Smith v. Hillshire Brands
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 33 Motion to Compel. Signed by Magistrate Judge James P. O'Hara on 6/20/2014. (ah)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
ANTHONY M. SMITH,
Case No. 13-2605-CM
The plaintiff, Anthony M. Smith, proceeding pro se, has sued his former employer,
Hillshire Brands,1 for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).2 Defendant has filed a motion to
compel plaintiff to respond to discovery requests seeking information relating to (1) his
electronic communications with others about the allegations raised in his complaint, (2) prior
litigation or administrative proceedings to which he was a party, (3) his social networking
activity, and (4) his employment history since January 1, 2009, including the identity of
Defendant refers to itself as “The Hillshire Brands Company,” but for the purposes
of this order, the court will refer to defendant by the name reflected on the court’s electronic
Plaintiff also brought a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, but the
presiding U.S. District Judge, Carlos Murguia, dismissed that claim on May 16, 2014. ECF
entities with whom he has sought employment (ECF doc. 33). For the reasons discussed
below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff began working for defendant in January 2011 as a production technician. He
states that in January 2013, he filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).3 He alleges that in the months after this administrative
filing, his supervisors subjected him to instances of discriminatory conduct. During at least
a portion of his employment, plaintiff was entitled to intermittent absences under the FMLA.
Plaintiff alleges that he received time off under the FMLA because of stress caused by
defendant. In a letter dated August 30, 2013, a company called Reed Group (presumably a
benefits-processing company utilized by defendant) informed plaintiff, with a copy to
defendant, that his intermittent FMLA leave was approved through February 16, 2014. On
September 3, 2013, defendant discharged plaintiff.
Plaintiff filed this action on November 26, 2013, alleging that his discharge violated
Title VII and the FMLA. Plaintiff seeks $1,000,000 in damages for medical expenses, lost
wages, and emotional distress.4 Defendant served its first interrogatories and first requests
for production of documents to plaintiff on February 24, 2014. Plaintiff responded and later
supplemented his responses, but defendant remains unsatisfied with some of plaintiff’s
The contents of this charge are unclear, as a copy of the charge is not in the current
See ECF doc. 1 at 4; ECF doc. 33-1 at 22–23 (plaintiff’s original responses to
interrogatories); id. at 64 (plaintiff’s supplemental responses to interrogatories).
answers. Defendant asks the court to compel plaintiff to fully respond to Interrogatory Nos.
7 and 11, and Request for Production Nos. 3, 9, 15, and 18.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), discovery may be obtained “regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” “Relevancy is broadly
construed during the discovery phase, and a request for discovery should be considered
relevant if there is ‘any possibility’ that the information sought may be relevant to the claim
or defense of any party.”5 At least as a general proposition, then, “[a] request for discovery
should be allowed unless it is clear that the information sought can have no possible bearing
on the claim or defense of a party.”6 “When the discovery sought appears relevant on its
face, the party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish that the requested discovery
does not come within the scope of relevance.”7 The party making the discovery request has
the burden if relevance is not readily apparent.8
Design Basics, L.L.C. v. Strawn, 271 F.R.D. 513, 523 (D. Kan. 2010) (quoting
Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Grp., Inc., 232 F.R.D. 377, 382 (D. Kan. 2005) and Owens v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 221 F.R.D. 649, 652 (D. Kan. 2004)).
Sheldon v. Vermonty, 204 F.R.D. 679, 689–90 (D. Kan. 2001) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
Cardenas, 232 F.R.D. at 380 (quoting Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652).
