Trevino v. Woodberry County Jail et al

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Accepting 15 Report and Recommendations granting 12 Motion for Summary Judgment. All of plaintiff Trevino's claims against the defendants are dismissed. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge Mark W Bennett on 5/13/15. (copy w/nef mailed to plaintiff) (djs)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
RICHARD TREVINO,
No. C14-4051-MWB
Plaintiff,
vs.
WOODBURY
LIEUTENANT
CARLOS LNU.

COUNTY
PHILLIPS,

Defendants.

JAIL,
and

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER REGARDING
MAGISTRATE’S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
CONCERNING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

___________________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. 

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ............................................ 2 
A. 
Procedural Background ......................................................... 2 
B. 
Factual Background .............................................................. 4 

II. 

LEGAL ANALYSIS ....................................................................... 6 
A. 
Standard of Review ............................................................... 6 
B. 
Trevino’s Objections .............................................................. 9 
1. 
Exhaustion of administrative remedies ............................... 9 
2. 
Evidence of discriminatory intent ................................... 12 

III. 

CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 15 

I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A.

Procedural Background

On June 25, 2014, plaintiff Richard Trevino filed a pro se complaint in the
Northern District of Texas.

In his complaint, Trevino, an inmate at Federal

Correctional Institute Fort Worth, names as defendants the Woodbury County Jail (“the
Jail”), Lieutenant Phillips, and Officer Carlos Last Name Unknown (collectively,
“defendants,” unless otherwise indicated).1 Trevino claims that defendants violated his
constitutional rights while he was incarcerated at the Jail and that defendants violated
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12133.
This case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Leonard T. Strand
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment
in which they seek dismissal of all claims against them. In their motion, defendants
argue that:

(1) Trevino failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies as

required by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (PLRA), causing
his claims to fail as a matter of law; (2) there is no genuine issue of material fact
regarding Trevino’s ADA claim and the summary judgment record shows that Trevino
was not excluded from a service, program, or activity or otherwise discriminated against
because of his disability, and (3) the Jail and the individual defendants, in their personal

1

Trevino also named the United States Marshals Service (“the USMS”) as a
defendant. I previously granted the USMS’s motion to dismiss and dismissed it from
this lawsuit.

2

capacities, are immune from suit for actions brought pursuant to Title II. Trevino did
not file a resistance.2
Judge Strand issued a Report and Recommendation in which he recommends
granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Judge Strand found that Trevino
failed to properly exhaust all available remedies for the allegations described in his
complaint and addendum.

Thus, Judge Strand recommends that Trevino’s claims be

dismissed for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.

Report and

Recommendation at 9. Judge Strand further concludes that Trevino failed to show that
any genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to the third element of his ADA
claim, that defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his disability. Thus,
Judge Strand recommends that defendants’ motion for summary judgment also be
granted on that ground.

Report and Recommendation at 14.

Judge Strand also

concludes that the individual defendants (Lieutenant Phillips and Officer Carlos) cannot
be sued for damages in their individual capacities because Title II permits such actions
only as against public entities, not individuals. Therefore, Judge Strand recommends
that, to the extent Trevino seeks damages from Phillips and Carlos in their individual
capacities based on alleged violations of Title II, the motion for summary judgment be
granted. Report and Recommendation at 15. Finally, in light of his earlier conclusions,
Judge Strand finds it unnecessary to determine whether Title II validly abrogates
Eleventh Amendment immunity to the extent Trevino seeks damages from Phillips and
Carlos in their individual capacities based on alleged violations of Title II. Therefore,
Judge Strand recommends that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted.

2

As Judge Strand pointed out in his Report and Recommendation, because
Trevino failed to resist defendants’ motion, it could be granted on that basis alone. See
Local Rule 7(f) (“If no timely resistance to a motion is filed, the motion may be granted
without notice.”). Judge Strand, however, addressed its merits.
3

Trevino filed objections to Judge Strand’s Report and Recommendation. Trevino
objects to Judge Strand’s finding that he did not exhaust all available administrative
remedies. He argues, for the first time, that defendants prevented him from utilizing
the jail’s grievance procedure and/or defendants failed to comply with the grievance
procedure. Trevino also objects to Judge Strand’s finding that defendants did not
discriminate against him on the basis of his disability. Trevino argues Lieutenant
Phillips’s affidavit is deficient and, thererfore, cannot support the motion for summary
judgment.3 Defendants filed a timely response to Trevino’s objections.
B.

