Crowder v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: The judgment of the Commissioner is affirmed pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Signed by U.S. District Senior Judge Sam A. Crow on 4/13/18. (msb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

HENRY F. CROWDER, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 17-2083-SAC

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This is an action reviewing the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security denying the plaintiff disability
insurance benefits.

The matter has been fully briefed by the

parties.
I.

General legal standards
The court's standard of review is set forth in 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g), which provides that "the findings of the Commissioner
as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive."

The court should review the Commissioner's

decision to determine only whether the decision was supported by
substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner applied the
correct legal standards.
(10th Cir. 1994).

Glenn v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 983, 984

Substantial evidence requires more than a

1

scintilla, but less than a preponderance, and is satisfied by
such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support the
conclusion.

The determination of whether substantial evidence

supports the Commissioner's decision is not simply a
quantitative exercise, for evidence is not substantial if it is
overwhelmed by other evidence or if it really constitutes mere
conclusion.

Ray v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 1989).

Although the court is not to reweigh the evidence, the findings
of the Commissioner will not be mechanically accepted.

Nor will

the findings be affirmed by isolating facts and labeling them
substantial evidence, as the court must scrutinize the entire
record in determining whether the Commissioner's conclusions are
rational.
1992).

Graham v. Sullivan, 794 F. Supp. 1045, 1047 (D. Kan.

The court should examine the record as a whole,

including whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight
of the Commissioner's decision and, on that basis, determine if
the substantiality of the evidence test has been met.

Glenn, 21

F.3d at 984.
The Social Security Act provides that an individual shall
be determined to be under a disability only if the claimant can
establish that they have a physical or mental impairment
expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of
twelve months which prevents the claimant from engaging in
substantial gainful activity (SGA).
2

The claimant's physical or

mental impairment or impairments must be of such severity that
they are not only unable to perform their previous work but
cannot, considering their age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d).

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential
evaluation process to determine disability.

If at any step a

finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the
Commissioner will not review the claim further.

At step one,

the agency will find non-disability unless the claimant can show
that he or she is not working at a “substantial gainful
activity.”

At step two, the agency will find non-disability

unless the claimant shows that he or she has a “severe
impairment,” which is defined as any “impairment or combination
of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant’s]
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”

At

step three, the agency determines whether the impairment which
enabled the claimant to survive step two is on the list of
impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled.

If

the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal a listed
impairment, the inquiry proceeds to step four, at which the
agency assesses whether the claimant can do his or her previous
work; unless the claimant shows that he or she cannot perform
their previous work, they are determined not to be disabled.
3

If

the claimant survives step four, the fifth and final step
requires the agency to consider vocational factors (the
claimant’s age, education, and past work experience) and to
determine whether the claimant is capable of performing other
jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
Barnhart v. Thomas, 124 S. Ct. 376, 379-380 (2003).
The claimant bears the burden of proof through step four of
Nielson v. Sullivan, 992 F.2d 1118, 1120 (10th

the analysis.
Cir. 1993).

At step five, the burden shifts to the

Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other work
that exists in the national economy.

Nielson, 992 F.2d at 1120;

Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993).

The

Commissioner meets this burden if the decision is supported by
substantial evidence.

Thompson, 987 F.2d at 1487.

Before going from step three to step four, the agency will
assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC).

This

RFC assessment is used to evaluate the claim at both step four
and step five.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 404.1520(e,f,g);

416.920(a)(4), 416.920(e,f,g).
II.

History of case
On October 22, 2015, administrative law judge (ALJ) Timothy

G. Stueve issued his decision (R. at 20-31).

Plaintiff alleges

that he has been disabled since September 16, 2013 (R. at 20).
Plaintiff is insured for disability insurance benefits through
4

December 31, 2018 (R. at 22).

At step one, the ALJ found that

plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
the alleged onset date (R. at 22).

At step two, the ALJ found

that plaintiff has severe impairments (R. at 22).

At step

three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s impairments do not
meet or equal a listed impairment (R. at 23).

