Daniels v. City of Sioux City et al
Filing
23
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order granting 14 Motion to Dismiss and the claims against Defendant Sioux City Community School District are dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Signed by Judge Mark W Bennett on 11/08/2013. (des)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
DaCOSTA DANIELS, individually, and
DaCOSTA DANIELS as mother,
guardian, and next friend of Y.A., a
minor child,
No. C 13-4068-MWB
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE CITY OF SIOUX CITY, JOSHUA
TYLER, individually and in his official
capacity as a police officer for the City of
Sioux City, and THE SIOUX CITY
COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER REGARDING THE
DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendants.
___________________________
This case involves federal constitutional claims, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging use of “excessive force” before and during the plaintiff’s arrest, against the
city police officer who arrested her and the city that employed him, and a state law
claim for assault against the city police officer. It also involves state law claims against
the city and a school district for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress
on the plaintiff’s daughter, arising from a separate incident, months later, in which a
different city employee and a school district employee showed a video of the plaintiff’s
arrest to the plaintiff’s daughter’s middle school class. This case is now before me on
the school district’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
More specifically, in a Complaint (docket no. 2), filed July 29, 2013, plaintiff
DaCosta Daniels alleges that, on or about August 8, 2011, defendant City Police
Officer Joshua Tyler directed another city police officer to approach a stopped vehicle
in which Daniels was located on suspicion that the person driving the vehicle did not
have a valid driver’s license.
Daniels alleges that Officer Tyler then approached
Daniels and “began to harass her regarding who was driving the vehicle and where that
person was.” Complaint at ¶ 12. Daniels alleges that she was placed in front of a
police vehicle in sight of a dashboard camera, which recorded relevant events; that
Officer Tyler did not want her to use her phone, even though she was not under arrest;
that when she attempted to use her phone, Officer Tyler “attacked, grabbed, shoved,
and punched Daniels,” causing various injuries; and that she was then handcuffed and
arrested. Based on these allegations, Daniels asserts, in Count I of her Complaint, that
Officer Tyler’s actions constituted an “assault”; in Count II, a claim pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, that Officer Tyler’s actions constituted use of unconstitutional
“excessive force” against her before and in the course of her arrest; and, in Count III,
another claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the City of Sioux City is subject to
“Monell liability” for Officer Tyler’s actions based on a custom and policy of deliberate
indifference to the rights of citizens.
In her Complaint, Daniels repleads all of the preceding paragraphs, then asserts,
in Count IV, a claim of “intentional infliction of emotional distress” on her minor
daughter, Y.A., and, in Count V, a claim of “negligent infliction of emotional distress”
on Y.A. These claims are based on additional factual allegations that, on or about
February 23, 2012, during class time, a City employee, Mr. Aesoph, and a Sioux City
School District employee, teacher Michael Newburn, showed Y.A. and the rest of her
class at West Middle School in Sioux City, Iowa, a video of her mother being
“brutalized” by Officer Tyler.
defendants in this action.
Mr. Aesoph and Mr. Newburn are not named as
Rather, the City and the Sioux City Community School
2
District are named as the defendants, and their liability is premised on wrongful acts of
their employees committed while acting within the scope of their employment.1
On August 20, 2013, the City and Officer Tyler filed a joint Answer (docket no.
12), denying the claims against them and asserting various affirmative defenses. Also
on August 20, 2013, the School District filed a Motion To Dismiss (docket no. 14),
asserting lack of supplemental subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a) over the state law claims against it in Counts IV, V, and VI, which the
School District argued were the only claims against it. More specifically, the School
District argues that the state law claims against it do not form part of the same case or
controversy as the federal claims upon which this court’s original jurisdiction is
premised, because the state law claims against it are entirely different in nature and
kind than the federal claims against the City and Officer Tyler. Specifically, the School
District argues that the claims against the City and Officer Tyler are based on Officer
Tyler’s conduct toward Y.A.’s mother, while the claims against it are based on the
showing of a video to Y.A.’s class, by a different City employee and a School District
employee, on a separate occasion. The School District argues that the facts necessary
to prove the claims against it have nothing to do with the facts necessary to prove the
claims against the City and Officer Tyler and that the legal issues among the claims are
entirely distinct. In short, the School District argues that resolution of the federal
claims would have no impact on the resolution of the state law claims against it, or vice
versa.
1
In Count VI of her Complaint, Daniels seeks punitive damages on her claims.
3
In her Resistance (docket no. 18), filed September 6, 2013, Daniels admits that
the only claims against the School District are the state law claims in Counts IV, V, and
VI, but she argues that supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to § 1367(a) over those
claims is proper.
