Bruce v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: The judgment of the Commissioner is affirmed pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Signed by U.S. District Senior Judge Sam A. Crow on 2/26/18. (msb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

JUANITA GRACE BRUCE,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 17-2068-SAC

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of
Social Security,1
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This is an action reviewing the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security denying the plaintiff disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income payments.
The matter has been fully briefed by the parties.
I.

General legal standards
The court's standard of review is set forth in 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g), which provides that "the findings of the Commissioner
as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive."

The court should review the Commissioner's

decision to determine only whether the decision was supported by
substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner applied the
correct legal standards.

1

Glenn v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 983, 984

On January 20, 2017, Nancy A. Berryhill replaced Carolyn W. Colvin as Acting Commissioner of Social Security.
1

(10th Cir. 1994).

Substantial evidence requires more than a

scintilla, but less than a preponderance, and is satisfied by
such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support the
conclusion.

The determination of whether substantial evidence

supports the Commissioner's decision is not simply a
quantitative exercise, for evidence is not substantial if it is
overwhelmed by other evidence or if it really constitutes mere
conclusion.

Ray v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 1989).

Although the court is not to reweigh the evidence, the findings
of the Commissioner will not be mechanically accepted.

Nor will

the findings be affirmed by isolating facts and labeling them
substantial evidence, as the court must scrutinize the entire
record in determining whether the Commissioner's conclusions are
rational.
1992).

Graham v. Sullivan, 794 F. Supp. 1045, 1047 (D. Kan.

The court should examine the record as a whole,

including whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight
of the Commissioner's decision and, on that basis, determine if
the substantiality of the evidence test has been met.

Glenn, 21

F.3d at 984.
The Social Security Act provides that an individual shall
be determined to be under a disability only if the claimant can
establish that they have a physical or mental impairment
expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of
twelve months which prevents the claimant from engaging in
2

substantial gainful activity (SGA).

The claimant's physical or

mental impairment or impairments must be of such severity that
they are not only unable to perform their previous work but
cannot, considering their age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d).

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential
evaluation process to determine disability.

If at any step a

finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the
Commissioner will not review the claim further.

At step one,

the agency will find non-disability unless the claimant can show
that he or she is not working at a “substantial gainful
activity.”

At step two, the agency will find non-disability

unless the claimant shows that he or she has a “severe
impairment,” which is defined as any “impairment or combination
of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant’s]
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”

At

step three, the agency determines whether the impairment which
enabled the claimant to survive step two is on the list of
impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled.

If

the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal a listed
impairment, the inquiry proceeds to step four, at which the
agency assesses whether the claimant can do his or her previous
work; unless the claimant shows that he or she cannot perform
3

their previous work, they are determined not to be disabled.

If

the claimant survives step four, the fifth and final step
requires the agency to consider vocational factors (the
claimant’s age, education, and past work experience) and to
determine whether the claimant is capable of performing other
jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
Barnhart v. Thomas, 124 S. Ct. 376, 379-380 (2003).
The claimant bears the burden of proof through step four of
Nielson v. Sullivan, 992 F.2d 1118, 1120 (10th

the analysis.
Cir. 1993).

At step five, the burden shifts to the

Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other work
that exists in the national economy.

Nielson, 992 F.2d at 1120;

Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993).

The

Commissioner meets this burden if the decision is supported by
substantial evidence.

Thompson, 987 F.2d at 1487.

Before going from step three to step four, the agency will
assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC).

This

RFC assessment is used to evaluate the claim at both step four
and step five.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 404.1520(e,f,g);

416.920(a)(4), 416.920(e,f,g).
II.

History of case
On September 11, 2015, administrative law judge (ALJ)

Alison K. Brookins issued her decision (R. at 14-27).

Plaintiff

alleges that she has been disabled since March 22, 2013 (R. at
4

14).

Plaintiff is insured for disability insurance benefits

through June 30, 2018 (R. at 16).

