Miller v. NEP Group, Inc. et al
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting #102 Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot #108 Motion for Leave to File Sur-reply. Signed by Chief District Judge Julie A Robinson on 5/16/17. (kao)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
Case No. 15-CV9701-JAR
NEP GROUP, INC. ET AL.,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff brought suit alleging he sustained an injury to his right foot while helping to take
down a large video screen at the Kansas Speedway in Kansas City, Kansas. Kansas law provides
that an employee may not recover twice from an employer for an injury that is covered by
workers’ compensation. Before the court is Defendants’ Joint Motion for Summary Judgment
based on the exclusive remedy provision of the Kansas Workers’ Compensation Act (“KWCA”)
(Doc. 102). The motion is fully briefed and the Court is prepared to rule.1 For the reasons stated
below, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates “that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that it is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”2
In applying this standard, the Court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.3 “There is no genuine [dispute] of material
Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a sur-reply (Doc. 108), which Defendants responded to and
opposed (Doc. 109). The Court read and considered these filings, therefore leave to file a sur-reply is unnecessary.
Accordingly, the Court denies that motion as moot.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
City of Herriman v. Bell, 590 F.3d 1176, 1181 (10th Cir. 2010).
fact unless the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”4 A fact is “material” if,
under the applicable substantive law, it is “essential to the proper disposition of the claim.”5 A
dispute of fact is “genuine” if “there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of
fact could resolve the issue either way.”6
The moving party initially must show the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact
and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.7 In attempting to meet this standard, a movant
who does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the nonmovant’s
claim; rather, the movant need simply point out to the court a lack of evidence for the nonmovant
on an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim.8
Once the movant has met the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute
of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.”9 The nonmoving party may not simply rest upon its pleadings
to satisfy its burden.10 Rather, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts that would be
admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the
Bones v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 255 (1986)).
Wright ex rel. Trust Co. of Kan. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing
Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998)).
Adler, 144 F.3d at 670 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
Spaulding v. United Transp. Union, 279 F.3d 901, 904 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 537 U.S. 816 (2002)
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)).
Adams v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 233 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Adler, 144 F.3d at
671); see also Kannady v. City of Kiowa, 590 F.3d 1161, 1169 (10th Cir. 2010).
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Spaulding, 279 F.3d at 904 (citing Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; accord Eck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 256 F.3d 1013, 1017 (10th Cir. 2001).
nonmovant.”11 In setting forward these specific facts, the nonmovant must identify the facts “by
reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein.”12 To
successfully oppose summary judgment, the nonmovant must bring forward more than a mere
scintilla of evidence in support of his position.13 A nonmovant may not create a genuine issue of
material fact with unsupported, conclusory allegations.”14
Finally, summary judgment is not a “disfavored procedural shortcut”; on the contrary, it
is an important procedure “designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s vexatious method of controverting
Defendants’ statement of material facts has unduly burdened the Court’s time. Defendants
asserted fourteen material facts in support of their motion for summary judgment. Yet Plaintiff
took thirty-eight pages to deny all but three partial facts, arguing: 1) the cited record did not
support the contention; 2) the cited testimony did not authenticate the identified exhibit; and/or
3) the cited support contained inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiff also claimed in many instances that
other evidence controverted the stated contention. Plaintiff then presented a statement of
additional facts (“SOAF”) that mostly contained immaterial facts or required unreasonable
When deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court may consider
evidence submitted, if admissible in substance, even if it would not be
Mitchell v. City of Moore, Okla., 218 F.3d 1190, 1197–98 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Adler, 144 F.3d at
670–71); see Kannady, 590 F.3d at 1169.
Adler, 144 at 671.
Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1539 (10th Cir. 1993).
Tapia v. City of Albuquerque, 170 F. App’x. 529, 533 (10th Cir. 2006).
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).
admissible, in form, at the trial. A party may properly authenticate a
document “through a supporting affidavit or deposition excerpt from anyone
with personal knowledge of the facts contained in the exhibit.”16
An affidavit is not required to authenticate every document submitted for consideration at
summary judgment.17 Documents produced during discovery that are on the letterhead of the
opposing, producing party are authentic per se under Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.18 “The appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances” may also satisfy the
authentication requirement.19 An exhibit may also qualify as “self-authenticated” under Fed. R.
Plaintiff claims that Exhibits A, B, C, and D were not properly authenticated. The Court
disagrees. First, Plaintiff acknowledged that various deponents identified and referenced these
exhibits during their depositions, albeit with different exhibit names. Second, these exhibits
were produced during discovery and either are on business letterheads or contain distinctive
characteristics that satisfy the authentication requirement. The Court finds Plaintiff’s
authentication arguments disingenuous.
