Hill v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
20
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - The court finds that the Commissioner's determination that plaintiff was not disabled is affirmed. Judgment shall be entered against plaintiff and in favor of the Commissioner. Signed by Magistrate Judge CJ Williams on 3/30/16. (djs)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
THOMAS WILLIAM HILL,
No. C14-4105-CJW
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
Defendant.
___________________________
Plaintiff Thomas Hill seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security (Commissioner) denying his application for Social Security Disability
Income Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income benefits (SSI) under Titles II
and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (Act). Plaintiff contends
that the administrative record (AR) does not contain substantial evidence to support the
Commissioner’s decision that he was not disabled during the relevant time period. For
the reasons that follow, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born in 1972, has a high school education, and has past work as a
cashier/stocker, cook, manager, and prep cook. AR 198, 241. He filed applications for
DIB and SSI on October 13, 2011, alleging a disability onset date of February 1, 1999.
AR 198-99, 200-06. He contends that he is disabled due to depression, anxiety attacks,
bulimia, borderline personality disorder, Obsessive Compulsive Disease (OCD), and
fractured vertebra. AR 240.
On January 10, 2012, the Commissioner denied his claims. AR 113-21. Plaintiff
requested reconsideration on February 17, 2012, which was denied on April 16, 2012.
AR 124, 125-29. He then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
on April 23, 2012, and ALJ Jan Dutton conducted a hearing on June 10, 2013, at which
plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE) testified. AR 30-58, 145-46. At the hearing,
plaintiff amended his onset date to April 1, 2010. AR 32. On August 7, 2013, the ALJ
issued a decision denying plaintiff’s claim. AR 10-29.
Plaintiff sought review from the Appeals Council, which denied his request on
October 3, 2014. AR 1-4, 5-7. The ALJ’s decision thus became the final decision of
the Commissioner. AR 1; 20 CFR 404.981.
Plaintiff filed a complaint (Doc. 3) in this court on November 19, 2014, seeking
review of the ALJ’s decision. On April 15, 2015, with the consent of the parties (Doc.
15), the Honorable Mark W. Bennett transferred this case to a United States Magistrate
Judge for final disposition and entry of judgment. The parties have briefed the issues
and the matter is now fully submitted.
II.
DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF
A disability is defined as “the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 416.905. An individual has a disability when, due to his physical
or mental impairments, he “is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists . . . in significant numbers either in the region
where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.”
42 U.S.C. §§
423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). If the claimant is able to do work which exists in the
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national economy but is unemployed because of inability to get work, lack of
opportunities in the local area, economic conditions, employer hiring practices or other
factors, the ALJ will still find the claimant not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(c)(1)(8), 416.966(c)(1)-(8).
To determine whether a claimant has a disability within the meaning of the Act,
the Commissioner follows the five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in the
regulations. Id. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir.
2007). First, the Commissioner will consider a claimant’s work activity. If the claimant
is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). “Substantial” work activity involves physical or
mental activities. “Gainful” activity is work done for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1572(a), 404.1572(b).
Second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the
Commissioner looks to the severity of the claimant’s physical and medical impairments.
If the impairments are not severe, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).
An impairment is not severe if “it does not
significantly limit your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1521(a); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c), 416.921(a); Kirby, 500
F.3d at 707.
The ability to do basic work activities is defined as having “the abilities and
aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(b), 416.921(b). These
abilities and aptitudes include: (1) physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting,
lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; (2) capacities for seeing,
hearing, and speaking; (3) understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple
instructions; (4) use of judgment; (5) responding appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; and (6) dealing with changes in a routine work
3
setting. Id. §§ 404.1521(b)(1)-(6), 416.921(b)(1)-(6); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.
137, 141 (1987).
Third, if the claimant has a severe impairment, then the Commissioner will
determine its medical severity.
If the impairment meets or equals one of the
presumptively disabling impairments listed in the regulations, then the claimant is
considered disabled regardless of age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1520(d), 416.920(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(d); see Kelley v. Callahan,
133 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir. 1998).
Fourth, if the claimant’s impairment is severe, but it does not meet or equal one
of the presumptively disabling impairments, then the Commissioner will assess the
claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC) and the demands of his past relevant work.
