Dinkens v. Creative Business Solutions, LLC et al

Filing 52

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 41 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Richard D. Rogers on 3/26/14. (meh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
SHEYVETTE D. DINKENS
Plaintiff,
v.
NEW DAWN ENTEPRISES, L.L.C.,
d/b/a CREATIVE BUSINESS SOLUTIONS
and KRISTINA DIETRICK
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-2158-RDR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case contains a claim of retaliation under 42 U.S.C. §
1981 and a state-law claim for tortious interference with an
expected
defendants

business

relationship.

retaliated

against

Plaintiff
plaintiff

for

claims
filing

that
an

administrative complaint alleging discrimination by warning a
prospective employer not to hire plaintiff.

Plaintiff further

claims that this caused the prospective employer to withdraw a
job offer that plaintiff had accepted.

This case is now before

the court upon the motion for summary judgment of defendants New
Dawn Enterprises, L.L.C. d/b/a Creative Business Solutions and
Kristina Dietrick.
I.

Doc. No. 41.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
Summary judgment is warranted if the materials on record

show that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.”
the

FED.CIV.P. 56(a).

light

most

The court views “all of the facts in

favorable

to

the

non-movant

and

reasonable

inferences from the record must be drawn in favor of the nonPiercy v. Maketa, 480 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir.

moving party.”
2007).

“Once a properly supported summary judgment motion is made,
the opposing party may not rest on the allegations contained in
the complaint, but must respond with specific facts showing the
existence of a genuine factual issue to be tried.... These facts
may be shown by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed
in

Rule

56(c),

except

the

mere

pleadings

by

themselves.”

Southway v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 149 F.Supp.2d 1268, 1273
(D.Colo.2001), aff'd, 328 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir.2003).
“Summary

judgment

is

.

.

.

appropriate

when

the

court

concludes that no reasonable juror could find for the non-moving
party

based

response.”

on

the

Southway,

evidence
149

presented

F.Supp.2d

at

in
1273.

the

motion

“The

and

operative

inquiry is whether, based on all documents submitted, reasonable
jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
plaintiff is entitled to a verdict.... Unsupported allegations
without ‘any significant probative evidence tending to support
the complaint’ are insufficient ... as are conclusory assertions
that

factual

disputes

exist.”
2

Id.

(interior

citations

and

quotations omitted).

The evidence presented must be based on

more than mere speculation, conjecture, or surmise to defeat a
motion for summary judgment.

Rice v. United States, 166 F.3d

1088, 1092 (10th Cir. 1999).
II.

UNCONTROVERTED FACTS
For

the

purposes

of

the

summary

judgment

motion,

following facts shall be considered uncontroverted.

the

In April

2012, plaintiff, who is African-American, applied by email for a
job with the United Way of Greater Topeka.

She submitted a

resume

employment

Florence

that

did

not

Crittenton

include

Services

her

of

previous

Topeka,

employment with St. Francis Hospital.

Inc.

or

her

with

current

Plaintiff had a job with

Florence Crittenton until December 2010.

She filed a charge of

discrimination with the Kansas Human Rights Commission against
Florence Crittenton on or about June 11, 2011.
Plaintiff was interviewed for a position with United Way by
Miriam Krehbiel, the President and CEO, and Tom Stratton, the
Vice

President

of

Community

Impact.

During

the

interview,

plaintiff did not mention her previous full-time employment with
Florence Crittenton, although she did mention her position at
that time with St. Francis Hospital.

Both were entry-level

positions, not related to plaintiff’s professional development.
Plaintiff was not asked during the interview whether there were
any other employers not listed on her resume, nor was she asked
3

at any time during the interview to relate her complete work
history.
On May 1, 2012, Stratton extended an offer of employment at
United Way to plaintiff.
was

transmitted

to

She accepted.

Alisa

A copy of the job offer

Mezger-Crawford,

an

defendant Creative Business Systems (“CBS”).

employee

of

CBS is a human

resources consulting company which provided services to Florence
Crittenton and United Way.

