Chambers v. Kansas City Kansas Community College

Filing 74

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 64 Motion for Reconsideration (Motion Requesting Review, Revisit, and Reversal of 60 Memorandum and Order Denying Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint). Signed by Magistrate Judge David J. Waxse on 8/7/2013.Mailed to pro se Plaintiff by regular mail. (do)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JOHNNY CHAMBERS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KANSAS CITY KANSAS COMMUNITY
COLLEGE,
Defendant.

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Case No. 11-CV-2646-KHV

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The Court has before it the Motion Requesting Review, Revisit, and Reversal of the
Memorandum and Order Denying Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (ECF No. 64).
Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider the Memorandum and Order (ECF No. 60) that denied his
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (ECF No. 42) as untimely and prejudicial.
Defendant has filed a Memorandum in Opposition (ECF No. 70). For the reasons set out below,
the Court concludes that the Motion should be denied.
I.

Relevant Factual Background
Plaintiff filed his Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint on March 11, 2013,

over six months after the August 24, 2012 deadline to move to amend the pleadings as set forth
in the Scheduling Order.1 Plaintiff sought to add five pages of new factual allegations based on
events that occurred mainly from 2009 to early 2012. These new allegations were related to the
leave process and probation, as well as to factual allegations already raised in his original
Complaint, such as the incorrect spelling of his name, his inability to participate in orientation,
his omission from the department directory, unequal pay, and his non-involvement in Work
Keys. The Court denied the original Motion, finding that Plaintiff had failed to show good cause

1

Sched. Order at 8:3(a), ECF No. 14.

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under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) to justify the untimely filing. Specifically,
Plaintiff set forth no explanation for the delay whatsoever in the Motion.
The Court also found that Defendant would suffer undue prejudice if Plaintiff were
allowed to amend his complaint at this late stage of the litigation. Discovery is closed, the
dispositive motion deadline has passed, and the Court has entered the final Pretrial Order. In
addition, the Court has entered a Memorandum and Order (ECF No. 71) granting in part and
denying as moot in part Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 45). As a result,
the only claims remaining for trial at this time are Plaintiff’s Title VII claims for (1) genderbased disparate treatment and (2) race and/or gender harassment.2
Plaintiff now states in the instant Motion that he delayed moving for leave to amend
because his allegations related to the leave process were pending before the Kansas Human
Rights Commission (“KHRC”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
until February 11, 2013, when the EEOC issued a right to sue letter to Plaintiff as to those
allegations. Rather than file a new action, Plaintiff then chose to seek leave to amend his original
complaint to add additional allegations. Plaintiff further states that because over ninety days have
passed since the issuance of the right to sue letter, he can no longer file a new action as to the
additional allegations. As a result, Plaintiff argues that denying him leave to amend would be
prejudicial to him.
Defendant argues in its Memorandum in Opposition that Plaintiff should not have
assumed that his motion for leave to amend would be granted, considering that it was being filed
after the deadline to move to amend and after discovery had closed. Defendant also argues that
Plaintiff created the prejudice of which he complains by choosing to not file a new action as to
the additional allegations.

2

Mem. and Order at 10, ECF No. 71.

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II.

Standard for Ruling on a Motion for Reconsideration
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for motions for

reconsideration,3 the District of Kansas has promulgated a local rule, D. Kan. Rule 7.3(b), which
addresses reconsideration of non-dispositive rulings. Pursuant to D. Kan. Rule 7.3(b), motions
seeking reconsideration of non-dispositive orders must be based on “(1) an intervening change in
controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence, or (3) the need to correct clear error or
prevent manifest injustice.” Whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is committed
to the court’s discretion.4
It is well settled that a motion to reconsider is not a second opportunity for a party to ask
the court to consider new arguments and supporting facts that could have been presented
originally.5 Nor is a motion to reconsider to be used as “a second chance when a party has failed
to present its strongest case in the first instance.”6 Improper use of motions to reconsider can
waste judicial resources and obstruct the efficient administration of justice.7 Reconsideration
may, however, be appropriate “where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party’s position,
or the controlling law.”8

3

Hatfield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 52 F.3d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1995).

4

Hancock v. Oklahoma City, 857 F.2d 1394, 1395 (10th Cir. 1988).

5

Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991).

6

Steinert v. Winn Group, Inc., No. 98-2564-CM, 2003 WL 23484638, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 24, 2003) (quoting
Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, No. 99-4071-JAR, 2003 WL 21536881, at *1 (D. Kan. July 2, 2003)).
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RTC v. Williams, 165 F.R.D. 639, 642 (D. Kan. 1996) (quoting United States ex rel. Houck v. Folding Carton
Admin. Comm., 121 F.R.D. 69, 71 (N.D. Ill. 1988)).

8

Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000).

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III.

Discussion
Here, Plaintiff has not shown that any of the factors for granting reconsideration are

present. First, Plaintiff does not show that there has been an intervening change in the controlling
law. Nor does Plaintiff present any new evidence that was unavailable at the time of the original
motion. At the time he moved for leave to amend, Plaintiff was aware of the EEOC right to sue
letter issued on February 11, 2013 regarding the new allegations. Nevertheless, he failed to make
any reference to the EEOC letter in his motion. Instead, he only included a copy of the EEOC
letter as one of the 118 pages of exhibits in support of his proposed amended complaint.9
Lastly, the Court finds neither clear error nor manifest injustice that needs to be
corrected. The Court based its original ruling on Plaintiff’s failure to show any cause for the
untimeliness of the original motion. As a result, there was no error. As stated previously, a
motion to reconsider is not to be used as “a second chance when a party has failed to present its
strongest case in the first instance.”10 Nor does the Court find manifest injustice here. In its
original ruling, the Court found that granting leave to amend would be prejudicial to Defendant,
and this finding still applies. Discovery is closed and the dispositive motion deadline has passed.
Also, the Court has entered the final Pretrial Order and ruled on Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, and this matter is set for trial on September 3, 2013. Allowing Plaintiff
leave to amend would require Defendant to respond again, engage in further discovery, and file
additional dispositive motion(s), and would undoubtedly delay the trial, resulting in undue
prejudice to the Defendant at this late stage. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds none of the
factors in favor of granting reconsideration are present.

9

Proposed Am. Compl., ECF No. 42-1.

10

Steinert, 2003 WL 23484638, at *2.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting Review, Revisit,
and Reversal of the Memorandum and Order Denying Motion for Leave to File Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 64), construed as a motion to reconsider under D. Kan. Rule 7.3(b), is
hereby denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated in Kansas City, Kansas on this 7th day of August, 2013.

s/ David J. Waxse
David J. Waxse
United States Magistrate Judge

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