Riley et al v. United States of America
Filing
51
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 38 Defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery. The motion is granted as to First Interrogatory Nos. 5-6, 9, and 12-16 to James Riley and Interrogatory Nos. 5-6, 9, and 12-16 to Margaret Ri ley. The motion is denied as to First Requests for Production Nos. 4-7 and 9 to James Riley and First Request Nos. 3-6 and 8 to Margaret Riley. For Interrogatory Nos. 8 and 19 to Margaret Riley and Nos. 8 and 20-21 to James Riley, the motion is gran ted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs shall serve amended answers to Interrogatory No. 19 to Margaret Riley and No. 21 to James Riley, but limited to injuries requiring hospitalization or extensive medical treatment during the last 20 years. I nterrogatory No. 8 to James Riley, Interrogatory No. 8 to Margaret Riley, and Interrogatory No. 20 to James Riley are also limited to a 20-year time period. All discovery ordered to be produced herein shall be produced within 30 days of the date of this Memorandum and Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge David J. Waxse on 4/12/2012. (byk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JAMES W. RILEY,
et. al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil Action No. 11-2244-EFM-DJW
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Compel Discovery (ECF No. 38).
Defendant seeks an order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a) compelling Plaintiffs to provide complete
answers to its First Set of Interrogatory Nos. 5-6, 8-9, 12-16, and 20-21 to James Riley, and First
Set of Interrogatory Nos. 5-6, 8-9, 12-16, and 19 to Margaret Riley. Defendant also seeks an
order compelling Plaintiffs to produce documents responsive to its First Requests for Production
Nos. 4-7 and 9 to James Riley, and Request Nos. 3-6 and 8 to Margaret Riley. As explained in
more detail below, Defendant’s motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part.
I.
Factual Background
This case arises out of an automobile accident on February 3, 2010 in Garden City,
Kansas. The accident involved Plaintiffs James and Margaret Riley in a Chevrolet Suburban, and
Matthew Weimer, an employee of Defendant’s Office of Personnel Management, in a Chevrolet
Malibu. In their Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11), Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Weimer, while in
the course and scope of his employment with Defendant, negligently caused the accident when
he failed to yield the right-of-way to Plaintiffs’ vehicle, which Plaintiff James Riley was driving.
1
According to Plaintiffs, the resulting collision resulted in physical and emotional injuries
to both of them. Plaintiff James Riley seeks damages for bodily injuries to his chest, legs, knees,
and elbows, shoulders, scapula, ribs, sternum, hips, pelvis, and sacrum, including fractures and
scarring. Plaintiff Margaret Riley seeks damages for bodily injuries to her head, knees, chest,
neck, abdomen, and pelvis, including scarring. Plaintiffs have claimed economic damages
relating to their medical care, treatment, and loss of income, as well as non-economic damages
for diminished enjoyment of life, pain and suffering, and loss of consortium.
On November 14, 2011, Plaintiff James Riley served his answers and responses to
Defendant’s First Set of Interrogatories and First Request for Production of Documents to
Plaintiff James Riley.
Plaintiff Margaret Riley also served her answers and responses to
Defendant’s First Set of Interrogatories and First Request for Production of Documents to
Plaintiff Margaret Riley on November 14, 2011. On November 23, 2011, Defendant sent
Plaintiffs a 24-page “Golden Rule” letter, setting out its specific concerns to Plaintiffs’
objections. Plaintiffs responded with their own 10-page letter on November 29, reiterating their
objections and suggesting temporal and scope limitations for Defendant’s discovery. On
November 29, 2011, counsel for Plaintiffs responded to Defendant’s letter and Plaintiff James
Riley served his first supplemental interrogatory answers. On December 13, 2011, Plaintiff
James Riley served his second supplemental interrogatory answers and Plaintiff Margaret Riley
served her first supplemental interrogatory answers.
Both Plaintiffs also served their first
supplemental responses to Defendant’s requests for production on December 13, 2011.
2
Following an unsuccessful telephone conference on December 8, 2011, Defendant filed the
instant motion on December 16, 2011.1
II.
