Ricard v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 14

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 2 Complaint to affirm the Commissioners determination and enter judgment against claimant and in favor of the Commissioner. Objections to R&R due by 5/27/2016. Signed by Magistrate Judge CJ Williams on 5/13/2016. (des)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
KARI SUE RICARD,
Plaintiff,

No. C15-4046-LTS

vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,

REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION

Defendant.
___________________________

Plaintiff, Kari Sue Ricard (claimant), seeks judicial review of a final decision of

the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) denying her application for
disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income benefits (SSI),
under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (Act).
Claimant contends that the administrative record (AR) does not contain substantial
evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision that she was not disabled during the
relevant time period. For the reasons that follow, I recommend the Court affirm the
Commissioner’s decision.
I.

BACKGROUND

Claimant was born in 1962, and completed high school. AR 32. She has past
relevant work as a bookkeeper, cafeteria attendant, and a secretary. AR 33-35. She
applied for DIB on May 30, 2012, and then for SSI on August 27, 2012, alleging a
disability onset date of August 18, 2007. AR 12. She alleged disability due to a brain
injury suffered on August 18, 2007, and resultant depression, balance issues, emotional

problems, memory loss, loss of taste and smell, arm and leg weakness, and tiredness.
AR 335-363.
The

Commissioner

reconsideration.

denied

AR 109, 114-121.

claimant’s

application,

initially

and

upon

Claimant then requested a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). On November 14, 2013, an ALJ conducted a hearing
at which claimant and a vocational expert testified. AR 29-55. The ALJ issued a decision
denying claimant’s claim on February 14, 2014. AR 9-26. The ALJ found claimant was
unable to perform past relevant work. AR 21. The ALJ determined, however, that there
was other work claimant could perform such as photocopy machine operator, sealing and
cancelling machine operator, and solderer. AR 21-22.
Claimant then sought review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council, which
it denied on May 19, 2015. AR 1-5. The ALJ’s decision stands as the final decision of
the Commissioner. AR 1; 20 C.F.R. § 416.1481.
Claimant filed a complaint (Doc. 2) in this Court on June 8, 2015, seeking review
of the Commissioner’s decision. This matter has been referred to me pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for the filing of a report and recommended disposition. The
parties have briefed the issues, and the matter is now fully submitted.
II.

DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF

A disability is defined as “the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20
C.F.R. § 416.905. An individual has a disability when, due to her physical or mental
impairments, she “is not only unable to do her previous work but cannot, considering
her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists . . . in significant numbers either in the region where such individual
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lives or in several regions of the country.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A) & 1382c(a)(3)(B).
If the claimant is able to do work which exists in the national economy but is unemployed
because of inability to get work, lack of opportunities in the local area, economic
conditions, employer hiring practices, or other factors, the ALJ will still find the claimant
not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(c)(1)-(8).
To determine whether a claimant has a disability within the meaning of the Act,
the Commissioner follows the five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in the
regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; see also Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir.
2007). First, the Commissioner will consider a claimant’s work activity. If the Claimant
is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4)(i). “Substantial” work activity involves physical or mental activities.
“Gainful” activity is work done for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. § 416.972(a)-(b).
Second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the
Commissioner looks to the severity of the claimant’s physical and medical impairments.
If the impairments are not severe, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4)(ii). An impairment is not severe if “it does not significantly limit your
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(a); see also
20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(c), 416.921(a); Kirby, 500 F.3d at 707.
The ability to do basic work activities is defined as having “the abilities and
aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(b). These abilities and
aptitudes include: (1) physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting,
pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; (2) capacities for seeing, hearing, and
speaking; (3) understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) use
of judgment; (5) responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work
situations; and (6) dealing with changes in a routine work setting.
416.921(b)(1)-(6); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987).

3

20 C.F.R. §

Third, if the claimant has a severe impairment, then the Commissioner will
determine its medical severity.