At step one, the ALJ found

that plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since the alleged onset date (R. at 16).

At step two, the ALJ

found that plaintiff has severe impairments (R. at 17).

At step

three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s impairments do not
meet or equal a listed impairment (R. at 17).

After determining

plaintiff’s RFC (R. at 19-20), the ALJ found at step four that
plaintiff is unable to perform past relevant work (R. at 25).
At step five, the ALJ found that plaintiff could perform other
work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy
(R. at 26).

Therefore, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not

disabled (R. at 27).
III.

Did the ALJ’s limitation of plaintiff to simple work

adequately account for a moderate limitation in concentration,
persistence, and pace?
At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff had moderate
difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace,2 and
moderate difficulties in social functioning (R. at 19).
2

In her

According to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3,4), the Commissioner rates a claimant’s mental limitations in four
functional areas: activities of daily living; social functioning; concentration, persistence, or pace; and episodes of
decompensation. In the first three functional areas a five point-scale is used: none, mild, moderate, marked, and
extreme. In the fourth functional area, a four-point scale is used: none, one or two, three, four or more
The psychiatric review technique findings described in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a are not an RFC assessment but are
used to rate the severity of mental impairments at steps 2 and 3 of the sequential evaluation process. The mental
RFC assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment by
itemizing various functions contained in the broad categories set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. SSR 96-8p, 1996
WL 374184 at *4. In assessing RFC, the ALJ must consider limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an
individual’s impairments, even those that are not “severe.”

5

RFC findings, the ALJ stated that plaintiff is able to
understand, remember, use judgment, and make decisions for
simple and intermediate instructions and tasks that do not
require more than occasional public interaction (R. at 20).
On March 6, 2014, Dr. Schulman, a non-examining state
agency medical source, reviewed the record and found that
plaintiff had moderate difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence, or pace (R. at 70).

Dr. Schulman

indicated in his RFC that plaintiff is moderately limited in her
ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed
instructions, and is moderately limited in her ability to
maintain attention and concentration for extended periods (R. at
72-73).

Dr. Schulman then concluded that plaintiff is able to

understand, remember, use judgement, and make decisions for
intermediate instructions and tasks (R. at 72), and can attend,
concentrate, and maintain pace and persistence for this level of
activity (R. at 73).

On July 2, 2014, Dr. Blum, a non-examining

medical source, reviewed the record.

He also found that

plaintiff had moderate difficulties in maintaining,
concentration, persistence, or pace (R. at 96).

He made the

same RFC findings as those noted above for Dr. Schulman; he also
found a moderate limitation in plaintiff’s ability to interact
appropriately with the general public (R. at 99, 100).

The ALJ

accorded considerable weight to their opinions (R. at 25), and
6

the ALJ’s RFC and step three findings adopted their opinions as
noted above.

At step five, the ALJ found that plaintiff could

perform three “unskilled” jobs that exist in significant numbers
in the national economy (R. at 26, 59).

All three unskilled

jobs have a SVP (specific vocational preparation) of level 2.
1991 WL 679524, 679616, 679631.
Plaintiff argues that limiting plaintiff to simple and
intermediate work fails to account for plaintiff’s moderate
limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace.

However, in

the case of Smith v. Colvin, 821 F.3d 1264, 1269 (10th Cir.
2016), the court held that an ALJ can account for moderate
mental limitations by limiting plaintiff to particular kinds of
work activity, including a limitation to simple tasks.

See also

Lee v. Colvin, 631 Fed. Appx. 538, 540-542 (10th Cir. Nov. 12,
2015)(same; Smith opinion indicated that Lee finding was
persuasive, Smith, 821 F.3d at 1269).
In the case of Nelson v. Colvin, 655 Fed. Appx. 626, 628629 (10th Cir. July 12, 2016), Dr. Taber (in his Section I
findings) found that claimant’s limitations included a moderate
limitation in her ability to maintain attention and
concentration for extended periods, and marked limitations in
her ability to understand, remember and carry out detailed
instructions.

