Progressive Northwestern Insurance Company v. Gant

Filing 244

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 214 Motion to Compel. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kenneth G. Gale on 8/16/17. (df)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
PROGRESSIVE NORTHWESTERN
INSURANCE COMPANY,

)
)
)
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
)
)
v.
)
)
GABRIEL GANT, et al.,
)
)
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs. )
____________________________________)

Case No.15-9267-JAR/KGG

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL
Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. (Doc. 214.) For the
reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part.
BACKGROUND
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by Plaintiff Progressive
Northwestern Insurance Company (“Plaintiff” or “Progressive”) resulting from a
head-on vehicle accident between Justin Birk and Katie Gant that resulted in Ms.
Gant’s death. Plaintiff requests a finding that its handling of an underlying claim
and lawsuit, resulting from a fatal automobile accident, “was appropriate, in good
faith, and consistent with the Progressive Policy and all duties imposed upon it by
law or otherwise.” (See Doc. 1, at 5; Doc. 14, at 7.) Issues with the handling relate

specifically to counsel (Kevin McMaster) retained by Plaintiff for its insured, who
were defendants in the underlying action. McMaster is alleged to have engaged in
conduct described as “obstructionist,” “highly prejudicial,” and “to the extreme
detriment” of the defendants in the underlying lawsuit. (See generally Doc. 6-5.)
Additional facts relating to this case, as well as to the underlying lawsuit,
were summarized in the District Court’s Memorandum and Order granting
Defendants leave to answer out of time, Plaintiff’s motion to strike, and Plaintiff’s
motion to dismiss. (See Doc. 92, at 1-3.) That summary, which accepted as true
the well-pleaded facts from Gant’s Counterclaim, is excerpted in relevant part:
The Birk Defendants were insured by Progressive,
which hired attorney Kevin M. McMaster to investigate
claims arising from the Fatality Collision and to represent
its insureds in a potential lawsuit. The underlying case
(the “Birk Lawsuit”) was highly contested and spanned
several years. As a result of McMaster’s actions and
inactions throughout the Birk Lawsuit, the court entered
sanctions against the Birk Defendants, including (1)
deeming over 500 Requests for Admission admitted as a
result of failure to respond; (2) finding an alter-ego
relationship between Edward and Linda Birk and Birk
Oil Company; and (3) striking the only comparative fault
expert on behalf of the Birk Defendants. Additionally,
both before and during the Birk Lawsuit, Progressive and
McMaster affirmatively misrepresented the existence of
additional insurance available through another carrier,
which prevented an early settlement.
Before trial, the Birk Defendants entered into the
Agreement and Assignment of Rights (the ‘Agreement’),
assigning to Gant any rights they had against Progressive
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in exchange for Gant’s covenant not to execute against
the personal assets of the Birk Defendants. The parties
agreed to a contested bench trial before Judge Goddrez,
and the case went to trial in June 2015. The court
granted judgment in favor of Gant in the amount of
$6,723,021; all of the Birk Defendants were liable for
some or all of the judgment. The court apportioned no
fault to Katie Gant. Pursuant to the Agreement, the
judgment amount was partially satisfied with certain
insurance proceeds. An unpaid balance of the judgment
remains in the amount of $5,473,021, plus $7,114.42 in
costs and post-judgment interest that continues to accrue.
On September 15, 2015, Progressive filed this
action for declaratory judgment, requesting this Court to
find that ‘its handling of the underlying claim and lawsuit
was appropriate, in good faith, and consistent with the
Progressive Policy and all duties imposed upon it by law
or otherwise.’ Progressive sought a declaration that it is
not liable to Gant for damages in excess of its policy
limits. Gant, as assignee of the Birk Defendants’ rights
against Progressive, filed an Answer and Counterclaim
asserting eight causes of action: 1) Assignment; 2)
Vicarious Liability; 3) Breach of Contract; 4) Breach of
Duty of Good Faith; 5) Negligence; 6) Negligent
Misrepresentation; 7) Fraudulent Misrepresentation; and
8) Fraud Through Silence. In addition to the unpaid
balance of the judgment and costs of the Birk Lawsuit,
Gant seeks interest, lost profits, and attorney’s fees.