Plaintiff’s Electronic Communication Regarding Conduct Alleged
Defendant’s Request No. 3 sought plaintiff’s communications regarding the
allegations raised in plaintiff’s complaint:
Request No. 3: All documents constituting or relating to communications by
and between you and any third party, person, entity or organization regarding
alleged retaliation at Hillshire and/or any other allegations raised in your
Defendant’s motion asks the court to compel plaintiff to produce e-mails that are responsive
to this request. Defendant notes that plaintiff has referred to responsive e-mails in other
documents, but has not produced any such e-mails. Plaintiff has informed defense counsel
that he did not save the e-mails. In his response to the motion, plaintiff states simply, “I have
submitted everything I have.”9
There is no dispute that Request No. 3 sought relevant discovery. Defendant correctly
asserts that plaintiff had an obligation to preserve e-mails related to his claims once litigation
was reasonably foreseeable.10 “Such preservation may not be ‘selective,’ saving only the
evidence supporting a theory of liability and impeding the examination of another theory.”11
Failing to preserve evidence—including electronic material—that another party might use
ECF doc. 34 at 3.
See Helget v. City of Hays, No. 13-2228, 2014 WL 1308893, at *2–3 (D. Kan.
March 31, 2014).
Id. at 3 (quoting Benton v. Dlorha, Inc., No. 06-2488, 2007 WL 3231431, at *4 (D.
Kan. Oct. 30, 2007)).
in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation is deemed “spoliation.”12 If it is found that
plaintiff engaged in spoliation, there are a variety of sanctions that the court may impose
against plaintiff, including, if the spoliation is found to be particularly egregious, dismissal
of this case.13
At this juncture, defendant is not requesting sanctions. Rather, defendant asks that
plaintiff attempt to recover relevant e-mails—perhaps by contacting his e-mail service
provider. The court finds this request reasonable and grants defendant’s motion regarding
this discovery. Plaintiff is therefore ordered to immediately take steps to recover deleted emails that mention or relate to the allegations he raises in this case, including contacting his
e-mail service provider for assistance.14 By July 3, 2014, plaintiff shall inform defendant of
the specific steps that he has taken to recover responsive e-mails and the progress that he has
made toward that end. Defendant may then decide whether to pursue spoliation sanctions
Information About Plaintiff’s Prior Lawsuits and Administrative
Defendant’s Interrogatory No. 7 and Request No. 9 sought information and documents
relating to any lawsuit or administrative proceeding to which plaintiff has been a party:
Id. at 6 (citing Garcia v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co. of Am., 569 F.3d 1174, 1179 (10th
Defendant states that it has provided plaintiff a list of search terms to assist him in
locating responsive e-mails.
Interrogatory No. 7: Please state the full title, court, and docket number of all
other litigation, arbitrations, and administrative proceedings (such as Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission proceedings) in which you have ever
been involved as a plaintiff, defendant, claimant, complainant, or respondent.
As to each matter listed, please state the general nature of the claim, the nature
of your involvement, and the final disposition of the action.
Request No. 9: All documents relating in any way to any lawsuit, claim,
charge, or complaint made by or against any person, entity, or organization
(other than Hillshire) by or against you, including, but not limited to, any and
all documents which you used, displayed, sent, or gave, in while or in part, to
a court, the EEOC, or any other administrative agency, and any and all
documents which a court, the EEOC, or other administrative agency used,
displayed, sent, or gave, in whole or in part, to you in connection with your
lawsuit, claim, charge, or complaint.
Plaintiff’s response to both of these discovery requests was “none.” Defendant reports,
however, that in a telephone conversation with defense counsel, plaintiff stated that he filed
a complaint with the EEOC against his prior employer, Caravan Ingredients.
The court agrees with defendant that information about plaintiff’s litigation history
is relevant because it could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding plaintiff’s
credibility and claim for damages. In his response to the motion, plaintiff does not dispute
relevance, but instead denies that he has “ever been in court or litigation against [any]
company of my pas[t].”15 This answer fails to address the questions of what administrative
claims (e.g., EEOC claims), if any, plaintiff has filed and whether plaintiff has been a party
to litigation other than that involving a former employer. Therefore, defendant’s motion is
granted as to these two discovery requests. By July 3, 2014, plaintiff is ordered to either
ECF doc. 34 at 1.
provide documents and information related to any past administrative claims or lawsuits, or
to provide a sworn statement to defendant that he has not been a party to any other lawsuit
or claim, including an affirmative statement that he has filed no claims with the EEOC
against any employer other than defendant.