If the impairment meets or equals one of the

presumptively disabling impairments listed in the regulations, then the claimant is
considered disabled regardless of age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§
416.920(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(d); see Kelley v. Callahan, 133 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir.
1998).
Fourth, if the claimant’s impairment is severe, but it does not meet or equal one
of the presumptively disabling impairments, then the Commissioner will assess the
claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC) and the demands of her past relevant work.
If the claimant cannot do her past relevant work, then, she is considered disabled. 20
C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.945(a)(4). Past relevant work is any work the claimant
has done within the past 15 years of her application that was substantial gainful activity
and lasted long enough for the claimant to learn how to do it. 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(b)(1).
“RFC is a medical question defined wholly in terms of the claimant’s physical ability to
perform exertional tasks or, in other words, what the claimant can still do despite her or
her physical or mental limitations.” Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir.
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). The RFC is
based on all relevant medical and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3). The
claimant is responsible for providing the evidence the Commissioner will use to determine
the RFC. Id. If a claimant retains enough RFC to perform past relevant work, then the
Claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv).
Fifth, if the claimant’s RFC, as determined in Step Four, will not allow the
claimant to perform past relevant work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to
show there is other work the claimant can do, given the claimant’s RFC, age, education,
and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.912(f), 416.920(a)(4)(v). The Commissioner
must show not only that the claimant’s RFC will allow him [her] to make the adjustment
to other work, but also that other work exists in significant numbers in the national
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economy. Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can make the adjustment, then the Commissioner will
find the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). At step five, the
Commissioner has the responsibility of developing the claimant’s complete medical
history before making a determination about the existence of a disability. 20 C.F.R. §
416.945(a)(3). The burden of persuasion to prove disability remains on the claimant.
Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004).
If after these five steps, the ALJ has determined the claimant is disabled, but there
is medical evidence of substance use disorders, the ALJ must decide if that substance use
is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability.

42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(2)(C). The ALJ must then evaluate the extent of the claimant’s limitations without
the substance use. Id. If the limitations would not be disabling, then the disorder is a
contributing factor material to determining disability, and the claimant is not disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 416.935.
III.

THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

The ALJ made the following findings:
1.
The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through March 31, 2011.
2.
The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
August 18, 2007, the alleged onset date (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1574 et seq.,
and 416.971 et seq.).
3.
The claimant has the following severe impairments: remote history
of skull fracture with subdural hematoma status post-surgical drainage, mild
encephalomacia, late effects of intracranial injury (cognitive impairment)
and dysthymia (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
4.
The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the
impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20
5

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and
416.926)).
5.
The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a range
of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) in
that the claimant can occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds, frequently
lift and/or carry 10 pounds, stand and/or walk (with normal breaks) for a
total of about six hours in an eight-hour workday and sit (with normal
breaks) for a total of about six hours in an eight-hour workday. The
claimant must avoid climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds. The claimant is
limited to occasional postural maneuvers, such as stooping, kneeling,
crouching and crawling. She must avoid even moderate exposure to
hazards. The claimant may struggle with complex tasks, but retains the
ability to complete 3-4 step tasks on a sustained basis.
6.
The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1565 and 416.965).
7.
The claimant was born on June 13, 1962, and was 45 years old,
which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49 on the alleged disability
onset date (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563 and 416.963).
8.
The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to
communicate in English (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1564 and 416.964.)
9.
Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of
disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework
supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the
claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 2).
10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers
in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 C.F.R. §§
404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).
11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social
Security Act, from August 18, 2007, through the date of this decision (20
C.F.R. §§ 404.350(a)(5), 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
6

AR 13-23.
IV.

THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD

This court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision “if it is supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577
(8th Cir. 2006); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social
Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”).
“Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Lewis, 353 F.3d at 645. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals explains the standard as “something less than the weight of the
evidence and [that] allows for the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions,
thus it embodies a zone of choice within which the [Commissioner] may decide to grant
or deny benefits without being subject to reversal on appeal.” Culbertson v. Shalala, 30
F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994).
In determining whether the Commissioner’s decision meets this standard, the court
considers “all of the evidence that was before the ALJ, but it [does] not re-weigh the
evidence.” Wester v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2005). The court considers
both evidence which supports the Commissioner’s decision and evidence that detracts
from it. Kluesner v. Astrue, 607 F.3d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 2010). The court must “search
the record for evidence contradicting the [Commissioner’s] decision and give that
evidence appropriate weight when determining whether the overall evidence in support
is substantial.” Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 555 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Cline v.
Sullivan, 939 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1991)).
In evaluating the evidence in an appeal of a denial of benefits, the court must apply
a balancing test to assess any contradictory evidence. Sobania v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 879 F.2d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1989). The court, however, does not
“reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ,” Baldwin, 349 F.3d at 555 (citing Bates v.
Chater, 54 F.3d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1995)), or “review the factual record de novo.” Roe
7

v. Chater, 92 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Naber v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 186, 188
(8th Cir. 1994)). Instead, if, after reviewing the evidence, the court finds it “possible to
draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents
the Commissioner’s findings, [the court] must affirm the [Commissioner’s] denial of
benefits.” Kluesner, 607 F.3d at 536 (quoting Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th
Cir. 2008)). This is true even in cases where the court “might have weighed the evidence
differently.” Culbertson, 30 F.3d at 939 (quoting Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817,
822 (8th Cir. 1992)). The court may not reverse the Commissioner’s decision “merely
because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision.” Baker v.
Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984); see Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 789
(8th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n administrative decision is not subject to reversal simply because
some evidence may support the opposite conclusion.”).
V.