(Doc. 92, at 2-3.)
The present motion relates to various of Gant’s responses to Progressive’s
First Requests for Admission, Second Requests for Production, and Second
Interrogatories that generally relate to Gant’s awareness of the existence of other
insurance policies. (See Doc. 215; see also Doc. 215-1, 215-2, 215-3.)
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Progressive contends that the discovery requests at issue seek “information and
documentation concerning efforts to investigate the existence of insurance
coverage for the Birks and/or Birk Oil performed by Gant’s counsel, prior to filing
the underlying Gant v. Birk wrongful death suit against the Birks and Birk Oil.”
(Doc. 215, at 5-6.) Progressive has summarized the allegations in Gant’s
Counterclaim relating to the existence of other insurance policies as follows:
In the Amended Counterclaim, Gant brings claims on his
own behalf as well as claims as assignee of the Birks.
Gant’s own claims are premised basically entirely on the
allegation that the Birks’ defense attorney Kevin
McMaster, and/or Progressive itself, untimely disclosed
the Bitco policy, thereby allegedly subjecting Gant to
allegedly extraneous litigation. Gant’s claim presented as
assignee of the Birks is the primary claim in this action,
and is in essence a “bad faith” claim against Progressive
for alleged breaches of various duties it owed to the Birks
centered on Progressive’s hiring of Kevin McMaster to
represent them. The Birks’ bad faith claim, asserted by
Gant, is also substantially premised upon the alleged
untimely disclosure of the Bitco policy by McMaster
and/or Progressive. The thrust of Gant’s putative claim
is that, had the Bitco policy been disclosed earlier, then
Gant could have submitted a claim to Bitco and Bitco
would have tendered its $1 million liability limit earlier,
obviating or circumscribing litigation.
(Doc. 215, at 4.)
DISCUSSION
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b) states that
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[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the
importance of the issues at state in the action, the amount in
controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant
information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need
not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
As such, the requested information must be nonprivileged, relevant, and
proportionate to the needs of the case to be discoverable. Within this framework,
the Court will review the contested discovery responses.
As stated above, Progressive contends that the discovery requests at issue
seek “information and documentation concerning efforts to investigate the
existence of insurance coverage for the Birks and/or Birk Oil performed by Gant’s
counsel, prior to filing the underlying Gant v. Birk wrongful death suit against the
Birks and Birk Oil.” (Doc. 215, at 5-6.) Progressive enumerates various
categories of Requests for Admission for which it seeks supplemental responses: 1)
whether Gant or his counsel “investigated the existence of other insurance” for
Birk Oil prior to “April 2013 when the Underlying Action was filed” (Requests for
Admission Nos. 5-8, 27-30); 2) whether Gant hired an “investigator to investigate
the existence of other insurance which could provide coverage for the accident
between June 2012 and April 2013” (RFA Nos. 25, 26); and 3) whether Gant or his
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counsel searched public records to investigate the existence of Birk Oil insurance
policies before February 26, 2014 (“the date the existence of the BitCo policy was
disclosed by the Birks to Gant in supplemental discovery responses in the
Underlying Action”) (RFA Nos. 44-47). (See Doc. 215, at 6.)
Progressive’s Second Requests for Production and Second Interrogatories
correspond to these RFAs. (See generally Docs. 215-1, 215-2, 215-3.) Progressive
moves the Court to compel supplemental responses to RFPs Nos. 1-3, which seek
documents relied upon in answering the interrogatories and RFAs. (Doc. 215, at 6;
Doc. 215-2, at 2.) Progressive also moves to compel Gant to provide a
supplemental response to RFP No. 4, which requests “a privilege log compliant
with District of Kansas requirements listing any documents or tangible materials
concerning which Gant asserts attorney-client privilege or work product
protection.” (Id.) Finally, Progressive seeks a supplemental response to
Interrogatory No. 1, “which requests factual bases in support of requests for
admission which were not fully admitted, concerning the items discussed herein.”
(Doc. 215, at 7; Doc. 215-3.)
A.