Dr. Taber’s Section III narrative then limited

plaintiff to carrying out simple instructions.
7

The ALJ’s RFC

findings included a limitation to simple instructions.

The

court held that Dr. Taber’s Section III narrative adequately
incorporated the limitations she found in Section I.

The court

further held that by limiting the claimant to unskilled work,
the ALJ effectively accounted for all the limitations noted in
Section I of Dr. Taber’s evaluation.
In Vigil v. Colvin, 805 F.3d 1199, 1203-1204 (10th Cir.
2015), a person with moderate difficulties in concentration,
persistence, or pace was limited by the ALJ to unskilled work
with an SVP (specific vocational preparation) of 1 or 2.

The

court held that limiting plaintiff to an SVP of 1 or 2
adequately took into account a moderate limitation in
concentration, persistence, or pace.
Dr. Schulman and Dr. Blum (in Section I) indicated that
plaintiff had moderate limitations in her ability to understand,
remember, and carry out detailed instructions, and in her
ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended
periods.

Their Section III narrative findings limited plaintiff

to intermediate instructions and tasks.

The ALJ, in her RFC

findings, limited plaintiff to simple and intermediate
instructions and tasks.3

The only jobs identified by the

3
Plaintiff argues in her brief that the ALJ’s RFC limitation to simple and intermediate instructions is selfcontradictory (Doc. 13 at 12). However, the ALJ expressly relied on Dr. Schulman and Dr. Blum, who opined that
plaintiff could perform intermediate instructions and tasks. The court finds nothing self-contradictory in the ALJ’s
findings. The case of Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2005), cited by plaintiff, does not address
limitations to intermediate instructions and tasks.

8

vocational expert (VE) and the ALJ as jobs that plaintiff could
perform were unskilled jobs with an SVP of 2.

The court finds

that the above cases control on the facts of this case.

As the

court indicated in Lee, the Section III narrative, which the ALJ
incorporated in his RFC assessment, reflected, explained,
accounted for, and delimited each of the moderate limitations
expressed in Section I.

Lee, 631 Fed. Appx. at 541-542.

Furthermore, as the court held in Nelson, by limiting plaintiff
to unskilled work, the ALJ effectively accounted for all the
limitations noted in Section I of the evaluations.

Finally, as

the court held in Vigil, a moderate limitation in concentration,
persistence, or pace is accounted for by limiting him to
unskilled work with an SVP of only one or two.
IV.

Did the ALJ err in the relative weight accorded to the

medical opinion evidence?
The opinions of physicians, psychologists, or psychiatrists
who have seen a claimant over a period of time for purposes of
treatment are given more weight than the views of consulting
physicians or those who only review the medical records and
never examine the claimant.

The opinion of an examining

physician is generally entitled to less weight than that of a
treating physician, and the opinion of an agency physician who
has never seen the claimant is entitled to the least weight of
all.

Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1084 (10th Cir. 2004).
9

When a treating source opinion is inconsistent with the other
medical evidence, the ALJ’s task is to examine the other medical
source’s reports to see if they outweigh the treating source’s
reports, not the other way around.

Treating source opinions are

given particular weight because of their unique perspective to
the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective
medical findings alone or from reports of individual
examinations, such as consultative examinations.

If an ALJ

intends to rely on a nontreating physician or examiner’s
opinion, he must explain the weight he is giving to it.
v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).

Hamlin

The ALJ must

provide a legally sufficient explanation for rejecting the
opinion of treating medical sources in favor of non-examining or
consulting medical sources.

Robinson, 366 F.3d at 1084.

A treating physician’s opinion about the nature and
severity of the claimant’s impairments should be given
controlling weight by the Commissioner if well supported by
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and if it is not
inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.
Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 26 F.3d
1027, 1029 (10th Cir. 1994); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2),
416.927(d)(2).

