Grider et al v. Shawnee Mission Medical Center, Inc. et al

Filing 152

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 122 Motion to Compel Defendant Shawnee Mission Medical Center, Inc. (SMMC) to Answer Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories. SMMC shall supplement its responses in accordance with this order within fifteen (15) days. See order for additional details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Gerald L. Rushfelt on 8/14/2018. (ydm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
GARY D. GRIDER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 16-CV-2750-DDC

SHAWNEE MISSION MEDICAL CENTER,
INC., et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The Court has before it Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Defendant Shawnee Mission
Medical Center, Inc. (SMMC) to Answer Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories (ECF 122). The
motion was filed on behalf of all four pro se plaintiffs: Teresa Mary Palmer, Gary Dean Grider,
Teresa Marita Palmer, and James William Palmer. Defendant Shawnee Mission Medical Center,
Inc. (SMMC) opposes the motion (ECF 130). For the reasons discussed below, the motion is
granted in part and denied in part.
I.

Duty to Confer
SMMC argues, among other things, that Plaintiffs failed to properly confer, because only

James Palmer spoke with counsel for SMMC on the phone. The Court has previously denied
Plaintiffs’ motion to compel for failure to properly confer (ECF 93). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(a)(1), a motion for an order compelling discovery must “include a certification that the
movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to
make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.” D. Kan. Rule 37.2
provides, furthermore, that the court will not entertain a motion to resolve a discovery dispute

unless the moving party “has conferred or has made reasonable effort to confer with opposing
counsel concerning the matter in dispute prior to the filing of the motion.”
In their motion Plaintiffs say they sent counsel for SMMC an email and “discussed the
objections with defendant SMMC’s counsel prior to beginning depositions on April 12, 2018.”1
SMMC disputes this in its response. It contends that, although the parties indicated via email that
they would confer on April 12, 2018, “none of them (Mr. Palmer included) brought up the
subject of SMMC’s answers and objections to their first interrogatories, either before, during or
after their depositions.”2 SMMC does note that counsel and Mr. Palmer discussed SMMC’s
objections by telephone on April 24, 2018.3
The Court finds that Teresa Marita Palmer, Teresa Mary Palmer, and Gary Dean Grider
failed to sufficiently confer pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1) and D. Kan. Rule 37.2. The
motion as it relates to these three plaintiffs is denied on that basis. It appears, however, that
James Palmer did sufficiently confer with opposing counsel. If he did not, however, “despite the
unqualified language in the federal and local rules, the court, in its discretion, may choose to
determine a motion to compel on its merits even when the duty to confer has been unfulfilled
under certain circumstances.”4 The Court finds in this instance that the interest of justice will be
better served by addressing the merits of Plaintiffs’ motion as it relates to Mr. Palmer. Plaintiffs
have filed other motions to compel. Mr. Palmer has at least attempted to confer with defense
counsel in the past and for this pending motion. SMMC is aware of Mr. Palmer’s positions on

1

ECF 122 at 1.

2

ECF 130 at 2.

Although Teresa Marita Palmer was also present on the telephone, she “said nothing about the issue in dispute
during the April 24 phone call with her husband.” ECF 130 at 2.
3

4

Miller v. NEP Group, Inc., No. 15-cv-9701-JAR, 2016 WL 6395205, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 28, 2016) (citations
omitted).

2

these discovery issues and has continuously sought to avoid meaningful consideration of them,
based upon procedural considerations. The Court has denied two prior motions to compel
because of Plaintiffs’ failure to follow procedural rules. Plaintiffs by now should be well aware
of the duty to confer and what it requires of them. Thus, the Court considers whether SMMC
should be compelled to further respond to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories as it relates to
Mr. Palmer’s remaining claim for tort of outrage, but not any other plaintiff.5
II.