After determining

plaintiff’s RFC (R. at 24-25), the ALJ found at step four that
plaintiff is unable to perform past relevant work (R. at 29).
At step five, the ALJ found that plaintiff could perform other
work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy
(R. at 30).

Therefore, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not

disabled (R. at 30-31).
III.

Did the ALJ err in his evaluation of plaintiff’s obesity?
At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s severe

impairments included obesity (R. at 22).

This was the only

specific mention of obesity in the ALJ decision.

Plaintiff

argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider plaintiff’s
obesity in accordance with SSR 02-1p.
SSR 02-1p is a social security ruling governing the
evaluation of obesity.

It states that, when assessing RFC,

obesity may cause limitations of various functions, including
exertional, postural and social functions.

Therefore, an

assessment should also be made of the effect obesity has upon
the claimant’s ability to perform routine movement and necessary
5

physical activity within the work environment.

Obesity may also

affect the claimant’s ability to sustain a function over time.
In cases involving obesity, fatigue may affect the individual’s
physical and mental ability to sustain work activity.
32255132 at *7.

2002 WL

The discussion in the SSR on obesity and RFC

concludes by stating that: “As with any other impairment, we
will explain how we reached our conclusions on whether obesity
caused any physical or mental limitations.” 2002 WL 32255132 at
*8.
Although the ALJ did not specifically mention plaintiff’s
obesity after making his step two findings, the ALJ, when making
his RFC findings, stated that he considered all of plaintiff’s
symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably
be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence
and other evidence (R. at 25).

Plaintiff relies on the opinions

of plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Knopp, regarding his
limitations.

However, the reports from Dr. Knopp which

plaintiff relies on to show that he is disabled and has severe
limitations, listed numerous impairments, but made no mention of
plaintiff’s obesity (R. at 500-501, 872-875).

The ALJ, in

making his RFC findings, gave great weight to the opinions of
the state agency assessments by Dr. Coleman and Dr. ToubesKlingler (R. at 28).

Dr. Coleman mentioned plaintiff’s height

(69”) and weight (244 lb.) (R. at 88), or a body mass index of
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36.

This reflects Level II obesity.

32255132 at *3.1

SSR 02-1p, 2002 WL

Dr. Toubes-Klingler listed plaintiff’s BMI as

35; both indicated it was an exertional limitation upon which
their limitations were based (R. at 88, 108).

Therefore, their

findings expressly took into consideration plaintiff’ obesity.
Plaintiff has failed to point to any evidence in the record
indicating that plaintiff’s obesity resulted in limitations not
included in the ALJ’s RFC findings.

See Arles v. Astrue, 438

Fed. Appx. 735, 740 (10th Cir. Sept. 28, 2011); Warner v. Astrue,
338 Fed. Appx. 748, 751 (10th Cir. July 16, 2009).

On the facts

of this case, the court finds no error by the ALJ in his
consideration of plaintiff’s obesity.
IV.

Did the ALJ err in the relative weight accorded to the

opinions of the medical sources regarding plaintiff’s physical
limitations?
The opinions of physicians, psychologists, or psychiatrists
who have seen a claimant over a period of time for purposes of
treatment are given more weight than the views of consulting
physicians or those who only review the medical records and
never examine the claimant.

The opinion of an examining

physician is generally entitled to less weight than that of a
treating physician, and the opinion of an agency physician who

1

Level 1 obesity is 30.0-34.9; Level II obesity is 35.0-39.9; Level III, or extreme obesity is greater than 40. SSR
02-10, 2002 WL 32255132 at *3.
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has never seen the claimant is entitled to the least weight of
all.

Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1084 (10th Cir. 2004).

When a treating source opinion is inconsistent with the other
medical evidence, the ALJ’s task is to examine the other medical
source’s reports to see if they outweigh the treating source’s
reports, not the other way around.

Treating source opinions are

given particular weight because of their unique perspective to
the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective
medical findings alone or from reports of individual
examinations, such as consultative examinations.

If an ALJ

intends to rely on a nontreating physician or examiner’s
opinion, he must explain the weight he is giving to it.
v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).