Factual Background

In his Report and Recommendation, Judge Strand found the following facts were
undisputed:
On August 30, 2012, Trevino was indicted in the Northern
District of Iowa on federal charges of conspiracy to
distribute methamphetamine (Count 1) and possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (Count 2).
On September 10, 2012, he was detained at the Jail while
awaiting resolution of those charges. He was transferred to
Linn County Correctional Center on November 20, 2012,
but returned to the Jail on December 22, 2012. Trevino
remained at the Jail until he was transferred to the custody
of the Federal Bureau of Prisons on February 25, 2014, at
the conclusion of the Criminal Case. He is now serving his
sentence at a federal prison in Texas.
Throughout Trevino’s incarceration at the Jail, he suffered
from a spinal disease which caused paralysis, rendering him
wheelchair bound and incontinent. For his safety and the
3

Trevino does not to object to Judge Strand’s finding that Trevino failed to file a
complaint with the DOJ. Trevino also does not object to Judge Strand’s finding that the
individual defendants are not amenable to suit under Title II of the ADA.
4

safety of his fellow inmates, Trevino was housed in a private
cell, away from the Jail’s general population. Because of his
wheelchair and medical needs, Trevino was at risk of harm
from other inmates. If permitted to join the Jail’s general
inmate population, Trevino would have needed to be
supervised anytime he was outside his cell, which would
have required hiring additional Jail staff. Phillips believed
Trevino’s isolated cell was in compliance with all ADA
guidelines. Additionally, at one point during his
confinement, Trevino intentionally cut his arms and, in
accordance with Jail policy, was placed in an isolated mental
health cell, secluded from the Jail’s general population.
The Jail maintained an inmate rule book (the Rule Book)
which included an inmate grievance policy that was in effect
throughout Trevino’s incarceration. The policy outlined the
process for inmates to alert Jail administration to violations
of civil rights, criminal acts, unjust denials or restrictions of
inmate privileges and prohibited acts. An inmate could
either file an informal grievance by discussing the issue with
Jail staff or submit a formal written grievance within seven
days of the alleged misconduct. The written grievance was
required to clearly define the situation, state the facts upon
which the grievance was based, describe the harm done and
request a remedy within the power and control of Jail
administration. All formal written grievances were to
include the inmate’s cell number and signature. Copies of
the Rule Book were provided in each cell block, to which
Trevino had access during his incarceration.
The Jail maintains a record of all letters, grievances and
correspondence from inmates. Each item of correspondence
is known as a “kite,” and a copy of each kite is placed in the
inmate’s personal file. Trevino’s personal file contains kites
relating to his allegations of isolation for inappropriate
reasons. However, none of his kites mention other
allegations set forth in his complaint and addendum in this
5

case, such as harassment, deprivation of clean clothes, a
shower or a sealed container for his soiled diapers, denial of
grief counseling or clergy, or that his cell did not have
handicap accessible toilets, facilities or furniture.
Report and Recommendation at 4-6.4
II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

A.

Standard of Review

Before considering whether or not to accept Judge Strand’s Report and
Recommendation, I will first set out my standard of review. The applicable statute
provides for de novo review by the district judge of a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, when objections are made, as follows:
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of
those portions of the report or specified proposed findings
or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of
the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,
the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or
recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006); see FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) (stating identical
requirements); N.D. IA. L.R. 72, 72.1 (allowing the referral of dispositive matters to a
magistrate judge but not articulating any standards to review the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation). Thus, “[a]ny party that desires plenary consideration by
the Article III judge of any issue need only ask.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154
4

Trevino did not file a response to defendants’ statement of material facts in
dispute. He also did not submit his own statement of additional material facts. As a
result, Trevino is deemed to have admitted defendants’ facts. See Local Rule 56(b).
6