Disputes Regarding SMMC’s Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs’ First Set of
Interrogatories
Plaintiffs’ motion does not list any particular answer or objection as being at issue, so the

Court will consider all 18 interrogatories attached to Plaintiffs’ motion as Exhibit A.6
The motion is denied as to Interrogatories 1, 15, 16, and 18. SMMC appears to have fully
answered them without objection. Mr. Palmer provides no explanation as to why those answers
are insufficient.
SMMC also does not object to Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 4. Both of them ask about Dr.
Angela Piquard. In response to Interrogatory No. 3, SMMC states: “Please see Defendant
Shawnee Mission Medical Center, Inc.’s Rule 26 Expert Disclosures (Doc. 96) attached hereto,
at page 2 of Exhibit A (Doc. 96-1, Page 2 of 3).” In response to Interrogatory No. 4, SMMC
states: “Please see the medical chart previously produced and the answer to interrogatory No. 3
above.” The Court grants the motion as to these interrogatories in that SMMC should state

SMMC notes that it “incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein” its response to one of Plaintiffs’
previous motions to compel (ECF 103). Arguments raised in that response are that the motion was filed out of time,
which is not at issue here; failure to confer, which has already been addressed; adequacy of SMMC’s objections,
which the Court later discusses; and unauthorized practice of law by Mr. Palmer, which is moot in light of the
Court’s denial of the motion as it relates to the other three Plaintiffs.
5

6

ECF 122-1.

3

specifically to what it is referring from the expert report rather than simply referring to it. SMMC
is directed to fully respond to Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 4 with specificity.
SMMC objects to every other interrogatory for various reasons. The Court will consider
each.
A. Interrogatory No. 2
Interrogatory No. 2 asks:
Why did Michael Magee, M.D. never personally examine Plaintiff
Teresa Mary Palmer (PTMP) at the Birth Center after PTMP was
admitted at approximately 2:30 AM CST on November 5, 2014.
SMMC’s response states:
Objection. Defendant objects to the above interrogatory on the
basis that it is beyond the scope of discovery as authorized by Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), calls for speculation, and lacks proper
foundation as to this defendant, as Michael Magee, M.D., was not
and is not an employee or agent of this defendant.
The Court overrules the objections. “When the discovery sought appears relevant, the
party resisting discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevancy by demonstrating that
the requested discovery (1) does not come within the scope of relevancy as defined under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevancy that the potential harm occasioned by
discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure.”7
The interrogatory appears relevant on its face, and SMMC provides no explanation as to
why it is not relevant and beyond the scope of discovery. SMMC also provides no adequate
explanation for its objection that the interrogatory calls for speculation or lacks proper
foundation. Evidence does not need to be admissible at trial to be discoverable. “‘Discovery
relevance is minimal relevance,’ which means it is possible and reasonably calculated that the

7

Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lear Corp., 215 F.R.D. 637, 640 (D. Kan. 2003).

4

request will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’”8 At the discovery stage, relevance is
broadly construed, and discovery should generally be allowed “‘unless it is clear that the
information sought can have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the action.’”9
Further, there is no need for SMMC to speculate. If it does not know, it can answer that it
does not know. The motion to compel is granted as to Interrogatory No. 2.
B. Interrogatory No. 5
Interrogatory No. 5 asks:
If PTMP experienced rupture of membranes (ROM) prior to her
admission to the Birth Center, what result would you expect the
Nitrazine test to provide, and did PTMP’s Nitrazine test/s provide
that result when you tested her?
SMMC’s response states:
Objection. Defendant objects to the above interrogatory on the
basis that it is vague, overbroad in time, and beyond the scope of
discovery as authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Further, as
phrased, the interrogatory is objectionable to the extent that it calls
for speculation, lacks proper foundation as to this defendant and
constitutes an improper hypothetical question since the chart
indicates that Teresa Mary Palmer had a “[n]egative nitrazine” test
and “[q]uestionable prolonged ROM” in the presence of “[f]alse
labor.” See the medical chart at SMMC000098. Finally, the above
interrogatory is objectionable to the extent that it seeks irrelevant
information which is outside the scope of the pleadings since
EMTALA is not a federal malpractice statute. See Doc. 84 at p. 10.
For the reasons discussed as to Interrogatory No. 5, the Court overrules the objections of
speculation and lack of proper foundation. SMMC can respond with what it knows, and if it does
not know, it can so state. The Court also does not find the request to be vague. To succeed on an

8

Stonebarger v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 13-2137-JAR-TJJ, 2015 WL 64980, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 5, 2015) (quoting
Teichgraeber v. Mem'l Union Corp. of Emporia St. Univ., 932 F. Supp. 1263, 1265 (D. Kan. 1996) (internal citation
omitted)).
9

Id. (quoting Snowden By and Through Victor v. Connaught Lab., 137 F.R.D. 325, 341 (D. Kan. 1991), appeal
denied, 1991 WL 60514 (D. Kan. Mar. 29, 1991)).

