Fuller v. State of Kansas, Department of Children & Families
Filing
128
ORDER granting 122 motion to compel contact information of former co-workers. Signed by Magistrate Judge James P. O'Hara on 4/9/2019. Mailed to pro se party Clara Fuller by regular mail. (heo)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
CLARA R. FULLER,
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Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF KANSAS, DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 16-2415-DDC
ORDER
The pro se plaintiff in this employment-discrimination case has filed a motion
asking the court to compel defendants to provide contact information for her former coworkers (ECF No. 122).1 Because the court finds the information sought facially relevant
and not protected by statute, the motion is granted.
This case arises from plaintiff’s employment in January-February 2016 with the
Low Income Energy Assistance Program (“LIEAP”), a federally-funded program
administered by the Kansas Department of Children and Families (“DCF”). Plaintiff
alleges defendants terminated her employment because of her race, and she disputes
defendants’ assertion that her work performance was subpar.
Although plaintiff titles her motion as one seeking “in-camera review,” the
substance of the motion makes clear plaintiff is seeking production of information. The
court holds pro se pleadings “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
1
1
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During discovery, plaintiff served an interrogatory requesting the names and
addresses of her LIEAP co-workers. DCF responded to the interrogatory with the names,
but not addresses, of the co-workers, objecting that the addresses were protected from
disclosure by Kan. Admin. Reg. § 1-13-1b. In the instant motion to compel, plaintiff
explains that the co-workers have information about what supervisors stated at daily
morning meetings regarding plaintiff and her co-workers’ responsibilities, including
whether they were required to process a set minimum number of LIEAP applications per
day.
In response to the motion, defendants first raise procedural arguments that plaintiff,
in violation of the court’s local rules, did not (1) attach the interrogatory in dispute to her
motion or (2) make an effort to confer before filing the motion.2 The court does not view
rule violations lightly, and emphasizes to plaintiff that she must carefully follow the court’s
procedural rules in the future. But in this instance, the court finds practicality and
efficiency counsel in favor of reaching the substance of the motion.
Defendants
acknowledge the interrogatory at issue and do not dispute its contents, so they will not be
prejudiced by this approach. Moreover, the pretrial conference is fast approaching on May
13, 2019, making timely resolution of this matter desirable.3
2
See D. Kan. Rules 37.1 and 37.2.
3
See Carter v. Spirit Aerosystems, Inc., No. 16-1350, 2018 WL 5923487, at *7 (D.
Kan. Nov. 13, 2018) (recognizing that failure to confer is a sufficient basis for denying a
discovery motion, but exercising discretion to address the motion on the merits); CCPS
Transp., LLC v. Sloan, No. 12-2602, 2013 WL 2405545, at *1 (D. Kan. May 31, 2013)
2
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The court therefore proceeds to the heart of the motion. First, the court finds (and
defendants have not disputed) that the co-worker contact information plaintiff seeks is
relevant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) allows a party to “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the
needs of the case.” At the discovery stage, relevance is broadly construed.4 “[A]ny matter
that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue
that is or may be in the case” is deemed relevant.5 Under this standard, the court finds the
requested co-worker contact information facially relevant. As plaintiff noted, she could
use the information to contact individuals regarding defendants’ stated expectations and
treatment toward plaintiff.6
The testimony of others who may have observed
(stating that although the court can deny a motion on procedural grounds for failing to meet
and confer, the court is within its discretion to address the merits of the argument); White
v. Graceland Coll. Ctr. for Prof’l Dev. & Lifelong Learning, Inc., No. 07-2319, 2009 WL
722056, at *2 (D. Kan. March 18, 2009) (waiving non-compliance with duty to confer to
avoid further delay of resolution of the matter).
4
Erickson, Kernell, Deruseau, & Kleypas v. Sprint Sols., Inc., No. 16-mc-212, 2016
WL 3685224, at *4 (D. Kan. July 12, 2016).
5
Rowan v. Sunflower Elec. Power Corp., No. 15-9227, 2016 WL 3745680, at *2
(D. Kan. July 13, 2016) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351
(1978) and ruling the Oppenheimer standard still relevant after the 2015 Amendment to
Rule 26(b)(1)). See also Waters v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., No. 15-1287, 2016 WL
3405173, at *1 (D. Kan. June 21, 2016) (“Relevance is broadly construed at the discovery
stage of the litigation and a request for discovery should be considered relevant if there is
any possibility the information sought may be relevant to the subject matter of the action.”)
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
6
See Azimi v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 06-2114, 2007 WL 2010937, at *2, 10
(D. Kan. July 9, 2007) (finding relevant contact information for former co-workers
employed in the same facility as plaintiff); McCoo v. Denny’s Inc., 192 F.R.D. 675, 6953
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discriminatory conduct by supervisors “is typically relevant to the issue of discriminatory
intent.”7
Defendants assert that the addresses nevertheless are protected from disclosure by
Kan. Admin. Reg. § 1-13-1b. Section 1-13-1b(a) provides that “information contained in
each state employee’s official personnel record shall not be open to public inspection.”
Significantly, however, the regulation contains an exception applicable here: “The official
personnel record of any specifically named employee shall be made available for
inspection in connection with litigation, pursuant to the terms of an order entered by a judge
of any federal, state, or municipal court having proper jurisdiction over the litigation.”8
Thus, with the entry of this order, the court finds nothing in § 1-13-1b that hinders the
disclosure of the addresses of plaintiff’s former state co-workers.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to compel is granted.
Defendants are ordered to provide plaintiff the names and addresses of each person
employed by DCF in the 2016 LIEAP program by no later than April 19, 2019. Plaintiff
is hereby prohibited from using such contact information for any purpose other than
prosecuting this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
96 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding discoverable the addresses and telephone numbers of
defendant’s employees who may have witnessed discrimination).
7
Azimi, 2007 WL 2010937, at *10.
8
Kan. Admin. Reg. § 1-13-1b(f).
4
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Dated April 9, 2019, at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ James P. O=Hara
James P. O=Hara
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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