When a treating physician opinion is not given

controlling weight, the ALJ must nonetheless specify what lesser
weight he assigned the treating physician opinion.
10

Robinson v.

Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 2004).

A treating

source opinion not entitled to controlling weight is still
entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the
following factors:
(1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency
of examination;
(2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship,
including the treatment provided and the kind of examination or
testing performed;
(3) the degree to which the physician’s opinion is supported by
relevant evidence;
(4) consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole;
(5) whether or not the physician is a specialist in the area
upon which an opinion is rendered; and
(6) other factors brought to the ALJ’s attention which tend to
support or contradict the opinion.
Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300-1301 (10th Cir. 2003).
After considering the above factors, the ALJ must give good
reasons in his/her decision for the weight he/she ultimately
assigns the opinion.

If the ALJ rejects the opinion completely,

he/she must then give specific, legitimate reasons for doing so.
Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1301.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by relying on the nonexamining medical sources (Dr. Schulman and Dr. Blum) in making
her mental RFC findings, and in discounting the opinions of
plaintiff’s treatment provider, ARNP (advanced registered nurse
practitioner) Garton.

As this court has previously noted, the

ALJ gave considerable weight to the opinions of Dr. Schulman and
Dr. Blum.

11

ARNP Garton filled out two mental capacity assessment
forms.

The first, dated November 27, 2013, states that

plaintiff has marked limitations in 9 categories, and an extreme
limitation in 1 category (R. at 421-423).

The second, dated

October 30, 2014, and also signed by Dr. Ibarra, states that
plaintiff has marked limitations in 7 categories and extreme
limitations in 6 categories (R. at 539-541).

The ALJ found that

her opinions were only entitled to limited weight due to the
lack of support for the more extreme limitations or
restrictions.

The ALJ stated that the treatment notes indicate

that plaintiff’s attention, concentration, and memory has been
generally intact or adequate.

Her GAF scores have generally

been in the range consistent with moderate symptoms with only a
few exceptions.

The ALJ noted that plaintiff was pursuing

further education through online courses.

The ALJ concluded

that this evidence does not support the marked and extreme
limitations assessed by ARNP Garton on the form check boxes (R.
at 24).
The ALJ gave greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Blum, who
reviewed the first assessment from ARNP Garton.

Dr. Blum stated

that there is no detail describing how the symptoms support the
opinions of marked and extreme limitations (R. at 97).
The court will not reweigh the evidence or substitute its
judgment for that of the Commissioner.
12

Hackett v. Barnhart, 395

F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005); White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d
903, 905, 908, 909 (10th Cir. 2002).

Although the court will

not reweigh the evidence, the conclusions reached by the ALJ
must be reasonable and consistent with the evidence.

See Glenn

v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 983, 988 (10th Cir. 1994)(the court must
affirm if, considering the evidence as a whole, there is
sufficient evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion).
the sufficiency of the evidence.

The court can only review

Although the evidence may

support a contrary finding, the court cannot displace the
agency’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even
though the court may have justifiably made a different choice
had the matter been before it de novo.

Oldham v. Astrue, 509

F.3d 1254, 1257-1258 (10th Cir. 2007).
The court will not reweigh the evidence.

The ALJ set out

in some detail her reasons for discounting the opinions of ARNP
Garton.

The ALJ set out in further detail plaintiff’s mental

treatment records, including the moderate GAF scores noted in
the medical records (R. at 21-22).

Dr. Blum’s report indicates

that there is no detail in ARNP Garton’s report describing how
plaintiff’s symptoms support the opinions of ARNP Garton that
plaintiff has marked and extreme limitations.

The court finds

that there is sufficient evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to give greater weight to the opinions of Dr.
13

Schulman and Dr. Blum, and to discount the opinions of ARNP
Garton and Dr. Ibarra.
V.