5

objection that a request is vague, one “must show that more tools beyond mere reason and
common sense are necessary to attribute ordinary definitions to terms and phrases utilized.’”10
SMMC fails to identify anything in the request that it finds vague. The Court also does not find
any part of the request to be overbroad in time, and SMMC does not identify what part of the
interrogatory it believes is overbroad.
Finally, the Court declines to consider any objection “to the extent that” it may apply to
any particular request for discovery. “This Court has characterized these types of objections as
‘worthless for anything beyond delay of the discovery.’”11 These types of objections “are
considered mere hypothetical or contingent possibilities, where the objecting party makes no
meaningful effort to show the application of any such theoretical objection to any request for
discovery.”12 Thus, the Court finds the general objection “to the extent that” it is irrelevant as
waived.
Nor does the Court find the interrogatory to be irrelevant or outside the scope of
discovery, even for Mr. Palmer’s claim for tort of outrage. In Kansas the tort of outrage, also
described as intentional infliction of emotional distress, requires the following four elements:
(1) The conduct of the defendant was so intentional or in reckless
disregard of the plaintiff; (2) the conduct was extreme and
outrageous; (3) there was a causal connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s mental distress; and (4)
the plaintiff’s mental distress was extreme and severe.13

10

Brecek & Young Advisors, Inc. v. Lloyds of London Syndicate 2003, No. 09-cv-2516-JAR, 2011 WL 765882, at
*2 (D. Kan. Feb. 25, 2011) (quoting Moss v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 241 F.R.D. 683, 696 (D. Kan.
2007)).
11

Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 221 F.R.D. 661, 666–67 (D. Kan. 2004) (quoting Cotracom Commodity
Trading Co. v. Seaboard Corp., No. Civ. A. 97–2391–GTV, 1998 WL 231135, at *1 (D. Kan. May 6, 1998)).
12

Id. (internal quotations omitted).

13

ECF 84 at 19–20.

6

The Court has already found that Plaintiffs “pleaded the elements of an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim under Kansas law,” and that they “have pleaded sufficient
facts to deserve an opportunity to discover additional facts to support their allegations.”14 Thus,
given that relevance is broadly construed at this point, the Court finds the requested discovery
should be allowed. The motion to compel is granted as to Interrogatory No. 5.
C. Interrogatory No. 6
Interrogatory No. 6 asks:
Why was the Fern test used to determine ROM status on PTMP
when her Medical Record repeatedly notes blood present?
SMMC’s response states:
Objection. Defendant objects to the above interrogatory on the
basis that it is overbroad in time and beyond the scope of discovery
as authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Further, as phrased, the
interrogatory is objectionable to the extent that it calls for
speculation and lacks proper foundation as to this defendant. The
interrogatory is also argumentative and improperly assumes facts
in dispute as to the phrase “when her Medical Record repeatedly
notes blood present.” Finally, the above interrogatory is
objectionable to the extent that it seeks irrelevant information
which is outside the scope of the pleadings since EMTALA is not a
federal malpractice statute. See Doc. 84 at p. 10.
The objections are overruled for the reasons discussed as to Interrogatory No. 5. As to the
objection that the interrogatory is argumentative and improperly assumes facts in dispute,
SMMC again provides no basis for why those objections are proper at this stage. The motion to
compel is granted as to Interrogatory No. 6.
D. Interrogatory No. 7
Interrogatory No. 7 asks:

14

ECF 84 at 20.

