Schuman et al v. Smith et al
Filing
2
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER granting 1 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis filed by Denny Propp, Ron Miller, Andrew M Clark, Daniel Roe, Stewart Schuman, Johnny Selby, Charles A Echols, Kevin R Stevenson, Harold Johnson. The Clerk of Cou rt is directed to file the Plaintiffs' Complaint. The Court is persuaded that the Complaint must be dismissed. The Clerk of Court shall send a copy of this Order to Assistant Iowa Attorney General Gretchen Kraemer. Signed by Senior Judge Donald E OBrien on 5/30/14. (copy w/nef and appeal packet mailed to pro se plaintiffs and Gretchen Kraemer) (djs)
N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
STEWART SCHUMAN, ANDREW M.
CLARK, HAROLD JOHNSON,
CHARLES A. ECHOLS, RON
MILLER, KEVIN R. STEVENSON,
DENNY PROPP, JOHNNY SELBY,
AND DANIEL ROE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
No. 14-CV-4030-DEO
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
CHARLES PALMER, JASON SMITH,
MARY BENSON, CCUSO
ADMINISTRATION, DHS
ADMINISTRATION, STATE OF
IOWA, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES, AND CCUSO MEDICAL
STAFF
Defendants.
____________________
I.
INTRODUCTION
This matter is currently before the Court on Stewart
Schuman’s [hereinafter Mr. Schuman] 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
Complaint, Docket No. 1, Att. 2.1
Also before the Court is
Mr. Schuman’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Paueris, Docket No.
1
As will be discussed more below, the Complaint names
of a variety of other Plaintiffs. However, this is clearly
Mr. Schuman’s Complaint and for clarity’s sake the Court will
refer to it as such.
1,
Att.
1.2
The
Plaintiffs
are
involuntarily
committed
patients at the Civil Commitment Unit for Sex Offenders
(CCUSO) in Cherokee, Iowa.3
II.
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
The filing fee for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 petition is $350.
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The doctrine of in forma pauperis allows
a plaintiff to proceed without incurring filing fees or other
Court costs.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
Prisoners must meet
certain requirements in order to have their filing fee waived.
28 U.S.C. 1915(a)-(b).
A prisoner is defined as “any person
incarcerated or detained in any facility” for “violations of
criminal law . . . .”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(h).
Under the
statute, prisoners are required to pay filing fees over time
and are not entitled to proceed in forma pauperis as to filing
2
Mr. Schuman previously filed an application to proceed
in forma pauperis in case 14-CV-4024-DEO. However, in that
case, Mr. Schuman did not attach a Complaint to his Motion.
Accordingly, that case was dismissed.
See 14-CV-4024-DEO,
Docket No. 2.
3
The patients at CCUSO “have served their prison terms
but in a separate civil trial have been found likely to commit
further violent sexual offenses.”
Iowa Department of Human
Services Offer #401-HHS-014: CCUSO,
http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/docs/11w-401-HHS-014-CCUSO.pdf,
last visited May 28, 2014.
2
fees.
Id.
“provides
However, CCUSO is not a prison facility; it
a
secure,
long
term,
and
highly
structured
environment for the treatment of sexually violent predators.”4
Moreover, the Iowa Code specifies that the types of persons
confined
at
CCUSO
are
not
prisoners.
They
are
civilly
committed patients who suffer from a “mental abnormality.”
I.C.A. § 229A (generally); I.C.A. § 229A.2(11).
Accordingly,
individuals held due to civil commitment under I.C.A. § 229A
are not prisoners and are not subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(b).
See Kolocotronis v. Morgan, 247 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir.
2001), stating that those committed to state hospitals are not
prisoners as defined under 28 U.S.C. § 1915; Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982), stating that individuals
who
are
involuntarily
considerate
treatment
committed
than
“are
criminals
entitled
whose
to
more
conditions
of
confinement are designed to punish;” and Michau v. Charleston
County, S.C., 434 F.3d 725 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied
Michau v. Charleston County, S.C., 126 S. Ct. 2936 (2006),
stating that:
Iowa Department of Human Services Offer #401-HHS-014:
CCUSO,
http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/docs/11w-401-HHS-014CCUSO.pdf, last visited May 28, 2014.
