Jackson-Holmes v. U.S. Postmaster General
Filing
22
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 12 Motion to Dismiss; granting 16 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 3/13/2013.Mailed to pro se party Lashonda Jackson-Holmes by regular mail. (aa)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
LASHONDA JACKSON-HOLMES,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 12-2047-EFM
U.S. POSTMASTER GENERAL,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Lashonda Jackson-Holmes brought this pro se employment discrimination
lawsuit against Defendant United States Postmaster General. Jackson-Holmes claims that she
was subjected to a hostile work environment and retaliation due to sexual harassment from a coworker at the United States Postal Service Network Distribution Center in Kansas City, Kansas.
The Postmaster General now moves to dismiss Jackson-Holmes’s claim of retaliation for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and also moved for summary judgment in its
favor on Jackson-Holmes’s hostile-work-environment claim. Because Jackson-Holmes failed to
allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim of retaliation and failed to establish a genuine
issue of fact regarding a hostile work environment, the Court grants both of Defendant’s
motions.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background1
At the time of the incidents in issue in this lawsuit, Plaintiff Lashonda Jackson-Holmes
was employed by Defendant United States Postmaster General at the U.S. Postal Service
Network Distribution Center in Kansas City. In 1999, Jackson-Holmes filed a union grievance
against the Postmaster General after she allegedly received a sexually explicit request from
another employee, Donald Zuger. On May 26, 2011, Jackson-Holmes gave her supervisor a
note, complaining that she would not be re-victimized by Zuger, who had recently transferred to
Jackson-Holmes’s work unit. According to Jackson-Holmes, she and Zuger had crossed paths
twice that day. During the first encounter, Zuger allegedly said something unintelligible that
Jackson-Holmes believed to be directed at her. During the second encounter, Zuger extended his
arms out across an aisle toward Jackson-Holmes and once again said something unintelligible.
No one else witnessed these incidents.
Jackson-Holmes immediately reported these incidents to manager Randy Shepherd. A
few hours later, Shepherd interviewed Zuger, who denied Jackson-Holmes’s claims. Shepherd
instructed Zuger to avoid all communication with Jackson-Holmes. Zuger was then assigned to
a work area some distance away from Jackson-Holmes.
On May 31, 2011, Jackson-Holmes filed a pre-complaint information form with the
EEOC, alleging that another employee informed her that Zuger calls her “princess.”
On
September 10, 2011, a co-worker reported to Shepherd that Zuger retrieved equipment from
beside Jackson-Holmes, used the equipment, and then returned it without saying anything. On
October 3, 2011, Jackson-Holmes filed a formal complaint with the EEOC. In the EEOC filing,
1
In accordance with summary judgment procedures, the Court has set forth the uncontroverted facts,
and they are related in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
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she alleged that the foregoing facts were proof that she was being retaliated against for filing
previous EEOC grievances.
In her complaint filed with the Court, Jackson-Holmes alleges that management at the
Postal Service has refused to relocate her or Zuger or offer other solutions, despite ongoing
harassment. Jackson-Holmes claims that she was subjected to retaliation and sexual harassment.
She asks that the Court grant her a promotion, monetary relief, transfer to another department,
payment for costs of this suit, and removal of the other employees involved.
Defendant Postmaster General moves to dismiss Jackson-Holmes’s retaliation claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. The Postmaster General also moves for summary judgment in its
favor on the claim of a hostile work environment based on sexual harassment, arguing that no
reasonable trier-of-fact could find that Jackson-Holmes was subjected to harassment or sexual
harassment. Jackson-Holmes did not respond to either motion.
II.
A.
