Conus v. Watson's Of Kansas City, Inc.
Filing
25
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 5 Motion to Dismiss Count I of Plaintiff's Petition. Signed by District Judge Julie A. Robinson on 9/16/2011. (pp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
CHAD CONUS,
Plaintiff,
v.
WATSON’S OF KANSAS CITY, INC.,
d/b/a/ FAMILY LEISURE,
Defendant.
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Case No. 11-cv-2149-JAR/KGG
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count I of
Plaintiff’s Petition (Doc. 5) under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This
case involves claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) for violations of federal law
and a claim under Kansas common law for wrongful termination. This motion is fully briefed,
and the Court is prepared to rule. As explained more fully below, the Court grants defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Count I of Plaintiff’s Petition because the remedy available under the FLSA
precludes relief under Kansas common law.
I.
Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must present factual allegations, assumed to
be true, that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and must contain “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”1 Under this standard, “the mere metaphysical
possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is
insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a
1
Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S 544, 554 (2007).
reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims.”2 The allegations must be
enough that, if assumed to be true, the plaintiff plausibly (not just speculatively) has a claim for
relief.3 As the Supreme Court recently explained, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does
a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”4
Additionally, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”5
II.
Factual Allegations
The following facts are alleged in plaintiff’s Complaint and construed in the light most
favorable to plaintiff.6 Defendant employed plaintiff from approximately November 2005 until
April 15, 2010, as a salesperson at its company. In March 2010, plaintiff contacted the Kansas
Department of Labor and the United States Department of Labor to report wage and hour
violations by defendant. Plaintiff told other employees at defendant’s company about his pay
complaints. On April 15, 2010, defendant’s owner fired plaintiff. The owner explained that he
fired plaintiff for his low sales numbers, but when questioned further by plaintiff, the owner
2
Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007).
3
Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247–48 (10th Cir. 2008). “‘Plausibility’ in this context must refer
to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct,
much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs ‘have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
4
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 2009 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
5
Id.
6
Doc. 1.
2
stated that plaintiff’s problem stemmed from his conversations with other employees. Plaintiff
alleges that defendant acted wilfully and maliciously, discharging him in retaliation for his pay
complaints.
III.
Discussion
Kansas is an at-will employment jurisdiction, meaning that absent an express or implied
contractual agreement an employer is free to terminate employment at will.7 The Kansas
Supreme Court, however, has recognized an exception to the at-will employment doctrine for
retaliatory discharge.8 This common law exception, based on public policy concerns, seeks to
discourage employers from firing employees who exercise their rights under labor!management
regulation statutes.9 The application of the public policy exception, however, is unnecessary
when a plaintiff is already protected by a statutory remedy because the statutory remedy will
adequately address the state’s public policy concerns.10 Thus, under the adequate alternative
remedy doctrine, if an adequate federal or state statutory remedy is available, the public policy
claim under Kansas common law is precluded.11 Therefore, to state a plausible claim for
retaliatory discharge under Kansas common law, a plaintiff must not only present factual
allegations showing conduct that violates public policy, but the plaintiff also must have no
7
Flenker v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 967 P.2d 295, 298 (Kan. 1998) (citing Johnston v. Farmers Alliance
Mutual Ins. Co., 545 P.2d 312 (Kan. 1976)).
8
Id.
9
Id. (citing Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685 (Kan. 1988)); Scott v. Topeka Performing Arts Ctr, Inc., 69 F.
Supp. 2d 1325, 1328 (D. Kan. 1999) (quoting Brown v. United Methodist Homes for the Aged, 815 P.2d 72 (Kan.
1991)).
10
See Conner v. Schnuck Mkts, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 606, 615 (D. Kan. 1995) (citing Polson v. Davis, 895 F.2d
705, 709–10 (10th Cir. 1990)).
11
Id.
3
adequate alternative remedy under federal or state statutory law.12
Here, defendant argues that the federal claim in Count II provides an adequate alternative
remedy to the Kansas common law claim in Count I and thus asks the Court to dismiss Count I.
In Count I, plaintiff seeks relief under Kansas common law for wrongful termination, and in
Count II, he seeks relief under the FLSA for retaliatory discharge. Plaintiff relies on essentially
the same factual allegations to form the basis of both claims, but plaintiff seeks emotional
distress and punitive damages under the Kansas common law claim in Count I. Plaintiff opposes
defendant’s motion to dismiss on two grounds: (1) plaintiff has pled two plausible alternative
claims and need not elect only one at the pleading stage, and (2) the FLSA provides an
inadequate remedy because it does not allow the same damages available under the Kansas
common law claim.13
Overlooking the adequate alternative remedy doctrine asserted by defendant, plaintiff’s
first argument claims that the Court must not dismiss Count I because plaintiff is allowed to
plead any plausible claim for relief at the pleading stage. Thus, plaintiff argues, the Court should
not force the plaintiff to elect between the two claims at this early stage but should allow him to
pursue his claim for retaliatory discharge under both Kansas common law and the FLSA. Under
the alternative remedies doctrine, however, a plaintiff has no plausible claim under Kansas
common law if an adequate remedy exists under federal law. Therefore, if precluded, the Kansas
common law claim is implausible at any stage of litigation. Thus, the motion before the court
12
Id.