7

Why was the Navigation Tour Progress note indicating PTMP had
experienced unknown fluid discharge on her leg earlier that week
not considered a sign/symptom of possible Prolonged Rupture of
Membranes (PROM)?
SMMC’s response states:
Objection. Defendant objects to the above interrogatory on the
basis that it is vague (as to the phrase “Navigation Tour Progress
Note”), overbroad in scope and time, and beyond the scope of
discovery as authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Further, as
phrased, the interrogatory is objectionable to the extent that it calls
for speculation and lacks proper foundation as to this defendant.
Finally, the above interrogatory is objectionable to the extent that it
seeks irrelevant information which is outside the scope of the
pleadings since EMTALA is not a federal malpractice statute. See
Doc. 84 at p. 10.
The Court sustains the objection on the basis that it is vague. The phrase “Navigation
Tour Progress Note” requires “‘more tools beyond mere reason and common sense’” to
respond.15 The motion to compel is denied as to Interrogatory No. 7.
E. Interrogatory No. 8
Interrogatory No. 8 asks:
Why was the dye test never used to determine whether or not
PTMP suffered ROM?
SMMC’s response states:
Objection. Defendant objects to the above interrogatory on the
basis that it is vague and ambiguous (as to the phrase “dye test”),
overbroad in scope and time, and beyond the scope of discovery as
authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Further, as phrased, the
interrogatory is objectionable to the extent that it calls for
speculation and lacks proper foundation as to this defendant.
Finally, the above interrogatory is objectionable to the extent that it
seeks irrelevant information which is outside the scope of the
pleadings since EMTALA is not a federal malpractice statute. See
Doc. 84 at p. 10.
15

Brecek & Young Advisors, Inc. v. Lloyds of London Syndicate 2003, No. 09-cv-2516-JAR, 2011 WL 765882, at
*2 (D. Kan. Feb. 25, 2011) (quoting Moss v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 241 F.R.D. 683, 696 (D. Kan.
2007)).

8

The Court sustains the objection on the basis that is vague as to the term “dye test” for the
same reasons discussed for Interrogatory No. 7. The motion to compel is denied as to
Interrogatory No. 8.
F. Interrogatory No. 9
Interrogatory No. 9 asks:
A CMS investigator’s note indicates that on two occasions
PTMP’s cervical dilation was measured by SMMC employees as
9.0 cm and 8.0 cm respectively, but never recorded. Was Angela
Piquard, M.D. made aware of the fact that CNM Yunghans and
Lisa Marie Nelson, RN measured PTMP’s cervical dilation as 9.0
cm and 8.0 cm respectively, but never recorded that fact in the
medical record; prior to order PTMP discharged?
SMMC’s response states:
Objection. Defendant objects to the above interrogatory on the
basis that its vague (as to the particular CMS investigator’s note in
question), overbroad in scope and time, and beyond the scope of
discovery as authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Further, as
phrased, the interrogatory is objectionable to the extent that it calls
for speculation and lacks proper foundation as to this defendant.
Finally, the above interrogatory is objectionable to the extent that it
seeks irrelevant information which is outside the scope of the
pleadings since EMTALA is not a federal malpractice statute. See
Doc. 84 at p. 10.
The Court overrules the objection on the basis that it is vague. SMMC says it is vague “as
to the particular CMS investigator’s note in question,” but the Court does not find vagueness to
be a proper objection here. “The party objecting to the discovery as vague or ambiguous has the
burden to show such vagueness or ambiguity.”16 SMMC has failed to do so. Further, SMMC
does not need to know what note Plaintiffs are referring to, because the interrogatory does not
ask about the note. It only asks if Angela Piquard, M.D. was made aware of the fact that CNM

16

Anderson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-2526-KHV-DJW, 2010 WL 4822564, at *5 (D. Kan. Nov. 22,
2010) (citing Johnson v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 238 F.R.D. 648, 655 (D. Kan. 2006)).

9

Yunghans and Lisa Marie Nelson, RN measured Teresa Mary Palmer’s cervical dilation but
never recorded it in the medical record. As noted earlier, if SMMC does not know, then it can so
state. The remaining objections are overruled for the reasons previously discussed. The motion to
compel is granted as to Interrogatory No. 9.
G. Interrogatory No. 10
Interrogatory No. 10 asks:
Uterine contractions are quantified as the number of contractions
present in a 10-minute window, averaged over 30 minutes. What
continuously monitored 30 minute period of PTMP’s electronic
fetal monitoring tracings included the lowest number of
contractions during a 10-minute window, and which 30 minute
period included the highest number of contractions during a 10minute window, and what were those highest and lowest numbers;
for the period PTMP was monitored for fetal heart rate and uterine
contractions at SMMC’s Birth Center?
SMMC’s response states:
Objection. Defendant objects to the above interrogatory on the
basis that it is overbroad in scope and beyond the scope of
discovery as authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Further, as
phrased, the interrogatory is objectionable to the extent that it calls
for speculation and lacks proper foundation as to this defendant.
Finally, the above interrogatory is objectionable to the extent that it
seeks irrelevant information which is outside the scope of the
pleadings since EMTALA is not a federal malpractice statute. See
Doc. 84 at p. 10.
The Court considers the overall wording of a request in determining whether it is overly
broad.17 In this instance the request does not appear overly broad on its face, and SMMC does
not explain how it is overbroad or beyond the scope of discovery. As discussed above,

