Bayless v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - It is ordered that the Commissioners decision shall be REVERSED and that judgment shall be entered pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) REMANDING the case for further proceedings consistent herewith. Signed by District Judge John W. Lungstrum on 1/23/2014. (ses)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

LAWRENCE R. BAYLESS, Jr.,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,1
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
)
)
Defendant.
)
________________________________________ )

CIVIL ACTION
No. 12-2432-JWL

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff seeks review of a partially favorable decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security (hereinafter Commissioner) finding Plaintiff disabled and eligible for
Social Security Disability (SSD) benefits under sections 216(i) and 223 of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 423 (hereinafter the Act), beginning August 29,
2009, but not before that date. (R. 30-38). Finding error in the Commissioner’s
evaluation of the medical opinions, the court ORDERS that the decision shall be
REVERSED and that judgment shall be entered pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42

1

On February 14, 2013, Carolyn W. Colvin became Acting Commissioner of
Social Security. In accordance with Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Ms. Colvin is substituted for Commissioner Michael J. Astrue as the
defendant. In accordance with the last sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), no further action
is necessary.

U.S.C. § 405(g) REMANDING the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
I.

Background
Plaintiff applied for SSD, alleging disability beginning June 30, 2005. (R. 30). In

due course, Plaintiff exhausted proceedings before the Commissioner, and now seeks
judicial review of the final decision denying benefits before August 29, 2009. He alleges
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in evaluating the medical opinions of his
treating physician and of a consultative examiner; erred in evaluating the credibility of his
allegations of symptoms; and improperly relied upon the testimony of the vocational
expert.
The court’s review is guided by the Act. Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052
(10th Cir. 2009). Section 405(g) of the Act provides that in judicial review “[t]he
findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court must determine whether the ALJ’s factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether he applied the
correct legal standard. Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007); accord,
White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 905 (10th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence is more than
a scintilla, but it is less than a preponderance; it is such evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971);
Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052; Gossett v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 802, 804 (10th Cir. 1988).

2

The court may “neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that
of the agency.” Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991)); accord,
Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2005). Nonetheless, the
determination whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision is not
simply a quantitative exercise, for evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by
other evidence or if it constitutes mere conclusion. Gossett, 862 F.2d at 804-05; Ray v.
Bowen, 865 F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 1989).
The Commissioner uses the familiar five-step sequential process to evaluate a
claim for disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136,
1139 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1988)).
“If a determination can be made at any of the steps that a claimant is or is not disabled,
evaluation under a subsequent step is not necessary.” Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1139 (quoting
Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084). In the first three steps, the Commissioner determines whether
claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset, whether he
has a severe impairment(s), and whether the severity of his impairment(s) meets or equals
the severity of any impairment in the Listing of Impairments (20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt.
P, App. 1). Williams, 844 F.2d at 750-51. After evaluating step three, the Commissioner
assesses claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). This assessment is used at both step
four and step five of the sequential evaluation process. Id.

3

The Commissioner next evaluates steps four and five of the sequential process-determining at step four whether, in light of the RFC assessed, claimant can perform his
past relevant work; and at step five whether, when also considering the vocational factors
of age, education, and work experience, claimant is able to perform other work in the
economy. Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1139 (quoting Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084). In steps one
through four the burden is on Plaintiff to prove a disability that prevents performance of
past relevant work. Blea v. Barnhart, 466 F.3d 903, 907 (10th Cir. 2006); accord,
Dikeman v. Halter, 245 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir. 2001); Williams, 844 F.2d at 751 n.2.
At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there are jobs in the
economy which are within the RFC assessed. Id.; Haddock v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 1084,
1088 (10th Cir. 1999).
The court finds that remand is necessary because the ALJ erred in evaluating the
medical opinions. Therefore, the court cannot determine whether the ALJ properly relied
upon the vocational expert testimony, and it will not address the ALJ’s evaluation of the
credibility of Plaintiff’s allegations of symptoms. Plaintiff may make his arguments in
regard to those issues to the Commissioner on remand.
II.

