Federal Insurance Company as subrogee of Bama Air Inc and Bridgeport Associates, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Company et al
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - The Motions to Quash by non-parties Piedmont and Limco 14 19 are denied as moot. Plaintiff's motion for discovery 21 is denied. Signed by District Judge John W. Lungstrum on 06/30/2017. (ses)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
as subrogee of Bama Air, Inc. and
Bridgeport Associates, Inc.,
CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY,
TEXTRON AVIATION, INC., and
Case No. 16-2755-JWL
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter presently comes before the Court on two motions to quash filed by
non-parties (Doc. ## 14, 19) and plaintiff’s motion for leave to conduct jurisdictional
discovery (Doc. # 21). For the reasons set forth below, the two motions to quash are
denied as moot, and the motion for leave to conduct discovery is denied.
On November 3, 2016, plaintiff filed this diversity product liability case against
One defendant, TAT Techologies (“TAT”), is alleged to be
incorporated and have its principal place of business in the country of Israel. The instant
motions to quash were filed by two non-party wholly-owned subsidiaries of TAT:
Piedmont Aviation Component Services, LLC (“Piedmont”), a North Carolina limited
liability company located in North Carolina; and Limco Airepair, Inc. (“Limco”), a
Delaware corporation located in Oklahoma. Piedmont states in its motion (to which the
relevant documents have been attached) that on April 24, 2017, plaintiff sent Piedmont’s
registered agent by certified mail a copy of the complaint, a summons for TAT, a notice
of service of process for service on Piedmont, and a letter to Piedmont stating as follows:
Please forward the enclosed Summons and Complaint to your
international parent company, TAT Technologies. Pursuant to the Kansas
Rules of Civil Procedure, service on a wholly owned subsidiary is proper
According to Limco’s motion, on April 28, 2017, plaintiff sent similar documents to
Limco’s registered agent. Plaintiff subsequently filed notices of service of process on
TAT by way of the mailings to Piedmont and Limco. Plaintiff has also filed a notice of
service of process on TAT by having mailed a copy of the summons and complaint
directly to TAT in Israel, as evidenced by a US Postal Service tracking document
indicating that the package was delivered in Israel on January 30, 2017.
Piedmont and Limco seek to quash the attempts at service upon them, on the basis
that they are separate entities from TAT that have not been named as parties to the
lawsuit. In response, plaintiff confirms that Piedmont and Limco are not parties to the
action and that it was attempting to serve only TAT through those subsidiaries. Plaintiff
also states that any objection to those attempts are moot because it has effected service
on TAT directly. For that reason, plaintiff states that it withdraws the attempted service
of TAT through Piedmont, but it does not withdraw the attempted service of TAT
through Limco in case its direct service of TAT is deemed improper.
It is clear from the documents, and plaintiff has confirmed, that no service of
Piedmont or Limco was intended or effected. Rather, plaintiff only “served” those
companies by sending documents to them in an attempt to serve process on TAT. Those
companies are not parties to this suit, and they lack standing to challenge any attempted
service of process on TAT, their parent. Thus, there is no basis to afford these
companies any relief in this action, and their motions are therefore denied as moot.1
By its motion, plaintiff seeks leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery “[i]n the
event that the Court does not decide that [TAT] was properly served through the use of
international mail.” It appears from the motion that plaintiff wishes to discover evidence
to support arguments that Limco is the alter ego of TAT and that Limco has sufficient
contacts with Kansas. The question regarding the attempted direct service of TAT is not
properly before the Court, however, as TAT has not raised any challenge to service, and
Piedmont and Limco lack standing to appear in this action (as plaintiff concedes).
Moreover, plaintiff has not indicated that it seeks discovery only from TAT, and it has
not identified any basis for seeking discovery from Limco, a non-party.2 Thus, the Court
Plaintiff requests, in essence, that Limco’s motion to quash remain pending, to
the extent that it challenges the attempted service of TAT through Limco, until the
propriety of its attempted direct service on TAT is adjudicated. As plaintiff notes,
however, Limco has no standing to seek relief in this action, and the issue of the
propriety of the direct service is not properly at issue before the Court.
Plaintiff’s complaint does not include any alter ego allegations; indeed, the
complaint does not mention Limco at all. Plaintiff insists in its motion that its alter ego
contention goes beyond a “mere hunch,” but it has not favored the Court with any factual
denies plaintiff’s motion for jurisdictional discovery.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the motions to quash
by non-parties Piedmont and Limco (Doc. ## 14, 19) are denied as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT plaintiff’s motion for
discovery (Doc. # 21) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 30th day of June, 2017, in Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ John W. Lungstrum
John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge
basis for its contention. Thus, even if a valid jurisdictional issue were before the Court,
plaintiff has not established that discovery on the subject of alter ego would be anything
other than an improper fishing expedition.
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?