(1985). The United States Supreme Court has explained that, although the statute
provides for review when objections are made, the statutory standard does not preclude
review by the district court in other circumstances:
[W]hile the statute does not require the judge to review an
issue de novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude
further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the
request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard.
Thomas, 474 U.S. at 154. Thus, the specific standard of review may depend upon
whether or not a party has objected to portions of the report and recommendation. I
will explain what triggers each specific standard of review in a little more detail.
If a party files an objection to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation,
the district court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In most cases, to trigger de novo review, “objections must be
timely and specific.”

Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 358-59 (8th Cir. 1990).

However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has been willing to “liberally construe[]”
otherwise general pro se objections to require a de novo review of all “alleged errors,”
see Hudson v. Gammon, 46 F.3d 785, 786 (8th Cir. 1995), and has also been willing
to conclude that general objections require “full de novo review” if the record is concise,
Belk v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 803, 815 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Therefore, even had petitioner’s
objections lacked specificity, a de novo review would still have been appropriate given
such a concise record.”). When objections have been made, and the magistrate judge’s
report is based upon an evidentiary hearing, “‘the district court must, at a minimum,
listen to a tape recording or read a transcript of the evidentiary hearing.’” United States
v. Azure, 539 F.3d 904, 910 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Jones v. Pillow, 47 F.3d 251, 252
(8th Cir. 1995), in turn quoting Branch v. Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir.
1989)). Judge Strand did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion, nor did he
7

consider oral arguments on the motion. Instead, he considered only the parties’ written
submissions, and I have done the same.
In the absence of an objection, the district court is not required “to give any more
consideration to the magistrate’s report than the court considers appropriate.” Thomas,
474 U.S. at 150; see also Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 939 (1991) (stating
that § 636(b)(1) “provide[s] for de novo review only when a party objected to the
magistrate’s findings or recommendations”); United States v. Ewing, 632 F.3d 412, 415
(8th Cir. 2011) (“By failing to file objections, Ewing waived his right to de novo review
[of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation on a suppression motion] by the
district court.”). Indeed, Thomas suggests that no review at all is required. Id. (“We
are therefore not persuaded that [§ 636(b)(1)] requires some lesser review by the district
court when no objections are filed.”).
Nevertheless, a district court may also review de novo any issue in a magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation at any time. Id. at 154. This discretion to conduct
de novo review of any issue at any time makes sense, because the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals has “emphasized the necessity . . . of retention by the district court of
substantial control over the ultimate disposition of matters referred to a magistrate.”
Belk, 15 F.3d at 815. Also, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated that, at
a minimum, a district court should review the portions of a magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation to which no objections have been made under a “clearly
erroneous” standard of review. See Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir.
1996) (noting that, when no objections are filed and the time for filing objections has
expired, “[the district court judge] would only have to review the findings of the
magistrate judge for clear error”); Taylor v. Farrier, 910 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1990)
(noting that the advisory committee’s note to FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) indicates “when no
timely objection is filed the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on
8

the face of the record”). Review for clear error, even when no objection has been
made, is also consistent with “retention by the district court of substantial control over
the ultimate disposition of matters referred to a magistrate.” Belk, 15 F.3d at 815.
Although neither the Supreme Court nor the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has
explained precisely what “clear error” review means in this context, in other contexts,
the Supreme Court has stated that the “foremost” principle under this standard of review
“is that ‘[a] finding is “clearly erroneous” when although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.’” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S.
564, 573 74 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948)).
I will review Judge Strand’s Report and Recommendation with these standards
in mind.