4
3
[h]owever, [plaintiff] is presently being
detained under the SVPA, which creates a
system of civil, not criminal, detention.
... see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346,
365-69
(1997)
(concluding
that
Kansas's Sexually Violent Predators Act
established civil rather than criminal
detention scheme).5 Because [plaintiff’s]
detention under the SVPA is not the result
of a violation of criminal law, or of the
terms of parole, probation, or a pretrial
diversionary program, he does not meet the
PLRA's definition of [a prisoner].6
See
... Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1139-40
(9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that a person
detained under state's civil sexually
violent predator act is not a prisoner
within meaning of PLRA). Accordingly, the
PLRA provides no basis for the dismissal of
[plaintiff’s] complaints.
Id. at 727-28.
(Some internal citations omitted.)
In order to qualify for in forma pauperis status, a
plaintiff must provide this Court an affidavit with the
following statements:
(1) statement of the nature of the
action, (2) statement that plaintiff is entitled to redress,
(3) statement of the assets plaintiff possesses, and (4)
statement that plaintiff is unable to pay filing fees and
5
6
SVPA stands for Sexually Violent Predator Act.
PLRA stands for Prison Litigation Reform Act.
4
court
costs
or
give
security
therefor.7
8
28
U.S.C.
§
1915(a)(1).
Mr. Schuman has now filed an affidavit that substantially
complies
with
the
above
rules.
Docket
No.
1,
Att.
1.
Accordingly, the Clerk of Court shall file Mr. Schuman’s
Complaint.
No filing fee will be assessed.
However, once any portion of a filing fee is waived, a
court must dismiss the case if a Plaintiff’s allegations of
poverty prove untrue or the action in question turns out to be
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
III.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 INITIAL REVIEW STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled
to
relief.”
Pro
se
complaints,
no
matter
how
“inartfully pleaded are held to less stringent standards than
7
An affidavit is a “voluntary declaration of facts
written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer
authorized to administer oaths.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th
ed. 2009), affidavit.
8
Entitled to redress means that the plaintiff is
entitled to relief or is entitled to a judgment in his or her
favor.
5
formal pleadings as drafted by a lawyer.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449
U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal citations omitted).
Although it is a long-standing maxim that a complaint’s
factual allegations are to be accepted as true at the early
stages of a proceeding, this does not require that a court
must entertain any complaint no matter how implausible.
The
facts pled “must [still] be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level . . . .”
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
In other words, the claim
to relief must be “plausible on its face.”
Id. at 570.
A
claim is only plausible if a plaintiff pleads “factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
Where the complaint
does “not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it
has not ‘show[n]’ - that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 1950 (citing Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2)).
In
addition, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of
the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions.”
Id. at 1949.
6
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States
or
other
person
within
the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
IV.
ISSUE
Mr. Schuman argues that the above named Defendants have
refused to take care of a rash on his leg.9
V.
ANALYSIS
A.
Mr.
Proper Defendants
Schuman
Administration,
has
CCUSO
named
the
State
Administration,
of
Iowa
Iowa,
Iowa
Department
DHS
of
Social Services, and CCUSO Medical Staff as a Defendants in
9
In his Complaint, Mr. Schuman raises additional issues
that are the subjects of other lawsuits before this Court,
such as the ability of CCUSO patients to get dentures or the
feeling among CCUSO patients that Mary Benson is an inadequate
medical provider. (See, for example, Mead v. Palmer et al.,
13-CV-4017-DEO, which discusses the issue of dentures at
CCUSO.) However, Mr. Schuman has no personal nexus to those
issues or lawsuits and cannot raise those issues on behalf of
other patients.
7
his Complaint.
Those entities are not individuals, rather,
they are groups of state actors or government organizations.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 specifically provides for a federal cause of
action against a "person" who, under color of state law,
violates another's federal rights.