Efforts to Investigate Insurance Coverage.
Progressive argues that “information and documentation concerning efforts

by Gant’s counsel to investigate the existence of other insurance which may
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provide coverage for the underlying accident to the Birks or Birk Oil, is relevant
and proportional to the needs of this case.” (Doc. 215, at 7.) More specifically,
Progressive contends that “Gant’s claims against Progressive are substantially
premised upon the alleged failure by Progressive and/or McMaster to timely
disclose to Gant an insurance policy issued to Birk Oil by Bitco, another insurer.”
(Id.) Although Progressive disputes it had a duty to disclose what it contends was
a “wholly unrelated” insurance policy (hereinafter “the Bitco policy”), it argues
that “to the extent Gant premises his claims . . . on . . . [an] alleged failure to timely
disclose” such a policy, “what Gant or his counsel knew (or should have known)
about the existence of other insurance, and when Gant or his counsel knew (or
should have known) about the existence of other insurance, is directly implicated
in Gant’s counterclaim.” (Id., at 8.)
To establish the relevance of the requested information, Progressive
provides the following analysis of Gant’s allegations:
In the Amended Counterclaim, Gant alleges that previous
counsel received correspondence from McMaster in
August 2011 which (a) tendered the Progressive
$250,000 bodily injury liability limit, and (b) stated there
were no other policies affording coverage for the
accident. (Id. at ¶124) Gant alleges that previous
counsel recommended to Gant that he accept
Progressive’s $250,000 offer. (Id. at ¶126) However,
Gant alleges that, despite previous counsel’s advice to
accept Progressive’s $250,000 policy limits offer, Gant
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instead rejected the $250,000 offer. (Id. at ¶126, also see
Gant Answer to Progressive Declaratory Judgment
Complaint, Doc. 104, ¶¶21, 28, 29, 30, 44) Gant alleges
he then discharged previous counsel and hired the
Wagstaff & Cartmell firm in June 2012. (Gant Am.
Counterclaim, Doc. 104, ¶128). Gant, through the
Wagstaff firm, filed the underlying Gant v. Birk lawsuit
in April 2013, approximately ten (10) months after that
firm was retained. In the Amended Counterclaim, Gant
(as assignee of the Birks) alleges that the failure to timely
disclose the Bitco policy that the Birks had purchased for
Birk Oil caused the Birks harm by subjecting them to a
lawsuit and excess judgment. (Am. Counterclaim, p. 43,
¶VIII)
(Id., at 8-9.) Progressive asserts that the information is relevant because “[i]f Gant
or his counsel actually knew about the Bitco policy, or had reason to know about
[it], prior to suit or prior to the Birks’ disclosure of the existence of the Bitco
policy in February 2014, then this would undermine or vitiate Gant’s claims
premised upon untimely disclosure of the existence of the Bitco policy.” (Id., at 9.)

Given the nature of Gant’s allegations and claims against Progressive, the
Court finds that information on the general topic of Gant’s awareness of, or efforts
to determine, the existence of other insurance requested is relevant and
proportional to the needs of the case. The Court will, however, address specific
discovery requests, and objections thereto, below.
B.

Requests for Admission.
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1.

Investigation of existence of other insurance.