17

Robinson v. City of Arkansas City, Kan., No. 10-1431-JAR-GLR, 2012 WL 603576, at *8 (D. Kan. Feb. 24, 2012)
(citing Cotracom Commodity Trading Co. v. Seaboard Corp., 189 F.R.D. 655, 665–66 (D. Kan. 1999)).

10

speculation and lack of foundation are not proper objections at this stage. If SMMC does not
know, then it should so state. The motion to compel is granted as to Interrogatory No. 10.
H. Interrogatory No. 11
Interrogatory No. 11 asks:
State whether any hearing dealing with mortality or morbidity was
held regarding the care and treatment of PTMP alleged in the
Second Amended Complaint.
SMMC’s response states:
Objection. Defendant objects to the above interrogatory on the
basis that it is overbroad in time and scope, unduly burdensome,
and beyond the scope of discovery as authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1). In particular, said interrogatory is objectionable to the
extent that it calls for information protected by Kansas’ peer
review and risk management privileges (see K.S.A. §§ 65-4914
through 65-4916, and §§ 65-4921 through 65-4930), and the
privilege accorded healthcare providers under the Patient Safety
and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (PSQIA), 42 U.S.C. §§
299b-21 to 26. Finally, the above interrogatory is objectionable to
the extent that it seeks irrelevant information which is outside the
scope of the pleadings since EMTALA is not a federal malpractice
statute. See Doc. 84 at p. 10.
K.S.A. § 65-4914(b) says “the reports, statements, memoranda, proceedings, findings and
other records submitted to or generated by peer review committees or officers shall be privileged
and shall not be subject to discovery.” Peer review includes the function of reducing morbidity or
mortality.18 However, the interrogatory is not asking for “reports, statements, memoranda,
proceedings, findings, and other records.” It is simply asking if a hearing occurred. Although the
outcome of such hearing, if it occurred, may be privileged and not subject to discovery, the
referenced statute does not appear to preclude the simple disclosure as to whether a hearing was
held. Likewise, K.S.A. § 65-4925 says reports and records made pursuant to the statute’s

18

K.S.A. § 65-4915(a)(3)(E).

11

reporting requirements are confidential and privileged and not subject to discovery. Again, the
interrogatory is not asking for records or reports, and the statute does not appear to prevent
whether a hearing was held from being discovered.
Similarly, 42 U.S.C. §299b-21 defines “patient safety work product” as “any data,
reports, records, memoranda, analyses (such as root cause analyses), or written or oral
statements.” Under 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22, patient safety work product shall be privileged and
shall not be subject to discovery. But as discussed above, the interrogatory does not request
“data, reports, records, memoranda, analyses … or written or oral statements.” It simply asks
whether or not a hearing was held. The motion to compel is granted as to Interrogatory No. 11.
I. Interrogatory No. 12
Interrogatory No. 12 asks:
State the name, author, publisher, title, date of publication and
specific provision of all medical texts, books, journals or other
medical literature which you or your attorney intend to use as
authority or reference in defending any of the allegations set forth
in the Complaint.
SMMC’s response states:
Objection. Defendant objects to the above interrogatory on the
basis that it is unduly burdensome and beyond the scope of
discovery as authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). In particular,
said interrogatory is objectionable to the extent that it calls for
information protected by the attorney-client privilege and workproduct doctrine. At the appropriate time, the defendant will
certainly list the exhibits it intends to use at trial but, as phrased,
the above interrogatory goes far beyond asking for a list of exhibits
and, as such, defendant objects on the above grounds.
The Court sustains the objection on the basis that this request is premature. As SMMC
notes, this information will be identified in SMMC’s exhibit list before trial. The motion to
compel is denied as to Interrogatory No. 12.