Daniels contends that establishing Y.A.’s claims will include an
intensive, fact-specific analysis of the allegedly outrageous conduct on the part of the
School District, which she argues depends, in part, on whether or not Officer Tyler
used “excessive force” on or assaulted Daniels. Thus, she argues that Officer Tyler’s
acts constitute the common operative facts between her federal claims against Officer
Tyler and the City and Y.A.’s state law claims against the School District. She also
argues that all of the claims in her Complaint would normally be expected to be tried in
one judicial proceeding, because her claims would have required the joinder of the
School District to afford her full relief. Finally, she argues that fairness, practical
considerations, and judicial economy will also be served by trying all of the claims in a
single case.
On September 12, 2013, the School District filed a Reply (docket no. 20) in
further support of its motion. In its Reply, the School District reiterates its contention
that there is no common nucleus of operative fact between Daniels’s federal claims and
Y.A.’s state law claims. The School District argues that nothing about Y.A.’s claims
of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress depends upon whether or not
Officer Tyler used “excessive force” against Daniels—and Officer Tyler is not even
named as a defendant on Y.A.’s state law claims. Indeed, the School District points
out that Daniels has conceded that, even should Daniels lose her claims against Officer
Tyler and the City, Y.A.’s claims could still proceed to a jury, because a jury could
still find that the School District acted in reckless disregard of the probability of
emotional distress to Y.A. from showing the video of her mother’s arrest.
4
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a pre-answer
motion to dismiss for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
How the court examines the pleadings and the facts on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to
dismiss depends upon whether the movant’s challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is
“facial” or “factual”:
On a facial attack, the court must accept all factual
allegations in the pleadings as true and view them in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Hastings v.
Wilson, 516 F.3d 1055, 1058 (8th Cir.2008); see also
United States v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569
F.3d 829, 834 (8th Cir.2009) (when a party seeks to dismiss
a suit for lack of standing, the court “‘must accept as true all
material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the
complaint in favor of the complaining party,’” quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45
L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). On the other hand, when jurisdictional
facts are in dispute, “[t]rial courts have ‘wide discretion to
allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary
hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts under Rule
12(b)(1).’” Johnson v. United States, 534 F.3d 958, 964
(8th Cir.2008) (quoting Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000,
1003 (10th Cir.1995)); see also Precision Press, Inc. v.
MLP U.S.A., Inc., 620 F.Supp.2d 981, 986–88 (N.D.Iowa
2009) (discussing, in detail, the differences between a facial
and a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction). As
this court has also noted, the proper course for a factual
challenge is for the defendant to request an evidentiary
hearing on the jurisdictional issue, so that the court can
determine the matter, not simply rule on whether there is or
is not enough evidence to have a trial on the issue. Precision
Press, 620 F.Supp.2d at 988 (citing Osborn v. United
States, 918 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir.1990)).
Farm-to-Consumer Legal Defense Fund v. Sebelius, 734 F. Supp. 2d 688, 683 (N.D.
Iowa 2010).
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Here, the parties have not looked outside of the pleadings for support for their
positions, but only argued whether, as a matter of law, there is a factual relationship
between the federal and state law claims as required to support § 1367(a) supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims against the School District. Furthermore, the
parties have not submitted any materials in support of the Motion To Dismiss or the
resistance to it outside of the pleadings, nor has the School District requested an
evidentiary hearing on the question of subject matter jurisdiction.2 Therefore, I will
treat the School District’s challenge to subject matter jurisdiction as a “facial”
challenge. See id.
Turning to the requirements for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
pursuant to § 1367(a), that statute provides, with exceptions not relevant here,
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims
in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the
United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction
shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention
of additional parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis added). As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has
explained,
“Claims within the action are part of the same case or
controversy if they ‘derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact.’” Myers v. Richland County, 429 F.3d 740,
2
The School District did request oral arguments on its Motion To Dismiss. My
crowded schedule has not permitted the timely scheduling of oral arguments, however,
and I find the parties’ written submissions to be adequate to resolve the issue.
Therefore, the School District’s Motion To Dismiss is deemed fully submitted on the
written submissions.
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746 (8th Cir.2005), quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).
A plaintiff’s claims derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact if the “claims are such that he would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130.
Having original jurisdiction over [a plaintiff’s action], the
district court ha[s]d supplemental jurisdiction over [the
plaintiff’s] claims against [another defendant] (regardless of
their eventual merit), as the claims against all defendants
arose from the same facts. See Northwestern Ohio Adm'rs,
Inc. v. Walcher & Fox, Inc., 270 F.3d 1018, 1026 (6th
Cir.2001); Brazinski, 6 F.3d at 1181–82. Once original
jurisdiction exists, supplemental jurisdiction over all related
claims is mandatory, absent certain statutory exceptions. See
Southern Council of Indus. Workers v. Ford, 83 F.3d 966,
968 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam); McLaurin v. Prater, 30
F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir.1994).
ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 645 F.3d 954, 963-64 (8th
Cir. 2011); and compare McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 984 (8th Cir. 2009)
(describing the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction as a matter of discretion, even
where the federal and state law claims derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact).
