Lynch v. Custom Welding and Repair, Inc et al
Filing
18
ORDER on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment - Plaintiff's 14 MOTION for Summary Judgment is denied in its entirety. Defendants' 13 MOTION for Summary Judgment is granted with regard to Counts I through VII of the complaint. Those coun ts are dismissed with prejudice and judgment on those counts shall enter in favor of Sease and against Lynch. Defendants' 13 MOTION for Summary Judgment is denied with regard to the remaining counts (VIII through XXI) of the complaint. However , because all of the remaining counts are state law claims over which this court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, they are dismissed without prejudice. Because this order disposes of all pending claims, this case is closed. Signed by Magistrate Judge Leonard T Strand on 11/6/15. (djs)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
KEITH LYNCH,
Plaintiff,
No. C14-4072-LTS
vs.
CUSTOM WELDING & REPAIR,
INC., et al.,
ORDER ON CROSSMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Defendants.
____________________
I.
INTRODUCTION
This case is before me on cross-motions (Doc. Nos. 13, 14) for summary
judgment. Both motions are resisted (Doc. Nos. 15, 16) and defendants have filed a
reply (Doc. No. 17) in support of their motion. While defendants have requested oral
argument, the issues have been thoroughly briefed such that I do not find oral argument
to be necessary. See N.D. Ia. L.R. 7(c). Both motions are fully submitted and ready
for decision.
II.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Keith Lynch (Lynch) commenced this action on September 2, 2014, by
filing a twenty-one complaint (Doc. No. 2) against defendants Custom Welding & Repair,
Inc. (Custom), and Randal G. Sease d/b/a Sease Law Firm (Sease). Counts I through
VII of the complaint assert that Sease, while attempting to collect a debt allegedly owed
by Lynch to Custom, committed various violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. Counts VIII through XIV allege
that Sease’s conduct also violated the Iowa Debt Collection Practices Act (IDCPA), Iowa
Code § 537.7101, et seq. Finally, Counts XV through XXI describe various alleged
violations of the IDCPA by Custom.
Defendants filed an answer (Doc. No. 4) on
November 3, 2014, denying liability with regard to all counts.
This case was referred to me (Doc. No. 8) on January 12, 2015, after the parties
unanimously consented to trial, disposition and judgment by a United States Magistrate
Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Discovery is closed and trial is scheduled to
begin January 25, 2016. See Doc. No. 9.
III.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following facts are undisputed for purposes of both motions:
On or about July 15, 2013, Lynch consulted Custom, a welding shop in Everly,
Iowa, to repair a gearbox owned by Lynch.
This was the first time Custom had
performed services for Lynch. At the completion of the project on July 31, 2013, Lynch
paid Custom $500. A dispute arose as to whether a balance remained. As a result of
this dispute, Custom retained possession of the gearbox. After the initial payment from
Lynch, Custom continued to seek additional payments and sent Lynch invoices that
included finance charges. Custom sent Lynch a final invoice for $606.31 on April 30,
2014, indicating that the gearbox would be disposed of unless the balance was paid.
In addition to sending invoices, Custom contacted Sease, who had previously
represented Custom with regard to corporate law matters. On April 16, 2014, Sease
sent a letter to Lynch that read as follows:
Please be advised that your outstanding account with Custom
Welding & Repair has been forwarded to my office for collection. In that
regard, please find a current billing showing an outstanding account of
$606.15.
The purpose of this letter is to make a demand on you in the amount
of $606.15 plus $50.00 for attorney fees for a total of $656.15 to be paid
to my office within the next 10 days. Failure to make payment within the
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next 10 days will result in an action filed in the Iowa District Court in and
for Clay County.
PLEASE GOVERN YOURSELF ACCORDINGLY.
Doc. No. 13-3 at 34 (emphasis in original). Sease directed no other correspondence to
Lynch.
Sease is a sole practitioner who has one employee, a legal secretary.
In an
affidavit and answers to interrogatories, Sease states that he has practiced law as a small
town general trial practitioner for 30 years and has handled over 4,000 matters. He
estimates that less than 10 of those matters, representing less than one percent of his
business, have related to the collection of money on behalf of another party.
IV.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
Any party may move for summary judgment regarding all or any part of the claims
asserted in a case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when
“the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A material fact is one that “‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law.’” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus,
“the substantive law will identify which facts are material.”
Id.
Facts that are
“critical” under the substantive law are material, while facts that are “irrelevant or
unnecessary” are not.
Id.