If the claimant cannot do his past relevant work, then he is considered disabled. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1545(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.945(a)(4). Past
relevant work is any work the claimant has done within the past 15 years of his application
that was substantial gainful activity and lasted long enough for the claimant to learn how
to do it. Id. § 416.960(b)(1). “RFC is a medical question defined wholly in terms of the
claimant’s physical ability to perform exertional tasks or, in other words, what the
claimant can still do despite his or her physical or mental limitations.” Lewis v. Barnhart,
353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). The RFC is based on all relevant medical and other
evidence. Id. §§ 404.145(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3). The claimant is responsible for providing
the evidence the Commissioner will use to determine the RFC. Id. If a claimant retains
enough RFC to perform past relevant work, then the claimant is not disabled. Id. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv).
Fifth, if the claimant’s RFC as determined in Step Four will not allow the claimant
to perform past relevant work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show there
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is other work the claimant can do, given the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work
experience. Id. §§ 416.912(f), 416.920(a)(4)(v). The Commissioner must show not only
that the claimant’s RFC will allow him to make the adjustment to other work, but also
that other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Eichelberger v.
Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
416.920(a) (4)(v). If the claimant can make the adjustment, then the Commissioner will
find the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). At
Step Five, the Commissioner has the responsibility of developing the claimant’s complete
medical history before making a determination about the existence of a disability. Id.
§§ 404.145(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3). The burden of persuasion to prove disability remains
on the claimant. Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004).
If after these five steps, the ALJ has determined the claimant is disabled, but there
is medical evidence of substance use disorders, the ALJ must decide if that substance use
is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability.
42 U.S.C. §§
423(d)(2)(C). The ALJ must then evaluate the extent of the claimant’s limitations without
the substance use. Id. If the limitations would not be disabling, then the disorder is a
contributing factor material to determining disability and the claimant is not disabled. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1535, 416.935.
III.
THE ALJ’S FINDINGS
The ALJ made the following findings:
(1)
The claimant meets the insured status requirements of
the Social Security Act through June 30, 2011.
(2)
The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since April 1, 2010, the alleged onset date (20
CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).
(3)
The claimant has the following severe impairments:
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, depression,
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anxiety, borderline personality disorder, and a history
of methamphetamine, alcohol abuse, and marijuana
(20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
(4)
The claimant does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically
equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in
20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR
404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d),
416.925 and 416.926).
(5)
After careful consideration of the entire record, the
undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual
functional capacity to perform a full range of work at
all exertional levels but with the following
nonexertional limitations: the claimant has no physical
limitations but is limited to performing routine,
repetitive unskilled work with an SVP of 1-2, that does
not require extended concentration, attention, and goal
setting. The claimant should avoid intense, constant,
or frequent work with coworkers, supervisors, and the
general public; but can handle occasional, brief and
superficial social interaction.
(6)
Step 4 – The claimant is capable of performing past
relevant work as a dining room attendant (DOT
311.677-018) kitchen helper. This work does not
require the performance of work-related activities
precluded by the claimant’s residual functional
capacity (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).
(7)
Step 5 – Although the claimant is capable of
performing past relevant work, there are other jobs
existing in the national economy that he is also able to
perform. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge
makes the following alternative findings for step five
of the sequential evaluation process.
Step 5 – other work identified: The vocational expert
testified that given all of these factors the individual
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would be able to perform 90% of medium exertion
work, 80% of light work and 60-70% of sedentary
unskilled work.
(8)
The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined
in the Social Security Act, from April 1, 2010, through
the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(f) and
416.920(f)).
AR 13-25.
IV.
THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD
The Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed “if it is supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole.” Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577 (8th Cir.
2006); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as
to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”).
“Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Lewis, 353 F.3d at 645. The Eighth
Circuit explains the standard as “something less than the weight of the evidence and [that]
allows for the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions, thus it embodies a
zone of choice within which the [Commissioner] may decide to grant or deny benefits
without being subject to reversal on appeal.” Culbertson v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939
(8th Cir. 1994).
In determining whether the Commissioner’s decision meets this standard, the court
considers “all of the evidence that was before the ALJ, but it [does] not re-weigh the
evidence.” Wester v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2005). The court considers
both evidence which supports the Commissioner’s decision and evidence that detracts
from it. Kluesner v. Astrue, 607 F.3d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 2010). The court must “search
the record for evidence contradicting the [Commissioner’s] decision and give that
evidence appropriate weight when determining whether the overall evidence in support
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is substantial.” Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 555 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Cline v.
Sullivan, 939 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1991)).
In evaluating the evidence in an appeal of a denial of benefits, the court must apply
a balancing test to assess any contradictory evidence. Sobania v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 879 F.2d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1989). The court, however, does not
“reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ,” Baldwin, 349 F.3d at 555 (citing Bates v.