B.
1.

Trevino’s Objections

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

Trevino first objects to Judge Strand’s finding that he did not exhaust all available
administrative remedies. Trevino contends that defendants “prevented Plaintiff from
utilizing the administrative remedy process, by way of not informing him of the official
procedure and by the Defendants themselves, failing to comply with the [grievance
procedure].” Trevino’s Objections at 5. The PLRA provides in pertinent part that:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by
a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available
are exhausted.
9

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Thus, there is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under
the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court. See Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199, 210-17 (2007);); see also King v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 598 F.3d 1051,
1053-54 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding inmate must complete administrative exhaustion
process in accordance with applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as
precondition to bringing suit). “To properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners
must ‘complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable
procedural rules.’” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218 (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88
(2006)). The applicable procedural rules are defined not by the PLRA but by the prison
grievance process itself. Id. at 218. However, under the PLRA, failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, which a prisoner is not required to
plead or demonstrate in his or her complaint. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 216; see also
Hahn v. Armstrong, 407 Fed. App’x 77, 78 (8th Cir. 2011); Lenz v. Wade, 991, 993
n.2 (8th Cir. 2007); Gibson v. Weber, 431 F.3d 339, 341 (8th Cir. 2005). Rather,
defendants bear the burden to establish a prisoner's failure to exhaust. See Jones, 549
F.3d at 216. When the exhaustion defense has been properly raised, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals has held that a district court is “obligated” to determine whether or
not the administrative remedies have been exhausted. See Chelette v. Harris, 229 F.3d
684, 688 (8th Cir. 2000).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has “only excused inmates from complying
with an institution’s grievance procedures when officials have prevented prisoners from
utilizing the procedures or when officials themselves have failed to comply with the
grievance procedures.” Gibson v. Weber, 431 F.3d 339, 341 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal
citations omitted). The facts alleged by Trevino are distinct from those in cases where
a prisoner's explicit and repeated requests for grievance forms were ignored, see Miller
v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 738 (8th Cir. 2001), or where prison officials themselves failed
10

to comply with grievance procedures, see Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 688 (8th
Cir. 2001).

Unlike the plaintiffs in Miller and Foulk, Trevino was able to file a

grievance. Although Trevino contends that defendants failed to inform him of the
administrative procedures, the summary judgment record belies his assertion. The Jail
maintained an inmate rule book which included an inmate grievance policy. Judge
Strand specifically found “Copies of the Rule Book were provided in each cell block,
to which Trevino had access during his incarceration.” Report and Recommendation at
5. Trevino does not point to anything in the summary judgment record which would
contradict this finding and my own review of the record reveals none. The Jail maintains
a record of all kites from inmates. Trevino’s personal file contains numerous kites.
This demonstrates that Trevino was aware of how to file formal grievances. Moreover,
none of his kites mention allegations, as found in his complaint and addendum,
regarding harassment, deprivation of clean clothes, a shower or a sealed container for
his soiled diapers, denial of grief counseling or clergy, or that his cell did not have
handicap accessible toilets, facilities or furniture.
Thus, I conclude that Trevino did not exhaust his remedies in accordance with
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) and his objection to Judge Strand’s Report and Recommendation
is overruled. Dismissal without prejudice is mandatory under such circumstances. See
Porter v. Sturm, 781 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 2015); see also Hammett v. Cofield, 681
F.3d 945, 949 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (affirming, in part, dismissal without
prejudice for § 1997e(a) failure to exhaust); Washington v. Uner, 273 Fed. App’x 575,
577 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (modifying district court's dismissal to clarify that §

11

1997e(a) failure to exhaust is dismissed without prejudice); Maddix v. Crawford, 216
Fed. App’x 605, 606 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (same).5
2.

Evidence of discriminatory intent

Trevino’s second objection is to Judge Strand’s finding that defendants did not
discriminate against Trevino on the basis of his disability. Trevino argues that Judge
Strand erred in relying on Phillips’s affidavit.
In order to prevail on his claim for compensatory damages under the ADA,
Trevino must prove that defendants acted with discriminatory intent. See Meagley v.
City of Little Rock, 639 F.3d 384, 389 (8th Cir. 2011). In Meagley, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals determined that “deliberate indifference is the appropriate standard