Evaluation of the Medical Opinions
“Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other

acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [a
claimant’s] impairment(s) including [claimant’s] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). Such opinions may not be ignored and, unless a treating
4

source opinion is given controlling weight, all medical opinions will be evaluated by the
Commissioner in accordance with factors contained in the regulations. Id. § 404.1527(d);
Soc. Sec. Ruling (SSR) 96-5p, West’s Soc. Sec. Reporting Serv., Rulings 123-24 (Supp.
2013). A physician who has treated a patient frequently over an extended period of time
(a treating source)2 is expected to have greater insight into the patient’s medical
condition, and his opinion is generally entitled to “particular weight.” Doyal v. Barnhart,
331 F.3d 758, 762 (10th Cir. 2003). But, “the opinion of an examining physician [(a
nontreating source)] who only saw the claimant once is not entitled to the sort of
deferential treatment accorded to a treating physician’s opinion.” Id. at 763 (citing Reid
v. Chater, 71 F.3d 372, 374 (10th Cir. 1995)). However, opinions of nontreating sources
are generally given more weight than the opinions of nonexamining sources who have
merely reviewed the medical record. Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1084 (10th
Cir. 2004); Talbot v. Heckler, 814 F.2d 1456, 1463 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Broadbent v.
Harris, 698 F.2d 407, 412 (10th Cir. 1983), Whitney v. Schweiker, 695 F.2d 784, 789 (7th
Cir. 1982), and Wier ex rel. Wier v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 955, 963 (3d Cir. 1984)).

2

The regulations define three types of “acceptable medical sources:”

“Treating source:” an “acceptable medical source” who has provided the claimant
with medical treatment or evaluation in an ongoing treatment relationship. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1502, 416.902.
“Nontreating source:” an “acceptable medical source” who has examined the
claimant, but never had a treatment relationship. Id.
“Nonexamining source:” an “acceptable medical source” who has not examined
the claimant, but provides a medical opinion. Id.
5

“If [the Commissioner] find[s] that a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of
the nature and severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the
other substantial evidence in [claimant’s] case record, [the Commissioner] will give it
controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); see also, SSR 96-2p, West’s Soc. Sec.
Reporting Serv., Rulings 111-15 (Supp. 2013) (“Giving Controlling Weight to Treating
Source Medical Opinions”).
The Tenth Circuit has explained the nature of the inquiry regarding a treating
source’s medical opinion. Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300-01 (10th Cir. 2003)
(citing SSR 96-2p). The ALJ first determines “whether the opinion is ‘well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.’” Id. at 1300 (quoting
SSR 96-2p). If the opinion is well-supported, the ALJ must confirm that the opinion is
also consistent with other substantial evidence in the record. Id. “[I]f the opinion is
deficient in either of these respects, then it is not entitled to controlling weight.” Id.
If the treating source opinion is not given controlling weight, the inquiry does not
end. Id. A treating source opinion is “still entitled to deference and must be weighed
using all of the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.” Id. Those factors are:
(1) length of treatment relationship and frequency of examination; (2) the nature and
extent of the treatment relationship, including the treatment provided and the kind of
examination or testing performed; (3) the degree to which the physician’s opinion is
supported by relevant evidence; (4) consistency between the opinion and the record as a
6

whole; (5) whether or not the physician is a specialist in the area upon which an opinion
is rendered; and (6) other factors brought to the ALJ’s attention which tend to support or
contradict the opinion. Id. at 1301; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2-6); see also Drapeau v.
Massanari, 255 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Goatcher v. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 52 F.3d 288, 290 (10th Cir. 1995)). However, a court will not insist on a
factor-by-factor analysis so long as the “ALJ’s decision [is] ‘sufficiently specific to make
clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s
medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.’” Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254,
1258 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300).
After considering the factors, the ALJ must give reasons in the decision for the
weight he gives the treating source opinion. Id. 350 F.3d at 1301. “Finally, if the ALJ
rejects the opinion completely, he must then give ‘specific, legitimate reasons’ for doing
so.” Id. (citing Miller v. Chater, 99 F.3d 972, 976 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Frey v.
Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir. 1987)).
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erroneously rejected the treating source opinion of Dr.
Appl and the nontreating source opinion of Dr. Spencer and erroneously accorded the
“greatest weight” to the nonexamining source opinion of Dr. Goering. She argues that the
record evidence does not support the rationale of the ALJ and that the reasons given by
the ALJ are in certain respects nonsensical. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ
properly found that the opinions of Dr. Appl and Dr. Spencer were “too restrictive in light
of the treating records and other evidence of record.” (Comm’r Br. 15). The court is
7