DISCUSSION

Claimant argues the ALJ’s decision is flawed for two reasons: (1) the vocational
expert’s testimony to the hypothetical question was flawed; and (2) the ALJ allegedly
erroneously substituted her own opinion for that of treating doctors. I will address these
arguments separately below.
A. The ALJ’s Hypothetical Question to the Vocational Expert
The ALJ asked the vocational expert to consider an individual of claimant’s age,
education, and work experience who could perform light work with the following
limitations: could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, but occasionally perform all
other postural movements; must avoid even moderate exposure to workplace hazards;
could struggle with complex tasks on a sustained basis, but retained the ability to complete
three to four step tasks on a sustained basis. AR 49. These limitations are virtually the
same as the ALJ’s RFC finding, discussed below. Claimant argues that the ALJ should
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have also included recommendations psychologist John Meyers, Psy. D., made
suggesting claimant needed to reduce sensitivity overload and take short naps in the early
afternoon to help “charge up her body.”
As discussed in detail below, Dr. Meyers’ recommendations were not work-related
limitations.

Rather, they were suggestions to help claimant reduce frustrations with

managing her condition.

The ALJ considered Dr. Meyers’ opinion as a whole, and

included appropriate limitations in the RFC to the extent consistent with the record as a
whole. Hypothetical questions need only include those impairments and limitations the
record supports. See, e.g., Vandenboom v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 2005)
(hypothetical is sufficient if it includes the limitations that the ALJ accepted as true);
Haggard v. Apfel, 175 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 1999) (same); Cruze v. Chater, 85 F.3d
1320, 1323 (8th Cir. 1996) (same).
Therefore, the hypothetical question the ALJ posed to the vocational expert accurately
reflected her work limitations. Vocational expert testimony, based on a properly phrased
hypothetical question, may provide substantial evidence to support an ALJ’s step five
finding that a claimant can perform work existing in significant numbers in the national
economy.

Grissom v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 834, 837 (8th Cir. 2005). In response to the

properly supported hypothetical question the ALJ posed in this case, the vocational expert’s
testimony provided substantial evidence that claimant could perform other work existing
in significant numbers in the national economy (AR 21-22).
B. The ALJ’s Evaluation of the Expert Medical Opinions
Claimant alleges the ALJ substituted her own opinion for that of claimant’s treating
doctor. I find the ALJ properly evaluated Dr. Meyers’ opinion. AR 18. On March 18,
2009, Dr. Meyers completed a neurological assessment where he found that claimant’s
general attention, concentration, and working memory were average and within normal
functioning limits.

AR 329.

Dr. Meyers further found that claimant’s cognitive
9

processing speed and mental flexibility were average and within normal functioning
limits. AR 329. He further found that claimant’s overall verbal reasoning was low
average, but also generally within normal functioning limits. AR 329. Further, he found
claimant’s overall verbal reasoning was within normal functioning limits, while her visual
reasoning skills were mildly impaired. AR 329.
Dr. Meyers also found that claimant’s ability to understand, remember, and carry
out very short and simple, as well as detailed, instructions was within normal limits. AR
329. Dr. Meyers found claimant’s ability to maintain attention and concentration for
extended periods were normal, but her ability to perform activities within a schedule,
maintain regular attendance, and sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision
was mildly impaired. AR 328-330. Dr. Meyers further opined that claimant’s ability to
make simple, work-related decisions, interact appropriately with the general public,
accept instructions, and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors were mildly
to moderately impaired. AR 330.