In ABF Freight System, the court held that the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims was proper, where all of the plaintiff’s claims,
including both federal claims under the Labor Management Relations Act and state law
claims, were based on violations of a collective bargaining agreement, so that all arose
from the same operative facts. Id. at 964. Similarly, in OnePoint Solutions, L.L.C., v.
Borchert, 486 F.3d 342 (8th Cir. 2007), the court held that all of the plaintiff’s state
law claims—conversion, tortious interference with contract, money had and received,
breach of fiduciary duty, civil theft under Minnesota Statute §§ 604.14, 609.52, and
609.53, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy—related to the same transactions in
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which the defendants authorized payments to themselves from company funds after
removal from their positions, so that all arose from the same operative facts as the state
statutory claim, the only one that met the amount-in-controversy requirement for the
federal court’s original diversity jurisdiction, and that these claims would ordinarily be
expected to be tried together. 486 F.3d at 350.
Here, an arrestee’s federal claim of “excessive force,” in violation of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments, has the following four elements: (1) the defendant used
force against the plaintiff; (2) the force used was excessive because it was not
reasonably necessary to stop the plaintiff, to arrest the plaintiff, or to take the plaintiff
into custody; (3) as a direct result, the plaintiff was injured; and (4) the defendant was
acting under color of state law. See, e.g., Bady v. Murphy-Kjos, 628 F.3d 1000, 100304 (8th Cir. 2011) (approving use of Eighth Circuit Model Civil Jury Instruction (now
4.10)); Eighth Circuit Model Civil Jury Instruction 4.10.
The tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, under Iowa law, requires proof of the following four
elements: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendants; (2) the defendants’ intentionally
causing or recklessly disregarding of the probability of causing emotional distress;
(3) severe or extreme emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff; and (4) actual and
proximate causation of emotional distress by the defendants’ outrageous conduct. See
Van Baale v. City of Des Moines, 550 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Iowa 1996).3 It seems plain
3
I have considerable doubt that a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress will lie outside of the context of bystander distress claims and
medical malpractice claims. See Doe v. Cherwitz, 518 N.W.2d 362, 365 (Iowa 1994);
and compare Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 107-08 (Iowa 1981); Oswald v.
LeGrand, 453 N.W.2d 634, 639-40 (Iowa 1990); see generally Millington v. Kuba, 532
N.W.2d 787, 793 (Iowa 1995).
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that there is no “common nucleus of operative fact” between such claims, where the
claims are based on the conduct of different actors, directed at different victims, in
different incidents several months apart. Furthermore, as the elements of the offense
indicate, nothing about the “outrageousness” of the School District’s employee’s
conduct in showing the video to Y.A.’s middle school class turns, factually or legally,
on whether or not Officer Tyler’s conduct toward Daniels in the incident months earlier
was “outrageous” or involved “excessive force.” Compare ABF Freight, 645 F.3d at
964 (holding that claims, all of which involved violation of a collective bargaining
agreement, arose from a common nucleus of operative fact, so that the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims was proper); OnePoint Solutions,
L.L.C., 486 F.3d at 350 (holding that supplemental jurisdiction was proper over claims
that were not within the federal court’s original diversity jurisdiction, because all arose
from the same incident in which the same defendants authorized payments to
themselves from company funds after their dismissal).
Nor am I convinced that Y.A.’s claims of “infliction of emotion distress” against
the School District (and a City employee) would ordinarily be expected to be tried in
the same proceeding as Daniels’s claim of “excessive force” against Officer Tyler and
the City. See OnePoint Solutions, 486 F.3d at 350. As the School District points out,
Officer Tyler is not a defendant on Y.A.’s “infliction of emotional distress” claims, and
those claims arise from the conduct of different individuals, Mr. Aesoph and
Mr. Newburn, in a different incident, even if the City may be liable for Mr. Aesoph’s
misconduct, as well as Officer Tyler’s, albeit on different theories.
Daniels appears to argue that the School District is a necessary party on an
“infliction of emotional distress” claim arising from the incident involving the showing
of the video to Y.A.’s class, because she cannot be afforded complete relief otherwise,
if the only defendant on that claim is the City, but the misconduct of a School District
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employee was also involved.
Section 1367(a) does recognize that “supplemental
jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional
parties.” This argument is a red herring here, however, because it is doubtful that the
“infliction of emotional distress” claims against the City are properly within this court’s
supplemental jurisdiction, either, where the City’s liability on the “infliction of
emotional distress” claims is based on different conduct of different employees in
different incidents and different legal theories than it is on the “excessive force” claim.
I conclude that this court does not have supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a) over the plaintiffs’ “infliction of emotional distress” claims, the only
claims asserted against the School District.
THEREFORE, the School District’s August 20, 2013, Motion To Dismiss
(docket no. 14) is granted, and the claims against the School District are dismissed
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 8th day of November, 2013.
______________________________________
MARK W. BENNETT
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
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