Chater, 54 F.3d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1995)), or “review the factual record de novo.” Roe
v. Chater, 92 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Naber v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 186, 188
(8th Cir. 1994)). Instead, if, after reviewing the evidence, the court finds it “possible to
draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents
the Commissioner’s findings, [the court] must affirm the [Commissioner’s] denial of
benefits.” Kluesner, 607 F.3d at 536 (quoting Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th
Cir. 2008)). This is true even in cases where the court “might have weighed the evidence
differently.” Culbertson, 30 F.3d at 939 (quoting Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817,
822 (8th Cir. 1992)). The court may not reverse the Commissioner’s decision “merely
because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision.” Baker v.
Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984); see Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 789
(8th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n administrative decision is not subject to reversal simply because
some evidence may support the opposite conclusion.”).
V.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s decision is flawed for four reasons:
1.
The ALJ erred by not including severe impairments;
2.
The ALJ erred by giving controlling weight to the nontreating,
nonexamining state agency doctors’ opinions;
3.
The ALJ erred by giving little or no weight to the examining source
medical opinion; and
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4.
There is not substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s RFC
assessment.
The court will address these arguments separately below.
A. ALJ’s Determination Whether Plaintiff Had a Severe Physical Injury
Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred because the ALJ did not find that plaintiff had severe
physical impairments.
Pl. Br. at 9. The ALJ found plaintiff had other severe
impairments, however, including attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, depression,
anxiety, borderline personality disorder, and a history of methamphetamine, alcohol,
and marijuana abuse. AR 16. Once the ALJ concluded at Step Two that plaintiff had
“severe” impairments, he then proceeded to evaluate plaintiff’s claim through the
remaining steps of the sequential evaluation process. At Step Two, a claimant must only
show “a severe” impairment—that is, one severe impairment—in order to avoid a denial
of benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).
As long as the ALJ finds one severe
impairment, the ALJ may not deny benefits at Step Two but must proceed to the next
step.
Id. Accordingly, the failure to find an additional particular impairment severe at
Step Two is not reversible error as long as the ALJ finds that at least one impairment is
severe.
Id.
Similarly, any alleged error by the ALJ in not considering the combined
effect of all of a claimant’s impairments “became harmless when the ALJ reached the
proper conclusion that [Plaintiff] could not be denied benefits conclusively at Step Two
and proceeded to the next step of the evaluation sequence.” Carpenter v. Astrue, 537
F.3d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008); see Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007)
(same); see also Maziarz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 837 F.2d 240, 244 (6th
Cir. 1987) (same).
Regardless, the ALJ did not err in concluding plaintiff did not have a severe physical
impairment. An impairment is “severe” if it “significantly limits [a claimant’s] physical
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or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). A
claimant bears the burden of establishing a severe impairment. See Anderson v. Barnhart,
344 F.3d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating standard of proof). “[S]everity is not an
onerous requirement for the claimant to meet . . . but it is also not a toothless standard,
and [the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has] upheld on numerous occasions the
Commissioner’s finding that a claimant failed to make this showing.” See Kirby v. Astrue,
500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 2007). In his application, plaintiff claimed severe physical
impairment due to a fractured vertebra and bulimia purging (AR 35, 43, 240); he did not
claim a physical impairment due to obesity. Plaintiff claimed his back injury was the
result of a fall on May 5, 2010 (AR 345), resulting in a minor compression fracture (AR
344). His treating physician released plaintiff with a brace and pain relievers, with no
record of further treatment (AR 344). In an October 2011 Function Report, plaintiff
indicated he could clean for two to three hours, wash clothes for three to five hours, and
mow for one and a half hours (AR 233). This evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that
plaintiff’s back injury was not severe.
Plaintiff argues, though, that the ALJ should have done more to develop the record
regarding plaintiff’s back injury. Pl.’s Br. at 11-12. A claimant bears the burden of
demonstrating he was prejudiced or treated unfairly by the ALJ’s failure to develop a
record. Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 881, 886 (8th Cir. 2006). In this case, the
Commissioner scheduled plaintiff for an examination with a nurse practitioner, whose
work was reviewed by a medical doctor (AR 424-26). She found plaintiff maintained
good motor strength, his fine motor skills remained intact, he had no appreciable
neurological deficits, and he performed heals/toe and tandem walk tasks satisfactorily (AR
426). In other words, there was nothing in this examination which would require further
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development of the record by the ALJ, or that the ALJ treated him unfairly by failing to
further develop the record.
Plaintiff also failed to show prejudice, especially given that the ALJ found at least one
other severe impairment at Step Two. Plaintiff must prove actual harm; he cannot simply
leave it up to this Court to sort through his arguments to find it.