Dr. Meyers also opined that claimant’s ability to

maintain socially appropriate behavior and adhere to basic standards of behavior were
mildly impaired. AR 330. Finally, Dr. Meyers opined that claimant’s ability to maintain
her own schedule and complete a work week, without undue interruptions from
psychologically based symptoms, were only mildly impaired. AR 330.
Claimant asserts that the ALJ “ignored the restrictions placed upon” claimant by
Dr. Meyers. At the end of his assessment, Dr. Meyers offered several recommendations
to aid claimant in reducing frustrations caused by her impairments. AR 330. For
example, Dr. Meyers recommended that claimant write notes to herself and maintain a
memory book for organization, develop patterns and routines, reduce sensitivity or
overload, avoid crowds, and take short naps in the early afternoon. AR 330. Claimant
argues that the ALJ committed a reversible error when she failed to include the doctor’s
recommendations in the hypothetical question she presented to the vocational expert.

10

Claimant mischaracterizes Dr. Meyers’ behavioral recommendations.

Although

Dr. Meyers indicated claimant had mild to moderate limitations in various areas of
cognitive functioning, he did not assess any specific, work-related restrictions. These
opinions of Dr. Meyers are suggestions to claimant on how to cope; they are not work-related
limitations. Opinions that a claimant would have difficulties in certain areas, without
further elaboration, are of limited value due to vagueness.

See Piepgras v. Chater, 76

F.3d 233, 236 (8th Cir. 1996). The ALJ discussed all the relevant medical evidence,
including Dr. Meyers’ neurological assessment, and assessed all limitations that the
record supported in her RFC finding. The ALJ was not required to incorporate a
psychologist’s coping suggestions into her RFC finding.
While discussing the “paragraph B” criteria,1 the ALJ discussed some of Dr.
Meyers’ findings regarding claimant’s social functioning. AR 16, 330-331. The ALJ
noted that claimant’s ability to work in coordination with or in proximity to others without
being too distractible was generally within normal limitations. AR 16, 330-331. The
ALJ further noted Dr. Meyers’ finding that claimant had only mild limitations in the
ability to interact appropriately with the general public, maintain socially appropriate
behavior, and adhere to basic standards of behavior. AR 16, 330-331.
The ALJ discussed other treatment records contained within the same medical
record as Dr. Meyers’ assessment. The ALJ noted that although claimant reported having
numbness in her fingers and toes in October 2007, her neurological examinations were
within normal limits.

AR 18, 335-338.

The ALJ further noted that during the

neurological assessment in March 2009, claimant complained of various neurological

1

To satisfy the paragraph B criteria, claimant must show at least two of the following: 1) marked
restriction of activities of daily living; or 2) marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning;
or 3) marked difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; or 4) repeated
episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1.

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symptoms. AR 18, 324-327. The ALJ found that neurological testing showed some
cognitive limitations, but overall claimant scored a full scale IQ of 91, which fell within
the average range. AR 18, 325-326. Dr. Meyers also observed that claimant appeared
to over-report her physical symptoms, which suggests that her symptoms were not as
severe as alleged. AR 18, 327. Finally, the ALJ mentioned that Dr. Meyers’ diagnostic
impression was closed head injury with loss of consciousness, late effects of intracranial
injury (cognitive impairment), and dysthymia. AR 18, 330. Thus, the ALJ properly
considered, discussed, and assessed Dr. Meyers’ neurological assessment.
Although the ALJ did not specify the weight she assigned to Dr. Meyers’ opinion,
it is clear that she properly considered the opinion.

An ALJ’s specific references in her

decision to portions of the doctor’s opinion were sufficient to show that she considered
the opinion.

See Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 385-86 (8th Cir. 1998). Further, an

ALJ’s failure to cite specific evidence does not indicate that such evidence was not
considered. Id.
The ALJ included nonexertional limitations in her RFC assessment that were
consistent with Dr. Meyers’ assessment. The ALJ found that despite the mild limitations
Dr. Meyers noted, claimant may struggle with complex tasks, but retained the ability to
complete three to four step tasks on a sustained basis. AR 17. See Howard v. Barnhart,
379 F.3d 945, 947 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding that if the treating physician evidence does
not conflict with the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination, then the burden to
expressly discuss such evidence is minimized).

Here, the ALJ’s RFC finding is not

inconsistent with the mild to moderate findings Dr. Meyers expressed in his assessment.
On July 30, 2012, the state agency medical consultant, Jennifer Wigton, Ph.D.,
reviewed the medical evidence and found that claimant had only mild limitations in
activities of daily living and social functioning and moderate difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence, and pace. AR 60. Dr. Wigton also found that claimant had
moderate limitations in the ability to carry out detailed instructions and the ability to
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complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically
based symptoms. AR 64. However, Dr. Wigton generally found that claimant had no
significant limitations in the remaining areas of cognitive functioning. AR 63-64. On
October 19, 2012, Myrna Tashner, Ed.D, reviewed the evidence of record and agreed
with Dr. Wigton’s findings. AR 87, 90-91.