An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record, Hartnagel
v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)), or when “‘a reasonable jury could
3
return a verdict for the nonmoving party’ on the question,”
Woods v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
Evidence that only provides “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,”
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, or evidence that is “merely colorable” or “not significantly
probative,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, does not make an issue of material fact
genuine.
As such, a genuine issue of material fact requires “sufficient evidence supporting
the claimed factual dispute” so as to “require a jury or judge to resolve the parties'
differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. The party
moving for entry of summary judgment bears “the initial responsibility of informing the
court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which show
a lack of a genuine issue.” Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at
323). Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond
the pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or otherwise, designate specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d
910 (8th Cir. 2005). The nonmovant must show an alleged issue of fact is genuine and
material as it relates to the substantive law.
If a party fails to make a sufficient showing
of an essential element of a claim or defense with respect to which that party has the
burden of proof, then the opposing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
In determining if a genuine issue of material fact is present, I must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
587-88.
Further, I must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the facts.
Id. However, “because we view the facts
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we do not weigh the evidence or
attempt to determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo &
4
Co., 383 F.3d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 2004). Instead, “the court's function is to determine
whether a dispute about a material fact is genuine.”
Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90
F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (8th Cir. 1996).
V.
A.
ANALYSIS
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
In Counts I through VII, Lynch alleges that Sease violated the FDCPA because he
acted as a “debt collector” within the meaning of the act and, in that capacity, failed to
comply with various FDCPA obligations.1 Sease argues that he did not violate the act
because he does not, as a matter of law, fall within the statutory definition of debt
collector.
1.
Applicable Law
The FDCPA was designed to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt
collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt
collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State
action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). As
a threshold matter, a plaintiff seeking relief under FDCPA must prove that he or she is a
“consumer” and that the defendant is a “debt collector” who violated a provision of the
statute while attempting to collect a “debt.”
Scott v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC,
___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2015 WL 6160003, at *4 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 16, 2015) (citing Mayhall
v. Berman & Rabin, P.A., No. 4:13CV0175 AGF, 2014 WL 340215, at *4 (E.D. Mo.
1
The alleged violations include Sease’s demand that Lynch pay $50 in attorney fees, Sease’s
threat to commence litigation (which never happened) and Sease’s failure to include various
disclosures that are required when a debt collector communicates with a consumer.
5
Jan. 30, 2014)); see also Owens v. Hellmuth & Johnson, PLLC, 550 F. Supp. 2d 1060,
1065 (D. Minn. 2008) (plaintiff must establish defendant is a debt collector).
The FDCPA defines a debt collector as “any person who uses any instrumentality
of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the
collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or
indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. §
1692a(6). Thus, the statute establishes two alternative tests for considering whether a
defendant is a debt collector: (1) the “principal purpose” test, which applies if the
defendant “uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business
the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts;” and (2) the “regularly
collects” test, which applies if the defendant “regularly collects or attempts to collect,
directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.”
Id.
The Supreme Court has held that the “regularly collects” test will encompass an
attorney if that attorney regularly engages in consumer debt collection efforts, even when
those efforts involve litigation. Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995). The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the “principal purpose” test to hold that a
defendant was a debt collector because its “principal business--some eighty percent--is
processing dishonored checks.” Volden v. Innovative Financial Systems, Inc., 440 F.3d
947, 952 (8th Cir. 2006). Other circuit courts of appeal have likewise concluded that
the FDCPA focuses on the defendant’s principal or regular activities to determine whether
the defendant is debt collector under the statute.
See Chiang v. Verizon New England
Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir. 2010) (“The [FDCPA] defines ‘debt collector’ as any
individual in a business whose ‘principal purpose ... is the collection of any debts, or
who regularly collects or attempts to collect ... debts owed or due or asserted to be owed
or due to another.’”) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)); Goldstein v. Hutton, Ingram, Yuzek,
Gainen, Carroll & Bertolotti, 374 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The FDCPA establishes
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two alternative predicates for “debt collector” status—engaging in such activity as the
‘principal purpose’ of the entity's business and ‘regularly’ engaging in such activity”);
Oppong v. First Union Mortg. Corp., 215 Fed. Appx. 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Thus,
a business may be a “debt collector” because its “principal purpose” is the collection of
debts or because it “regularly” engages in the collection of debts”); Scott v. Jones, 964
F.2d 314, 316 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding the “principal purpose” of the defendant’s business
qualified him as a debt collector when 70-80% of his legal fees were generated from debt
collection); Hester v. Graham, Bright & Smith, P.C., 289 Fed. Appx. 35, 41 (5th Cir.