Hamlin

The ALJ must

provide a legally sufficient explanation for rejecting the
opinion of treating medical sources in favor of non-examining or
consulting medical sources.

Robinson, 366 F.3d at 1084.

A treating physician’s opinion about the nature and
severity of the claimant’s impairments should be given
controlling weight by the Commissioner if well supported by
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and if it is not
inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.
Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 26 F.3d
1027, 1029 (10th Cir. 1994); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2),
416.927(d)(2).

When a treating physician opinion is not given
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controlling weight, the ALJ must nonetheless specify what lesser
weight he assigned the treating physician opinion.
Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 2004).

Robinson v.

A treating

source opinion not entitled to controlling weight is still
entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the
following factors:
(1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency
of examination;
(2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship,
including the treatment provided and the kind of examination or
testing performed;
(3) the degree to which the physician’s opinion is supported by
relevant evidence;
(4) consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole;
(5) whether or not the physician is a specialist in the area
upon which an opinion is rendered; and
(6) other factors brought to the ALJ’s attention which tend to
support or contradict the opinion.
Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300-1301 (10th Cir. 2003).
After considering the above factors, the ALJ must give good
reasons in his/her decision for the weight he/she ultimately
assigns the opinion.

If the ALJ rejects the opinion completely,

he/she must then give specific, legitimate reasons for doing so.
Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1301.
Dr. Knopp, plaintiff’s treating physician, indicated on
April 22, 2014 that that plaintiff was permanently and totally
disabled; that he cannot hold down a part-time or full-time job
because it would exacerbate all of his symptoms and make it more
difficult to treat (R. at 500-501).

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On September 3, 2015, Dr.

Knopp provided a physical RFC assessment, opining that plaintiff
can stand/walk for less than 2 hours in an 8 hour workday, and
can sit for less than 2 hours in an 8 hour workday.

Plaintiff

would also need to lie down 6 times during a work day at
unpredictable times (R. at 872).

In his accompanying letter,

Dr. Knopp noted plaintiff’s medical problems which support his
RFC findings, and indicated that pain keeps him from doing much
activity day to day (R. at 875).
The ALJ gave little weight to the opinions of Dr. Knopp.
The ALJ found that Dr. Knopp’s own treatment notes do not
document any neurologic, sensory or motor deficits reasonably
consistent with his opinions, but instead consistently reflect
normal physical examinations.

The ALJ also found that other

medical records, including those of Dr. Peloquin, consistently
reflect normal neurological functioning, along with the ability
to ambulate normally, and normal strength.

The ALJ concluded

that the objective findings do not support the extreme
limitations asserted by Dr. Knopp (R. at 29).
The ALJ gave great weight to the opinions of Dr. Coleman
(dated June 2, 2014) and Dr. Toubes-Klingler (dated November 18,
2014) (R. at 28).

The ALJ’s findings limiting plaintiff to a

range of light work are consistent with the opinions expressed
by these two consulting physicians; to the extent that Dr.
Toubes-Klingler found additional limitations, they are reflected
10

in the ALJ’s RFC findings (R. at 24-25, 88-89, 108-111).

Dr.

Coleman gave only a brief explanation in support of his RFC
findings (R. at 89).

However, Dr. Toubes-Klingler gave a very

detailed two page summary of the medical evidence in support of
her RFC findings (R. at 110-111).

The ALJ stated that he gave

great weight to the consulting physician opinions because they
are accompanied by detailed narratives that explain what
evidence they relied on in reaching their conclusions.
Furthermore, the ALJ found that evidence subsequent to their
opinions does not show an appreciable worsening of plaintiff’s
condition.2

Finally, the ALJ concluded that their opinions are

consistent with the evidence of record (R. at 28).
Dr. Toubes-Klingler noted in his very detailed narrative
statement that plaintiff was advised by Dr. Peloquin on May 16,
2013, only four months before the date plaintiff alleged
disability, that he work no more than 40 hours in his current
position.

Dr. Toubes-Klingler noted that this opinion predates

the time period under consideration, but gives it some weight as
it is a reasonable suggestion (R. at 110).