compelled to find that the decision is not sufficiently specific to make clear the weight the
adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.
Thus, it concludes that the ALJ has not provided specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting
the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Appl, and remand is necessary for the
Commissioner to properly evaluate the medical opinions in accordance with the legal
standard presented here.
The court notes that the ALJ addressed and evaluated the medical opinions in three
sections of the decision at issue here, and it quotes and considers each of those
discussions in its entirety:
The undersigned considered the opinion of Emil Goering, M.D. at Exhibit
1F, finding the claimant is capable of a residual functional capacity
consistent with the one specified above herein. Dr. Goering was afforded
the opportunity to review the evidence and noted the following in support of
his opinion. The claimant has a remote history of neck surgery, and recent
diagnosis of diabetes. The claimant was also diagnosed with sleep apnea in
April 2005, but the records indicate that he recently declined a CPAP or a
new sleep study. Otherwise, he has minimal medical care or treatment.
Dr. Madden cited the consultative examination of findings from May 2006
in his opinion. Specifically, he notes that lumbar x-ray results showed only
mild spondylolysis at L5-Sl with all proximal levels unremarkable w
shallow marginal osteophytes, pedicles intact. Reported intermittent
numbness but no pain in his feet, localized w no radiation. The claimant’s
weight was 310 pounds and standing at 58 inches tall. The claimant’s effort
on examination was rated as “fair” by the doctor. The claimant exhibited
some difficulty feeling a monofilament on distal soles of his feet, but cranial
nerves were otherwise intact, sensation to touch was grossly intact, and
reflexes were 2/4 and equal. Babinsky and Romberg tests were negative.
Grip was 40 pounds on the left and 60 pounds on the right with dexterity
preserved. Range of motion of the claimant’s ankles, hips, knees wrist and
elbows were normal. Seated straight leg raise was 90 degrees bilaterally.
Muscle strength was normal at 5/5 in all extremities. Stance and gait were
8

also normal and the claimant did not have any trouble with any orthopedic
maneuvers.
The claimant’s allegations are partially credible but he gave only fair effort
on exam and has declined CPAP treatment. He reports no problems with
personal care. He is morbidly obese but diabetes has recent onset and
functional exam was essentially normal w some decreased neck motion. Xray and exam do not show significant impairment other than obesity but he
has a diagnosis of sleep apnea which coincides with the obesity.
The credibility of the functional limitations is questionable since he
continues to drive and operate potentially dangerous riding lawn mower.
The objective medical evidence indicates he is capable of medium work as
indicated by this RFC but he was afforded the benefit of the doubt and
restricted heights and hazards including operating a motor vehicle due to
the possibility of alleged sleep apnea related problems. (Exhibit 1F /9-16)
The undersigned finds this opinion persuasive in light of the other evidence
of record, or lack thereof.
(R.34).
The record here contains two “Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment”
(Physical RFC Assessment) forms SSA 4734-BK. (R. 197-203, 205-12). Both forms are
contained within Exhibit 1F. The first consists of Exhibit 1F/1-7, and the second consists
of Exhibit 1F/9-16. The Social Security Administration’s Physical RFC Assessment
form consists of 8 pages, and the signature of the individual completing the form appears
on page 8 of the form. In the record here, the first Physical RFC Assessment form is
missing page 8. The record simply does not contain a page numbered “204,” and Exhibit
1F does not contain a page numbered “1F-8.” This is the page which should contain the
signature block of the first Physical RFC Assessment form in the record. The second

9

Physical RFC Assessment form (R. 205-12), (Ex. 1F/9-16) is signed by Dr. Goering, and
constitutes Dr. Goering’s opinion as discussed by the ALJ in the decision. (R. 36).
The court does not know who prepared the first Physical RFC Assessment form, as
the signature page is not in the record. In the first four paragraphs quoted above, the ALJ
discussed Dr. Goering’s opinion and Dr. Madden’s opinion. (R. 34). Thus, it is possible
that the first Physical RFC Assessment form was completed by Dr. Madden, and is Dr.
Madden’s medical opinion. However, on 10/05/2006 the case was referred to Dr.
Goering on a “Request for Medical Advice” for a Physical RFC assessment on
reconsideration, noting that on the initial consideration the claim “was denied with a
medium RFC by an SDM.” (R. 213) (Ex. 1F-17). There is a substantial line of cases
holding that an “SDM,” a single decisionmaker, is not an acceptable medical source and
his RFC assessment is not worthy of any weight as a medical opinion in an ALJ’s
analysis. I.e., Dewey v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 447, 449-50 (8th Cir. 2007); Kennedy v.
Astrue, Civ. A. No. 09-00449-B, 2010 WL 1643248, *8 (S. D. Ala. Apr. 21, 2010);
Lawrence v. Astrue, No. 08-cv-00483-REB 2009 WL 3158149, *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 24,
2009); Ky v. Astrue, No. 08-cv-00362-REB, 2009 WL 68760 at *3 (D. Colo. Jan. 8,
2009); Casey v. Astrue, Civ. A. No. 07-0878-C 2008 WL 2509030, *4 n.3 (S. D. Ala.
June 19, 2008); Bolton v. Astrue, No. 3:07-cv-612-J-HTS, 2008 WL 2038513, *4 (M. D.
Fla. May 12, 2008). Thus, there is record evidence indicating that “Madden” is not a
medical source at all, and that his opinion is not a medical opinion. The ALJ did not
address this issue whatsoever.
10