2008) (“The [FDCPA] contains two categories of debt collector, those who collect debts
as their ‘principal purpose,’ and those who do so ‘regularly’”); Glazer v. Chase Home
Finance L.L.C., 704 F.3d 453, 463 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[the FDCPA] defin[es] a “debt
collector” as one whose principal business purpose is the “collection of any debts” or
who “regularly” collect debts”); Gillard v. Michalakos, 365 Fed. Appx. 1, 1-2 (7th Cir.
2010) (upholding the district court’s finding that the defendant was not a debt collector
when the complaint did not allege that the defendant regularly collected debts or “the
principal purpose of his law practice was to collect debts”); Romine v. Diversified
Collection Services, Inc., 155 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998) (“We note first that the
[FDCPA] regulates the conduct of “any person” in “any business” whose (1) principal
purpose is debt collection, or (2) who regularly collects or attempts to collect debts,
directly or indirectly”); James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir. 2013) (“The
FDCPA establishes two alternative predicates for ‘debt collector status’: 1) engaging in
debt collection as the ‘principal purpose’ of the entity's business; or 2) engaging in debt
collection ‘regularly’”); Birster v. American Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 481 Fed.
Appx. 579, 583 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The statutory text clearly states that, to qualify as a
‘debt collector,’ the ‘principal purpose’ of ‘any business’ must be ‘the collection of any
debts’ or that the business must ‘regularly collect[ ] or attempt[ ] to collect ... debts.’”).
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2.
Discussion
a.
The “Principal Purpose” Test
Here, Lynch relies primarily on the “principal purpose” test to allege that Sease
is a debt collector. Indeed, he faults Sease for focusing on the “regularly collects” test:
Sease focuses on the latter definition without analysis of the former. This
is likely for good reason, as in this case, the undisputed evidence shows
that Sease acted as a debt collector by using the mail for the express purpose
of collecting a debt.
Doc. No. 16 at 3.
Similarly, Lynch states: “Because the principal purpose of the
business Sease conducted in this case was the collection of a debt using the mail, Sease
is a ‘debt collector’ as defined by the FDCPA.” Doc. No. 14-1 at 3 (emphasis added).
In other words, according to Lynch, because Sease sent one letter by mail and the
“principal purpose” of that letter was collect a debt, Sease is a debt collector within the
meaning of the FDCPA.
This argument might have some merit were it not for the statute’s express language
and the utter lack of supporting case law. The statute plainly refers to the “principal
purpose” of the defendant’s business, not the principal purpose of a particular
communication.
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
As set forth above, cases applying the
FDCPA likewise focus on the nature of the defendant’s business in determining whether
the defendant falls within the statutory definition of debt collector. Other than citing
Heintz for the obvious proposition that attorneys may fall within the statutory definition,
Lynch provides absolutely no analysis of whether the principal purpose of Sease’s
business is debt collection. To borrow Lynch’s phrase, this is likely for good reason.
Sease has submitted undisputed information indicating that his business is a
general, small-town trial practice with less than one percent of his business relating to
the collection of money. As a matter of law, Lynch has failed to meet his burden of
showing that Sease is a debt collector under the “principal purpose” test.
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b.
The “Regularly Collects” Test
This leaves the “regularly collects” test which, as I noted above, is not the focus
of Lynch’s argument.
Indeed, Lynch’s only contention regarding the “regularly
collects” test is that Sease is precluded from arguing that he does not regularly collect
debts because he objected to certain discovery requests. Doc. No. 16 at 4-5. During
discovery, Sease answered interrogatories and document requests concerning his practice
and his debt collection activities. Doc. No. 10-2. He objected only to two document
requests.
One sought “[a]ll documents related to the collection of any money by
Defendant on behalf of third parties within the last 6 years.” Doc. No. 10-2 at 30 (Req.
No. 15). Sease objected on grounds that the requested information was not likely to
lead to relevant evidence, was overly broad and unduly burdensome and was protected
by the attorney client privilege. Id. The other request sought “all documents related
to Defendant’s bookkeeping or accounting for the last 6 years, such as profit/loss
statements, tax returns, and any other business records showing the source of Defendant’s
income.”
Id. (Req. No. 16).
Sease objected on grounds that his tax returns are
“private and not discoverable” while also stating that he has no “profit loss statements,
bookkeeping or accounting records.”
Id.