Dr. Toubes-Klingler

notes the findings that plaintiff has only minimal loss in range

2

Dr. Knopp indicated on April 22, 2014, prior to the opinions from Dr. Coleman and Dr. Toubes-Klingler, that
plaintiff’s conditions “are all slowly getting worse over months and years” (R. at 500). The court does not find this
statement inconsistent with the ALJ’s assertion that evidence subsequent to the opinions of Dr. Coleman and Dr.
Toubes-Klingler does not show an “appreciable” worsening of plaintiff’s condition. Dr. Knopp did not indicate in
September 2015 that there had been an appreciable worsening of plaintiff’s condition since his April 22, 2014
report. In fact, the September 2015 report opined that plaintiff had been disabled and unable to work for many years
(R. at 875).
11

of motion, normal strength, and the ability to ambulate without
difficulty.

She also notes only mild changes on MRI testing,

and no neurological findings.

She further notes that the

fibromyalgia findings are not supported with trigger points (R.
at 111).
The symptoms of fibromyalgia are entirely subjective, and
there are no laboratory tests to identify its presence or
severity.

Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir.

2010)(when the record contained diagnoses of chronic pain
syndrome or fibromyalgia, the court stated that complaints of
severe pain do not readily lend themselves to analysis by
objective medical tests, and are notoriously difficult to
diagnose and treat; further noting that no objective medical
tests reveal the presence of fibromyalgia); Gilbert v. Astrue,
231 Fed. Appx. 778, 783-784 (10th Cir. Apr. 11, 2007)(the lack
of objective test findings noted by the ALJ is not determinative
of the severity of fibromyalgia); Brown v. Barnhart, 182 Fed.
Appx. 771, 773 (10th Cir. May 25, 2006); Priest v. Barnhart, 302
F. Supp.2d 1205, 1213 (D. Kan. 2004); Glenn v. Apfel, 102 F.
Supp.2d 1252, 1258 (D. Kan. 2000); Anderson v. Apfel, 100 F.
Supp.2d 1278, 1286 (D. Kan. 2000); Ward v. Apfel, 65 F. Supp.2d
1208, 1213 (D. Kan. 1999).

Because fibromyalgia is diagnosed by

ruling out other diseases through medical testing, negative test
results or the absence of an objective medical test to diagnose
12

the condition cannot support a conclusion that a claimant does
not suffer from a potentially disabling condition.

Priest, 302

F. Supp.2d at 1213.
Fibromyalgia is diagnosed entirely on the basis of
patients’ reports and other symptoms.

Brown v. Barnhart, 182

Fed. Appx. 771, 773 n.1 (10th Cir. May 25, 2006).

The rule of

thumb is that the patient must be positive on at least 11 of the
18 tender points to be diagnosed with fibromyalgia (R. at 425);
Gilbert, 231 Fed. Appx. at 783; Brown, 182 Fed. Appx. at 773
n.1; Glenn, 102 F. Supp.2d at 1259.
Significantly, both Dr. Coleman and Dr. Toubes-Klingler
noted that the diagnosis of fibromyalgia was not supported with
a physical exam or with trigger point findings (R. at 89, 111).
This is certainly a relevant consideration in considering the
severity of plaintiff’s condition.

Furthermore, it is not error

to consider plaintiff’s other severe impairments (e.g.,
degenerative disc disease) through objective findings.

Romero

v. Colvin, 563 Fed. Appx. 618, 621 (10th Cir. May 29, 2014).
The court will not reweigh the evidence or substitute its
judgment for that of the Commissioner.

Hackett v. Barnhart, 395

F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005); White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d
903, 905, 908, 909 (10th Cir. 2002).

Although the court will

not reweigh the evidence, the conclusions reached by the ALJ
must be reasonable and consistent with the evidence.
13

See Glenn

v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 983, 988 (10th Cir. 1994)(the court must
affirm if, considering the evidence as a whole, there is
sufficient evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion).
the sufficiency of the evidence.