With respect to hearsay, the Court may consider hearsay testimony in support of
summary judgment if the evidence may ultimately be presented at trial in an admissible form.
Deposition testimony or sworn affidavits are admissible to the extent the content of the statement
is based on personal knowledge.20 To the extent the content of any such statement is obviously
not substantively within the personal knowledge or perception of the witness, the Court
Peterson v. Garmin Int’l., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1304 (D. Kan. 2011) (quoting Toney v. Cuomo, 92
F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1196 (D. Kan. 2000), aff’d, 221 F.3d 1353 (10th Cir. 2000).).
Law Co. v. Mohawk Const. and Supply Co., 577 F.3d 1164, 1170 (10th Cir. 2009).
Id. (citations omitted).
Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(4).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
disregards the same, as statements of mere belief in an affidavit or deposition testimony must be
disregarded.21 Business records produced during discovery and those that may be authenticated
by the custodians of records are excepted from the hearsay rule.22 Moreover, the Court can
consider these records to the extent they are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.23
With these principles in mind, the Court overrules the hearsay objections to Exhibits A-D
because they are business records produced during discovery.
Local Rule 56.1(e) states “all responses [to statements of uncontroverted facts] must
fairly meet the substance of the matter asserted.”24 After reviewing and considering Plaintiff’s
responses to paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 of Defendants’ statement of
material facts (“SOMF”), the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to comply with this rule. For
example, SOMF 1 simply asserts that Screenworks was performing work at the Speedway on
October 7, 2013. Plaintiff denied SOMF 1even though his own sixty additional facts would
support the asserted fact. Plaintiff inexplicably denied other benign SOMFs, but the Court will
not belabor this point.
Instead, with the above rules of law and principles of application in mind, the following
material facts are either uncontroverted or, if controverted, are construed in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff. Defendant Screenworks, LLC is in the entertainment business, providing
LED screens for use in outdoor events across the nation.25 During the relevant time,
Screenworks and Motor Racing Network, Inc. (“MRN”) had an agreement that says Screenworks
shall be the sole supplier of large screen video displays for MRN events held at various venues,
Fed. R. Evid. 602.
Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).
Fed. R. Evid. 801.
D. Kan. Rule 56 (e).
Doc. 105-8, Ex. K, Naccarato Dep., Vol. I at 26: 20–22.
including the Kansas Speedway in Kansas City, Kansas. As part of its business, Screenworks
builds the screens, provides technical support during events, and takes down the screens
provided at these events. Screenworks sends its employees to these jobs, but also hires local
stagehands to assist with building and tearing down the screens.
In early October 2013, Screenworks supplied a large screen for a racing event at the
Kansas Speedway. Screenworks’ work order for this event indicated: build the screen on
October 1; tech screen on October 2-6; and load out (i.e., tear down the screen) on October 7.
For this particular job, Screenworks sent several of its employees, including Defendant Jeffrey
Smith, an LED technician, to Kansas Speedway. Screenworks also hired stagehands from the
Kansas City chapter of International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees Local 31
(“IATSEL31”) to assist Smith with building and tearing down the screen, and loading equipment
onto its trucks. Plaintiff was one of these stagehands.
IATSEL31 is a referral hall that provides stagehand labor for production companies such
as Screenworks.26 It receives jobs by phone or email, and dispatches its members to the event
site. Whoever requests the stagehands is responsible for communicating the tasks to be
completed and the safety protocols for that particular job.27 Screenworks and IATSEL31 have
an understanding that Screenworks will pay the stagehands an agreed hourly rate plus 45% for
“Employers FICA and Missouri State Unemployment tax, Retirement, Workmen’s
On October 7, 2013, as the lead LED technician for the job, Miller directed the
stagehands during the take-down of the large video screen. During that process, a truss crushed
Doc. 105-2, Ex. E, Taylor Dep. at 10–12; 25: 11–21.
Id. at 25:12–16; Doc. 105-3; Doc. 105-3, Ex. F, Miller Dep. at 14:23–15:6–11 (“out of town people”
[production company] tells him what to do even if he is the acting steward).
Doc. 105-2, Taylor Dep. at 24:4–9; Doc. 104-3, Ex. C.