Social Networking Documents
Defendant’s Requests Nos. 15 and 18 sought documents showing plaintiff’s activity
on social networking sites:
Request No. 15: All documents constituting or relating in any way to any
posting, blog, or other statement you made on or through any social
networking website, including but not limited to Facebook.com,
MySpace.com, Twitter.com, Orkut.com, that references or mentions in any
way Hillshire and/or the matters referenced in your Complaint.
Request No. 18: Electronic copies of your complete profile on Facebook,
MySpace, and Twitter (including all updates, changes, or modifications to
your profile) and all status updates, messages, wall comments, causes joined,
groups joined, activity streams, blog entries, details, blurbs, and comments for
the period from January 1, 2013, to present. To the extent electronic copies
are not available, please provide these documents in hard copy form.
In response, plaintiff did not object to the requests, but instead stated that he produced all
responsive documents on April 25, 2014.
Plaintiff has informed defendant that he
maintained several Facebook accounts and a Twitter account during the relevant time period.
Defendant states in its motion that plaintiff, however, has produced only limited information
from his Facebook account and no information from his Twitter feed. In response to the
motion to compel, plaintiff objects on relevancy and privacy grounds to producing additional
information from Faceboook, stating that it reveals his “most personal conversations with
friends that has nothing to do with this case” and “highly personal data like sexual talking
and business that is no concern to Hillshire.”16 Plaintiff has not addressed his activity on
other social networking sites.
The court first notes that plaintiff does not appear to object to producing documents
responsive to Request No. 15, i.e., social networking documents that directly reference or
mention defendant or matters raised in plaintiff’s complaint. Thus, to the extent that he
hasn’t already, plaintiff is ordered to produce such documents to defendant by July 3, 2014.
If plaintiff has no additional responsive documents to produce—if, for example, nothing on
plaintiff’s Twitter feed references defendant or the matters raised in this case—plaintiff shall
provide a sworn statement to defendant so stating by that same date.
Request No. 18 raises a more complex issue, as it seeks documentation of all of
plaintiff’s activity on the named social networks since January 1, 2013, regardless of whether
the activity has anything at all to do with this case or the allegations made in plaintiff’s
complaint. Defendant asserts that this broad swath of information is relevant for at least two
reasons. First, it “provide[s] a contemporary diary of Plaintiff’s activities, thoughts,
mental/emotional condition, and actions,” which relate to plaintiff’s claim for damages
arising from emotional distress.17 Second, it may support defendant’s “defense that Plaintiff
ECF doc. 34 at 2.
ECF doc. 33 at 8.
abused his FMLA leave, which is the true reason for Plaintiff’s termination.”18 Defendant
contends that the protective order governing this case adequately addresses plaintiff’s privacy
Request No. 18, in contrast to Request No. 15, seeks information that does not appear
relevant on its face. Although it is apparent to the court that plaintiff’s social networking
activity that references in any way defendant or matters asserted in plaintiff’s complaint is
relevant, it is less apparent why unfettered access to plaintiff’s social media activity over the
past year-and-a-half is relevant. The burden therefore falls on defendant to establish
As it currently stands, the record does not support defendant’s extremely broad
discovery request for all-inclusive access to plaintiff’s social media accounts. As plaintiff
notes, such access could reveal highly personal information—such as plaintiff’s private
sexual conduct—that is unlikely to lead to admissible evidence in this case. Information on
social networking sites is not entitled to special protection, but a discovery request seeking
it nevertheless must meet Fed. R. Civ. P. 26’s requirement that it be tailored “so that it
‘appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’”20
Cardenas, 232 F.R.D. at 380.
