Minnesota Life Insurance Company v. Scott Washington et al

Filing 63

ORDER denying in its entirety 58 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Chief Magistrate Judge CJ Williams on 6/20/2018. (skm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
EASTERN DIVISION
LORI SCOTT; ANNIE HUDSON;
KELLY SCOTT; and WILLIAM SCOTT,

No. 17-CV-2016 CJW
ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SUSIE SCOTT WASHINGTON,
Defendant.
________________________________
SUSIE SCOTT WASHINGTON,
Cross Claimant/Counter Plaintiff,
vs.
LORI SCOTT; ANNIE HUDSON;
KELLY SCOTT; and WILLIAM SCOTT,
Cross Defendants/Counter Defendants.1
____________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

Procedural History ............................................................................. 2

II. Factual History .................................................................................. 3
III. Applicable Law ................................................................................. 5
1

Although Susie Scott Washington is not a co-defendant with the cross defendants/counter
defendants, and the cross claimant designation is therefore unusual, this procedural abnormality
is explained in the “Procedural History” section, infra.

IV. Discussion ....................................................................................... 6
A.

Declaratory Judgment ..................................................................... 6

B.

Tortious Interference with Expected Inheritance ..................................... 9

V. Conclusion ..................................................................................... 12

This matter is before the Court on Lori Scott, Annie Hudson, Kelly Scott, and
William Scott’s (collectively “plaintiffs”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc.
58). Plaintiffs seek summary judgment as to their action for declaratory relief and seek
summary judgment as to liability, damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs on their claim
for tortious interference with inheritance. (Doc. 58, at 1). Plaintiffs do not seek summary
judgment on the punitive damages portion of their tortious interference claim. (Id.).
Defendant Susie Scott Washington timely filed her resistance to plaintiffs’ motion. (Doc.
62).
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case began as an interpleader action with Todd Micou, Cynthia Scott, and all
parties reflected in the case style named as defendants. (Doc. 2). On April 12, 2017,
Susie Scott Washington (“defendant”) brought a cross claim against Cynthia Scott, Todd
Micou, Lori Scott, Annie Hudson, Kelly Scott, and William Scott. (Doc. 14). Cynthia
Scott and Todd Micou failed to make an appearance, and a default judgment was
ultimately entered against them, in their capacities as both defendants and cross
defendants. (Docs. 38, 46, 57).
On August 14, 2017, Lori Scott, Annie Hudson, Kelly Scott, and William Scott
were substituted as plaintiffs in this case, and the interpleader plaintiff was terminated.
Defendant’s cross claim was unresolved at the time the plaintiffs were substituted. On
September 21, 2017, defendant brought a counterclaim against plaintiffs. (Doc. 51).
This counterclaim appears to be the same, in all material respects, as the previously filed

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and, as of yet, unresolved cross claim. Further, it appears that defendant brought the
counterclaim only because plaintiffs amended their complaint, which prompted defendant
to amend her answer and replead her claims. (Docs. 50-51). In short, it appears to the
Court that defendant’s cross claim and her counterclaim should be viewed as one and the
same, although the counterclaim would reflect an updated version of the cross claim.
The Court has not been called upon to resolve the issue of these multiple claims existing
by different names, however, and the Court will not presently do so.

As such,

defendant’s cross claim exists independently of her counterclaim and the parties are,
therefore, properly styled above.
II.

FACTUAL HISTORY

This case has a complex factual background, and the Court finds it unnecessary to
discuss many of the factual nuances presented. Further, the parties disagree as to many
of the facts. It is agreed, however, that Bennie Scott, Jr. (“Bennie Scott”) was covered
under a life insurance policy and, upon his death on January 30, 2017, the life insurance
benefits became payable. (Docs. 58-2, at 1-2; 62-1, at 1). At the time of Bennie Scott’s
death, the beneficiary designation for the policy reflected defendant as the beneficiary of
the policy. (Id.). This beneficiary designation was made on January 22, 2017, and no
prior beneficiary designations had been made. (Id.). In the absence of the January 22,
2017 beneficiary designation, the proceeds of the policy would, by default, be payable to
Bennie Scott’s children before his siblings. (Docs. 58-2, at 3; 62-1, at 1).
Defendant is Bennie Scott’s sister, while plaintiffs are Bennie Scott’s children.
(Docs. 58-2, at 1-2; 62-1, at 1). The parties agree that had the January 22, 2017
designation not been made, Bennie Scott’s children would be entitled to the life insurance
proceeds. (Docs. 58-2, at 3; 62-1, at 1). Plaintiffs, collectively, and defendant each
argue that they are entitled to the life insurance proceeds. Defendant argues that she is
entitled to the proceeds because she was the designated beneficiary. Plaintiffs, however,