Plaintiff’s right foot. After sittin out for app
proximately twenty-five minutes, Pl
laintiff, with the
use of a stick to help him walk, assisted the other stageha
ands with “p
push[ing] the rest of the s
back to th truck.”29 After finish
hing the job, Plaintiff we directly to see the “w
doctor.”30 Plaintiff filed a worke compens
sation claim with IATSE
Smith has no independent recollection regarding the October 7, 2013 acc
cident, other than
what was stated in hi typed state
ement on No
ovember 4, 2
He filled out an incid report on December 12, 2013, th mainly r
referenced hi typed
Defendants Screenworks and NEP Br
roadcasting, LLC are sub
bsidiaries of Defendant NEP
Group, In NEP Group owns th holding co
ompanies tha own Scree
enworks. NE Broadcas
serves as a payroll en
ntity for emp
ployees with the NEP g
group of com
Doc. 105-3, Ex. F, Miller De at 92:6–15.
Id. at 79:16–2
Doc. 106-10, Ex. P at 2.
Doc. 105-8, Ex. K, Naccarat Dep. at 26:2
Defendants seek summary judgment based on the exclusive remedy provision of the
Kansas Workers’ Compensation Act (“KWCA” or “the Act”).33 Kansas law provides that an
employee may not recover twice from an employer for an injury that is covered by workers’
compensation. K.S.A. 44-501(b) provides:
Except as provided in the workers compensation act, no employer, or other
employee of such employer, shall be liable for any injury for which
compensation is recoverable under the workers compensation act nor shall an
employer be liable to any third party for any injury or death of an employee
which was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability against a third
party and for which workers compensation is payable by such employer.
“The exclusive remedy provision protects both employers and employees. Employees are
guaranteed a form of recovery against their employer; and employers are protected against
paying for the employees damages twice — once through workers’ compensation and again
through a civil action for damages.”34 The Kansas Supreme Court has emphasized the
provisions of the KWCA are to be “liberally construed for the purpose of bringing a worker
under the Act whether or not desirable for the specific individual’s circumstances.”35
This protection from suit extends to employers who may not be the immediate employers
of the injured party. K.S.A. 44-503(a) states:
Where any person (in this section referred to as principal) undertakes to
execute any work which is a part of the principal’s trade or business or which
the principal has contracted to perform and contracts with any other person (in
this section referred to as the contractor) for the execution by or under the
contractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by the principal,
the principal shall be liable to pay to any worker employed in the execution of
K.S.A. 44-501 (2014); see Coble v. Williams, 282 P.2d 425, 429–30 (Kan. 1955) (applying the Kansas
Workers’ Compensation Act to a case in which the claimant was injured while working in Kansas despite the
following: (1) the claimant resided in Oklahoma, (2) the employer’s principal place of business was Missouri, and
(3) the employment contract was entered into in Missouri).
Cuiksa v. Hallmark Hall of Fame Prods., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1170–71 (D. Kan. 2003)
Zehring v. Wickham, 658 P.2d 1004, 1008 (1983).
the work any compensation under the workers compensation act which the
principal would have been liable to pay if that worker had been immediately
employed by the principal; and where compensation is claimed from or
proceedings are taken against the principal, then in the application of the
workers compensation act, references to the principal shall be substituted for
references to the employer, except that the amount of compensation shall be
calculated with reference to the earnings of the worker under the employer by
whom the worker is immediately employed. For the purposes of this
subsection, a worker shall not include an individual who is a self-employed
The Kansas Supreme Court has provided two separate tests—known as the Hanna tests—for
determining whether an employer is a statutory employer.36 An employer is the statutory
employer of the worker if either of the following are met:
(1) [I]s the work being performed by the independent contractor and the
injured employee necessarily inherent in and an integral part of the principal’s
trade or business? (2) is the work being performed by the independent
contractor and the injured employee such as would ordinarily have been done
by the employees of the principal?37
If either of the above tests is answered with a “yes,” the work being done is part of the
principal’s trade or business and the employee’s sole remedy is under the KWCA.38
Screenworks claims that it was Plaintiff’s statutory employer on October 7, 2013.
Plaintiff argues that a dispute exists as to whether the KWCA applies in this case because
Defendants have failed to offer evidence that Plaintiff was not a self-employed person who
elected to bring himself within the KWCA. The Court rejects this argument. Plaintiff’s own
statement of facts dispels any dispute as to him being a self-employed subcontractor. He
considered IATSEL31 his employer. He received paychecks from IATSEL31; it issued him W2s (instead of 1099s) and provided him with benefits, including health insurance, a pension plan,
Bright, 837 P.2d at 356.
Id. (quoting Hanna v. CRA, Inc., 409 P.2d 786, 789 (1966)).
Bright, 837 P.2d at 356.
and workers’ compensation benefits. The undisputed facts establish that IATSEL31 was
Plaintiff’s employer at all relevant times. This, however, does not foreclose Screenworks from
being Plaintiff’s statutory employer.
