Scheckel v. State of Iowa et al

Filing 12

ORDER granting 7 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The clerk's office is directed to enter judgment in favor of the defendants. Signed by Chief Judge Linda R Reade on 10/27/16. (copy w/NEF mailed to Petitioner) (jjh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
EASTERN DIVISION

ELMER SCHECKEL,
Plaintiff,

No. C16-2100-LRR

vs.
STATE OF IOWA, IOWA SUPREME
COURT, BUCHANAN COUNTY
COURT,

ORDER

Defendants.

This matter is before the court pursuant to the defendants’ motion to dismiss (docket
no. 7). The defendants filed such motion on September 29, 2016. The plaintiff filed a
resistance (docket no. 8) on October 13, 2016. The defendants filed a reply (docket no.
10) on October 24, 2016.
I. APPLICABLE STANDARDS
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal on the
basis of “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). In determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim sufficient to survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept all of the plaintiff’s factual allegations
as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 696 (2009). With respect to the facts, “‘[t]he
court may consider the pleadings themselves, materials embraced by the pleadings, exhibits
attached to the pleadings, and matters of public record.’” Illig v. Union Elec. Co., 652
F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498
(8th Cir. 2010)); accord Mulvenon v. Greenwood, 643 F.3d 653, 656-57 (8th Cir. 2011);
Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999).

“To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); accord B & B
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 569 F.3d 383, 387 (8th Cir. 2009). A claim
satisfies the plausibility standard “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 556);
see also Parkhurst v. Tabor, 569 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[A] complaint must
contain factual allegations sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level
. . .’” (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555)); Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 507
F.3d 614, 618 (8th Cir. 2007) (examining federal pleading standards).
Although a plaintiff need not provide “detailed” facts in support of his or her
allegations, the “short and plain statement” requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (citing Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555); see also
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (“Specific facts are not necessary [under Rule
8(a)(2)].”). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl.,
550 U.S. at 555). And, “[w]here the allegations show on the face of the complaint [that]
there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.”
Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 546 (8th Cir. 1997)).
“A motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1)] which is limited to a facial attack on the pleadings is subject to the same standard
as a motion brought under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)].” Mattes v. ABC
2

Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 698 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d
724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990)); see also Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d
517, 520-21 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing standard of review). The court, however, must
address the challenge to subject matter jurisdiction before addressing a defendant’s other
arguments. See Moran v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1994)
(stating the district court must consider jurisdictional motions first, because a court must
find jurisdiction before considering the merits of a claim); United States ex rel. Kreindler
& Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1155-56 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating the
court should address Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) challenge before Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
motion).
A pro se party’s pleadings are to be liberally construed and are held “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d
537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam)); accord United States v. Sellner, 773 F.3d 927, 932 (8th Cir. 2014). Liberal
construction requires that, “if the essence of an allegation is discernible . . ., then the
district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to
be considered within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787
(8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). “Although
pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, ‘they still must allege sufficient facts to
support the claims advanced.’” Stringer v. St. James R-1 Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 799, 802
(8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Stone, 364 F.3d at 914). Additionally, the court is not permitted
to act as counsel to either party. See Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984)
(“A pro se litigant should receive meaningful notice of what is expected of him, but the
court is not permitted to act as counsel for either party.”). Therefore, the court is not
permitted to construct claims on behalf of a pro se party, even though it has a duty to
liberally construe his or her pleadings. Cf. id.; Farnsworth v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl.
513, 518 (Fed. Cl. 2012) (noting that a pro se plaintiff is entitled to liberal construction
3

of his or her pleadings; however, there is no duty on the part of the court to create a claim
which the pro se party has not asserted in his or her pleading). Likewise, the court will
not rewrite deficient pleadings to save them. See Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090,
1096 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Th[e] court, however, will not supply additional factual
allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s
behalf.” (quoting Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997)));
Dawkins v. Glover, 308 Fed. App’x 394, 395 (11th Cir. 2009) (“However, [the court] will
not act as de facto counsel for pro se parties or rewrite a deficient pleading.” (formatting
omitted)).
II. ANALYSIS
Having reviewed the record, the court concludes that it is appropriate to dismiss the
claims against the defendants for the reasons stated in their briefs. The defendants
adequately set forth the law and apply such law to the facts that are set forth in the
plaintiff’s complaint. Namely, the defendants correctly conclude that: (1) the court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and/or the plaintiff’s claims
are precluded, (2) the court is unable to interfere in ongoing state court matters, (3) the
defendants are immune from suit and (4) the plaintiff failed to state a valid federal claim
in his complaint.
In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), the Supreme Court clarified
that only it has the authority to entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify a state court
judgment. Id. at 416; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (granting only the United States
Supreme Court the power to review final judgments rendered by high courts of a state).
In District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), the Supreme
Court reaffirmed that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review final state court
judgments in judicial proceedings. Id. at 482-86. The Supreme Court concluded that
federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review issues that are “inextricably intertwined”
with the issues previously decided in a state court proceeding. Id. at 486. The two
4