“[T]he burden of
showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s
determination.” Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (citations omitted); see
Onstad v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1232, 1234 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding remand not warranted
where claimant was treated fairly and failed to show that he was prejudiced); see also
Owen v. Astrue, 551 F.3d 792, 800 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[A]ny error on the part of the ALJ
was harmless because there was no indication that the ALJ would have decided differently
in the absence of the error.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Whether
plaintiff’s “severe” impairments should have also included the additional impairments he
alleges is ultimately irrelevant to the claim of prejudice, in any event, because the ALJ
found that he had severe impairments and proceeded through the sequential evaluation.
Thus, any alleged error at Step Two would not change the ultimate outcome.
See
Carpenter, 537 F.3d at 1266.
Finally, plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred by “fixating” on plaintiff’s alcohol and drug
abuse history. Pl.’s Br., at 9-12. There was nothing improper or erroneous in the ALJ
finding that plaintiff’s substance abuse constituted a severe impairment as the evidence
supported that finding. Regardless, inclusion of the impairment at Step Two is not
erroneous where, as here, there was at least one other severe impairment, and the ALJ
considered all of the plaintiff’s impairments, severe and otherwise, under the remaining
steps of the sequential evaluation process.
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B. The ALJ’s Weighing of State Agency Medical Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by giving controlling weight to non-treating, consulting
medical consultants employed by the state. Pl.’s Br., at 12. An ALJ can give controlling
weight only to a treating physician. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). An
ALJ must, however, consider and rely on non-examining or treating physicians’ opinions.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2)(i), 416.927(e)(2)(i). See also Casey v. Astrue, 503 F.3d
687, 697 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding as well-settled an ALJ’s authority to consider opinions
of non-treating medical advisors).
In this case, the ALJ considered and relied in part on opinions of medical consultants
John May, M.D., and Beverly Westra, Ph.D., who worked for the state (AR 20-21, 9296). Plaintiff does not argue or provide a basis to establish that these medical advisors
were unqualified. The record shows the ALJ considered their opinions, along with the
rest of the medical evidence presented. See Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 807-08
(8th Cir. 2004) (holding that opinions from non-treating medical advisors can constitute
substantial evidence supporting an ALJ’s findings when the opinions are consistent with
other medical evidence). Their opinions are consistent with the medical records, and
therefore, the ALJ was proper in considering and relying upon them.
There is nothing in the record to establish that the ALJ afforded their opinions
“controlling” authority.
Plaintiff’s assertion to the contrary, even when made
emphatically and repeatedly, does not constitute evidence. The ALJ considered plaintiff’s
non-treating consultant’s opinion (AR 21, 482, 923). The ALJ said nothing that indicates
that she gave the state agency physicians’ opinions controlling weight; rather, the record
reflects a weighing of the opinions of all of the non-treating physicians.
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C. Plaintiff’s Examining Physician’s Opinion
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by giving little or no weight to the opinion of an
examining, non-treating physician. Pl.’s Br., at 13-15. In December 2012, consulting
psychologist Michael Baker, Ph.D., examined plaintiff. AR 21, 479-482, 923. Dr.
Baker diagnosed plaintiff with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, generalized anxiety
disorder, major depressive disorder, and a history of amphetamine abuse. AR 482.
During the examination, plaintiff claimed he had not abused controlled substances since
2000. AR 480. Dr. Baker concluded defendant:
would seem to have the ability to remember and understand instructions,
procedures, and locations. For employment tasks that are not particularly
complex, [plaintiff’s] ability to maintain attention, concentration, and pace
appears to be adequate. His history of emotional problems are [sic] likely
to interfere in sustained responsible functioning. His actual responses to
mental status exam suggests that he is capable of having good judgment
when responding to appropriate changes in the workplace. However, his
past methamphetamine abuse, mental health issues, and, of course,
borderline personality traits might affect sustained good judgment under
perceived stress.
AR 482. Six months later, in June 2013, Dr. Baker sent a letter to plaintiff’s counsel in
response to an undisclosed solicitation by plaintiff’s counsel sent two days after plaintiff’s
hearing. AR 21, 30, 923. Although Dr. Baker had not examined plaintiff in the interim,
Dr. Baker altered his opinion, now concluding plaintiff:
would have difficulty attending a job on a day to day basis, eight full hours
each day for five straight days every week after week. Based on history
and other reasons stated in the report, client would likely miss work often
and that might be estimated at once a week or five times a month.
AR 923.
The ALJ considered Dr. Baker’s report and opinions (AR 20), but discounted it
because the ALJ found Dr. Baker’s report did not support Dr. Baker’s revised opinion
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and because Dr. Baker provided the opinions after plaintiff had misinformed Dr. Baker
about plaintiff’s substance abuse history (AR 21). An ALJ may discount the opinion of
a physician whose medical record does not support the opinion.