Defendant Kristina Dietrick is the

owner and President of CBS.
Back

when

plaintiff

worked

for

Florence

Crittenton,

Dietrick participated in a meeting on December 4, 2010 with
plaintiff and JoLana Pinon, the CEO of Florence Crittenton.
meeting

concerned

change.

whether

plaintiff

would

accept

a

The

schedule

Plaintiff felt that she was being forced to change her

schedule, which had been approved to accommodate her disability,
while a white employee was allowed to retain a certain schedule.
Plaintiff
meeting
Florence

left
that

the

plaintiff’s

Crittenton

standing.

organization.

As

and

Dietrick

resignation
that

mentioned

was

plaintiff

being

was

previously,

wrote

after

the

accepted

leaving

plaintiff

in

by
good

filed

a

discrimination complaint with the Kansas Human Rights Commission
against Florence Crittenton in June 2011.
in

responding

to

plaintiff’s

charge

Dietrick was involved
of

discrimination

and

attending meetings with Pinon and Florence Crittenton’s attorney
4

regarding the charge.

Dietrick received a copy of the right-to-

sue letter which was sent from the EEOC to Florence Crittenton
in February 2012.

The letter initiated a 90-day period in which

plaintiff

file

could

suit

against

Florence

Crittenton.

Defendant Dietrick was concerned about this.
Tom

Stratton

notified

Mezger-Crawford

of

United

Way’s

employment offer to plaintiff because CBS provided new employee
orientation and human resources training for United Way.

At the

same time, Stratton emailed plaintiff to ask when she could
start and to inform plaintiff that she would meet with MezgerCrawford

or

someone

else

filling out paperwork.

to

work

out

the

details,

such

as

United Way did not ask Mezger-Crawford

or CBS to do a background check on plaintiff, although CBS did
perform such work for United Way upon request.
On May 3, 2012, Mezger-Crawford forwarded Stratton’s email
regarding plaintiff’s hiring to Dietrick commenting, “I just saw
this

.

.

.

I

had

contemplating hiring.”
Krehbiel, stating:

no

idea

this

was

someone

they

were

About two hours later, Dietrick emailed

“Please contact me as soon as possible.”

Krehbiel, who was out of town, asked if they could speak by
phone.

Dietrick responded that Krehbiel could call around the

lunch hour and that Dietrick would step out of her lunch meeting
to talk.

5

Krehbiel, Stratton and Dietrick spoke over the phone around
noon on May 3, 2012.

Dietrick stated that she was familiar with

plaintiff, that there were “red flags” concerning plaintiff and
that Dietrick was concerned that plaintiff wouldn’t be a good
fit for United Way.
plaintiff’s

past

Krehbiel stated that they had checked with

employers.

Dietrick

asked

that

plaintiff’s

application be forwarded and was told that plaintiff was not
required to complete an application, only submit a resume.
Dietrick asked that plaintiff’s resume be forwarded.

So,

Krehbiel

forwarded plaintiff’s resume to Dietrick during the late evening
of May 3, 2012 and said that she wanted “to clear this up
tomorrow if possible.”
clean this up pronto!”

Dietrick emailed back that:

“We will

During the morning on May 4, 2012,

Dietrick emailed Krehbiel with plaintiff’s dates of employment
at Florence Crittenton and her application for employment at
Florence Crittenton.
Dietrick did not tell Krehbiel that plaintiff had filed a
discrimination charge against Florence Crittenton.

But, by this

time, Krehbiel was aware that plaintiff had worked at Florence
Crittenton and had not listed that employer on her resume or
mentioned that employer during her interview for the position
with United Way.
On May 4, 2012, Mezger-Crawford emailed Dietrick with the
suggestion that they could request that plaintiff fill out an
6

application, which asks for an applicant’s last four employers.
She stated, “[a]lthough this is an ‘after the fact’ request, it
would

be

interesting

to

see

what

[plaintiff]

puts

on

the

application and see if it is different than what was listed on
her resume.”

Mezger-Crawford also suggested that another idea

would be to have Stratton contact plaintiff “and explain that
the job offer he made is actually a ‘conditional’ job offer
pending a satisfactory background check.”

Stratton did tell

plaintiff that her potential hiring was on hold as additional
information needed to be checked.
Krehbiel

decided

to

call

Florence

Crittenton

Pinon “for a reference” regarding plaintiff.

CEO

JoLana

Dietrick, who was

aware of this planned call, contacted Pinon on May 5 or May 6 to
give her a heads up that Krehbiel may be calling her, but did
not give Pinon the reasons Krehbiel might call.