5

Judge Strand also concludes that the PLRA requires exhaustion of both internal
and external administrative remedies prior to filing suit. In reaching this conclusion,
Judge Strand points out a number of decisions holding that all available DOJ remedies
must be exhausted to satisfy the PLRA. See Brown v. Cantrell, No. 11–CV–00200–
PAB–MEH, 2012 WL 4050300, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept.14, 2012); Haley v. Haynes, Civil
Action No. 11–CV–00200–PAB–MEH, 2012 WL 112946, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Jan.12,
2012); William G. v. Pataki, 03 Civ. 8331(RCC), 2005 WL 1949509, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 12, 2005) (citing Burgess v. Garvin, No. 01 Civ. 10994(GEL), 2003 WL
21983006, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.19, 2003), recon. granted on other grounds, 2004 WL
527053 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.16, 2004)). Judge Strand finds that, even if Trevino complied
with the Jail's grievance policy regarding his claims, he failed to exhaust an available
federal remedy by filing a complaint with the United States Department of Justice
(“DOJ”), pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 35.170(a). Report and Recommendation at 11.
Trevino has not objected to this portion of Judge Strand’s Report and Recommendation.
Judge Strand’s determination was not clearly erroneous. While exhaustion of the DOJ
remedy is not a prerequisite to a private right of action for non-prisoners under the
ADA, see 28 C.F.R. § 35.172, App. A., the PLRA imposes such an exhaustion
requirement on prisoners. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002).
Accordingly, even if Trevino had made formal grievances regarding his ADA claims in
compliance with the Jail's grievance policy, he still failed to exhaust his available
remedies under § 1997e(a) because he did not exhaust available external administrative
remedies prior to filing his lawsuit.
12

for showing intentional discrimination.” Id. (citations omitted); see Roberts v. City of
Omaha, 723 F.3d 966, 975 (8th Cir. 2013). The court of appeals noted that “[t]he
deliberate indifference standard, unlike some tests for intentional discrimination, does
not require a showing of personal ill will or animosity toward the disabled person, but
rather can be inferred from a defendant's deliberate indifference to the strong likelihood
that pursuit of its questioned policies will likely result in a violation of federally
protected rights.” Meagley, 639 F.3d at 389 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, to recover compensatory damages, Trevino must show defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his rights under the ADA. See id.; see also Roberts, 723
F.3d at 975.
Defendants, as the moving party, bear “the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record
which show a lack of a genuine issue,” Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th
Cir. 1992) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)), and demonstrating
that they are entitled to judgment according to law. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323
(“[T]he motion may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the district
court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set forth in
Rule 56(c), is satisfied.”). Defendants have met their initial burden. They argue that
they did not discriminate against Trevino on the basis of his disability. Instead, they
contend that Trevino was placed in solitary confinement for his own protection, not for
the purpose of discriminating against him based on his disability. They have buttressed
this argument by providing an affidavit from Phillips indicating (a) that at all times she
believed the Jail was in compliance with the ADA and (b) that the decision to place
Trevino in a solitary cell was not made for discriminatory reasons but, instead, was
based on “an actual and legitimate risk of other inmates physically harming him.”
Phillips Aff. at ¶¶ 12-15. Because defendants have met their initial burden, Trevino
13

has the burden to go beyond his pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or otherwise,
designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(e); Mosley v. City of Northwoods, Mo., 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The
nonmoving party may not ‘rest on mere allegations or denials, but must demonstrate on
the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial.’”
(quoting Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995))). As the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained,
The nonmovant “must do more than simply show that there
is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” and
must come forward with “specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S. Ct.
1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). “‘Where the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for
the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’”
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677, quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
587, 106 S. Ct. 1348.
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042-43 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
Trevino has not met his burden to provide evidence showing that defendants possessed
discriminatory intent. Indeed, Trevino has produced no evidence supporting his claims
and failed to respond to defendants’ statement of undisputed facts. Because Trevino has
the burden proof and has failed to show that any genuine issues of material fact exist
with regard to this element of his ADA claim, his objection is overruled.

14

III.

CONCLUSION

I accept Judge Strand’s Report and Recommendation and, therefore, grant
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. All of plaintiff Trevino’s claims against the
defendants are dismissed. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 13th day of May, 2015.
______________________________________
MARK W. BENNETT
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

15