Requests for Admission Nos. 5-8 and 27-30 all generally relate to Gant’s
efforts to investigate the existence of other insurance at various times prior to the
filing of the underlying action in April 2013. (See Doc. 215-1, at 3-5, 14-15.) In
response to Requests Nos. 5 and 7, which relates to actions taken by Gant himself,
Gant objects to the use of the term “investigate.” Without waiving the objection,
Gant “admits in part and denies in part” Requests Nos. 5 and 7 “because Gant took
steps to investigate the existence of other insurance by hiring counsel who
communicated with Progressive and Progressive’s retained counsel; however, Gant
did not, personally, directly investigate the existence of insurance.” (Id., at 4, 5.)
The Court overrules Gant’s objections to Requests Nos. 5 and 7 but finds that the
response, which provides a valid qualification of the admission as well as an
adequate explanation of the partial denial, is appropriate pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
36(a)(4). (See Doc. 225, at 11.) This finding also applies to Request Nos. 27 and
29, which incorporate Gant’s responses to Requests Nos. 7 and 5, respectively.
(See Doc. 215-1, at 14.)
Gant objects to Requests Nos. 6 and 8, which relate to actions taken by
Gant’s counsel to investigate the existence of other insurance between June 2012
and April 2013. (Doc. 215-1, at 4, 5.) Gant objects that Requests 6 and 8 are
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“vague and ambiguous as to the terms ‘investigate’ and ‘other insurance.’” (Id.)
Gant’s Counsel also objects to this Request “seeks information which is neither
relevant nor proportional to the case” because “it improperly presumes that Gant
and/or his Counsel had some duty to independently investigate insurance of an
opposing party, particularly when that opposing party is represented by counsel.”
(Id.) The Court overrules these objections.
Gant also objects that these Requests seek information protected by the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. As stated above, Progressive
argues that “to the extent Gant premises his claims . . . on . . . [an] alleged failure to
timely disclose” such a policy, “what Gant or his counsel knew (or should have
known) about the existence of other insurance, and when Gant or his counsel knew
(or should have known) about the existence of other insurance, is directly
implicated in Gant’s counterclaim.” (Id., at 8.) The Court agrees with this
assessment.
As an initial matter, what steps Gant’s counsel did or did not take to
determine the existence of other insurance is not protected by the attorney-client
privilege. The privilege “protects disclosure of substantive communication
between attorney and client, ‘it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts .
. . .’” within that communication. Whether or not Gant’s counsel investigated the
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existence of insurance is a fact and thus not protected. No. 03-2200-JWL-DJW,
2006 WL 1867478, at *5 (D. Kan. July 1, 2006). The substance of any
communication wherein counsel informed Gant as to the form or results of such
investigation would, however, be protected.
As for the work product doctrine, that protection simply does not apply to
these Requests for Admission. In order to constitute work product under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3), “the material must be all of the following: 1. Documents
and tangible things; 2. Prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial; 3. Prepared
by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative.” Bohannan v.
Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 127 F.R.D. 536, 538-39 (D. Kan. 1989) (emphasis added);
see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3). Despite his arguments for the application of the
work product doctrine, Gant’s brief in opposition seemingly concedes that the
protection applies only to documents and tangible things. (See Doc. 225, at 7-10.)
Gant’s arguments for the application of work product protection to these
Requests for Admission is misguided. The response to the Requests for Admission
at issue – which seek a simple an admission or denial as to whether Gant’s counsel
did or did not investigate the existence of other insurance – does not constitute or
implicate a document or tangible thing. Even assuming the information is
protected by the work product doctrine, Progressive would be able to pierce the
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immunity because it is material to the preparation of the case and Progressive
would have no other avenue for obtaining this information. Id.; see also
Jacqueline McCoo v. Denny’s Inc., 192 F.R.D. 675, 684 (D. Kan. 2000).
Progressive’s motion is GRANTED in regard to Requests for Admission
Nos. 6 and 8. Gant is instructed to respond to Requests Nos. 6 and 8, without
objection. Gant may, however, qualify and explain his answer as necessary
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(4). This finding also applies to Requests for
Admission Nos. 28 and 30, which incorporate Gant’s response to Request No. 6.
2.

Private investigator.

Requests Nos. 25 and 26 ask whether Gant “hired an investigator to
investigate other insurance which could provide coverage for the accident between
June 2012 and April 2013.” (Doc. 215-1, at 13.) Gant objected to these Requests
as “overbroad, vague, ambiguous.” (Id.) These objections are overruled.
Gant also objected that the requests sought irrelevant or disproportionate
information because the Requests “improperly presume[s] that Gant and/or his
Counsel had some duty to independently investigate insurance of an opposing
party, particularly when that opposing party is represented by counsel.” As
discussed above, the information is neither irrelevant nor disproportionate. These
objections are overruled.
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In addition, Gant stated that “he retained attorneys to investigate and pursue
his legal claims. Thus, it may be argued that Gant ‘hired’ individuals to conduct an
‘investigation.’ Gant did not personally, however, hire a private investigator.”
(Id.) The Court accepts this as a qualified admission of Requests Nos. 25 and 26,
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(4). Although the Court overrules the objections
stated by Gant, Progressive’s motion is, however, DENIED as to Gant’s
substantive response to Requests Nos. 25 and 26.
3.