Dietrick did

not advise Krehbiel not to contact Pinon without authorization
from plaintiff.

Sometimes Dietrick gives such advice to her

clients.
Krehbiel did call Pinon at which time Pinon told Krehbiel
that

plaintiff

Crittenton

and

was
that

not

eligible

Florence

should

visit

with

rehire

Crittenton’s

plaintiff was difficult at best.
Krehbiel

for

Florence

relationship

with

Pinon also suggested that

Dietrick.

7

at

Pinon

did

not

inform

Krehbiel that plaintiff had filed a charge of discrimination
against Florence Crittenton.
Dietrick

did

not

tell

Krehbiel

that

plaintiff

was

not

eligible for rehire at Florence Crittenton or discuss the issues
which developed with regard to plaintiff at Florence Crittenton.
On

May

8,

2012,

Krehbiel

sent

an

email

to

rescinding the offer of employment with United Way.

plaintiff

She said in

the email that the job offer was withdrawn because plaintiff had
not disclosed her employment at Florence Crittenton and because
Pinon stated that plaintiff was not eligible for rehire.
9,

2012,

email

Mezger-Crawford

Dietrick

had

forwarded

written

by

concerning

email
the

to

wrote:

Dietrick

December

meeting between Pinon, Dietrick and plaintiff.

On May

6,

the
2010

Mezger-Crawford

“FYI – this is the email I mentioned about [plaintiff]

leaving in good standing which I took to mean she would be
eligible

for

rehire.

However,

if

JoLana

[Pinon]

says

differently that is her call [smiley face].”
Pinon has stated in an affidavit that nothing said or done
by defendants influenced in any way the statement Pinon made to
Krehbiel

regarding

plaintiff.

Krehbiel

has

stated

in

a

deposition that she decided to withdraw the offer of employment
to plaintiff for reasons unrelated to anything said or done by
Dietrick or any employee of CBS.

8

III. THERE ARE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT AS TO WHETHER DEFENDANTS’
ACTIONS CAUSED THE WITHDRAWAL OF PLAINTIFF’S JOB OFFER.
Defendants

raise

one

argument

to

support

their

summary

judgment motion against plaintiff’s § 1981 claim and make a
similar

argument

interference

against

claim.

plaintiff’s

Defendants

state-law

contend

that

tortious

there

is

no

evidence to support plaintiff’s claim of a causal relationship
between

plaintiff’s

protected

activity

(the

filing

of

the

administrative complaint) and the withdrawal of the employment
offer

by

United

Way.

Defendants

argue

as

well,

as

to

plaintiff’s tortious interference claim, that plaintiff cannot
prove

that

plaintiff’s

defendants’
alleged

actions

injury

were

because

the

the

proximate

employment

cause
offer

of
was

withdrawn due to Krehbiel’s independent decision and plaintiff’s
failure

to

Crittenton.

disclose

her

previous

employment

with

Florence

Because defendants are making what appears to be

the same argument as to both of plaintiff’s claims and because
the proximate cause standards for both claims are drawn from the
same

common

law

source,

the

court

shall

address

defendant’s

arguments as to both claims together.
The court’s analysis here is somewhat complicated by the
fact that, unlike most cases, the defendants here are not and
never

were

plaintiff’s

employer

1

Privity of contract, as between an
necessary for a violation of § 1981.

9

or

supervisor.1

In

most

employee and an employer, is not
See Flores v. City and County of

employment
adverse

discrimination

action

is

defendant-employer

taken
or

or

retaliation

against

a

supervisor.

cases,

the

alleged

plaintiff-employee

Also,

in

most

by

cases,

a

the

alleged adverse action (e.g., job termination) coincides with
the alleged injury.

Thus, in most cases the main issue of

causation is whether the adverse action/injury was substantially
motivated

by

motivation.

or

would

not

have

happened

without

an

illegal

On summary judgment motions, courts often examine

this issue by looking at whether there is direct evidence of
retaliation or whether retaliation may be proven indirectly (the
McDonnell

Douglas

approach).

See,

e.g.,

Twigg

v.

Hawker

Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987, 998 (10th Cir. 2011).
Here, there is a separation between the adverse action by
defendants

(i.e.,

the

alleged

warning

to

United

Way

against

hiring plaintiff) and the alleged injury - - the withdrawal of
plaintiff’s job offer by United Way.