principles have merged to become the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which stands for the
proposition that federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review final state
judgments or to review claims that are inextricably intertwined with state court decisions.
See Riehm v. Engelking, 538 F.3d 952, 964 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining limited scope of
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Lemonds v. St. Louis Cty., 222 F.3d 488, 493 (8th Cir.
2000) (explaining when a federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court
judgment).
Here, the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the judgments that entered against
him the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County. The judicial actions attacked in this
case were taken in adversary proceedings and within the scope of the color of authority
granted to the defendants. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff’s allegations of error are “inextricably intertwined”
with the issues that were resolved in the state court proceedings. Stated differently, the
court lacks the authority to review and reject the state court judgments. It is not possible
for the court to grant the requested relief without disrupting the judicial process of the
Iowa courts; the plaintiff’s recourse, if any, is through the Iowa appellate procedure and,
ultimately, a review by the United States Supreme Court. Because the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, dismissal is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12.
Alternatively,
[t]he federal courts have traditionally adhered to the related
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Under res
judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes
the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or
could have been raised in that action. Under collateral
estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law
necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude
relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action
involving a party to the first case. . . . The federal courts
generally have also consistently accorded preclusive effect to
issues decided by state courts. Indeed, [under the Full Faith
and Credit Statute—28 U.S.C. § 1738, the federal courts must]
5

give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the
courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would
do so.
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-96 (1980) (citations omitted); see also Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291-94 (2005) (explaining that RookerFeldman is a jurisdictional doctrine and it does not override or supplant preclusion
doctrine). Because the judgments entered against the plaintiff in Iowa, the law of Iowa
must be applied. See United States v. B.H., 456 F.3d 813, 816-17 (8th Cir. 2006);
Haberer v. Woodbury Cty., 188 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 1999); Gross v. Heikien, 957
F.2d 531, 532 (8th Cir. 1992); Tyler v. Harper, 744 F.2d 653, 655 (8th Cir. 1984). The
doctrine of collateral estoppel, see Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 123
(Iowa 1981) (setting forth prerequisites that must be established before the doctrine of
collateral estoppel may be applied), and/or the doctrine of res judicata, see George v. D.W.
Zinser Co., 762 N.W.2d 865, 868-69 (Iowa 2009) (discussing what must be established
when asserting res judicata), bar the plaintiff from proceeding with his claims in the courts
of Iowa. Consequently, the plaintiff is precluded from proceeding here because his claims
were or could have been litigated in the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County, where
he was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate. Cf. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at
94 (stating that, under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars
parties or their privies from relitigating issues raised or which could have been raised in
the prior action); id. at 103-05 (collateral estoppel may apply when a plaintiff attempts to
relitigate in federal court issues decided against him in state criminal proceedings); Gross,
957 F.2d at 532-33 (concluding that issues decided in state post-conviction proceedings are
given collateral estoppel effect in subsequent actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
As to the specific nature of the relief that is requested, the court lacks the authority
to reverse or review decisions that the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County made.
The court is precluded from interfering in the interworkings of a state court in criminal
matters because the record does not indicate any improper conduct by the prosecution. See
6

Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013)
(explaining that Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), precludes a court from intruding
into ongoing state criminal prosecutions); Zanders v. Swanson, 573 F.3d 591, 593-95 (8th
Cir. 2009) (determining that district court properly abstained from hearing claim because
there was no showing of bad faith or other extraordinary circumstances); Norwood v.
Dickey, 409 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 2005) (listing factors to be considered).1
Regarding the State of Iowa, the Iowa Supreme Court and the Iowa District Court
for Buchanan County, sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment bars a suit
brought solely against the state or an agency of the state. See Brown v. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 451 F. App’x 690, 691 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying Eleventh Amendment), Morstad
v. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 147 F.3d 741, 743-44 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); Williams v.
Missouri, 973 F.2d 599, 599-600 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (same). And, to the extent
that the plaintiff believes the State of Iowa, the Iowa Supreme Court and the Iowa District
Court for Buchanan County are subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff cannot
proceed any further against the State of Iowa, the Iowa Supreme Court and the Iowa
District Court for Buchanan County because a “person” does not include states or their
political subdivisions. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-71
(1989) (holding that a state and its agencies are not “persons” within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983); McLean v. Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 2008) (making clear that
a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may not be asserted against a state or an arm
of the state). Accordingly, the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