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argue that the beneficiary designation was invalid because Bennie Scott was allegedly not
mentally competent to sign the form on January 22, 2017, and the designation was the
result of defendant either fraudulently falsifying Bennie Scott’s signature, or exercising
undue influence over Bennie Scott to the point of coercing Bennie Scott into signing the
form. (Doc. 50, at 4). Further, plaintiffs suggested to the life insurance company that
Cynthia Scott, a defaulting party, was Bennie Scott’s intended beneficiary. (Id.).
Plaintiffs brought an action against defendant for declaratory relief and for tortious
interference with expected inheritance. (Doc. 50). In their request for declaratory relief,
plaintiffs “ask this Court to enter a declaratory judgment that they are the beneficiaries
under the policy, and that [defendant has] no entitlement to the [life insurance] benefits
and order that the benefits be paid to [plaintiffs].” (Doc. 50, at 5). Plaintiffs’ claim for
tortious interference is premised on the notion that defendant acted wrongfully. (Id., at
6-7). If defendant committed no wrongful act—i.e., if defendant did not fraudulently
procure Bennie Scott’s signature on the beneficiary designation form—plaintiffs’ tortious
interference claim must fail.
Defendant’s counterclaim only requests that the Court enter a declaratory judgment
in her favor; the counterclaim contains no other claims. (Doc. 51, at 5). In support of
her request for a declaratory judgment, defendant alleges that she “is the sole named
beneficiary” of the life insurance policy and that none of the plaintiffs are entitled to
proceeds from the life insurance policy. (Id.). Defendant therefore requests that the
Court enter a declaratory judgment finding that defendant is the sole beneficiary of the
life insurance policy and that “[p]laintiffs have no right, title[,] or claim to such benefits.”
(Id.). Unlike plaintiffs, however, defendant has not moved for summary judgment on
any part of her counterclaim.

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III.

APPLICABLE LAW

Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows that “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A movant must cite to “particular parts of materials in
the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits
or declarations, stipulations, . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Alternatively, a party may “show[ ] that the materials cited do not establish the absence
or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible
evidence to support the fact.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B).
A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law . . ..” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (citation omitted).
“An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record,” Hartnagel v.
Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted), or “when a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the question,” Wood v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

Evidence that presents only “some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986), or evidence that is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative,” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249-50, does not make an issue of fact genuine. In sum, a genuine issue of
material fact requires “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute” that it
“require[s] a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.”
Id. at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The party moving for summary judgment bears “the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of
the record which show a lack of a genuine issue.” Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395. Once

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the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings
and by depositions, affidavits, or other evidence designate specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. See Mosley v. City of Northwoods, Mo., 415 F.3d 908,
910 (8th Cir. 2005).
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, courts must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, giving that party the
benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Tolan, 134 S. Ct.
at 1863; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88 (citation omitted); see also Reed v. City of St.
Charles, Mo., 561 F.3d 788, 790 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating that in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, a court must view the facts “in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party—as long as those facts are not so ‘blatantly contradicted by the record . . .
that no reasonable jury could believe’ them”) (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). A court does “not weigh the evidence or attempt to
determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383
F.3d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Rather, a “court’s function is to
determine whether a dispute about a material fact is genuine . . ..” Quick v. Donaldson
Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (8th Cir. 1996).
IV.
A.

DISCUSSION

Declaratory Judgment

Although defendant has not moved for summary judgment and the Court therefore
need not address the factual basis for defendant’s claim, the Court finds it helpful to do
so. By discussing the factual basis for defendant’s claim alongside the factual bases for
plaintiffs’ claims, the Court may more easily explain why a genuine dispute of material
fact exists such that summary judgment is inappropriate.
The Court notes that there seem to be a number of factual disputes, many of which
may be material.

Any one of these disputed material facts, however, will defeat

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plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The Court will thus discuss only the matter of
whether Bennie Scott signed the change of beneficiary form himself.
The Court will discuss this fact, as opposed to others, because this is the predicate
fact upon which the claims at issue rest, and this fact “might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. This fact is material as to
the requests for declaratory judgment because plaintiffs request that the Court find that
they are the rightful beneficiaries under the life insurance policy. Defendant requests
that the Court make the same finding as to defendant. Who the rightful beneficiary is
depends on whether the change of beneficiary was validly executed. This, in turn,
depends on whether Bennie Scott signed the change of beneficiary form.2
In support of their motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs offer the deposition
testimonies of defendant and of Mary Alexander, who appears to be Bennie Scott’s double
first cousin. (See 61, at 14). To the best of the Court’s understanding, plaintiffs take
the position that because the testimonies present certain inconsistencies, Bennie Scott
could not have signed the change of beneficiary form. (Doc. 58-1, at 2-4). More
specifically, plaintiffs allege that the deponents disagree as to whether defendant was
sitting at the foot of Bennie Scott’s bed when defendant handed the change of beneficiary
form to Bennie Scott, or whether defendant walked into Bennie Scott’s room and walked
directly to Bennie Scott without sitting down. (Doc. 58-1, at 2-3). Plaintiffs further
allege that the deponents each testified differently as to whether Bennie Scott used a
supporting surface, such as a magazine, beneath the change of beneficiary form to support
the paper while Bennie Scott signed it. (Id., at 4). These inconsistencies, along with a
slight date discrepancy, lead plaintiffs to conclude that Mary Alexander must have
perjured herself. (Id., at 2).
2