There is also a separation

between the defendants who committed the alleged adverse action
and the United Way officials who withdrew plaintiff’s job offer.
Defendants did not act as United Way’s employees, although they
did

have

a

business

relationship

with

United

Way.

So,

the

question here is not the normal issue of whether an adverse

Denver, 30 Fed.Appx. 816, 819 (10th Cir. 2002); Al-Khazaji v. Saint Francis
College, 784 F.2d 505 (3rd Cir. 1986); Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956, 959
(5th Cir.) cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1006 (1975); see also, Foley v. University
of Houston System, 355 F.3d 333, 338 n.7 (5th Cir. 2003)(listing cases from
five circuits suggesting § 1981 liability against individual defendants).

10

action/injury was motivated by retaliation.

Instead, the issue

is whether plaintiff can prove that defendants’ adverse action
caused United Way’s withdrawal of plaintiff’s job offer in spite
of the absence of an employment relationship between defendants
and United Way.
In

this

court’s

order

denying

defendants’

motion

to

dismiss, we cited Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 S.Ct. 1186,
1192 (2011) mainly for the proposition that there can be more
than one proximate cause for an injury, even in the context of
an employment decision.

Staub is a so-called “cat’s paw” case

where an employer is alleged to be liable “for the animus of a
supervisor

who

was

not

charged

with

making

the

ultimate

employment decision” but allegedly influenced the decision by
virtue of the supervisor’s reports or evaluations.2

Id. at 1190.

This case is not a cat’s paw case because defendants are not
employees of United Way.
action

(a

job

Also, unlike Staub, where the adverse

termination)

is

the

alleged

injury

to

the

plaintiff, here the adverse action by defendants is not the
alleged injury.
of

this

case

Nevertheless, Staub is comparable to the facts
because

both

cases

examine

whether

an

actor’s

allegedly biased conduct can be said to have caused an injury
inflicted by a different decisionmaker.
2

The derivation of the term “cat’s paw” is explained at 131 S.Ct. at 1990
n.1.
The term originates from a story in which a cat is persuaded by a
monkey to extract chestnuts from a fire.
The monkey winds up with the
chestnuts while the cat is left only with burned paws.

11

In

examining

this

issue,

the

Court

did

not

focus

upon

whether there was direct evidence of retaliation or engage in
McDonnell

Douglas

analysis.

Instead,

the

Court

referred

to

traditional tort-law concepts of proximate cause and observed
that “[w]e are aware of no principle in tort or agency law under
which an employer’s mere conduct of an independent investigation
has a claim-preclusive effect.”

More recently, in University of

Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517,
2524-25 (2013), the Court again emphasized the role of standard
tort causation principles in employment discrimination cases,
when it stated: “Causation in fact - - i.e., proof that the
defendant’s conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff’s injury - is a standard requirement of any tort claim. . . . This includes
federal statutory claims of workplace discrimination.”
Here, in spite of defendants’ arguments, we believe there
is a material issue of fact as to whether defendants’ actions
directly caused United Way to withdraw plaintiff’s job offer.
Defendants compare this case to Frederick v. Metropolitan State
University, 535 Fed.Appx. 713 (10th Cir. 10/3/13) which is a
cat’s

paw

case.

In

Frederick,

the

plaintiff

was

a

female

associate professor who applied for promotion at a university.
The plaintiff prepared a dossier in support of her request for
promotion and the dossier moved through seven levels of review.
The ultimate decisionmaker was the president of the university.
12

The plaintiff had applied for promotion in 2006 and was not
recommended for promotion at five of the seven levels of review.
The plaintiff applied again in 2007.

This time, she was not

recommended for promotion at six of the seven levels of review
and her request for promotion was ultimately denied, at the
seventh level, by the president.