Public records searches.

Requests Nos. 44- 47 relate to whether Gant searched public records to
investigate the existence of Birk Oil insurance policies before February 26, 2014
(“the date the existence of the BitCo policy was disclosed by the Birks to Gant in
supplemental discovery responses in the Underlying Action”) (RFA Nos. 44-47).
(See Doc. 215, at 6; Doc. 215-1, at 20.) In response to Requests Nos. 44 and 46,
Gant incorporates his response to Request No. 5, discussed supra, wherein the
Court overrules Gant’s objections to that Request.
Regardless of the validity of the objections lodged, Gant responds to
Requests 44 and 46 that he “did not, personally, conduct a public records search.”
(Doc. 215-1, at 20.) The Court finds this to be a sufficient denial of Request No.
44 and a sufficient admission of Request No. 46. Plaintiff’s motion is, thus,
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DENIED as to Requests for Admission Nos. 44 and 46.
Requests Nos. 45 and 47 relate to whether or not Gant’s counsel searched
public records “to investigate the existence of insurance policies held by Birk
Oil, prior to February 26, 2014.” (Doc. 215-1, at 20.) In response, Gant
incorporates his response to Request No. 6. The Court discussed Request for
Admission No. 6, supra, overruling the objections and instructing Gant to respond
to the Request without objection. The Court herein incorporates its analysis of
Gant’s objections to Request No. 6, supra, and GRANTS Progressive’s motion as
to Requests 45 and 47. Similarly, Gant is instructed to admit or deny whether his
counsel conducted public records searches before February 26, 2014, to investigate
the existence of insurance policies held by Birk Oil. Again, however, Gant may
qualify and explain his answer as necessary pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(4).
C.

Requests For Production.
Plaintiff also moves for supplemental responses to its Second Request for

Production Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4. RFP No. 1 asks Gant to produce “all documents
referenced in your answers to Progressive’s Second Interrogatories.” (Doc. 215-2,
at 2.) Request No. 2 seeks the documents reviewed or relied upon to respond to
Progressive’s Second Interrogatories, while Request No. 3 seeks such documents
reviewed, referenced or relied upon to respond to Progressive’s 81 Requests for
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Admission.
Gant responds to Request No. 1 (which is incorporated by reference in
response to Requests Nos. 2 and 3) by objecting that the Request is
overbroad and unduly burdensome in that it seeks to
obtain ‘all documents’ referenced in an Interrogatory that
itself incorporates 81 Requests for Admission. However,
as stated in response to Progressive’s Second
Interrogatories, the documents referenced therein already
have been produced to Progressive by Gant and/or his
counsel. In addition, Gant’s Counsel refers Progressive
to the following items which were referenced in Gant’s
responses and already are in Progressive’s possession: (1)
the documents produced by Bitco and the deposition
transcript of Shelly Storey which otherwise have been
made available to Progressive in this litigation and (2) the
documents which Progressive has produced in this
litigation.
(Id.) The Court finds Gant’s objections to be valid given the all-encompassing
nature of the Interrogatory – and corresponding 81 Requests for Admission – at
issue (see Doc. 215-3, at 1). Even so, Gant has clearly stated that the responsive
documents have been produced and/or are in Progressive’s possession. (Doc. 2152, at 2.) Should Progressive need to know which documents were referenced or
relied upon regarding particular Requests for Admissions, it will need to submit
more specific document requests. Progressive’s motion is DENIED as to Requests
for Production Nos. 1, 2, and 3.
Request No. 4 asks Gant to produce a privilege log “compliant with District
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of Kansas requirements.” (Id.) Gant responded to the Request by incorporating
his response to Request No. 1, and continues that
these Requests seek documents reviewed, relied upon,
and referenced in response to extensive discovery. As
phrased, this Request therefore seeks the disclosure of
materials protected by the attorney work product doctrine
and/or the attorney client privilege. Therefore, Gant’s
Counsel objects to the same. Subject to and without
waiving these objections, no documents were reviewed,
relied upon, and/or referenced other than those that
already have been produced to Progressive by Gant’s
Counsel and/or otherwise are in the possession of
Progressive for the reasons set forth in response to
Request No. 1.
(Id.) Progressive argues that
Gant has not submitted a privilege log or any description
whatsoever what information or documentation is being
withheld on the basis of attorney-client privilege or work
product, and accordingly is depriving Progressive and
this Court of critical and required information necessary
to ascertain the propriety of the assertion of attorneyclient privilege or work product protection.
(Doc. 215, at 12.)
Gant’s response is wholly inappropriate. Request No. 4 does not seek “the
disclosure of materials protected by the attorney work product doctrine and/or the
attorney client privilege.” The Request merely seeks a privilege log as to any such
documents withheld from production on those bases.
As an initial matter, Progressive should not be required to submit such a
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document request; Gant should have included a privilege log because his responses
raise attorney/client privilege and attorney work product objections. A party
withholding documents subject to assertion of privilege must submit a compliant
privilege log pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(5)(A). “The objecting party must
provide enough information in the privilege log to enable the withholding party,
and the Court, to assess each element of the asserted privilege and determine its
applicability.” Leftwich v. City of Pittsburg, Kansas, No. 16-2112-JWL-GLR,
2017 WL 1338838, at *2 (D. Kan. April 12, 2017) (citations omitted)).
In his response brief, however, Gant states that “Progressive appears to ask
this Court to have Gant produce a privilege log despite the fact that there simply
were no documents to list on that privilege log.” (Doc. 225, at 18.) If there are no
documents to list on a privilege log, then Gant has no basis to have raised these
objections. As such, the Court overrules Gant’s work product and attorney-client
privilege objections. This includes, but is not necessarily limited to, Gant’s
responses to Request for Production No. 4 and Requests for Admission Nos. 6, 8,
45, 47, and any other discovery responses that incorporate those responses.
D.