The court can only review

Although the evidence may

support a contrary finding, the court cannot displace the
agency’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even
though the court may have justifiably made a different choice
had the matter been before it de novo.

Oldham v. Astrue, 509

F.3d 1254, 1257-1258 (10th Cir. 2007).
The ALJ’s findings regarding the medical evidence and
plaintiff’s physical impairments and limitations are supported
by the very specific narrative summary of Dr. Toubes-Klingler.
The court will not reweigh the evidence.

The court finds that

there is sufficient evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to give greater weight to the opinions of Dr.
Coleman and Dr. Toubes-Klingler.

The court concludes that

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s physical RFC findings.
V.

Did the ALJ err in the relative weight accorded to the

opinions of the medical sources regarding plaintiff’s mental
limitations?
On June 16, 2014, Dr. Hemmendinger, a licensed
psychologist, performed a mental status evaluation on the
plaintiff (R. at 546-548).

Dr. Hemmendinger concluded that
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plaintiff’s medical issues prevent him from being able to
consistently perform even the simplest of tasks.

He further

stated that plaintiff seems to have the cognitive capacity to
perform tasks that require decision-making skills, but “his
self-described anger issues probably would impair interacting
successfully with co-workers or doing a job that required
meeting the public” (R. at 548).

The ALJ accorded his opinions

“some” weight, noting that plaintiff demonstrated the ability to
understand and carry out simple instructions on mental status
examination.

The ALJ further stated that Dr. Hemmendinger’s

opinion that plaintiff’s self-described anger issues would
probably impair his interacting successfully with coworkers or
doing a job that required meeting the public was not supported
by the other evidence.

The ALJ noted that none of the treatment

notes document anger issues, nor did Dr. Hemmendinger note any
observations in this regard.

The ALJ concluded that the

evidence showed that plaintiff is capable of occasional
interaction with the public (R. at 28).
The ALJ also had before him two state agency consulting
mental RFC evaluations, including detailed narratives
summarizing the evidence and explaining the basis for their
findings, by Dr. Bergmann-Harms on June 16, 2014 (R. at 86-87,
89-91), and Dr. Maxfield on October 20, 2014 (R. at 105-106,
111-113).

Both Dr. Bergmann-Harms and Dr. Maxfield considered
15

the evaluation by Dr. Hemmendinger, and both accorded it some
weight (R. at 86, 106).

Dr. Bergmann-Harms and Dr. Maxfield

found that plaintiff has the ability to understand, remember and
carry out short and simple instructions, and persist on simple
tasks.

They both concluded that plaintiff would work best in

positions that do not require frequent contact with coworkers or
the public (R. at 90-91, 112-113).

The ALJ accorded great

weight to their opinions because they were accompanied by
detailed narratives that explain what evidence they relied upon
in reaching their conclusions.

The ALJ also found their

opinions consistent with the evidence of record, including
treatment records and the evaluation by Dr. Hemmendinger (R. at
28).

The ALJ’s mental RFC findings reflect the opinions of the

two state agency consultants.

The ALJ found that plaintiff is

able to understand, remember and carry out only simple, routine,
repetitive tasks, involving only simple work-related decisions,
with few, if any, workplace changes.

He is limited to no more

than occasional interaction with the public and coworkers (R. at
25).
Plaintiff argues that both Dr. Bergmann-Harms and Dr.
Maxfield found that plaintiff had moderate limitations in
maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace (R. at 86,
105), and more specifically had moderate limitations in
maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods (R.
16

at 90, 112), and further argues that these limitations are not
adequately incorporated into the ALJ’s RFC findings, which
included a limitation to simple, routine, repetitive tasks and
simple work-related decisions.
However, in the case of Smith v. Colvin, 821 F.3d 1264,
1269 (10th Cir. 2016), the court held that an ALJ can account for
moderate mental limitations by limiting plaintiff to particular
kinds of work activity, including a limitation to simple tasks.
See also Lee v. Colvin, 631 Fed. Appx. 538, 540-542 (10th Cir.
Nov. 12, 2015)(same; Smith opinion indicated that Lee finding
was persuasive, Smith, 821 F.3d at 1269).
In the case of Nelson v. Colvin, 655 Fed. Appx. 626, 628629 (10th Cir. July 12, 2016), Dr. Taber (in his Section I
findings) found that claimant’s limitations included a moderate
limitation in her ability to maintain attention and
concentration for extended periods, and marked limitations in
her ability to understand, remember and carry out detailed
instructions.