The plaintiff argued that the

decision to deny her promotion in 2007 was influenced by the
opposition of the interim dean of the business school (at the
fourth level of review) who, the plaintiff alleged, did not like
outspoken women and disliked plaintiff’s advocacy for minorities
and women at the university.
Summary judgment was granted against the plaintiff’s claims
in

Frederick

because

there

was

no

evidence

of

a

causal

relationship between the dean’s recommendation against promotion
and

the

Circuit

president’s
affirmed

decision

this

to

decision

deny

because

evidence in the plaintiff’s favor.
there

was

no

evidence

that

the

promotion.
of

the

The

Tenth

absence

of

The court commented that
dean

communicated

with

the

faculty senate committee (a level of review above the dean) and
that

there

president

was
that

no
he

evidence
did

not

rebutting
rely

the

affidavit

exclusively

on

the

of

the

dean’s

comments or anyone else’s, and that he independently reviewed
the plaintiff’s dossier and made his own assessment regarding
her request for promotion.

The Tenth Circuit also noted that at
13

the level of review below the president, it was remarked that
the plaintiff did not come close to meeting the standard for
promotion.
Defendants

contend

that,

as

in

Frederick,

the

ultimate

decisionmaker in this case (Miriam Krehbiel) has stated that her
withdrawal of plaintiff’s employment offer was not the result of
anything said or done by defendants CBS or Dietrick.
according

to

defendants,

it

was

the

result

of

Rather,

Krehbiel’s

conversations with Pinon and plaintiff’s failure to disclose her
previous

employment

with

Florence

Crittenton.

Defendants

emphasize that it was Pinon, not defendants, who told Krehbiel
that

plaintiff

Crittenton

was

and

not

that

eligible

the

for

rehire

organization

had

at
a

Florence
difficult

relationship with plaintiff.
In

response,

plaintiff

contends

that

there

is

ample

evidence that defendant Dietrick (unlike the dean in Frederick)
exercised
case.

influence

over

the

ultimate

decisionmaker

in

this

According to plaintiff, Dietrick urgently requested to

talk to Krehbiel and told Krehbiel that there were “red flags”
regarding plaintiff and that plaintiff would not be a good fit
at United Way.

Plaintiff alleges that Krehbiel sent Dietrick

plaintiff’s resume and asked that the situation be cleared up
within a day and that Dietrick responded:
up

pronto.”

Defendants

relayed
14

“We will clean this

information

regarding

plaintiff’s employment at Florence Crittenton to Krehbiel and
Krehbiel made the decision to tell plaintiff that the hiring
decision

was

investigation”

on

hold.

or

This

was
with

conversation

before

any

Pinon

was

“independent
conducted

by

Krehbiel.
“Proximate cause is causation substantial enough and close
enough

to

proximate

the
cause

harm

to

need

be

not

recognized
be,

and

exclusive proximate cause of harm.”
542 U.S. 692, 704 (2004).

by

law,

frequently

but
is

a

given

not,

the

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,

The Tenth Circuit has held that “if

‘competent evidence [is] introduced, even though conflicting,
the question[] of . . . proximate cause must be left to the
jury.’” Sheets v. Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1389 (10th Cir.
1995)(quoting Key v. Liquid Energy Corp., 906 F.2d 500, 505 (10th
Cir.

1990)).

“A

defendant

is

the

proximate

cause

of

a

plaintiff’s injury if the injury [is] a natural consequence of
defendant’s actions.”

Id.

The court finds that there is a material issue of fact as
to whether defendants’ actions were a proximate cause of the
withdrawal of plaintiff’s offer of employment from the United
Way.

Unlike the Frederick case, the final decisionmaker in this

matter, Miriam Krehbiel, had decided to offer and did offer
plaintiff a job, but changed her mind after she was contacted by
defendant

Dietrick.

Although

Krehbiel

15

has

stated

that

she

reached

her

decision

to

withdraw

the

offer

of

employment

independent of Dietrick’s input, there is evidence in the record
from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the withdrawal
of the job offer was the natural consequence of defendants’
actions.

Krehbiel allegedly asked Dietrick to take care of the

situation before Krehbiel spoke with anyone else about it and
shortly thereafter Krehbiel put the job offer on hold.

This is

not the scenario in Frederick where the decision to promote the
plaintiff had not been made, and five out of six levels of
review had recommended against promoting the plaintiff.

The

process of reconsidering the employment offer was initiated by
defendants who appear to have recommended withdrawing the job
offer

before

Krehbiel

spoke

to

anyone

else,

and

effectively did that by putting the offer on hold.