Legal Standards
Standard for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move for dismissal of any claim for which the
plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.2 Upon such motion, the
court must decide “whether the complaint contains ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’”3 A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads facts sufficient for the
2
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
3
Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.4 The plausibility
standard reflects the requirement in Rule 8 that pleadings provide defendants with fair notice of
the nature of claims as well the grounds on which each claim rests.5 Under 12(b)(6), the court
must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, but need not afford such a
presumption to legal conclusions.6 Viewing the complaint in this manner, the court must decide
whether the plaintiff’s allegations give rise to more than speculative possibilities.7
If the
allegations in the complaint are “so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much
of it innocent, then the plaintiffs ‘have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable
to plausible.’”8
B.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.9
A fact is “material” when it is essential to the claim, and issues of fact are “genuine” if the
proffered evidence permits a reasonable jury to decide the issue in either party’s favor.10 The
movant bears the initial burden of proof, and must show the lack of evidence on an essential
4
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 566 U.S. at 556)
5
See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
6
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
7
See id. (“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” (Citation omitted)).
8
Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247 (quoting Twombly, 566 U.S. at 570).
9
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
10
Haynes v. Level 3 Communications, LLC, 456 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006).
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element of the claim.11 The nonmovant must then bring forth specific facts showing a genuine
issue for trial.12 These facts must be clearly identified through affidavits, deposition transcripts,
or incorporated exhibits—conclusory allegations alone cannot survive a motion for summary
judgment.13 The court views all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
to the party opposing summary judgment.14
C.
Title VII Claims of Retaliation and Hostile Work Environment based on Sexual
Discrimination
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from discriminating or
retaliating against an individual based upon that person’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.15 When a plaintiff alleges a claim of retaliation or hostile work environment based on
sexual discrimination under Title VII, but the plaintiff cannot produce any direct evidence of
discrimination, the Court applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.16 Under that
framework, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination or
retaliation.17 If the plaintiff meets the initial burden, “the burden shifts to the defendant to show
11
Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)).
12
Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 935 (10th Cir. 2005).
13
Mitchell v. City of Moore, Okla., 218 F.3d 1190, 1197 (10th Cir. 2000)(citing Adler v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998)).
14
LifeWise Master Funding v. Telebank, 374 F.3d 917, 927 (10th Cir. 2004).
15
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting discrimination by employers); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)
(prohibiting discrimination against specific federal employees, including employees of the United States Postal
Service).
16
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1972); see also, Daniels v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 701 F.3d 620, 627–38 (10th Cir. 2012) (applying the McDonnell Douglas analysis to claims of
sexual discrimination and retaliation under Title VII).
17
See Daniels, 701 F.3d at 627–38.
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legitimate, non-discriminatory” or non-retaliatory reason for its actions.18
If the defendant
provides such a reason, then the burden returns to the plaintiff who must show that the
defendant’s stated reasons are a pretext for discriminatory intent.19
To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, a plaintiff must show that “(1) she engaged
in protected opposition to discrimination; (2) she suffered an adverse action that a reasonable
employee would have found material; and (3) there is a causal nexus between her opposition and
the employer's adverse action.”20 Adverse material actions constitute a “significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”21 Reassignment
of duties does not necessarily constitute an adverse material action.22 Instead, the Court looks at
all of the surrounding circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s
position to determine whether a material adverse action has occurred.23 A causal connection
may exist between the filing of administrative charges and the adverse action when “protected
conduct [is] closely followed by adverse action.”24 If, however, an employee’s discrimination
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2006).
21
Daniels, 701 F.3d at 635.
22
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 71 (2006).
23
Id.
24
Proctor v. United Parcel Serv., 502 F.3d 1200, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007).