On July 17, 2015, Lynch filed a motion (Doc. No. 10) to compel the production
of additional records. However, Lynch’s counsel failed to comply with Local Rule 37 2
2
Rule 37 states, in relevant part:
a.
Declaration Required. No motion relating to discovery may be filed
unless counsel for the moving party electronically attaches to the motion a
declaration, subscribed under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746,
attesting to the following:
1.
Counsel, in good faith, has conferred personally with counsel for
the opposing party in an attempt to resolve or narrow by agreement the
issues raised by the motion;
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by conferring personally with Sease’s counsel before filing the motion.
denied the motion by order filed August 20, 2015.
As such, I
See Doc. No. 12. Nothing in the
record suggests that Lynch did anything else, formally or informally, to obtain the
business records at issue.
I find that Sease’s objections were, at the very least, colorable. Had Lynch’s
counsel taken the seemingly-routine step of calling Sease’s counsel, and attempting to
resolve or narrow the issues, perhaps additional documents would have been produced.
In any event, Lynch has failed to show that Sease acted in bad faith or that the production
of additional documents would have any impact on the analysis. Sease has provided an
affidavit, in addition to his interrogatory answers, describing the extremely-limited
portion of his practice that has involved the collection of money on behalf of others.
See, e.g., James, 724 F.3d at 1318-19 (holding that a court may rely on a party’s affidavit
and answers to interrogatories, without more, in determining that the party is not a debt
collector).
I reject Lynch’s contention that Sease’s objections to certain discovery
requests somehow precludes Sease from arguing that he does not regularly collect debts.
As for the merits of the issue, the Eighth Circuit has yet to determine what
constitutes “regularly” engaging in debt collection under the FDCPA. However, the
Second Circuit has held that “the question of whether a lawyer or law firm ‘regularly’
2.
The lawyers have been unable to reach an agreement; and
3.
The nature of the disagreement.
In the alternative, counsel for the moving party may certify in a written
declaration, subscribed under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746,
that a personal conference with opposing counsel was impossible, and describe
the efforts undertaken to schedule the conference. An exchange of written
communications or a single telephone message will not, by itself, satisfy the
requirements of this section.
N.D. Ia. L.R. 37(a).
10
engages in debt collection activity . . . must be assessed on a case-by-case basis in light
of factors bearing on the issue of regularity.” Goldstein, 374 F.3d at 62. The court
then listed various non-exclusive factors that are relevant to the determination:
Most important in the analysis is the assessment of facts closely relating to
ordinary concepts of regularity, including (1) the absolute number of debt
collection communications issued, and/or collection-related litigation
matters pursued, over the relevant period(s), (2) the frequency of such
communications and/or litigation activity, including whether any patterns
of such activity are discernable, (3) whether the entity has personnel
specifically assigned to work on debt collection activity, (4) whether the
entity has systems or contractors in place to facilitate such activity, and (5)
whether the activity is undertaken in connection with ongoing client
relationships with entities that have retained the lawyer or firm to assist in
the collection of outstanding consumer debt obligations. Facts relating to
the role debt collection work plays in the practice as a whole should also be
considered to the extent they bear on the question of regularity of debt
collection activity (debt collection constituting 1% of the overall work or
revenues of a very large entity may, for instance, suggest regularity,
whereas such work constituting 1% of an individual lawyer's practice might
not).
Whether the law practice seeks debt collection business by
marketing itself as having debt collection expertise may also be an indicator
of the regularity of collection as a part of the practice.
Id. at 62-63 (footnote omitted). Other courts have adopted similar approaches to this
issue. See, e.g., James, 724 F.3d at 1317-18) (adopting the Goldstein analysis); Hester
v. Graham, Bright & Smith, P.C., 289 Fed. Appx. 35, 41 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing
Goldstein favorably and applying a similar analysis).
In the absence of controlling
Eighth Circuit authority, I find it appropriate to apply the Goldstein analysis.
In considering the Goldstein factors, I conclude that Lynch has failed, as a matter
of law, to show that Sease regularly engages in debt collection activity. The record
demonstrates that debt collection has amounted to less than one percent of Sease’s
business over the past six years. Doc. No. 13-3 at 3; see Schroyer, 197 F.3d at 1176
(finding that two percent of an overall law practice did not amount to regularly engaging
11
in debt collection). Additionally, Sease has not had an ongoing relationship with any
debt collection entity. Doc. No. 13-3 at 4; see Schroyer, 197 F.3d at 1176 (noting the
lack of an ongoing relationship with any client whose business substantially involves debt
collection); see also Goldstein, 374 F.3d at 63 (finding that ongoing relationships with
entities engaged in debt collection supported a finding that the firm had regularly engaged
in debt collection). Sease has had no employees dedicated to debt collection, nor any
system in place to facilitate debt collection. Doc. No. 13-3 at 4; Golstein, 374 F.3d at
62.
