conclude that those claims are waived,
because they were not expressly argued, and, if not waived, are without merit. Thus,
any such claims are denied.
E.
Certificate Of Appealability
Denial of Huston’s claims for § 2254 relief requires me to consider whether or not
Huston should be issued a certificate of appealability on any of those claims. See 28
U.S.C. § 2253. Huston must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right in order to be granted a certificate of appealability. See Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322 (2003); Garrett v. United States, 211 F.3d 1075, 1076–77 (8th Cir. 2000);
Mills v. Norris, 187 F.3d 881, 882 n.1 (8th Cir. 1999); Carter v. Hopkins, 151 F.3d
872, 873–74 (8th Cir. 1998); Ramsey v. Bowersox, 149 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 1998); Cox
v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir.1997). “A substantial showing is a showing that
37
issues are debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently,
or the issues deserve further proceedings.” Cox, 133 F.3d at 569. Moreover, the United
States Supreme Court reiterated in Miller–El v. Cockrell that “‘[w]here a district court
has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy
§ 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong.’” 537 U.S. at 338 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). I
conclude that Huston failed to make a substantial showing that any issue or claim raised
in his § 2254 Petition, whether pro se or by habeas counsel, is debatable among
reasonable jurists, that a court could resolve any issue differently, or that any question
deserves further proceedings. Consequently, a certificate of appealability is denied. See
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 335-36; Cox, 133 F.3d at 569.
III.
CONCLUSION
Upon the foregoing, all claims in Huston’s June 28, 2013 pro se Petition For Writ
Of Habeas Corpus (filed at the court’s direction on October 24, 2013, as docket no. 5),
and his May 19, 2014 Amended Petition For Writ Of Habe[a]s Corpus (docket no. 22),
are denied in their entirety. No certificate of appealability shall issue from this court in
this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 11th day of January, 2016.
______________________________________
MARK W. BENNETT
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
38
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?