Did the ALJ err by failing to develop the administrative

record in regards to plaintiff’s physical RFC findings?
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not obtaining
additional medical evidence regarding plaintiff’s physical
impairments, and that insufficient evidence supports the ALJ’s
physical RFC findings.

In general, the ALJ limited plaintiff to

sedentary work, with some additional limitations (R. at 19-20).
The ALJ rejected the opinion of Dr. Geis, a non-examining
consultative physician, who found that plaintiff’s physical
limitations were non-severe.

The ALJ relied on the evidence of

diabetes with neuropathy and degenerative joint disease of the
left knee, obesity and hypertension to find that plaintiff is
limited to a range of sedentary work (R. at 24).

However, the

ALJ did not rely on medical opinion evidence in making her
physical RFC findings.
In a counseled case, the ALJ may ordinarily require counsel
to identify the issue or issues requiring further development.
In the absence of such a request by counsel, the court will not
impose a duty on the ALJ to order a consultative examination
unless the need for one is clearly established in the record.
Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1166-1168, 1169 (10th Cir.
1997; see Madrid v. Barnhart, 447 F.3d 788, 791-792 (10th Cir.
14

2006)(where additional tests are required to explain a diagnosis
already in the record, resort to a consultative examination may
be necessary).
Plaintiff did not request a consultative examination, and
at the hearing, counsel indicated that all the information or
medical records they had sought were in the record for this case
(R. at 39-41).

Although the ALJ has a duty to develop the

record, such a duty does not permit a claimant, through counsel,
to state that the record is complete, and then fault the ALJ for
not seeking additional medical evidence.

The court will not

ordinarily reverse or remand for failure to develop the record
when a claimant is represented by counsel who affirmatively
submits to the ALJ that the record is complete, especially when
any missing records are not obvious from the administrative
record or otherwise brought to the attention of the ALJ.

Maes

v. Astrue, 522 F.3d 1093, 1097 (10th Cir. 2008); see Branum v.
Barnhart, 385 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 2004).
Furthermore, an exact correspondence between a medical
opinion and the RFC is not required.

In reaching his RFC

determination, an ALJ is permitted, and indeed required, to rely
on all of the record evidence, including but not limited to
medical opinions in the file.
1071-1072 (10th Cir. 2013).

Wells v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 1061,

In addition, the ALJ is allowed to

engage in less extensive analysis where none of the record
15

evidence conflicts with the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff can
perform work at a certain exertional level.

Wall v. Astrue, 561

F.3d 1048, 1068 (10th Cir. 2009); Howard v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d
945, 947 (10th Cir. 2004).

As in Wall and Howard, the ALJ in

this case discussed the relevant medical evidence in some detail
regarding plaintiff’s physical limitations (R. at 20-21, 24).
Plaintiff fails to cite to any medical evidence indicating that
plaintiff cannot perform sedentary work with the other
limitations set forth in the ALJ’s RFC findings, or any medical
evidence that she has limitations not included in the ALJ’s RFC
findings.
In conclusion, the court finds that plaintiff failed to
establish the need for a consultative examination, or the need
to seek other medical records.

As noted above, plaintiff’s

counsel did not request a consultative examination, and stated
that the record was complete.

Plaintiff fails to cite to any

evidence in the record that would trigger a duty by the ALJ to
recontact a medical source to supplement or clarify the
evidence.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have inquired

into the extent of Dr. Ibarra’s treatment records.

However, as

was the case with Dr. Kimball in Maes, 522 F.3d at 1097, any
missing records from Dr. Ibarra were not obvious from the
administrative record or otherwise brought to the attention of
the ALJ, and counsel indicated the record was complete.
16

Therefore, the ALJ did not have a duty to obtain any other
records from Dr. Ibarra which may have existed.
This case is distinguishable from the court’s ruling
regarding claimant’s mental impairment in Maes, 522 F.3d at
1097-1098.

The ALJ noted that the record showed that Ms. Maes

was prescribed medication used to treat depression, but the
record did not contain evidence demonstrating that Ms. Maes was
specifically diagnosed with or treated for depression or another
mental condition.