Lynch has presented no evidence that Sease is regularly engaged in debt collection.
The record contains only a single debt-collection letter – the one Sease sent to Lynch.
This does not suffice. See Schroyer, 197 F.3d at 1175 (“the legislative history hardly
makes clear that attorneys who collect debts occasionally and small firms that collect
debts incidentally to their general law practices are ‘debt collectors’ under the FDCPA”).
As a matter of law, Lynch has failed to meet his burden of showing that Sease is a debt
collector under the “regularly collects” test. Because Sease is not a debt collector within
the meaning of the FDCPA, he is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law on
Counts I through VII of the complaint.
B.
The Iowa Debt Collection Practices Act
In the remaining fourteen counts of his complaint, Lynch contends that both Sease
and Custom violated the IDCPA, Iowa Code § 537.7103. Lynch argues that he has
established Sease’s and Custom’s liability under the IDCPA as a matter of law. Sease
and Custom disagree and contend that the transaction at issue does not, as a matter of
law, fall within the IDCPA’s definition of a “consumer credit sale.” Moreover, and as
a threshold issue, Sease and Custom argue that if summary judgment is granted in Sease’s
favor on the FDCPA claims, then the court should decline to exercise supplemental
12
jurisdiction over Lynch’s fourteen IDCPA claims.
I will address that argument to
determine whether it is necessary to consider the merits of Lynch’s IDCPA claims.
1.
Applicable Standards
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when the court
has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
“A district court's decision whether to exercise that jurisdiction after dismissing every
claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.”
Crest Const. II,
Inc. v. Doe, 660 F.3d 346, 359 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF
Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009)). While the determination of whether to dismiss
state-law claims pursuant to § 1367(c)(3) is a matter of discretion for a district court,
“[i]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance
of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction
over the remaining state-law claims.” Barstad v. Murray County, 420 F.3d 880, 888
(8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Carnegie–Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7
(1988)). Among other things, this reflects a policy that federal courts should avoid
addressing state law issues when possible.
Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d 413, 419-20
(8th Cir. 2000).
2.
Analysis
Having disposed of all of the federal claims in this case, I find it appropriate to
decline to exercise jurisdiction over Lynch’s IDCPA claims.
As evidenced by the
parties’ arguments, the statutory scheme enacted by the IDCPA differs in many ways
from that created by the FDCPA.
For example, the IDCPA’s definition of “debt
collector” is more expansive than the FDCPA’s. Compare Iowa Code § 537.7102(5)
13
with 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). However, the IDCPA includes a narrower definition of
“debt.” Compare Iowa Code § 537.7102(3) with 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). The “debt”
definition set forth in the IDCPA requires consideration of additional statutory
definitions, including the definition of a “consumer credit sale.”
Iowa Code §§
537.7102(3), 537.1301(12)-(13). Determining whether the transaction between Lynch
and Custom fell within the IDCPA will require a detailed analysis of Iowa statutes and
case law. With no federal claims remaining in this case, I find that this is best left to
the Iowa state courts.
In addition, I note that this court has already devoted significant resources to a
twenty-one count lawsuit that arose from one letter sent to collect an alleged debt of less
than $700. As explained earlier in this order, the FDCPA claims – which were the only
claims that gave rise to federal jurisdiction – were extremely weak. I see no reason for
this court to spend further time and effort on the question of whether Lynch’s state law
claims are any better.
VI.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein:
1.
Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. No. 14) for summary judgment is denied in its
entirety.
2.
Defendants’ motion (Doc. No. 13) for summary judgment is granted with
regard to Counts I through VII of the complaint. Those counts are dismissed with
prejudice and judgment on those counts shall enter in favor of Sease and against Lynch.
3.
Defendants’ motion (Doc. No. 13) for summary judgment is denied with
regard to the remaining counts (VIII through XXI) of the complaint. However, because
all of the remaining counts are state law claims over which this court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction, they are dismissed without prejudice.
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4.
Because this order disposes of all pending claims, this case is closed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 6th day of November, 2015.
________________________________
LEONARD T. STRAND
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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