Interrogatories in Dispute
Defendant served a separate First Set of Interrogatories on each Plaintiff. In its present
motion, Defendant seeks an order compelling Plaintiffs to provide complete answers to 11
interrogatories served on James Riley and 10 interrogatories served on Margaret Riley. The
interrogatories at issue seek information that can be grouped into the following four general
categories:
(A) Plaintiffs’ medical history, (B) any claims for disability or worker’s
compensation and benefits, (C) specifics relating to the basis for Plaintiffs’ damages claims, and
(D) other car accidents.
A.
Interrogatories Related to Plaintiffs’ Medical History
Defendant served each Plaintiff with two interrogatories concerning their past medical
history. Defendant served identical versions of Interrogatory No. 5 on both Plaintiffs, requesting
the identity of their health care providers for the past 20 years. Defendant also served each
Plaintiff with identical interrogatories – Interrogatory No. 21 to James Riley and No. 19 to
Margaret Riley – requesting information on any injuries requiring medical treatment.
1.
Interrogatories Seeking Identity of Plaintiffs’ Health Care Providers Interrogatory No. 5
Interrogatory No. 5 ask each Plaintiff to “[i]dentify each and every health care provider
(including, but not limited to, physicians, psychologist, psychiatrists, chiropractors, physician’s
assistants, nurses, or counselors) [Plaintiffs have] consulted or been treated by in the last twenty
1
Plaintiffs do not suggest in their briefing, nor does the Court find, that Defendant’s
conferring attempts were insufficient under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1) or D. Kan. Rule 37.2.
3
(20) years” (emphasis added). Plaintiffs object to these interrogatories as being overly broad and
unduly burdensome. They further object that the interrogatories are not limited in scope and to
the injuries claimed in their complaint. In their response brief, Plaintiffs propose limiting the
scope of the interrogatories to the body parts that were injured in the underlying accident and for
which they are claiming damages in their complaint, and to a reasonable time period, which they
suggest is 10 years.
Defendant maintains that the interrogatories are appropriate and within the bounds of the
discovery rules given the nature of the injuries claimed by Plaintiffs and their relationship to a
myriad of Plaintiffs’ known pre-existing conditions. It argues that Plaintiffs’ position that the
scope of the interrogatory should be limited to 10 years and to the body parts for which they are
claiming injuries is incompatible with the facts and claims in this case. Defendant contends that
a 20-year time period is neither overly broad nor unduly burdensome as Plaintiffs are making
substantial damages totaling more than $10 million for a broad range of injuries, disabilities,
pain and suffering they claim were caused by the car accident giving rise to this action.
Defendant maintains that it is entitled to review Plaintiffs’ prior medical history in order to
evaluate the degree to which Plaintiffs may have suffered relevant pre-existing injuries or
conditions, as well as their overall health condition. Defendant points to the post-accident
medical records of Mr. Riley, which show that he weighs over 550 pounds and his medical
history includes diabetes, deep venous thrombosis, chronic atrial fibrillation, obstructive sleep
apnea, and severe osteoarthrosis. Defendant also claims that both Plaintiffs were on some form
of disability prior to the accident.
4
Although use of a potentially broad time period in a discovery request may make the
request overly broad or unduly burdensome, the party resisting discovery on that ground must
nevertheless provide a sufficient basis for the court to sustain such objections.2 Merely objecting
to the time period encompassed by a request for discovery does not suffice, and use of a broad
time period does not necessarily make a request overly broad on its face.3
Plaintiffs simply state in their response to the motion to compel that the interrogatories
are overly broad and unduly burdensome because they are unlimited in scope and to the injuries
claimed in the complaint. This is not a sufficient basis for the Court to sustain their objections to
the interrogatories. One of the primary issues in this case will be the nature and extent of
Plaintiffs’ damages, including whether Plaintiffs had any pre-existing medical conditions at the
time of the accident. The post-accident medical records of Plaintiffs James Riley show that he
was 62 years old at the time of the accident and his medical history includes chronic health
conditions, which may have been present before the accident. Defendant has provided a
reasonable explanation for requesting 20 years worth of health care providers for James Riley.