The real issue here is whether the work performed by Plaintiff was inherent in or an
integral part of Screenworks’ trade or business, or, alternatively, whether the work would have
ordinarily been done by Screenworks’ employees. Screenworks meets both Hanna tests.
Screenworks’ business was providing LED screens for use in outdoor events, which required
building the screen, providing technical support, and dismantling the screen. The work being
performed by Plaintiff — tearing-down the screen — was an integral part of Screenworks’
business. The Court concludes that Screenworks was Plaintiff’s statutory employer on October
7, 2013, under the first Hanna test.
Screenworks also qualified as Plaintiff’s statutory employer under the second Hanna test.
It is uncontroverted that Screenworks’ own employees would have undertaken the tear-down of
the screen. Indeed, Miller was helping to perform that task. For racing events, Miller’s duties
were “set up the screen, get it working . . . Then tear down the screen when the race is over.”39
Stagehands were hired to help Screenwork employees unload the truck, get gear to a certain spot,
erect the screen, take down the screen, reload the truck, and to provide general labor.40
Because Screenworks was Plaintiff’s statutory employer on October 7, 2013, the KWCA
bars this negligence action against Screenworks.41 Plaintiff’s sole remedy against Screenworks
is under the Act.
Doc. 105-6, Ex. I, Smith Dep. at 15:14–18.
Id. at 16: 1–16, 17:6–8; 25:22–23.
Screenworks may also be entitled to immunity as a special employer. A special employer/employee
relationship exists if three things are satisfied: (a) the employee has made a contract of hire, express or implied, with
the second employer; (b) the work being done is essentially that of the second employer; and (c) the second
employer has the right to control the details of the work. Scott v. Altmar, Inc., 38 P.3d 673, 676 (2002). Because the
B. Jeffrey Smith
Smith argues he is entitled to summary judgment because he was Plaintiff’s co-employee
and would have been entitled to receive workers’ compensation benefits had he suffered an
injury on October 7, 2013. Plaintiff argues that a material issue exists as to whether Smith would
have been entitled to workers’ compensation given his potential use or consumption of alcohol,
drugs, or medication on October 7, 2013, and/or his reckless violation of the training he received
to safely take-down the video screen. K.S.A. 40-501(a)(1)(D) disallows compensation for an
injury if it results from the employee’s reckless violation of their employer’s workplace safety
rules or regulations. K.S.A. 40-501(b)1)(A) disallows compensations for an injury that was
contributed to by the employee’s use of alcohol or other prohibited substances. 42
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish that a factual dispute exists regarding
Smith’s entitlement to workers’ compensation based on his alleged use of alcohol or other
prohibited substances. Smith’s failure to recall whether he consumed alcohol, drugs, or
medication does not mandate an inference that he consumed prohibited substances on October 7,
2013, and thus would have been disallowed workers’ compensation under K.S.A. 44501(b)(1)(A). Even if that negative inference was made, it constitutes, at most, a “mere scintilla
Court disposes of this case under the statutory employee analysis, the Court considers many of the issues Plaintiff
raised to be immaterial (i.e., whether an express or implied contract existed between Plaintiff and Screenworks, who
controlled Plaintiff’s work, etc.).
K.S.A. 44-501(b)(1)(A) provides:
The employer shall not be liable under the workers compensation act where
the injury, disability or death was contributed to by the employee’s use or
consumption of alcohol or drugs, chemicals or any other compounds or
substances, including, but not limited to, any drugs or medications which are
available to the public without a prescription from a health care provider,
prescription drugs or medications, any form or type of narcotic drugs,
marijuana, stimulants, depressants or hallucinogens.
of evidence,” which is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.43 Moreover,
“[n]either entitlement to receive nor actual receipt of workers compensation benefits by a
coemployee tortfeasor is required for fellow servant immunity to attach and bar a civil suit.
What matters is whether that coemployee was acting within the scope and course of employment
when [he] caused injury to another.”44 It is uncontroverted that Smith was acting within the
scope of employment when Plaintiff was injured.
Likewise, Plaintiff has failed to establish that a dispute exists regarding whether Smith
recklessly violated Screenworks’ safety rules or regulations. Plaintiff attempts to create a dispute
by pointing to evidence that Screenworks provided training and a safety manual to its employees
and required them to follow safety protocols, but Smith denied receiving any such training or
documentation. The Court finds this argument a non sequitur. Kansas law provides that,
[t]o be reckless, it must be something more than negligent. It must not only
be unreasonable, but it must involve a risk of harm to others substantially in
excess of that necessary to make the conduct negligent. It must involve an
easily perceptible danger of death or substantial physical harm, and the
probability that it will so result must be substantially greater than is required
for ordinary negligence.45
Smith must have actual knowledge of the safety policy in order to recklessly violate it.46
Allen v. Muskogee, Okla., 119 F.3d 837, 846 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
Scott v. Hughes, 132 P.3d 889, 897 (Kan. 2006).