Krehbiel

A reasonable

jury could conclude that the withdrawal of the employment offer
was

a

natural

and

foreseeable

consequence

of

defendants’

actions.
Defendants

also

support

their

argument

with

citation

to

George v. Breising, 477 P.2d 983 (Kan. 1970).

In George, the

defendant

which

automobile
ignition.

was

an

automobile

outside
The

on

its

automobile

somewhere in Wichita.

repair
premises
was

business
with

stolen,

the
driven

keys
and

left
in

an
the

parked

The following day, an acquaintance of the

thieves, who had driven the car the previous day, returned to
16

the car and, while driving it again, struck a pedestrian.
pedestrian sued the repair business.

The

The Kansas Supreme Court

affirmed judgment for the defendant on the grounds that the
defendant did not owe a duty of care to the pedestrian and
because the harm to the pedestrian was not a foreseeable result
of any alleged negligence in leaving the keys in the ignition.
The court held that the negligent and criminal actions of the
driver were an independent intervening act constituting the sole
and proximate cause of the pedestrian’s injuries.
We find George to be distinguishable from the facts of this
case for the following reasons.
conduct

alleged

considered

a

in

this

First, there is no criminal

matter.

superseding

cause

(Second) of Torts § 448.

Criminal
of

harm.

conduct
See

is

often

Restatement

Second, in George, even if it was

arguable that the car theft was a foreseeable result of the
defendant’s alleged negligence, the additional negligent driving
by

a

third

person

led

to

the

pedestrian’s

injuries.

The

operation of the third person’s actions is another factor which
suggests a superseding cause, particularly when those actions
are wrongful.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442(d)&(e).

Defendants contend that Pinon’s negative reference was a
superseding cause by a third party.

But, it may be argued that

Pinon’s comments were a foreseeable consequence of events placed
in operation by defendants.

Moreover, it is not alleged that
17

Pinon’s comments were wrongful.

These are factors which incline

against finding a superseding cause.
Torts § 442(b),(e)&(f).

Restatement (Second) of

Furthermore, plaintiff’s job offer was

placed on hold before Krehbiel spoke to Pinon.

There is no

indication that the offer would have been reactivated if, for
instance,

Pinon

had

refused

to

talk

to

Krehbiel.

In

other

words, it is arguable that the job offer was withdrawn on the
basis of defendants’ alleged warning to United Way and that the
input contributed by Pinon merely buttressed what had already
been done.
Finally, the significance of plaintiff’s failure to mention
her employment at Florence Crittenton on her resume and in her
interview is a matter of reasonable dispute.

Plaintiff was not

asked to list her former employers for United Way.

So, one

might infer that the issue was not of genuine significance to
United

Way.

Plaintiff

left

her

job

at

Florence

Crittenton

fourteen months before her interview with United Way.

The lapse

in time may have attenuated the job’s importance to a future
employer.
with

Plaintiff has suggested that she considered her job

Florence

Crittenton

immaterial

to

her

professional

development and, therefore, excluded it from her resume.
might be considered a reasonable view.
put

plaintiff’s

job

offer

on

hold

when

This

Also, the decision to
it

was

learned

that

plaintiff had worked at Florence Crittenton was made in the wake
18

of defendants’ “red flags” warning.

Given all of these factors,

it is impossible on summary judgment to rule that knowledge of
plaintiff’s

failure

to

disclose

Florence

Crittenton

as

a

previous employer was a superseding cause for the withdrawal of
the job offer and to separate that knowledge from defendants’
“red flags” warning to United Way.
In conclusion, the summary judgment record in this case
presents a material issue of fact as to whether the withdrawal
of plaintiff’s job offer was an ordinary and foreseeable result
of

a

sequence

retaliatory

of

events

action.

initiated

Viewing

the

by

defendants’

record

in

a

alleged

light

most

favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable person could decide that
defendants warned United Way against hiring plaintiff and that
this

warning

withdrawal

was

of

of

such

importance

plaintiff’s

job

to

offer

United
was

a

Way

that

natural

the
and

foreseeable consequence, given that the job offer was almost
immediately

placed

on

hold

and

not

long

after

completely

withdrawn.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For

the

above-stated

reasons,

defendants’

summary judgment (Doc. No. 41) shall be denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

19

motion

for

Dated this 26th Day of March, 2014, at Topeka, Kansas

Richard D. Rogers
United States District Judge

20