Sprint Communications Company L.P. v. Cox Communications, Inc. et al

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying without prejudice 24 Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate Cases. Signed by District Judge Julie A. Robinson on 5/18/2012. (pp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS, L.P.

)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
)
COX COMMUNICATIONS KANSAS, )
LLC, COX KANSAS TELCOM, LLC, )
and, COXCOM, LLC.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
____________________________________)

Case No. 11-2683-JAR-KMH

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate Cases (Doc. 24) with Case Nos. 112684-KHV, 11-2685-RDR, and 11-2686-JTM. The motion is fully briefed and the Court is
prepared to rule. Because the Court finds the motion to consolidate is premature in this action, it
denies the motion without prejudice to refiling.
Plaintiff asks for consolidation of these actions that all relate to broadband and/or packetbased telephony products and services offered by various cable companies that allegedly infringe
twelve of Sprint’s patents. At this time, Sprint seeks consolidation for discovery purposes only.
The defendant cable providers in each case filed motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) Sprint’s claims for contributory infringement and enhanced damages; Sprint
subsequently filed amended complaints rendering these motions moot. In this case, but not in
any of the other actions, Defendants—several Cox Communications entities—have filed a
motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3), as well as a Motion to Transfer
the case to the District of Delaware.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) provides:

If actions before the court involve a common question of law or
fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing of trial any or all matters at
issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any
other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.
The decision whether to consolidate is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.1 “In
exercising its discretion, the court should consider whether judicial efficiency is best served by
consolidation.”2 “The court generally weighs the saving of time and effort that consolidation
would produce against any inconvenience, delay, or expense that consolidation would cause.”3
Courts also consider (1) whether the relief sought varies substantially between the two actions;
(2) whether defendants are being sued in different capacities; and (3) what would be gained by
consolidation and what injury would be suffered by failure to consolidate.4 The party requesting
consolidation bears the burden of showing that the balance weighs in favor of consolidation.5
Due to the pending motions to dismiss and transfer in this case, the Court finds that
judicial economy would not be served by consolidation at this time, even for purposes of
discovery. This is the only case of the four Sprint cases that presents challenges by the
defendants to personal jurisdiction and venue. These motions are not yet fully briefed, although
the Court expects them to become ripe within the next week. Because this case is subject to

1

Shump v. Balka, 574 F.2d 1341, 1344 (10th Cir. 1978).

2

McCoy v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 02-2064-KHV, 2003 WL 124531, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 12, 2003).

3

C.T. v. Liberal Sch. Dist., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1346 (D. Kan. 2008) (citing 9A Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2383, at 35–36 (3d ed. 2008)).
4

Shump, 574 F.3d at 1344; Lane v. United States, Nos. 90-4228-S, 90-4229-S, 1991 WL 105204, at *1 (D.
Kan. May 28, 1991).
5

Blagg v. Line, Nos. 09-CV-0703-CVE-FHM, 09-CV-0708-TCK-PJC, 10-CV-0502-GKF-PJC, 2010 WL
3893981, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2010) (citing Bank of Montreal v. Eagle Assocs., 117 F.R.D. 530, 532
(S.D.N.Y. 1987)).

2

dismissal or transfer prior to discovery or claim construction, the Court does not find that
consolidation with the other three Sprint cases would be efficient. The Court finds that judicial
efficiency is best served by deciding the pending motions to dismiss and transfer prior to any
consolidation. If the Court ultimately denies the motions to dismiss and transfer, Plaintiff may
renew its motion for consolidation.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff’s Motion to
Consolidate Cases (Doc. 24) is denied without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 18, 2012
S/ Julie A. Robinson
JULIE A. ROBINSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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