Davenport v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:11-cv-632-J-JBT, 2012 WL
555759, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)); see also Ogden
v. All-Star Career Sch., No. 2:13cv406, 2014 WL 1646934, at *1 (W.D. Pa. April 23, 2014)
(holding that discovery request seeking complete access to the plaintiff’s social networking
“Otherwise, the Defendant would be allowed to engage in the proverbial fishing expedition,
in the hope that there might be something of relevance in Plaintiff’s [social networking]
account[s].”21 The court agrees with courts that have recognized that a discovery request for
unfettered access to social networking accounts—even when temporally limited—would
permit the defendant “to cast too wide a net” for relevant information.22 As the court
reasoned in Ogden v. All-Star Career School,
Ordering plaintiff to permit access to or produce complete copies of his social
networking accounts would permit defendant to cast too wide a net and
sanction an inquiry into scores of quasi-personal information that would be
irrelevant and non-discoverable. Defendant is no more entitled to such
unfettered access to plaintiff’s personal email and social networking
communications than it is to rummage through the desk drawers and closets
in plaintiff's home.23
Indeed, if the court were to accept defendant’s position on the scope of relevant discovery,
defendant would likely be unhappy with the ramifications. For example, every Facebook
post of every Hillshire manager and supervisor involved in the decision to terminate plaintiff
could be deemed relevant because it might show discriminatory pretext.
activity was “far beyond the scope of discovery authorized by Rule 26”); Mailhoit v. Home
Depot U.S.A., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 566, 570 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (same).
Davenport, 2012 WL 555759, at *1 (quoting Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport,
No. 10-10413, 2012 WL 179320, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan 18, 2012)).
Ogden, 2014 WL 1646934, at *4; Mackelprang v. Fid. Nat’l Title Agency of Nev.,
Inc., No. 2:06-CV-00788-JCM, 2007 WL 119149, at *7 (D. Nev. Jan 9, 2007).
2014 WL 1646934, at *4.
Defendant has cited Held v. Ferrellgas, Inc.,24 a District of Kansas case, in support
of Request No. 18. In Held, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant retaliated against him
for reporting a claim of discrimination. Without much stated analysis, the court found that
information on the plaintiff’s Facebook page during his one-year tenure at the defendant’s
company was relevant to plaintiff’s claim and ordered it produced. The undersigned is not
persuaded, however, that Held supports defendant’s position—in fact, it could be read as
adverse to that position. The opinion states that the defendant was “not seeking unfettered
or unlimited access to Plaintiff’s Facebook, but rather limited access during the relevant time
frame.”25 From this description, it appears that defendant here is seeking broader access to
information on plaintiff’s social networking sites than the court permitted in Held—the
unrestricted access sought by Request No. 18 cannot be described as “limited,” as it was in
Held.26 In any event, given the absence of detail and analysis in Held, the court declines to
rely on it either to support or to defeat defendant’s position.27
No. 10-2393-EFM, 2011 WL 3896513 (D. Kan. Aug. 31, 2011).
Id. at *1.
Of course, the Held court may have described the access sought as “limited” based
on nothing more than the fact that a particular time frame was set—in which case, Request
No. 18 is similar. Unfortunately, the request at issue in Held was not quoted or described in
detail in the opinion.
But see Kear v. Kohl’s Dept. Stores, Inc., No. 12-cv-1235-JAR-KGG, 2013 WL
3088922, at *6 (D. Kan. June 18, 2013) (relying solely on Held to find that defendant’s
request for plaintiff’s “Twitter and Facebook account data between her date of hire through
present” was sufficiently limited in scope); Moore v. Miller, No. 10-cv-651-JLK, 2013 WL
2456114, at *2 (D. Colo. June 6, 2013) (relying solely on Held to find plaintiff’s “entire
Defendant asserts that plaintiff’s social networking activity is relevant to his claim of
emotional distress, and this position finds some support in the caselaw.28 But other courts
have noted that only social networking activity that specifically pertains to the plaintiff’s
emotional state is relevant to an emotional distress claim.29 As one court reasoned, “To be
sure, anything that a person says or does might in some theoretical sense be reflective of her
emotional state. But that is hardly justification for requiring the production of every thought
she may have reduced to writing, or, indeed, the deposition of everyone she may have talked
to.”30 In addition, some courts have gone so far as to question the probative value of social
Facebook history” relevant to plaintiff’s claims of emotional pain and suffering arising from
See, e.g., Reid v. Ingerman Smith LLP, No. 12–CV–307(ILG)(MDG), 2012 WL
6720752, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012) (holding that “statements regarding plaintiff’s
social activities may be relevant to plaintiff’s claims of emotional distress and loss of
enjoyment of life,” but nonetheless declining to order “full disclosure of all material on
plaintiff’s social media accounts because not all postings”—such as birthday wishes—“will
be relevant to her claims”); Robinson v. Jones Lang LaSalle Ams., Inc., No. 12–CV–127-PK,
2012 WL 3763545, at *1 (D. Ore. Aug. 29, 2012) (finding it “reasonable to expect severe
emotional or mental injury to manifest itself in some social media content”); Bass v. Miss
Porter’s Sch., No. 3:08cv1807 (JBA), 2009 WL 3724968, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 2009)
(“Facebook usage depicts a snapshot of the user’s relationships and state of mind at the time
of the content’s posting.”).
EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 435 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (noting,
“the simple fact that a claimant has had social communications is not necessarily probative
of the particular mental and emotional health matters at issue in the case . . . it must be the
substance of the communication that determines relevance”).
Rozell v. Ross–Holst, No. 05 CIV 2936(JGK)JCF, 2006 WL 163143 at *3–4
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2006) (denying motion to compel production of the plaintiff’s e-mails
which the defendant asserted would “provide a contemporaneous record of her emotional
networking activity as reflective of a plaintiff’s emotional state. For example, United States
Magistrate Judge A. Kathleen Tomlinson on the Eastern District of New York has noted,
“The fact that an individual may express some degree of joy, happiness, or sociability on
certain occasions sheds little light on the issue of whether he or she is actually suffering
emotional distress.”31 Citing a law review article on the topic, Judge Tomlinson reasoned,
“a severely depressed person may have a good day or several good days and choose to post
about those days and avoid posting about moods more reflective of his or her actual
Based on the limited record before it, the court finds it prudent to follow what appears
to be the intermediate approach taken by courts addressing this issue—to allow defendant
to discover not the contents of plaintiff’s entire social networking activity, but any content
state”); see also Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., 293 F.R.D. 112,
115 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“If the Court were to allow broad discovery of Plaintiff’s social
networking postings as part of the emotional distress inquiry, then there would be no
principled reason to prevent discovery into every other personal communication the Plaintiff
had or sent since alleged incident.”); Holter v. Wells Fargo & Co., 281 F.R.D. 340, 344 (D.
Minn. 2011) (“While everything that is posted on a social media website is arguably
reflective of a person’s emotional state. [sic] This Court would not allow depositions of every
friend and acquaintance to inquire about every conversation and interaction with plaintiff.
So too, the Court will not require plaintiff to produce all information from all her social
media websites to obtain similar information.”).
Giacchetto, 293 F.R.D. at 115.
Id. at 116 (citing Kathryn R. Brown, The Risks of Taking Facebook at Face Value:
Why the Psychology of Social Networking Should Influence the Evidentiary Relevance of
Facebook Photographs, 14 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 357, 365 (2012) (“Because social
networking websites enable users to craft a desired image to display to others, social
scientists have posited that outside observers can misinterpret that impression.”)).
that reveals plaintiff’s emotions or mental state, or content that refers to events that could
reasonably be expected to produce in plaintiff a significant emotion or mental state.33 The
court concludes that this approach will permit defendant to discover information relevant to
plaintiff’s emotional state, which he has put at issue, while protecting plaintiff from a fishing
expedition into every thought he reduced to writing on the internet since January 1, 2013.
Thus, defendant’s motion to compel plaintiff to respond to Request No. 18 is granted, but
with the important limitation that it only be read to encompass references to his emotional
state and references to potential causes of that emotional state. Plaintiff is ordered to produce
such documents to defendant by July 3, 2014.