In Will v. Michigan Dept.
of State Police, the Supreme Court ruled "that a State is not
a person within the meaning of § 1983."
(1989).
491 U.S. 58, 63
Therefore, Mr. Schuman’s § 1983 Complaint cannot
proceed against the State of Iowa, Iowa DHS Administration,
CCUSO Administration, Iowa Department of Social Services, and
CCUSO Medical Staff because they are not “persons” under the
law.
Accordingly, those entities must be dismissed from this
case as a matter of law.
B.
Representing Other Individuals
The Complaint is signed by all above named Plaintiffs and
discusses a number of broad concerns, such as access to
dentures and Nurse Benson’s qualifications. However, only Mr.
Schuman filled out and filed an application to proceed in
forma pauperis.
More importantly, the only specific issue
discussed by the Complaint is Mr. Schuman’s rash.
Mr.
Schuman’s
rash,
the
Complaint
8
merely
Outside of
lists
general
concerns about CCUSO and names a long list of CCUSO patients
as Plaintiffs.
There is no nexus (or connection) in the
Complaint between the listed Plaintiffs and the alleged wrongs
committed by the listed Defendants.
As
this
Court
has
repeatedly
recognized,
pro
se
Complaints are not held to the same standard as Complaints
filed
by
attorneys.
However,
the
Complaint
must
still
“articulate a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).
Federal Rule of
Applying that standard, it is clear
that Plaintiffs Mr. Clark, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Echols, Mr.
Miller, Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Propp, Mr. Selby, and Mr. Roe have
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Accordingly, they must be dismissed from this case.
As noted above, it seems to the Court that Mr. Schuman is
attempting to bring a large case on behalf of other CCUSO
patients.
Mr. Schuman filed the application to proceed in
forma pauperis, mailed the Complaint, and provided exhibits
about his rash.
He then added general complaints about CCUSO
not providing dentures to other CCUSO patients and his concern
that Ms. Benson is not qualified to treat CCUSO patients.
9
It is well settled that:
the Constitution of the United States, in
particular the First and Sixth Amendments,
does not grant to [a litigant] the right to
have an unlicensed layman represent them in
Court proceedings.”
Turner v. American
Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 478 (N.D. Tex.
1975), affirmed, sub nom. Pilla v. American
Bar Ass'n, 542 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976); see
also Guajardo v. Luna, 432 F.2d 1324, 1325
(5th Cir. 1970).
Cuellar
v.
Johnson,
174
F.3d
198
(5th
Cir.
1999).
Accordingly, only attorneys can represent other individuals in
Court proceedings.
As the 8th Circuit has repeatedly held:
[W]e find respondent's claim to be without
legal merit. [The Court has] rejected []
other cases involving the efforts of laymen
to practice law and to the claims of
certain litigants that they were entitled
to be represented by laymen rather than by
licensed lawyers. See Turner v. American
Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 480-81 (N.D.
Tex. 1975), a multi-district decision,
which was affirmed by this court as far as
the Eighth Circuit was concerned in Pilla
v. American Bar Ass'n, 542 F.2d 56 (8th
Cir. 1976); See also United States v.
Pilla, 550 F.2d 1085 (8th Cir. 1977).”
Matter of Green, 586 F.2d 1247, 1251, n. 5 (8th Cir. 1978).
Under that law, it is clear that, because Mr. Schuman is
not an attorney, he cannot bring a large “class action” type
case on behalf of other CCUSO patients.
10
Mr. Schuman cannot
allege that the above named Defendants are denying dentures to
other CCUSO patients and attempt to bring a case on their
behalf.
If CCUSO patients wish to bring claims, they need to
file them on their own behalf.
That is to say, a CCUSO
patient (or any individual asking the Court for relief under
42 U.S.C. § 1983) must articulate the alleged wrong done to
them, allege who (individually) did the wrong, and allege a
possible solution the Court can provide. One lay person (nonattorney) cannot rely on another lay person to represent them
in Court.10
Accordingly, because Mr. Schuman cannot prosecute
claims on behalf of other individuals, the general claims
outlined in the Complaint, regarding dentures and Ms. Benson’s
qualifications, must be dismissed.