While Defendant has not offered much explanation to justify asking Margaret Riley to identify
her health care providers for the past 20 years, other than arguing that she was on some form of
disability prior to the accident, it is Plaintiffs who have the burden to support their objection that
the interrogatories are overly broad and unduly burdensome. Plaintiffs cite no authority for the
proposition that a 20-year limitation is per se overly broad or any case where the court limited an
interrogatory seeking the identity of health care providers to a 10-year time period. They have
2
Audiotext Commc’ns Network, Inc. v. US Telecom, Inc., No. 94-2395-GTV, 1995 WL
625962, at *6 n.6 (D. Kan. Oct. 5, 1995).
3
Id.
5
further failed to show that providing the names of their health care providers for the past 20
years is unduly burdensome.
Plaintiffs also argue that the interrogatories should be limited to the body parts for which
they are claiming injuries arising from the accident in this case and which are identified in their
complaint. The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ proposal to limit the interrogatories to the specific body
parts they claim were injured in the accident and listed in their complaint. Limiting discovery to
certain body parts, particularly when the Plaintiffs have themselves put their emotional and
mental condition at issue, in addition to alleging physical injuries, is overly restrictive. Mr.
Riley’s post-accident medical records indicate that he sustained a fall fifteen years ago that still
requires his use of crutches. There is no question that this fall would be just as relevant to
Defendant’s defense if that injury was to his ankles or feet (which are not on Plaintiffs’ proposed
list) as it would be if it was to his hips or legs (which are listed in Plaintiffs’ proposed
limitations).
The Court therefore overrules Plaintiffs’ overly broad and unduly burdensome objections
to each Interrogatory No. 5. Defendant’s motion to compel as to these interrogatories is granted.
2.
Interrogatories Seeking Other Injuries Requiring Medical Treatment
- Interrogatory No. 19 to Margaret and No. 21 to James
Interrogatory No. 19 to Margaret and No. 21 to James respectively ask whether they
“have ever been injured such that [they] ever required medical treatment of any kind.” (emphasis
added). For each injury, Plaintiffs are asked to “state the date of the incident, nature of the
incident, nature of the injury, medical treatment provided, and the name(s) and address(es) of the
medical provider(s).”
Plaintiffs object to the interrogatories as overly broad, unduly
burdensome, and unlimited in time, scope, and without regard to the injuries claimed in the
6
complaint. They propose limiting the scope of the interrogatories to medical consultations in the
previous 10 years concerning the same body parts that were injured in the underlying accident.
Defendant opposes this suggestion and denies that the interrogatory is overly broad or unduly
burdensome, arguing that it has a general right to review Plaintiffs’ prior medical history to
evaluate relevant pre-existing injuries or conditions.
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that these interrogatories are facially overly broad
because they lack any limitation either by the subject matter such as type of injury or medical
treatment, severity of injury, type of provider, or other limitation such as a certain time period or
body part. As written, the interrogatories seek information concerning “every” injury ever
sustained by Plaintiffs since birth, without limitation as to the severity or type of health care
needed or the level of practitioner from whom it was sought. Nor do the interrogatories have
any temporal limitation, such as limiting to the last 20 years as used in Interrogatory No. 5. The
Court therefore sustains Plaintiffs’ overly broad objections to these interrogatories and limits the
scope of these interrogatories to injuries requiring hospitalization or extensive medical treatment
during the last 20 years. Plaintiffs shall serve amended answers to Interrogatory No. 19 to
Margaret and No. 21 to James, but limited to injuries requiring hospitalization or extensive
medical treatment during the last 20 years.
B.
Interrogatories Related to Plaintiffs’ Claims for Disability or Worker’s
Compensation and Benefits - Interrogatory Nos. 6 and 8
Interrogatory No. 6 served on each Plaintiff asks whether they “have ever applied for or
sought any Social Security or any other disability benefits (state, federal, or private carrier), and
if so, identify when, where, with what agency or entity, and the result (e.g. benefits awarded,
denial, etc.).” Interrogatory No. 8 asks whether Plaintiffs “have ever applied for or sought any
7
claims for worker’s compensation benefits (e.g. OWCP, FECA), and if so, for each such claim,
please state the date, case number, and outcome of [the] claims (e.g. benefits awarded, denial,
etc.).” Plaintiffs object to these interrogatories as being overly broad and unduly burdensome.
They further object that the interrogatories are unlimited in scope and to the injuries claimed in
their complaint.