Dr. Taber’s Section III narrative then limited

plaintiff to carrying out simple instructions.

The ALJ’s RFC

findings included a limitation to simple instructions.

The

court held that Dr. Taber’s Section III narrative adequately
incorporated the limitations she found in Section I.

The court

further held that by limiting the claimant to unskilled work,

17

the ALJ effectively accounted for all the limitations noted in
Section I of Dr. Taber’s evaluation.
The ALJ’s findings regarding the medical evidence and
plaintiff’s mental impairments and limitations are supported by
the opinions and the very specific narrative summary by Dr.
Bergmann-Harms and Dr. Maxfield.
evidence.

The court will not reweigh the

The court finds that there is sufficient evidence

which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to give greater
weight to the opinions of Dr. Bergmann-Harms and Dr. Maxfield.
The court concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
mental RFC findings.
VI.

Did the ALJ err in his analysis of plaintiff’s credibility?
Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of

the finder of fact, and a court will not upset such
determinations when supported by substantial evidence.

However,

findings as to credibility should be closely and affirmatively
linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the
guise of findings.
Cir. 1995).

Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th

Furthermore, the ALJ cannot ignore evidence

favorable to the plaintiff.

Owen v. Chater, 913 F. Supp. 1413,

1420 (D. Kan. 1995).
When analyzing evidence of pain, the court does not require
a formalistic factor-by-factor recitation of the evidence.

So

long as the ALJ sets forth the specific evidence he relies on in
18

evaluating the claimant’s credibility, the ALJ will be deemed to
have satisfied the requirements set forth in Kepler.

White v.

Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 909 (10th Cir. 2002); Qualls v. Apfel,
206 F.3d 1368, 1372 (10th Cir. 2000).

Furthermore, the ALJ need

not discuss every relevant factor in evaluating pain testimony.
Bates v. Barnhart, 222 F. Supp.2d 1252, 1260 (D. Kan. 2002).

An

ALJ must therefore explain and support with substantial evidence
which part(s) of claimant’s testimony he did not believe and
why.

McGoffin v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 1248, 1254 (10th Cir.

2002).

It is error for the ALJ to use standard boilerplate

language which fails to set forth the specific evidence the ALJ
considered in determining that a claimant’s complaints were not
credible.
2004).

Hardman v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 676, 679 (10th Cir.

On the other hand, an ALJ’s credibility determination

which does not rest on mere boilerplate language, but which is
linked to specific findings of fact fairly derived from the
record, will be affirmed by the court.

White, 287 F.3d at 909-

910.
The court finds no clear error by the ALJ in his
credibility analysis.

The ALJ reasonably relied on the opinions

of four medical sources, Dr. Coleman, Dr. Toubes-Klingler, Dr.
Bergmann-Harms, and Dr. Maxfield, in making his RFC findings and
in evaluating plaintiff’s credibility.

All four consulting

medical sources opined that plaintiff was only partially
19

credible (R. at 87, 89, 106, 111).
the evidence.

The court will not reweigh

Although the evidence may support a contrary

finding, there is sufficient evidence in the record to find that
plaintiff was not fully credible.

The balance of the ALJ’s

credibility analysis was supported by substantial evidence in
the record.

See Barnum v. Barnhart, 385 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th

Cir. 2004)(while the court had some concerns about the ALJ’s
reliance on plaintiff’s alleged failure to follow a weight loss
program and her performance of certain household chores, the
court concluded that the balance of the ALJ’s credibility
analysis was supported by substantial evidence in the record).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the judgment of the
Commissioner is affirmed pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
Dated this 13th day of April 2018, Topeka, Kansas.

s/Sam A. Crow
Sam A. Crow, U.S. District Senior Judge

20