The first Physical RFC Assessment form in the record opines that Plaintiff is able
to perform medium level work. (R. 197-203). Dr. Goering opined that Plaintiff is able to
perform only light level work (R. 205-12), and the ALJ assessed Plaintiff with the
capacity for “the full range of light work.” (R. 33). However, the ALJ did not distinguish
between these opinions. The first paragraph quoted above mentions Dr. Goering’s
opinion and states that Dr. Goering “noted the following in support of his opinion,” (R.
34), thus suggesting that at least that paragraph is a summary of Dr. Goering’s opinion.
However, a review of Dr. Goering’s opinion reveals that it says nothing whatever about
“a remote history of neck surgery,” that Plaintiff “recently declined a CPAP or a new
sleep study,” or that Plaintiff “has minimal medical care or treatment.” (R. 34). Rather,
each of these observations appears in the discussion on page 6 of the first Physical RFC
Assessment form. (R. 202) (Ex. 1F-6). The ALJ refers to “Dr. Madden” in the second
paragraph quoted above, and in that, and the next two paragraphs the ALJ summarized
(often nearly verbatim) the observations in the discussion on page 6 of the first Physical
RFC Assessment form appearing in the record. Id.
However, in the fourth paragraph quoted above, the ALJ states the conclusion
from the first Physical RFC Assessment form that “objective medical evidence indicates
[Plaintiff] is capable of medium work as indicated by this RFC but he was afforded the
benefit of the doubt and restricted heights and hazards including operating a motor
vehicle due to the possibility of alleged sleep apnea related problems.” (R. 34); compare,
(R. 202). The ALJ then cites Dr. Goering’s opinion, “(Exhibit 1F/9-16)” as the basis for
11

this assertion, and concludes that she “finds this opinion persuasive in light of the other
evidence of record, or lack thereof.” (R. 34). Moreover, the ALJ assessed an RFC for
light work and stated that he accorded Dr. Goering’s opinion “greatest weight.” (R. 36).
This creates an ambiguity which the court is unable to resolve. The ALJ confused the
summary of the two Physical RFC Assessment forms, stated that she found the opinion
regarding medium work “persuasive,” gave “greatest weight” to Dr. Goering’s opinion
that Plaintiff could perform light work, and found that Plaintiff can perform the full range
of light work. Yet she never explained how she weighed the opinions, and never
addressed the record’s suggestion that “Dr. Madden” was actually a single decisionmaker.
Nonetheless, the ALJ purported to find a basis in the record to discount the treating
source opinion of Dr. Appl, and the nontreating source opinion of Dr. Spencer.
As for the opinion evidence, the undersigned considered the treating
physician, Dr. Bradley Appl’s opinions at Exhibit 2F and 4F and finds that
they are too restrictive in light of the treating records and other evidence of
record. The records clearly indicate that the claimant does not take nor is
he prescribed any strong pain medications; Dr. Appl has never restricted the
claimant’s ability to work; and the claimant’s treating neurosurgeon’s
physician assistant notes indicate that the claimant walks normally, there is
no mention of swelling of the claimant’s feet, and no mention of other
problems sleep problems. The doctor’s opinions are without substantial
support from the other evidence of record, which obviously renders them
less persuasive. (Exhibit 2F, 4F/10)
In addition, the possibility always exists that a doctor may express an
opinion in an effort to assist a patient with whom he or she sympathizes for
one reason or another. Another reality which should be mentioned is that
patients can be quite insistent and demanding in seeking supportive notes or
reports from their physicians, who might provide such a note in order to
satisfy their patients’ requests and avoid unnecessary doctor/patient tension.
While it is difficult to confirm the presence of such motives, they are more
12