Defendant counters that the interrogatories are narrowly framed to include only certain
kinds of disability claims, which are specifically relevant because Plaintiffs’ medical history
indicates that both have either filed previous disability claims or were on disability at the time of
the accident. Because the interrogatories seek to reveal information about prior injuries, the
scope of the interrogatories is reasonable and relevant under the broad standard contained in Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(1)(b). Further, the lack of time constraint may pose an oppressive burden to
Plaintiffs, irrespective of whether few claims exist in Plaintiffs’ medical histories. Defendant
argues that, if an extensive history exists, it would be highly relevant to Defendant’s defense.
The interrogatories ask Plaintiffs whether they have ever applied for or sought disability
or worker’s compensation benefits, and, if so, to provide certain information. Although the
interrogatories are limited to Plaintiffs’ discrete events of applying for disability or worker’s
compensation benefits, the Court finds that they are facially overbroad and should be limited to a
reasonable time period, which the Court finds to be the last 20 years. Plaintiffs’ overly broad
objections based upon the lack of any time restriction are therefore sustained. The remainder of
their objections, including the objections based upon the failure to limit the scope of specific
body parts and objections that responding to the interrogatories would be unduly burdensome,
are overruled. Defendant’s motion to compel as to Interrogatory Nos. 6 and 8 is granted, except
8
that these interrogatories are limited to disability or worker’s compensation benefit claims in the
last 20 years.
C.
Interrogatories Related to Plaintiffs’ Damages Claims - Interrogatory Nos. 9
and 12-16
Defendant’s Interrogatory Nos. 9 and 12-16 seek to ascertain the basis and value asserted
of Plaintiffs’ damages claims. For example, identical versions of Interrogatory No. 9 ask each
Plaintiff to:
a) State the specific amount of money you are seeking associated with pain and
suffering; b) Describe in detail the pain you have experienced since the injury; c)
Describe in detail the pain you are currently experiencing; and d) Describe in
detail the pain you expect to experience in the future.
The interrogatories relating to disability (No. 12), emotional damages (No. 13), loss of
consortium (No. 14), disfigurement (No. 15), and any other damages not otherwise listed (No.
16) have similar constructions, in that they request Plaintiffs to describe the pain associated with
the injuries and the dollar amount associated with the injuries. Interrogatory Nos. 12, 15, and 16
also ask Plaintiffs to describe the manner in which the damages figure was calculated.
Interrogatory Nos. 13 and 14 ask Plaintiffs to describe the medical treatment sought for their
conditions.
Plaintiffs object to these interrogatories as overly broad, unduly burdensome, and seeking
to set forth additional requirements not authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
They also object that the interrogatories seek attorney mental impressions protected by the work
product doctrine. Plaintiffs then refer Defendant to their initial and supplemental disclosures
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). In their response to the motion to compel, Plaintiffs argue that
the interrogatories are improper contention interrogatories. Requiring them to answer would be
9
the equivalent of their providing Defendant with a “skeletonized brief on the facts and law.”
Answering the interrogatory would require them to sift through facts and documents to
determine matters of law and have the case “be tried at the discovery stage rather than at trial.”
Further, Plaintiffs assert that they have already provided Defendant with a computation of their
damages pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1) via “comprehensive Medical Outlines” that include an
itemization of their medical bills to date, and which will continue to be supplemented as their
treatment continues. Plaintiffs claim they have stipulated that they are not making a past,
present, or future wage loss claim. By asking for an itemization of their non-economic damages,
Defendant is attempting to set forth additional requirements not authorized by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure or Kansas law. Finally, in the event the Court requires them to answer these
interrogatories, Plaintiffs request they be given 30 days after the discovery deadline to serve their
answers to these interrogatories.
Defendant contends that the interrogatories are neither overly broad nor unduly
burdensome. They are merely requesting a description of Plaintiff’s injury and damage claims
as is already required under Rule 26(A)(1)(a)(iii).
Defendant further argues that Plaintiffs’
reference to their initial disclosures in their interrogatory answers does not comply with Rule
33(b). Defendant further argues that these initial disclosures are incomplete and unresponsive
since they address only 11% of Plaintiffs’ $10.6 million claim.