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filing is not close enough in time to the employer’s actions, those actions do not constitute
retaliation.25
Sexual harassment claims generally fall into two categories: quid pro quo and hostile
work environment harassment.26 Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when an employment
benefit is conditioned upon sexual conduct.27 Hostile work environment sexual harassment
occurs when the sexual conduct interferes with an employee’s work performance or creates an
abusive working environment.28 To establish a prima facie case for a hostile work environment
due to sexual harassment, a plaintiff must show the following:
(1) [S]he is a member of a protected group; (2) she was subject to unwelcome
harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; and (4) due to the harassment's
severity or pervasiveness, the harassment altered a term, condition, or privilege of
the plaintiff's employment and created an abusive working environment.29
The extent of the severity or pervasiveness must permeate the workplace “with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that . . . alter[s] the conditions of the victim’s employment and
create[s] an abusive working environment.”30 The plaintiff must show that the workplace was
objectively and subjectively hostile.31 Such finding will be determined by looking at the entire
circumstances, including (1) the frequency and severity of the behavior; (2) whether such
25
Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that material adverse
actions taking place one and a half months after an employee’s protected action may constitute retaliation but
actions taking place three months later do not constitute retaliation.)
26
Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1413 (10th Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Harsco Corp. v. Renner, 475 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007).
30
Davis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 142 F.3d 1334, 1341 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal citations omitted)).
31
Id.
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behavior is threatening, humiliating, or merely offensive; and (3) whether it unreasonably
interferes with the employee’s ability to work.32
III.
Analysis
The Court agrees with the Postmaster General that Jackson-Holmes’s retaliation claim
must be dismissed because Jackson-Holmes has not pled facts sufficient to establish, under Title
VII, that (1) there is a casual nexus between her opposition to discrimination and the employer’s
adverse action, and (2) she suffered an adverse action that a reasonable employee would have
found material. The Court also agrees that the Postmaster General is entitled to summary
judgment on Jackson-Holmes’s hostile work environment claim based on sexual harassment.
There is no genuine dispute that Jackson-Holmes was (1) not subject to harassment, and (2) no
term, condition, or privilege of Jackson-Holmes’s employment was altered in such a way to
create a hostile work environment.
A.
Jackson-Holmes has not established a prima facie case of retaliation.
Jackson-Holmes does not allege facts sufficient for her retaliation claim to survive
dismissal. First, Jackson-Holmes has not sufficiently alleged that there was a causal connection
between any actions taken by Postmaster General and her discrimination complaint. The only
protected action that Jackson-Holmes references in her pleadings is the 1999 dispute with Zuger.
The temporal relationship between that dispute and the current case is too distant for the Court to
consider them causally connected.33
Furthermore, Jackson-Holmes’s retaliation claim fails to allege facts sufficient show that
the Postmaster General took any materially adverse action in response to that filing. When
32
Id.
33
See Anderson, 181 F.3d at 1179.
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Jackson-Holmes brought up her concerns with manager Shepherd, he interviewed Zuger,
prohibited him from speaking to Jackson-Holmes, and then reassigned both of them to different
locations. There is nothing to indicate that Jackson-Holmes’s job duties, responsibilities, or
benefits were significantly altered.34 Considering all of the surrounding circumstances, JacksonHolmes has not sufficiently alleged that she has suffered from materially adverse action by her
employer.35 Therefore, her claim of retaliation must be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
B.
No genuine dispute exists regarding Jackson-Holmes’s claim of hostile work
environment due to sexual harassment.
Jackson-Holmes did not contest the Postmaster General’s claim that the harassment she
suffered was not severe or pervasive and did not alter any term, privilege or condition of the
workplace into a hostile environment. Jackson-Holmes admits that Zuger did not say anything to
her during the incidents comprising this lawsuit, and there are no allegations that Zuger ever
touched her. The only contact Zuger has had with Jackson-Holmes was in passing. These
isolated incidents would not cause a reasonable employee to feel threatened or humiliated, and
they do not create a workplace “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult.”36 Therefore, no genuine issue exists on the claim of sexual harassment.
34
See Daniels, 701 F.3d at 635.
35
See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 71.
36
See Davis, 142 F.3d at 1341.
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IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED this 13th day of March, 2013, that Defendant
United State Postmaster General’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) and Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 16) are hereby GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ERIC F. MELGREN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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