12

J. Interrogatory No. 13
Interrogatory No. 13 asks:
Identify each and every rule, bylaw, or other document of any
hospital, association, licensing authority, accrediting authority or
other private body which you, or your attorneys, may use at trial in
defense of the allegations contained in the Complaint.
SMMC’s response states:
Objection. Please see the objection and answer to interrogatory No.
12 which defendant incorporates by reference, as though fully set
forth herein.
The Court sustains the objection for the same reasons discussed for Interrogatory No. 12.
The motion to compel is denied as to Interrogatory No. 13.
K. Interrogatory No. 14
Interrogatory No. 14 asks:
State whether there were any policies, procedures, guidelines rules
(sic) or protocols for Preterm Labor patients in effect at SMMC at
the time of the care and/or treatment of PTMP and if so, state:
a. Whether such policies, opinions, rules or protocols are published and
by whom;
b. The effective date of said policies, procedures, rules or protocols;
c. Which medical professionals are bound by said policies, procedures,
guidelines, rules or protocols;
d. Who is the administrator of any such policies, procedures, guidelines,
rules or protocols;
e. Whether the policies, procedures, guidelines, rules or protocols in
effect at the time of the occurrence alleged in the Complaint have been
changed, amended or altered after the occurrence. If so, state the
change(s) and the date(s) of any such change(s).
SMMC’s response states:
Objection. Defendant objects to subparagraph (e) of the above
interrogatory on the basis that it is overbroad in time and scope,
unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of discovery as
authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). In particular, said
interrogatory is objectionable to the extent that it calls for
irrelevant and inadmissible information respecting subsequent

13

remedial measures. Without waiving said objection, defendant
responds to the balance of the interrogatory as follows: Yes. Please
see Patient Care Protocol Number 308 (Effective Date: 2/14/2012)
attached hereto. This interrogatory answer may be further
supplemented.
SMMC has answered the first part of the question by saying yes, and answered
subsection (b) by including the effective date. However, as discussed regarding Interrogatory
Nos. 3 and 4, SMMC should be more specific in the remainder of its answer rather than simply
referencing the policy it attached. It should use the information from the attached policy to
answer whether the policy is published and by whom, which medical professionals are bound by
the policy, and who is the administrator of the policy.
SMMC’s objection to subsection (e) based on it calling for inadmissible information
respecting subsequent remedial measures is not appropriate at this stage. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)
specifically notes that information sought in discovery “need not be admissible in evidence to be
discoverable.” The objection to subsection (e) is overruled. The motion to compel is granted as
set forth herein as to Interrogatory No. 14.
L. Interrogatory No. 17
Interrogatory No. 17 asks:
State for each person who directly or indirectly was involved in the
care and treatment of PTMP alleged in the Complaint:
a. That person’s full name and current address;
b. The name and current address of that person’s employer;
c. The employment relationship of that person with defendant SMMC;
d. The date(s) of such person’s care or treatment, including a description
of the care or treatment; and
e. The name and current address of any other individual present when the
care or treatment was rendered.
SMMC’s response states:
Objection. Defendant objects to the above interrogatory on the
basis that it is vague and ambiguous as to the term “indirectly.”

14

Without waiving said objection, defendant responds to the balance
of the interrogatory as follows: Please see the medical chart
previously produced. The names of the nurses and certified nursemidwife involved in Teresa Mary Palmer’s care at SMMC on
November 5, 2014 are set forth in the chart, along with a
description of their assessments. Said individuals were employed
by SMMC at the time and, as such, may only be contacted through
undersigned counsel. Please see the chart for SMMC’s address.
The Court sustains the objection as to the term “indirectly” being vague. However, as
discussed in regard to Interrogatory Nos. 3, 4, and 14, SMMC shall supplement the answer it did
provide with specificity instead of simply referring to the medical chart. Specifically, SMMC
shall respond with the names of the nurses and certified nurse-midwife involved in Teresa Mary
Palmer’s care on November 5, 2014, their assessments, and SMMC’s address. The motion to
compel is otherwise denied as to Interrogatory No. 17.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel
Defendant Shawnee Mission Medical Center, Inc. (SMMC) to Answer Plaintiffs’ First Set of
Interrogatories (ECF 122) is granted in part and denied in part as discussed herein. SMMC shall
supplement its responses in accordance with this order within fifteen (15) days.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated August 14, 2018, at Kansas City, Kansas.
S/ Gerald L. Rushfelt
Gerald L. Rushfelt
U.S. Magistrate Judge

15