The Court does not understand the parties to be arguing that anyone other than Bennie Scott
could validly execute the form.

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Mary Alexander also appears to have offered a letter in support of defendant’s
claim that Bennie Scott signed the form. (Doc. 61, at 14). Plaintiffs argue, however,
that this letter is fraudulent. (Doc. 58-1, at 2). This argument is not well articulated,
but to the best of the Court’s understanding, plaintiffs argue that because Mary Alexander
allegedly perjured herself, the letter is fraudulent, and, therefore, there can be no doubt
that Bennie Scott did not sign the form. (Id.). Plaintiffs have also offered a report by
their handwriting expert, in which the expert opines “that there is a strong probability
that Bennie Scott did not sign the signature Bennie Scott on the beneficiary designation
and change form.” (Doc. 61, at 64). These facts, individually and together, plaintiffs
argue, “plainly suggest that Bennie [Scott] did not sign the form, and therefore Plaintiffs
are entitled to the life insurance proceeds.” (Id., at 4).
Plaintiffs, as the movants, are tasked with demonstrating that there is no genuine
dispute. Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395. Plaintiffs have failed to do so. First, plaintiffs’
expert witness opined that there is a “strong probability” that Bennie Scott did not sign
the form (Doc. 61, at 64), while defendant maintains that Bennie Scott did sign the form
(see Doc. 62-3, at 18). In opining that there is only a “strong probability” that Bennie
Scott did not sign the form, plaintiffs’ expert witness implicitly opined that there is some
probability that Bennie Scott did sign the form. The Court must view the facts in the
light most favorable to defendant. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1863. Such a view leads the
Court to conclude that Bennie Scott could have signed the form, which is consistent with
defendant’s position that Bennie Scott did sign the form.
Plaintiff could argue that the record so blatantly contradicts this conclusion that a
reasonable factfinder could not find in favor of defendant. See Reed, 561 F.3d at 790.
The Court, however, disagrees with this proposition. The record contains evidence both
that Bennie Scott did sign the form and that Bennie Scott did not sign the form. Plaintiffs’
argument that minor inconsistencies between the testimonies of defendant and of Mary

8

Alexander render it impossible for Bennie Scott to have signed the form is unconvincing.
Were the Court to adopt plaintiffs’ argument, the Court would be required to weigh the
testimonies of defendant and of Mary Alexander, and the Court would have to determine
whether each deponent is credible. The Court is not empowered to make such credibility
determinations at the summary judgment stage. Kammueller, 383 F.3d at 784. Further,
even if the Court found both witnesses to lack credibility on certain issues, such as the
minor inconsistencies plaintiffs turn to, this credibility determination would not
necessarily be applicable to every issue to which defendant and Mary Alexander testified.
In other words, the Court could find a witness credible on one issue, but not credible on
another issue. Likewise, the Court is not in a position to determine whether Mary
Alexander perjured herself and, even if she did perjure herself, the Court could still find
Mary Alexander credible on the issue of whether Bennie Scott signed the change of
beneficiary form.
The Court is therefore unable to accept plaintiffs’ proposition that they are entitled
to summary judgment as a factual matter, based on the assertion that Bennie Scott could
not have signed the change of beneficiary form. The Court is unable to conclude, at this
stage, whether Bennie Scott signed the change of beneficiary form himself and, therefore,
the issue should be decided by the factfinder at trial. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment as to declaratory relief is denied.
B.