The ALJ properly relied on this opinion.

See 20 C.F.R.§§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e) (ALJ may rely upon state-agency opinions as
medical opinion evidence); SSR 96-6p (July 2, 1996), Consideration of Administrative
Findings of Fact by State Agency Medical and Psychological Consultants, available at
1966 WL 374180, at *3 (ALJ may assign greater weight to state-agency opinions than to
treating-source opinions)); accord Smith v. Colvin, 756 F.3d 621, 626-27 (8th Cir. 2014);
see also Jones, 619 F.3d at 971 (requiring only that the record contain “some medical
evidence” supporting the ALJ’s decision”).
The ALJ further noted that claimant’s consultative examination showed that her
memory scores ranged from 99 to 117, which were noted to be average to high average.
AR 18, 295. See Smith, 756 F.3d at 626-27 (an ALJ may discount a treating doctor’s
opinion where objective testing is more reliable or is inconsistent). The consultative
examiner further stated that “clearly her memory is not a problem,” which contradicts
claimant’s alleged memory impairment. AR 296. The ALJ further noted the consultative
examiner opined that claimant was able to sustain concentration and attention to complete
tasks and understand, remember short and simple instructions under ordinary supervision.
AR 296.
The ALJ properly determined that claimant could perform unskilled jobs,
involving three to four step tasks on a sustained basis, which is consistent with the record
as a whole. AR 17, 50. Dr. Meyers found that claimant’s cognitive functioning was
within normal limits, with only mild to moderate limitations in the ability to make simple,
work-related decisions, request assistance or accept criticism from supervisors, interact
with the general public, and maintain socially appropriate behavior, and manage her own
13

schedule, and complete a workweek without undue interruptions form psychologically
based symptoms. AR 329-330.
The state agency medical experts, Dr. Wigton and Dr. Tashner, also concluded
that claimant was limited to unskilled work. AR 66. Unskilled work involves dealing
primarily with objects, rather than data or people, and such jobs generally provide
substantial vocational opportunity for a person with solely mental impairments. SSR 8515. The vocational expert testified that claimant could perform three unskilled jobs,
including work as a photocopy machine operator, sealing and canceling machine operator,
and solderer. AR 22, 50-51.
In deciding whether claimant was disabled, the ALJ considered medical opinions
along with the rest of the relevant evidence in the record.
842, 848 (8th Cir. 2007).

Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d

In light of the medical evidence supporting the ALJ’s

determination, there is no basis for me to find that the ALJ substituted her own opinion
for that of Dr. Meyers. The ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert included
all of the limitations supported by the record.

AR 17, 49-50.

Consequently, the

vocational expert’s response to the hypothetical inquiry constitutes substantial evidence
that claimant could perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national
economy. Haggard, 175 F.3d at 594. Despite her assertions that the ALJ committed
reversible error, claimant has failed to identify any additional limitations that would
preclude her from performing unskilled work. Thus, based upon the vocational expert’s
testimony, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that claimant could perform a
significant number of jobs that exist in the national economy.
In sum, the ALJ properly found that claimant’s impairments did not preclude her
from sustaining work activity. The ALJ properly considered the record as a whole,
including Dr. Meyers’ assessment, and assessed limitations that the objective evidence
supported.

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions.

14

Wildman, 596 F.3d

at 964; Loving v. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., Sec’y, 16 F.3d at 967, 969 (8th Cir.
1994).
VI.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, and without minimizing the seriousness of
claimant’s impairments, I RESPECTFULLY RECOMMEND that the Court affirm the
Commissioner’s determination that claimant was not disabled, and that the Court enter
judgment against claimant and in favor of the Commissioner.
Parties must file objections to this Report and Recommendation in accordance with
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) within fourteen (14) days of the service
of a copy of this Report and Recommendation. Objections must specify the parts of the
Report and Recommendation to which objections are made, as well as the parts of the
record forming the basis for the objections. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Failure to object to
the Report and Recommendation waives the right to de novo review by the district court
of any portion of the Report and Recommendation as well as the right to appeal from the
findings of fact contained therein. United States v. Wise, 588 F.3d 531, 537 n.5 (8th
Cir. 2009).
IT IS SO ORDERED this 13th day of May, 2016.

__________________________________
C.J. Williams
United States Magistrate Judge
Northern District of Iowa

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