C.
Mr. Schuman’s Rash
The only remaining issue is Mr. Schuman’s rash.
Courts apply the deliberate indifference standard in
analyzing deficient medical care claims to cases brought by
civilly committed individuals.
10
See Senty-Haugen v. Goodno,
Additionally, the Court notes that lay individuals who
attempt to represent other individuals in Court may incur
penalties or sanctions for engaging in the unauthorized
practice of law.
11
462
F.3d
876,
deliberate
889
(8th
indifference
Cir.
2006),
standard
to
a
which
applied
medical-care
the
claim
raised by a patient involuntarily committed as a sexually
violent predator under the 14th Amendment.
See also Scott v.
Benson, 742 F.3d 335, 339 (8th Cir. 2014), stating, “where a
patient's Fourteenth Amendment claim is for constitutionally
deficient medical care, we apply the deliberate indifference
standard from the Eighth Amendment. Senty-Haugen, 462 F.3d at
889-90.”
Under
Plaintiffs
the
deliberate
must
show
the
indifference
Defendants
standard,
were
the
deliberately
indifferent to a serious illness or injury. Senty-Haugen, 462
F.3d at 889.
A successful deliberate indifference claim is
comprised of both an objective and a subjective element.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
First, the
Plaintiffs must demonstrate that, objectively, the deprivation
he suffered was "sufficiently serious; that is, it must result
in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities."
Cir. 2002).
Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th
In the medical care context, this objective
element is satisfied when a plaintiff demonstrates that his
12
medical need itself was sufficiently serious.
Gutierrez v.
Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997).
Second, the
Plaintiffs must establish that the Defendants acted with a
"‘sufficiently culpable state of mind'" to support liability
under § 1983.
Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir.
2005).
In his Complaint, Mr. Schuman states that he developed a
rash in February.
He saw Nurse Benson for the rash and
requested that he be sent to the doctor.
Mr. Schuman states
that Nurse Benson never referred him to the doctor.
Nurse
Benson’s failure to refer him to the doctor is the basis for
his present claim.
As stated above, the deliberate indifference standard
requires a two part analysis.
First, the Court must consider
whether the complaint comprises a serious medical need; and
second, the Court must consider whether the Defendant acted
with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. In this case, Mr.
Schuman’s allegation fails to meet that burden.
Mr. Schuman alleges that he had a rash in February and
that Nurse Benson refused to send him to the doctor. However,
the Complaint fails to articulate if Mr. Schuman still suffers
13
from a rash or if the rash subsequently healed. The Complaint
does not otherwise state how a rash in February comprises a
serious medical need nor does the Complaint state if Mr.
Schuman suffered any ill-consequence when Nurse Benson treated
the rash herself without sending Mr. Schuman to the doctor.
Accordingly, Mr. Schuman has failed to state a medical claim
under the deliberate indifference standard and his case must
be dismissed.
VI.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Schuman’s Motion(s) to Proceed In Forma Pauperis,
Dockets No. 1 and Docket No. 1, Att. 1, are GRANTED.
The
Clerk of Court is directed to file the Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
However, after conducting an initial review, the Court is
persuaded that the Complaint must be DISMISSED as set out
above.11
to
The Clerk of Court shall send a copy of this Order
Assistant
Iowa
Attorney
General
Gretchen
Kraemer,
Department of Justice, Regents and Human Services Division,
Hoover Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319-0109.
11
The dismissal as to Mr. Schuman’s medical claim is
without prejudice to refiling.
If Mr. Schuman wishes to
refile this case in the future, he should do so in compliance
with this Order and set out how his rash constitutes a serious
medical need.
14
IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of May, 2014.
__________________________________
Donald E. O’Brien, Senior Judge
United States District Court
Northern District of Iowa
15
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