Information About Plaintiff’s Employment History
Defendant’s Interrogatory No. 11 sought information regarding plaintiff’s
employment history from January 1, 2009, through the date of his answer to the interrogatory
See Ogden, 2014 WL 1646934, at *5; Giacchetto, 293 F.R.D. at 116; Holter, 281
F.R.D. at 344; Simply Storage, 270 F.R.D. at 435; Reid, 2012 WL 6720752, at *2; Robinson,
2012 WL 3763545, at *1; Sourdiff v. Tex. Roadhouse Holdings, LLC, No. 10–CV–0408
(TJM/DEP), 2011 WL 7560647, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2011) (directing plaintiff to
produce social networking information related in any way to her emotional or mental state).
But see Kennedy v. Contract Pharm. Corp., No. 12-2664(JFB)(ETB), 2013 WL 1966219,
at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2013) (sustaining as vague a request for production seeking
documents reflecting the plaintiff’s “expression of an emotional feeling while utilizing a
social networking site”); Mailhoit, 285 F.R.D. at 571–72 (rejecting request as too vague to
meet the “threshold showing” that it was reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence because even if “‘any emotion’ could be understood to encompass only
communications containing specific emotive words (which the request does not identify), the
category would still arguably require the production of many materials of doubtful relevance,
such as a posting with the statement ‘I hate it when my cable goes out’”).
(March 21, 2014), including the identity of entities with whom he has sought employment:
Interrogatory No. 11: For the period from January 1, 2009, through the date of
your answers to these interrogatories, please identify:
(a) the name and address of each person, firm or entity at which you have
sought employment or self-employment, . . . ; and
(b) the name and address of each person, firm and entity for whom you have
worked as an employee, independent contractor or on any other basis in
exchange for money or anything else, . . .; and
For periods of time during which you were not employed and did not seek
employment or self-employment, please identify the dates of those periods and
the reason that you did not seek employment or self-employment during that
For each employer or potential employer identified in your answer, please
execute the attached Authorization to Release Employment Records.
Plaintiff’s response to this interrogatory stated in full: “DJ & HOST SPECIAL EVENTS, AT
VARIOUS LOCATIONS FOR RECOGNITION ONLY.”34 Defendant contends that
plaintiff has produced other documents, however, that show he was employed by Caravan
until 2010 and that he has applied for employment at various companies following his
discharge from defendant.
In his response to the motion to compel, plaintiff discussed his employment with (and
termination by) Caravan, and consented to defendant obtaining his employment records from
Caravan. Plaintiff also stated that since his termination by defendant, he has sought
employment with at least four companies, but “received turn down letters,” some of which
ECF doc. 33-1 at 70.
he attached to his response.35 The record also reflects that plaintiff has executed a generic
(i.e., not addressed to any particular employer) “Authorization to Release Employment
Records,” as Interrogatory No. 11 requested.36 Thus, it appears that plaintiff has now
provided the information requested in Interrogatory No. 11—defendant did not file a reply
suggesting otherwise. Accordingly, defendant’s motion as to this discovery is denied as
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. Defendant’s motion to compel is granted with respect to Request No. 3. By July
3, 2014, plaintiff shall inform defendant of the steps he has taken to recover responsive emails.
2. Defendant’s motion to compel is granted with respect to Interrogatory No. 7 and
Request No. 9. Plaintiff shall respond to this discovery by July 3, 2014.
3. Defendant’s motion to compel is granted with respect to Request No. 15 and
granted, as limited herein, with respect to Request No. 18. Plaintiff shall respond to this
discovery by July 3, 2014.
4. Defendant’s motion to compel is denied as moot with respect to Interrogatory No.
Plaintiff is hereby informed that, within 14 days after he is served with a copy
of this order, he may, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 and D. Kan. Rule 72.1.4(a), file written
ECF doc. 34 at 3.
ECF doc. 33-1 at 34.
objections to this order by filing a motion to review this order. Plaintiff must file any
objections within the 14-day period if he wants to have appellate review of this order. If
plaintiff does not timely file his objections, no court will allow appellate review.
Dated June 20, 2014, at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ James P. O’Hara
James P. O’Hara
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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