Gould v. Wright Tree Serv., Inc., No. 114,482, 2016 WL 2811983 at *10 (Kan. Ct. App. May 13, 2016)
(quoting Wiehe v. Kukal, 592 P.2d 860, 864 (1979) and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500(a) (19654)).
Id. at *10-11 (explaining that requiring knowledge of a safety policy as part of the recklessness element
comports with both the plain language of the statute and prior applications of the provision). Workers
Compensation Board has allowed workers compensation for injuries based at least partly on the claimant’s
ignorance of a specific safety policy. See Castillo–Chavez v. Ammex Masonry, Inc ., No. 1,062,121, 2013 WL
2455712, at *8 (Kan. Work. Comp. Bd. 2013) (claimant climbed down scaffolding frame in violation of safety
policy to use ladder); Solorzano v. Packers Sanitation Serv., Inc., No. 1,056,986, 2012 WL 369780, at *4 (Kan.
Work. Comp. Bd. 2012) (Claimant violated safety policy to lock out machinery prior to cleaning; “(a) worker must
be aware of and understand a safety rule before she can be said to have recklessly violated the rule.”).
The Court concludes that under the circumstances, both Smith and Plaintiff were
employees of Screenworks on October 7, 2013. Because Smith was Plaintiff’s co-employee, the
KWCA bars this negligence action against Smith.
C. NEP Group, Inc. and NEP Broadcasting, LLC
NEF Group, Inc. and NEP Broadcasting, LLC claim they are entitled to summary
judgment because their only connection to the case is their corporate relationship with
Screenworks. And even if that was not the case, they contend they are immune from suit under
the exclusive remedy provision because Plaintiff’s claim arose during the course of performing
work that was integral to their business. Plaintiff argues the evidence he cited directly
contradicts their non-involvement, and instead shows they are responsible for and direct the
training received by Screenworks employees. He further argues that they cannot have it both
ways — deny involvement regarding activities on October 7, 2013 and claim statutory employer
status via their corporate relationship.
In Love v. Flour Mills of America,47 the Tenth Circuit disapproved the attempt by a
parent company to “avoid the consequences of its separate corporate identity to claim immunity,
as an alter ego employer of its subsidiary employer’s injured employees.”48 Thus, Screenworks’
status as a statutory employer does not extend to NEP Group or NEP Broadcasting.
Even though they are not immune from suit, the Court, nonetheless, finds these
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. An employer has a nondelegable duty to provide
safe working conditions for its employees. Courts do not lightly assume that a parent
corporation has agreed to accept this responsibility.49 The parent-shareholder is not responsible
647 F.2d 1058 (10th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1062.
Muniz v. Nat’l Can Corp., 737 F.2d 145, 147 (1st Cir. 1984).
for the working conditions of its subsidiary’s employees merely on the basis of parent-subsidiary
relationship.50 A parent corporation may be liable for unsafe conditions at a subsidiary only if it
assumes a duty to act by affirmatively undertaking to provide a safe working environment at the
subsidiary. Providing general safety guidelines is insufficient to show that a parent corporation
affirmatively assumed that responsibility.51 Plaintiff’s evidence simply shows that NEP provided
general safety materials to all of its subsidiaries. A duty is not proved by conduct consistent with
an intention solely or primarily to serve the parent’s own purposes.52 The Court concludes that
there is no independent cause of action against the NEP Defendants because the tort alleged
against them was that they failed to perform Screenwork’s duty of providing adequate training to
Screenworks was Plaintiff’s statutory employer on October 7, 2013. Thus, the KWCA
bars Plaintiff from pursuing this action against Screenworks and Smith. Plaintiff’s sole remedy
against those two Defendants is under the Act. As for the NEP Defendants, they are immune
from this suit under corporate law.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Defendants’ Joint Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 102) is GRANTED .
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a sur-reply (Doc.
108) is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Love, 647 F.2d at 1063.
Muniz, 737 F.2d at 149; Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 525 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1976); Rick v. RLC
Corp., 535 F. Supp. 39, 45 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (explaining evidence must show more than an incidental rendering of
service by a parent corporation to establish a duty for the safe operations of a subsidiary).
Rick, 535 F. Supp. 46–47.
Dated: May 16, 2017
S/ Julie A. Robinson
JULIE A. ROBINSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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