13
Plaintiff also argues that the FLSA does not preempt the state law claim. This argument, however, is
irrelevant because defendant’s motion argues that the FLSA precludes recovery under state law, and not that the
FLSA preempts state law.
4
turns not on the stage of the litigation but on plaintiff’s second argument, that the FLSA offers an
inadequate remedy for plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim.
The adequacy of the FLSA remedy for retaliatory discharge has already been examined
by both courts in this district and the Tenth Circuit.14 The Tenth Circuit held in Conner v.
Schnuck Markets, Inc. that the FLSA precludes a common law wrongful termination claim under
the alternative adequate remedy doctrine.15 The plaintiff challenged whether federal statutory
law could preclude the Kansas common law action, and the Tenth Circuit found that it could.16
Conner, however, did not discuss whether the FLSA provides the full remedy available under the
Kansas common law claim because the plaintiff in Conner conceded that issue.17
Since Conner, however, cases in this district have examined the ability of the FLSA to
provide a full remedy.18 These cases have relied on Conner to find the remedy in the FLSA an
adequate alternative to the remedy provided under Kansas common law.19 For example, in
Whipkey v. Cencon L.L.C, the court found that plaintiff’s FLSA retaliation claim and the Kansas
common law retaliation claim were mirror images of each other.20 Further, the court stated that
the FLSA “allow[ed] for several remedies, including employment, reinstatement, payment of
14
Conner, 906 F. Supp. 606, aff’d, 121 F.3d 1390 (10th Cir. 1997); Scott v. Topeka Performing Arts Ctr,
Inc., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (D. Kan. 1999); Whipkey v. Cencon L.L.C., No. 05-2281-CM, 2006 WL 2433859 (D. Kan.
Aug. 21, 2006).
15
Conner, 121 F.3d at 1399.
16
Id.
17
See id.
18
Scott, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1325; Whipkey, 2006 WL 243385.
19
Scott, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 1329; Whipkey, 2006 WL 243385, at *3.
20
Whipkey, 2006 WL 243385, at *3.
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wages lost, liquidated damages, attorney fees, and costs.”21 As a result, Whipkey found the
remedies available under the FLSA adequate.22
The court in Whipkey did not, however, discuss the availability of punitive damages
under the FLSA. Here, unlike in Whipkey, the plaintiff seeks emotional distress and punitive
damages. So the Court’s analysis here must consider how emotional distress and punitive
damages affect the adequacy determination. As plaintiff notes, courts disagree about whether
punitive damages are available under FLSA.23 While the Tenth Circuit has not decided the issue,
two district courts within the Tenth Circuit have determine that punitive damages are
unavailable.24 For example, the Utah District Court has determined that while punitive damages
are unavailable, emotional distress damages are available under FLSA, allowing the plaintiff “to
recover compensatory damages for the full consequences of retaliation.”25 But even if damages
for emotional distress are available, the unavailability of punitive damages under the FLSA
would make the damages under Kansas common law more comprehensive. This difference in
damages, however, does not necessarily make the remedy available under the FLSA an
inadequate alternative to plaintiff’s common law claim. An adequate remedy can exist under
21
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)).
22
Id.
23
Compare Snapp v. Unlimited Concepts, Inc., 208 F.3d 928, 933 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding punitive
damages unavailable under FLSA), Allen v. Garden City Co-Op, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (D. Kan. 2009) (holding
punitive damages unavailable under FLSA), and Johnston v. Davis Sec., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (D. Utah 2002)
(holding punitive damages unavailable under FLSA but stating that emotional distress damages may be available),
with Travis v. Gary Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 921 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding punitive damages
available under FLSA).
24
Allen, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 1265; Johnston, 217 F. Supp 2d at 1232–33.
25
Johnston, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1233.
6
federal law even if the Kansas common law remedy may offer “more comprehensive relief.”26
An exact alternative remedy is not required for preclusion, only an adequate alternative remedy.
The Kansas District Court has addressed the issue of whether less than comprehensive
damages could make a remedy inadequate in Scott v. Topeka Performing Arts Center, Inc.27 In
Scott, the plaintiff argued that the FLSA provided an inadequate remedy because it did not
“include all of the remedies available under her state-law claim, in particular, damages for loss
of reputation and emotional distress and punitive damages.”28 The court declined to focus only
on whether the remedy under the FLSA was co-extensive with the remedy under Kansas
common law.29 Instead, to determine the adequacy of the remedy, the court focused whether the
alternative remedy offered adequate protection for the employee’s state public policy right
against her employer.30 Because “[d]istrict courts have ‘the historic power of equity to provide
complete relief in light of the [FLSA’s] purposes,’” the court found that the FLSA remedies
adequately vindicated the state public policy claim.31
The Tenth Circuit has also stated that unavailability of punitive damages does not make a
federal remedy inadequate.32 In Masters v. Daniel International Corp., the Tenth Circuit
decided that the Energy Reorganization Act (“ERA”) precluded a Kansas common law
26
Polson v. Davis, 635 F. Supp. 1130, 1150 (D. Kan. 1986), aff’d, 895 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1990).