likely in situations where the opinion in question departs substantially from
the rest of the evidence of record, as in the current case.
The undersigned recognizes that there is no objective evidence of the
claimant experiencing blackouts, either frequent or durational. In addition,
there is no objective medical evidence to support the claimant’s allegations
that he needs to elevate his legs above waist level, per Dr. Appl’s medical
source statement. In addition, the undersigned finds that Wayne Spencer,
M.D.’s medical source statement appears to be too restrictive, as well. Dr.
Spencer’s treatment notes from March 2008, exhibit the claimant only
exhibits trace amounts of lower extremities, which is contrary to the
claimant’s allegations. (Exhibit 3F/13-16).
The undersigned also notes that the claimant continued to drive after the last
hearing. The claimant admitted that he drive one time. The record does not
indicate that Dr. Appl has restricted the claimant’s ability to drive. Thus, it
appears that Dr. Appl does not view the claimant’s alleged uncontrollable
sleeping/blackouts as a severe impairment.
(R. 35-36).
Here, the ALJ discounted both physicians’ opinions because they are “too
restrictive,” and attempted to support that finding by asserting that the record shows the
claimant does not take and is not prescribed strong pain medications, that Dr. Appl has
never restricted Plaintiff’s work ability, and that the Plaintiff’s treating neurosurgeon’s
physician assistant indicated that he walks normally that, there is no mention of swelling
feet, and no mention of other sleep problems, and that Dr. Spencer’s report only mentions
trace amounts of edema in his extremities.3 In considering Dr. Appl’s opinion and Dr.

3

The decision states that Dr. Spencer’s report shows only “trace amounts of lower
extremities,” and Plaintiff asserts that this is nonsensical. The court agrees that this is
nonsensical, and tends to reenforce the impression that the ALJ did not demonstrate
sufficient attention to detail in considering the record. But, consideration of Dr.
Spencer’s report indicates that the ALJ intended to state that it only mentions trace
13

Spencer’s opinion, the ALJ made no record citation other than to the opinions of the
physicians. (R. 35-36). Moreover, one of those citations is erroneous in that the ALJ
cited to Dr. Appl’s opinion at 4F/10 (R. 35), but that exhibit is only 3 pages long.
Moreover, the court is simply unable to located any records containing “the claimant’s
treating neurosurgeon’s physician assistant notes.” (R. 35). It is not the court’s
responsibility to find record evidence which would support the ALJ’s decision, especially
when the ALJ does not provide citation to that evidence. Rather, it is the ALJ’s
responsibility to ensure that her “decision [is] ‘sufficiently specific to make clear to any
subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical
opinion and the reasons for that weight.’” Oldham, 509 F.3d at 1258 (quoting Watkins,
350 F.3d at 1300).
The ALJ also speculates that Dr. Appl may have expressed “an opinion in an effort
to assist a patient with whom he or she sympathizes,” or “in order to satisfy their patients’
requests and avoid unnecessary doctor/patient tension.” (R. 35-36). The Tenth Circuit
held years ago that an ALJ’s assertion that a family doctor naturally advocates his
patient’s cause is not a good reason to reject his opinion as a treating physician. Frey v.
Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 515 (10th Cir. 1987). Here, the ALJ points to no evidence in the
record suggesting that Dr. Appl’s opinion was given to assist his patient or to avoid

amounts of edema in his extremities. (R. 331).
14

tension, and absent such specific, individualized evidence, the ALJ’s speculation may not
stand.
Finally, the ALJ expressed her conclusion that Dr. Goering’s opinion was worthy
of “greatest weight.”
The undersigned finds that the residual functional capacity described above
is supported by the evidence during the relevant time period, when
considered as a whole, and especially in light of the paucity of clinical
deficits noted upon physical examination, the claimant’s conservative
course of treatment, the claimant’s lack of cooperation in prescribed
treatments, and the opinion of State agency physician Emil Goering, M.D.
at Exhibit 1F /9-16 that has been given greatest weight.
(R. 36). This conclusion does nothing to resolve the issues discussed above.
Remand is necessary here for the Commissioner to properly evaluate the medical
opinion, clarify the ambiguities identified above, and make clear the weight accorded to
each medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision shall be
REVERSED and that judgment shall be entered pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) REMANDING the case for further proceedings consistent herewith.
Dated this 23rd day of January 2014, at Kansas City, Kansas.

s:/ John W. Lungstrum
John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge

15