Based on this lack of evidence, the ALJ

determined that Ms. Maes was not disabled during the relevant
period.

The court held that this evidence was an inadequate

basis for a determination of plaintiff’s disability.

The court

stated that the medication could have been prescribed because
Ms. Maes was suffering from a severe mental impairment, or it
could have been prescribed for a mild condition.

Thus, the

regulations required the ALJ to seek additional available
records that may clarify the extent of the alleged disability.
Without that clarification, the court could not say that the
ALJ’s determination was supported by substantial evidence.

In

the case before the court, the ALJ was not relying on an absence
of evidence from Dr. Ibarra or others regarding a medication
prescribed to find plaintiff not disabled.
As noted above, although there is no medical opinion
evidence directly supporting the ALJ’s physical RFC findings, an
17

exact correspondence is not required between a medical opinion
and the RFC.

An ALJ can rely on all the record evidence,

including but not limited to medical opinions when making her
RFC findings.

The ALJ discussed the medical evidence in some

detail, and no medical evidence conflicts with or contradicts
the ALJ’s physical RFC findings.

The court therefore finds that

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s physical RFC findings.
VI.

Did the ALJ err in her analysis of plaintiff’s subjective

complaints?
Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of
the finder of fact, and a court will not upset such
determinations when supported by substantial evidence.

However,

findings as to credibility should be closely and affirmatively
linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the
guise of findings.
Cir. 1995).

Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th

Furthermore, the ALJ cannot ignore evidence

favorable to the plaintiff.

Owen v. Chater, 913 F. Supp. 1413,

1420 (D. Kan. 1995).
When analyzing evidence of pain, the court does not require
a formalistic factor-by-factor recitation of the evidence.

So

long as the ALJ sets forth the specific evidence he relies on in
evaluating the claimant’s credibility, the ALJ will be deemed to
have satisfied the requirements set forth in Kepler.

White v.

Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 909 (10th Cir. 2002); Qualls v. Apfel,
18

206 F.3d 1368, 1372 (10th Cir. 2000).

Furthermore, the ALJ need

not discuss every relevant factor in evaluating pain testimony.
Bates v. Barnhart, 222 F. Supp.2d 1252, 1260 (D. Kan. 2002).

An

ALJ must therefore explain and support with substantial evidence
which part(s) of claimant’s testimony he did not believe and
why.

McGoffin v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 1248, 1254 (10th Cir.

2002).

It is error for the ALJ to use standard boilerplate

language which fails to set forth the specific evidence the ALJ
considered in determining that a claimant’s complaints were not
credible.
2004).

Hardman v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 676, 679 (10th Cir.

On the other hand, an ALJ’s credibility determination

which does not rest on mere boilerplate language, but which is
linked to specific findings of fact fairly derived from the
record, will be affirmed by the court.

White, 287 F.3d at 909-

910.
The court finds no clear error by the ALJ in her
credibility analysis.

The ALJ discussed in some detail

plaintiff’s testimony and statements, work activities
questionnaires, the medical record, and the medical opinion
evidence regarding plaintiff’s mental limitations (R. at 20-25).
The ALJ reasonably relied on the medical evidence and the
medical opinion evidence to find that plaintiff was not fully
credible.

The court will not reweigh the evidence.

The balance

of the ALJ’s credibility analysis was supported by substantial
19

evidence in the record.

See Barnum v. Barnhart, 385 F.3d 1268,

1274 (10th Cir. 2004)(while the court had some concerns about the
ALJ’s reliance on plaintiff’s alleged failure to follow a weight
loss program and her performance of certain household chores,
the court concluded that the balance of the ALJ’s credibility
analysis was supported by substantial evidence in the record).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the judgment of the
Commissioner is affirmed pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
Dated this 26th day of February 2018, Topeka, Kansas.

s/Sam A. Crow
Sam A. Crow, U.S. District Senior Judge

20