Interrogatory No. 1.
Finally, Progressive’s Interrogatory No. 1 instructs Gant that if his response

to
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any of Progressive’s First Requests for Admissions is
anything other than an unqualified admission, please
describe all facts concerning and/or in support of each
such response, identify all persons with knowledge of
any facts concerning and/or in support of each such
response, and identify all documents concerning or
evincing the same.
(Doc. 215-3, at 1.) Gant objects to the Interrogatory as overbroad, unduly
burdensome, and an “improper attempt to circumvent the limit of 35
Interrogatories” set forth in the Scheduling Order “by requesting a detailed
recitation of ‘all facts,’ ‘all persons,’ and a narrative description relevant to 81
Requests for Admission.” (Id.) The Court agrees and finds that Interrogatory 1
is not a proper use of the request for admission discovery
tool. A request for admission is meant to be answered
with a simple admission or denial. FED.R.CIV.P. 36(a).
Requiring the type of additional information sought [by
the interrogatory at issue] is more akin to a response to a
statement of fact in a dispositive motion. Also, as the
Court has noted in prior cases, where the requests are an
attempt to circumvent rules designed to limit the number
of interrogatories or where the requests are contrary to
the purposes of Rule 36, objections to those requests will
be sustained.
Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp., LLC v. Midwest Div., Inc., No. 05-2164MLB-DWB, 2007 WL 3171768, at *6 (D.Kan. Oct. 29, 2007) (citing Audiotext
Commc'ns Network, Inc. v. US Telecom, Inc., No. 94-2395-GTV, 1995 WL
625744, at *6 (D. Kan. Oct. 5, 1995). The Court thus DENIES Progressive’s
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motion as to Interrogatory No. 1.
Regardless, the Court agrees that Gant generally took particular care “in
responding to Progressive’s Requests for Admissions, attempting to provide
explanation and details to Requests that were not responded to with unqualified
admissions.” (Doc. 225, at 15.) In conjunction with the supplemental Admission
responses required by the Court herein, the Court agrees that Gant has sufficiently
provided the factual detail requested by Progressive in regard to any qualified
responses to Progressive’s Requests for Admission.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (Doc.
214) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as more fully set forth herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated at Wichita, Kansas, on this 16th day of August, 2017.
S/ KENNETH G. GALE

KENNETH G. GALE
United States Magistrate Judge

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