Defendant’s interrogatories are permissible. Under Rule 33(a)(2), a party may serve
interrogatories to “relate to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b),” and an
interrogatory is “not objectionable merely because it asks for an opinion or contention that
relates to fact or the application of law to fact.” The commentary to the 1970 Amendments to
10
Rule 33 identified a trend towards permitting “factual” opinions, and further noted that
contention interrogatories that call for the application of law to fact “can be most useful in
narrowing and sharpening the issues, which is a major purpose of discovery.”4
The Court also finds Plaintiffs’ objections that the interrogatories seek attorney mental
impressions protected by the work product doctrine unavailing. In the context of a work product
objection to an interrogatory, this Court has held that unless the interrogatory (1) specifically
inquires into an attorney’s mental impressions, conclusions, or legal theories, or (2) asks for the
content of a document protected as work product, it is inappropriate to raise a work product
objection.5 The work product doctrine also does not provide any protection for “facts concerning
the creation of work product or facts contained within work product.” The party asserting the
objection to an interrogatory has the burden of establishing that the information sought is
protected by the work product doctrine.6 Mere allegations that the work product doctrine applies
are not sufficient.7
Plaintiffs claim that the method of calculating damages constitutes privileged “mental
impressions” of their attorney. They have, however, failed to substantiate that claim. Their
mere conclusory statements do not suffice.8 Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of
showing that the interrogatories seek protected attorney opinion work product. Their work
product objections are therefore overruled.
4
Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b) advisory committee’s note (1970 Am.)
5
Pouncil v. Branch Law Firm, 277 F.R.D. 642, 649 (D. Kan. 2011).
6
Id. (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dabney, 73 F.3d 262, 266 (10th Cir. 1995)).
7
Id.
8
See Audiotext Commc’ns, 1995 WL 625962, at *10 (conclusory statements that damages
calculations prepared at the request of attorneys contain mental impressions and trial strategies of
counsel did not suffice to establish work product).
11
Finally, the Court overrules Plaintiffs’ prematurity objections. Plaintiffs argue that the
nature of their ongoing treatment justifies a delayed response, as information continues to be
compiled. The mere fact that there may be additional information in the future is no reason to
refuse provision of the information possessed in the present. Under Rule 26(e), Plaintiffs have a
continuing duty to supplement their interrogatory answers as information becomes available.
Defendant’s motion to compel answers to Interrogatory Nos. 9 and 12-16 is granted.
D.
Interrogatories Related to Other Car Accidents - Interrogatory No. 20
Defendant’s Interrogatory No. 20 to James Riley, asks:
If you have ever been involved in a car accident, other than the one described in
the complaint initiating this action, please: a) Describe the accident(s) in detail;
b) State the date(s) the accident(s) occurred; c) Identify the location(s) of the
accident(s); d) State whether you made a claim against an insurance company, or
any other party as a result of the accident(s); e) State whether a claim was made
against you, or your insurance carrier as a result of the accident(s); and f) State
whether you reached a private settlement agreement or other agreement with any
other party as a result of the accident(s).
Plaintiffs object to this interrogatory on the grounds it is overbroad, unduly burdensome,
unlimited in time, scope and without regard to the injuries claimed in the complaint. They
suggest that it should be limited to the past 10 years and to the body parts injured and outlined in
their complaint.
Defendant argues that Interrogatory No. 20 is neither overbroad nor unduly burdensome.
Both Plaintiffs in this case are making substantial damage claims for a broad range of injuries,
disabilities, and pain and suffering they claim were caused by the accident. As such, Defendant
claims it is entitled to review the Plaintiffs’ accident history in order to evaluate the degree to
which the Plaintiff may have suffered relevant preexisting injuries or conditions, and whether
Plaintiff’s driving history may be relevant.
12
Although the interrogatories are limited by their subject matter to other car accidents, the
Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the interrogatory’s lack of a time limitations makes it facially
overbroad. The Court will therefore limit it to a reasonable time period, which the Court finds to
be the last 20 years.
Plaintiffs’ overly broad objection based upon the lack of any time
restriction is therefore sustained. The remainder of their objections, including the objection
based upon the failure to limit the scope to specific body parts and objection that responding to
the interrogatory would be unduly burdensome, are overruled. Defendant’s motion to compel as
to Interrogatory No. 20 to James Riley is granted, but the interrogatory is limited to car accidents
occurring in the last 20 years.
