Brez v. Fougera Pharmaceuticals, Inc. et al

Filing 76

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 75 Motion to Seal Case. Signed by District Judge Daniel D. Crabtree on 04/20/2018. (mig)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

LISA BREZ,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 16-2576-DDC-GEB

FOUGERA PHARMACEUTICALS,
INC., et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On August 18, 2016, plaintiff Lisa Brez filed this suit, alleging Title VII, Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and state employment law claims. Doc. 1. Over a year later, the
parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal after mutually resolving plaintiff’s claims. Doc. 74.
This closed the case. On March 30, 2018, plaintiff filed a Motion to Seal Case, arguing that the
court should seal the case because plaintiff is having difficulty finding new employment because
this case is public record. Doc. 75. Defendants have not filed a response and the time for filing
one has passed. See D. Kan. Rule 6.1(d)(1) (“Responses to non-dispositive motions . . . must be
filed and served within 14 days.”).
The public has a “general right to inspect and copy public records and documents . . . .”
Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). The same is also true with the name
of litigants. Doe H. v. Haskell Indian Nations Univ., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 1288 (D. Kan.
2017). “ʻThis right derives from the public’s interest in understanding disputes that are
presented to a public forum for resolution and is intended to assure that the courts are fairly run
and judges are honest.’” Fish v. Kobach, 320 F.R.D. 566, 577 (D. Kan. 2017) (quoting Gambrell

v. Weber Carpet, Inc., No. 10-2131-KHV, 2011 WL 3518172, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 11, 2011)).
So, a party seeking to seal records “must articulate a real and substantial interest that justifies
depriving the public of access to the records that inform [the court’s] decision-making process.”
Helm v. Kansas, 656 F.3d 1277, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011).
Some courts have allowed a litigant to use a pseudonym to prosecute a case, but courts
generally frown upon this practice. See Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118, 1125
(10th Cir. 1979) (“[I]dentifying a plaintiff only by a pseudonym is an unusual procedure, to be
allowed only where there is an important privacy interest to be recognized.”). For example, the
Supreme Court allowed a woman seeking an abortion to use a pseudonym in litigation over her
right to an abortion. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179 (1973). And this court has allowed a minor to proceed under a pseudonym when he sought
relief for “alleged sexual abuse and assault he suffered as a child.” J.B. v. Liberal Sch. Dist.,
USD No. 480, No. 06-2359, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67622, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 20, 2006). But
courts have refused to allow a plaintiff to litigate by pseudonym when the public nature of the
lawsuit might affect plaintiff’s professional future. Lindsey, 592 F.2d at 1125 (citing Doe v.
Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652 (D. Mont. 1974)).
Here, plaintiff fails to identify a substantial interest that justifies sealing the case or even
proceeding under a pseudonym. In her Amended Complaint, plaintiff brought Title VII, ADA,
and state employment law claims. See Doc. 69. So, this is not a case involving a woman
seeking an abortion or a minor. Plaintiff simply argues that this case’s public presence is
harming her professional future. This interest falls short of the standard required to proceed
under a pseudonym, much less seal an entire case. So, the court denies plaintiff’s request.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT plaintiff’s Motion to Seal
Case (Doc. 75) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 20th day of April, 2018, at Topeka, Kansas.

s/ Daniel D. Crabtree______
Daniel D. Crabtree
United States District Judge

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