20 C.F.R.
§§404.1527(c)(3), 416.927(c)(3); see also Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 930 (8th
Cir. 2010). Moreover, an ALJ need not given any significance to Dr. Baker’s opinion
of plaintiff’s ability to attend work because that is a decision reserved to the ALJ.
Davidson v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 838, 842 (8th Cir. 2009). This court cannot conclude that
the ALJ erred in discounting Dr. Baker’s opinion where the plaintiff misinformed Dr.
Baker, and where Dr. Baker altered his opinion in response to an undisclosed solicitation
by plaintiff’s attorney such that it was inconsistent with Dr. Baker’s own prior opinion.
See Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 925 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that an ALJ may
discount a medical opinion which is “inconsistent or contrary to the medical evidence as
a whole”).
D. The ALJ’s Finding of Residual Functional Capacity
Plaintiff claims the record lacks substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding
of plaintiff’s RFC. Pl.’s Br., at 16-18. The ALJ determined plaintiff was capable of
work at all exertional levels, subject to certain mental limitations. AR 18. Plaintiff
concedes there was no treating physician upon whose opinion the ALJ could rest this
determination (Pl.’s Br., at 17-18). The ALJ relied instead on the State agency’s medical
consultants’ opinions (AR 19-20). The ALJ found plaintiff’s subjective complaints not
fully credible based on the medical evidence, plaintiff’s admission in June 2010 that he
was “finally able to work,” the effectiveness of medication to control plaintiff’s
symptoms, plaintiff’s non-compliance with treatment, and plaintiff’s poor work history
(AR 19-22).
The claimant’s RFC is “what [the claimant] can still do” despite his or her
“physical or mental limitations.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).
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“The ALJ must
determine a claimant’s RFC based on all of the relevant evidence.” Fredrickson v.
Barnhart, 359 F.3d 972, 976 (8th Cir. 2004). This includes “an individual’s own
description of [her] limitations.” McGeorge v. Barnhart, 321 F.3d 766, 768 (8th Cir.
2003) (quoting McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000)). The claimant’s
RFC “is a medical question,” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001), and
must be supported by “some medical evidence.” Dykes v. Apfel, 223 F.3d 865, 867 (8th
Cir. 2000) (per curiam). The medical evidence should address the claimant’s “ability to
function in the workplace.” Lewis, 353 F.3d at 646. At Step Four, the claimant has the
burden to prove his RFC and the ALJ determines the RFC based on all relevant evidence.
See Harris v. Barnhart, 356 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 2004).
The ALJ is not required to mechanically list and reject every possible limitation.
McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605, 615 (8th Cir. 2011). Furthermore, “[a]n ALJ’s failure
to cite specific evidence does not indicate that such evidence was not considered.”
Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 966 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d
383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998)). “[T]he ALJ may reject the conclusions of any medical expert,
whether hired by a claimant or by the government, if inconsistent with the medical record
as a whole.” Bentley v. Shalala, 52 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 1995). The RFC must only
include those impairments which are substantially supported by the record as a whole.
Goose v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Forte v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d
892, 897 (8th Cir. 2004).
The ALJ’s reliance on the State agency consulting physicians was permissible where,
as here, there was no treating physician. Further, although the ALJ must consider a
claimant’s subjective complaints, the ALJ is responsible for resolving credibility questions
and conflicting medical information. Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 725 (8th Cir. 2002).
There is a basis in the record for the ALJ to have discounted the credibility of plaintiff’s
15
subjective complaints where they were inconsistent with other medical evidence and plaintiff’s
own statements. This court cannot reweigh the evidence, nor find reversible error merely
because it would have decided the case differently.
Wildman, 596 F.3d at 964;
McKinney, 228 F.3d at 863; Loving v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 16 F.3d 967,
969 (8th Cir. 1994). Rather, the court must determine whether substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s conclusion, not whether the ALJ could have reached a different
decision. See Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Even if we
would have weighed the evidence differently, we must affirm the denial of benefits if
there is enough evidence on the other side.”). Here, the court finds that, on the record
as a whole, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s RFC finding.
VI.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, and without minimizing the seriousness of
plaintiff’s impairments, the court finds that the Commissioner’s determination that
plaintiff was not disabled is affirmed. Judgment shall be entered against plaintiff and in
favor of the Commissioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of March, 2016.
__________________________________
C.J. Williams
United States Magistrate Judge
Northern District of Iowa
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