III.
Requests for Production in Dispute
Defendant also seeks to compel Plaintiffs to comply with First Request Nos. 4-7 and 9
served upon James Riley, and Request Nos. 3-6 and 8 served upon Margaret Riley. All of these
requests ask Plaintiffs to sign an authorization form releasing various classes of Plaintiffs’
records. Request No. 3 (Margaret) and 4 (James) seeks a signed release for medical records,
insurance records, and related information. Request No. 4 (Margaret) and 5 (James) seeks a
release for social security records. Request No. 5 (Margaret) and 6 (James) seeks a release for
their employment records. Request No. 6 (Margaret) and 7 (James) seeks a release for their
unemployment and worker’s compensation records. Finally, Request No. 8 (Margaret) and 9
(James) seeks a release for their Medicare and Medicaid records.
Plaintiffs object that these production requests are irrelevant, overbroad, unduly
burdensome, or not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. They are
completely unlimited in time and scope. This could potentially require Plaintiffs to release drug
13
and alcohol treatment records or information dating back to their very first paid employment,
both of which unreasonably violate Plaintiffs’ privacy and have no relevance to the case at hand,
particularly when no past, present, or future wage loss claim is being pursued. For their part,
Defendant argues that these releases are proper, not only because the information contained in
the documents would be highly relevant to Defendant’s defense, but also because Plaintiff has
asked for similar records from Defendant’s employee. Thus, Defendant seeks an order from this
Court compelling Plaintiffs to provide the requested signed authorization forms.
This Court has previously addressed the propriety of compelling parties to provide signed
release authorizations, and concluded that Rule 34 provides no basis for doing so.9 Rule 34
allows a party to “serve on any other party a request within the scope of Rule 26(b)”, including
production requests that permit the requesting party “to inspect, copy, test, or sample . . .
[documents] in the responding party’s possession, custody, or control.” Nowhere in Rule 34 is
there a provision “requiring a party to sign a release or authorization so that the requesting party
may obtain a document directly from a non-party.”10
Defendant has not asked Plaintiffs to produce the medical, employment, or Medicare
records in Plaintiffs’ possession or control, as Rule 34 would allow. Instead, they have asked
Plaintiffs to execute a release allowing Defendant to obtain these records from a non-party
custodian. As discussed in the Shaw and Becker cases, this is improper. Defendant should
instead first attempt to obtain the documents by either a request for production of the documents
under Rule 34 or a subpoena under Rule 45.
9
See, e.g. Becker v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., No. 06-2226-KHV-DJW, 2007 WL
677711 (D. Kan. Mar. 2, 2007); Shaw v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., No. 04-2394-KHV-DJW, 2005
WL 375666 (D. Kan. Feb. 9, 2005).
10
Becker, 2007 WL 677711, at *2.
14
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Compel Discovery (ECF
No. 38) is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted as to First Interrogatory Nos.
5-6, 9, and 12-16 to James Riley and Interrogatory Nos. 5-6, 9, and 12-16 to Margaret Riley. The
motion is denied as to First Requests for Production Nos. 4-7 and 9 to James Riley and First
Request Nos. 3-6 and 8 to Margaret Riley. For Interrogatory Nos. 8 and 19 to Margaret Riley
and Nos. 8 and 20-21 to James Riley, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs
shall serve amended answers to Interrogatory No. 19 to Margaret Riley and No. 21 to James
Riley, but limited to injuries requiring hospitalization or extensive medical treatment during the
last 20 years. Interrogatory No. 8 to James Riley, Interrogatory No. 8 to Margaret Riley, and
Interrogatory No. 20 to James Riley are also limited to a 20-year time period. All discovery
ordered to be produced herein shall be produced within 30 days of the date of this
Memorandum and Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ request for a 30-day extension of time
beyond the discovery deadline to respond to Defendants’ interrogatories related to damage
calculations is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s request for the discovery deadline to be
extended by 60 days is found to be moot. The Court has already ruled on the parties’ separately
filed joint motion for modification of the scheduling order (ECF No. 50) and extended the
discovery deadline by 30 days.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated in Kansas City, Kansas on this 12th day of April, 2012.
s/ David J. Waxse
David J. Waxse
United States Magistrate Judge
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