Tortious Interference with Expected Inheritance

Plaintiffs next seek partial summary judgment as to liability and damages on their
tortious interference with expected inheritance claim. The parties disagree as to whether
Iowa law or federal law governs the tortious interference claim. (See Docs. 58-1, at 7;
62, at 9). The Court, however, need not determine which body of law governs.
In support of their motion, plaintiffs urge that Iowa law governs and provide a
detailed discussion of why defendant should be considered to have been in a confidential

9

relationship with Bennie Scott under Iowa law. (Doc. 58-1, at 5-6). This confidential
relationship, plaintiffs argue, shifts the burden to defendant “to prove by clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that she acted in good faith throughout the
transactions and Bennie acted freely, intelligently, and voluntarily.” (Doc. 58-1, at 6
(emphasis, citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted)). Plaintiffs argue
that defendant is unable to meet this burden because defendant cannot produce evidence
showing Bennie Scott’s true intentions and plaintiffs are, therefore, entitled to partial
summary judgment on their tortious interference claim.
The Court’s discussion of whether Bennie Scott signed the change of beneficiary
form is equally applicable here. The parties agree that absent a beneficiary designation,
plaintiffs would have been entitled to the proceeds of the life insurance policy. (Docs.
58-2, at 3; 62-1, at 1). Plaintiffs urge that this amounts to an expectancy interest. (Doc.
58-1, at 7-8). Plaintiffs further argue that defendant interfered with that expectancy
interest by exerting undue influence over Bennie Scott to persuade him to designate
defendant as the beneficiary of the life insurance policy. (Id.).
Without reaching the question of which body of law governs, the Court finds that
plaintiffs have failed to show that defendant is incapable of proving “by clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that she acted in good faith throughout the
transactions and Bennie acted freely, intelligently, and voluntarily.” (Id., at 6 (emphasis
and alterations omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Schrader, 676 N.W.2d 599, 605 (Iowa
2004)). Plaintiffs contend that defendant bears this heavy burden. At the summary
judgment stage, however, plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that defendant is incapable
of meeting this burden at trial. In failing to point to any evidence in the record in support
of their proposition that defendant cannot meet this burden, plaintiffs have failed to meet
their own. In short, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bennie Scott
signed the form of his own volition. Because, on this record, the factfinder could find

10

that Bennie Scott signed the form of his own volition, without anyone improperly
interfering, plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment as to their tortious
interference claim is denied.3
Even if the Court were to conclude that a factfinder could not find that Bennie
Scott freely signed the form, summary judgment would still be inappropriate. Assuming,
in arguendo, that Iowa law governs this issue and that the burden would therefore shift
to defendant upon a showing that defendant enjoyed a confidential relationship with
Bennie Scott, summary judgment still would not be warranted because plaintiffs have
failed to show that defendant was in a confidential relationship with Bennie Scott.
Plaintiffs assert that defendant had a relationship based on trust and confidence for
their whole lives. Plaintiffs’ support for this proposition, however, is limited to actions
taken in the twenty-five days prior to Bennie Scott’s death. (See Doc. 58-1, at 5). The
Supreme Court of Iowa has held:
A confidential relationship arises whenever a continuous trust is
reposed by one person in the skill and integrity of another, and so it has
been said that all the variety of relations in which dominion may be
exercised by one person fall within the general term “confidential relation.”
Mendenhall v. Judy, 671 N.W.2d 452, 455 (Iowa 2003). Although Bennie Scott and
defendant may have had a lifelong relationship that was based on trust, plaintiffs have
only produced evidence showing that this relationship led Bennie Scott to rely on

3

Defendant has not brought a motion seeking dismissal of plaintiffs’ tortious interference claim.
In defendant’s resistance, however, defendant states: “Plaintiffs’ state law claims for tortious
interference with expected inheritance are . . . preempted by federal law and must be dismissed.”
(Doc. 62, at 15). Although this statement indicates that defendant is seeking dismissal of the
tortious interference claim, defendant has not brought such a motion. To the extent defendant
believes such a motion is somehow inferred, it is denied without prejudice. It is equally unclear
whether plaintiffs’ tortious interference claim is intended to have been brought under federal law
or state law, and the Court will not presently address this issue, or whether the claim itself is
proper.

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defendant in the last several weeks of his life. Plaintiffs simply have not produced
evidence showing that this relationship of “trust and confidence” existed prior to this
time. (See Doc. 58-1, at 5).
The Supreme Court of Iowa opined that a confidential relationship could arise
from “continuous trust.” Mendenhall, 671 N.W.2d at 455 (emphasis added). It is
possible that defendant had such a relationship with Bennie Scott. The Court, however,
has not been presented with sufficient information to make such a determination.
Plaintiffs have presented facts that could indicate that Bennie Scott trusted
defendant and that such trust was “continuous” within the meaning of Mendenhall. The
inquiry the Court must make, however, is so fact intensive that the Court cannot properly
reach a conclusion on the record before it. In other words, there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Bennie Scott and defendant had such a confidential relationship
that it would shift the burden of proof to defendant. As such, the Court finds that
plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing the existence of a confidential
relationship sufficiently at this stage to merit summary judgment on their behalf.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
is denied in its entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 20th day of June, 2018.

__________________________________
C.J. Williams
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Northern District of Iowa

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