1

The court notes that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action for damages does not arise
until “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by an authorized state tribunal . . ., or called into
question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
486 (1994). Thus, the plaintiff may not seek damages based on valid convictions.
7

Further, the other defendants are not subject to suit. A judge, performing judicial
functions, enjoys absolute immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability. See Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967); Whisman
v. Rinehart, 119 F.3d 1303, 1309 (8th Cir. 1997); Callahan v. Rendlen, 806 F.2d 795,
796 (8th Cir. 1996). Most of the defendants performed as judges. Accordingly, the
plaintiff’s action against them fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Similarly, a prosecutor is immune from civil rights claims that are based on actions taken
in the performance of his or her prosecutorial duties. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,
486 (1991) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976)); Robinson v.
Freeze, 15 F.3d 107, 108-09 (8th Cir. 1994); Patterson v. Von Riesen, 999 F.2d 1235,
1237 (8th Cir. 1993); Snelling v. Westhof, 972 F.2d 199, 200 (8th Cir. 1992). The
prosecutor that the plaintiff identifies in his complaint presented the State’s case, and the
prosecutor’s conduct is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
proceedings. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s action against the prosecutor fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.2
Lastly, although courts construe pro se pleadings liberally, pro se litigants, like all
other parties, must abide by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Williams v.

2

The court notes that: (1) the applicable statute of limitations is the period
governing personal injury actions, see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1985); see
also City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 123 n.5 (2005) (reaffirming
that the statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is generally the applicable statelaw period for personal-injury torts); Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d 983, 984-87 (8th Cir.
1985) (finding it appropriate to apply Iowa’s personal injury statute of limitations to actions
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), (2) in Iowa, the statute of limitations for personal injury
actions is two years after accrual, see Iowa Code § 614.1(2), and (3) a cause of action
accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the harm, see Hall v. Elrod,
399 F. App’x 136, 137 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dept. of Children’s
Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007), for the proposition that a cause of action
accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of
the action).
8

Harmon, 294 F. App’x 243, 245 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal where pro se litigant
failed to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). The plaintiff’s pleading does
not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 8;
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10. Stated differently, the plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege facts that
support each individual’s personal involvement in or responsibility for the harm that he
suffered. See Stewart v. Baker, 360 F. App’x 696, 697 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating that a
plaintiff must allege in his or her complaint that a defendant was personally involved with
or had direct responsibility for the incident that injured him or her) (citing Ellis v. Norris,
179 F.3d 1078, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999)); accord Gully v. Maynard, 218 F. App’x 551, 552
(8th Cir. 2007) (citing Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985)); Beck v.
LaFleur, 257 F.3d 764, 766 (8th Cir. 2001) (requiring personal involvement or
responsibility for a constitutional violation). Merely listing federal provisions and/or
statutes is not sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
Moreover, the plaintiff’s claims are meritless, frivolous and/or malicious. Because the
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the plaintiff’s claims are not plausible, dismissal
is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12.3

3

Accordingly, the motion to

To the extent that the plaintiff is attempting to assert state-law claims, the court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See Brown v. Peterson, 156 F. App’x 870,
871 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
state-law claim is discretionary); see also McLaurin v. Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir.
1994) (indicating that subsection (c) of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 clearly gives a court discretion
to reject jurisdiction over supplemental claims). In light of the court’s review of the
plaintiff’s federal claims and the plaintiff’s statement as to the basis for the court’s
jurisdiction, there is no reason to retain jurisdiction over supplemental claims, if any, that
the plaintiff desires to pursue.
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dismiss (docket no. 7) is granted.4 The clerk’s office is directed to enter judgment in favor
of the defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 27th day of October, 2016.

4

The defendants observe that the plaintiff failed to serve the prosecutor. The court
concludes that the prosecutor is entitled to benefit from the defendants’ dispositive motion
because the controlling issues would be the same for the unserved defendant, the
controlling issues have been briefed and the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to
address the controlling issues. See Abagninin v. AMVAC Chemical Corp., 545 F.3d 733,
742-43 (9th Cir. 2008); Transclean Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 474 F.3d 1298, 1308
(Fed. Cir. 2007); Columbia Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Ahlstrom Recovery, 44 F.3d 800,
802-03 (9th Cir. 1995); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Cathey, 977 F.2d 447, 449 (8th Cir.
1992).
10