27
69 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (D. Kan. 1999).
28
Id. at 1330.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 1331.
32
See Masters v. Daniel Int’l Corp., 917 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1990).
7
retaliatory claim despite the unavailability of punitive damages: “We find that the remedies
provided by the Act are sufficient to have satisfied [plaintiff’s] claim despite the fact that
exemplary damages would not have been recoverable.”33
Nevertheless, as plaintiff points out, the Kansas Supreme Court has recently made clear
that the lack of punitive damages can be a factor in determining adequacy.34 In Hysten v.
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co., the Kansas Supreme Court examined whether the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”) provided an adequate alternative remedy to a
Kansas common law retaliation claim.35 The court noted that it “did not regard the unavailability
of compensatory damages for pain and suffering and punitive damages as trivial,” and the court
stated that the differences in damages influenced its decision to find the remedy under FELA
inadequate.36 Still, the main focus of the opinion in Hysten surrounded the lack of process and
claimant control and not the unavailability of punitive damages.37
Further, Hysten relied on precedent created in Flenker v. Williamette Industries, Inc. in
making its adequacy determination.38 And in Flenker, while discussing the inadequacy of the
remedy under OSHA, the Kansas Supreme Court intimated that the FLSA provides adequate
relief when quoting another case: “‘It is obvious from the language of the two statutes that
33
Id. (explaining that exemplary damages are only available under the ERA “if a person fails to comply with
an order issued by the Secretary of Labor” and that provision was not applicable).
34
Hysten v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 108 P.3d 437, 445 (Kan. 2004).
35
Id. at 444–45.
36
Id. at 445.
37
See id. a 444–45.
38
Id. at 444.
8
although an employee may obtain any type of relief possible under the FLSA through the
employee’s own actions, the relief available under OSHA is limited to what the Secretary of
Labor deems appropriate.’”39 Again, like in Hysten, the Kansas Supreme Court focused on the
employee’s ability to control its own private action in federal court and not on the specific
damages available.40 Additionally, Flenker cited Masters in its opinion and explained that the
ERA provided an adequate alternative remedy to Kansas common law retaliatory discharge.41
The court took no issue with the fact that Masters found the remedy provided under the ERA
adequate despite the unavailability of punitive damages.42 Thus, Flenker implicitly approved a
finding of adequacy absent the availability of punitive damages. Therefore, under Kansas
Supreme Court precedent, the lack of emotional distress and punitive damages alone does not
necessitate a finding of inadequacy. Instead, an adequacy determination should focus on all
aspects of the alternative remedy, including the process available for relief and the litigants
ability to control its own private action in federal court.43
Relying on Hysten and Flenker, the Court determines that even if the FLSA does not
provide plaintiffs the opportunity to seek punitive damages, it still offers an adequate alternative
39
Flenker v. Williamette Indus., Inc., 967 P.2d 295, 301 (Kan. 1998) (quoting Shawcross v. Pyro Prods.,
Inc., 916 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)).
40
Id. at 299–302.
41
Id. at 299 (citing Masters v. Daniel Int’l Corp., 917 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1990)).
42
See id.
43
The Kansas District Court has considered similar factors in determining the adequacy of other statutory
remedies. See Daniels v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 09-2304-JAR, 2011 WL 2531099, *26 (D. Kan. June 24,
2011) (“‘Characteristics of an adequate statutory remedy include ample filing time, limits on the discretion of an
administrative official in awarding relief, and an opportunity for the employee to pursue relief after administrative
remedies are exhausted.’” (quoting Chapman v. Atchison Casting Corp., No. 99-2094-KHV, 2000 WL 1469315, at
*2 (D. Kan. Sept 25, 2000))).
9
remedy to the Kansas common law claim for wrongful termination. The FLSA provides
employees with the opportunity to bring a private action in federal court to vindicate their
retaliatory discharge claims.44 Additionally, an employer is “liable for such legal or equitable
relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section 215(a)(3) of [the FLSA],
including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages
lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.”45 The variety of damages offered
under the FLSA provides adequate relief to an aggrieved employee and alleviates the Kansas
public policy concerns surrounding wrongful termination. Thus, the FLSA provides an adequate
alternative remedy and precludes the Kansas common law claim for wrongful termination. As a
result, plaintiff can state no plausible claim for relief under Kansas common law, and Count I of
the plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Count I of the Plaintiff’s Petition (Doc. 5) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Count I of plaintiff’s Complaint be and hereby is
DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 16, 2011
S/ Julie A. Robinson
JULIE A. ROBINSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
44
29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
45
Id.
10
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