Roman Catholic Archdiocese et al v. City of Mission Woods
Filing
97
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 87 plaintiffs' Motion for Permanent Injunction. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the court PERMANENTLY ENJOINS defendant, ORDERING IT TO APPROVE--within 45 days of this Order--the 2016 land use application submitted by John Watkins for the Archdiocese and identified in the record as Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit 32. See Doc. 84-2 at 2. Signed by District Judge Daniel D. Crabtree on 05/10/2019. (tvn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE
OF KANSAS CITY IN KANSAS and
ST. ROSE PHILIPPINE DUCHESNE
CATHOLIC CHURCH,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 17-2186-DDC
v.
CITY OF MISSION WOODS,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the court on the motion of plaintiffs Roman Catholic
Archdiocese of Kansas City in Kansas (“the Archdiocese”) and St. Rose Philippine Duchesne
Catholic Church (“St. Rose Church”) for a permanent injunction (Doc. 87). Defendant City of
Mission Woods has filed a Response (Doc. 91). And plaintiffs have filed a Reply (Doc. 95).
The court grants plaintiffs’ motion for the reasons explained, below.
I.
Facts
St. Rose Church began holding religious services in Mission Woods in 2013. As the
congregation grew, plaintiffs looked to expand. In 2015, plaintiffs acquired a single-family
house next to the church’s property. Plaintiffs planned to renovate the house, converting it into a
meeting house. So, in February 2016, plaintiffs submitted a land use request—i.e., their
renovation plan—to defendant’s City Plan Commission. The Commission denied plaintiffs’ land
use request, citing local zoning laws as its reason.
After defendant denied the request, plaintiffs sued, bringing claims under the Substantial
Burden, Equal Terms, Nondiscrimination, and Unreasonable Limitations provisions of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–
2000cc-5; the First Amendment through 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Section 7 of the Kansas Constitution
Bill of Rights; and the Kansas Preservation of Religious Freedom Act. Doc. 1 at 22–30.1
In November 2018, the case went to trial. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs on
their RLUIPA Equal Terms claim, concluding that Pembroke Hill School (“Pembroke”) was
similarly situated to plaintiffs in its land use request and that defendant had treated Pembroke
more favorably than plaintiffs.2 Doc. 86 at 1. The jury awarded plaintiffs $10,000 in damages.
Id. at 6. But, the jury found for defendant on the rest of plaintiffs’ claims—i.e., RLUIPA
Substantial Burden and Nondiscrimination claims; First Amendment claims; and Kansas state
law claims. Id. at 1–6.
After trial, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Permanent Injunction (Doc. 87). It asks the court
to issue an injunction requiring defendant to approve plaintiffs’ 2016 land use application.
Approving this land use application would permit plaintiffs to renovate the single-family house
into a meeting house.
II.
Legal Standard
The court may enter a permanent injunction if the moving party proves “(1) actual
success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm unless the injunction is issued; (3) the threatened
injury outweighs the harm that the injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) the
The court granted defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment against plaintiffs’ Unreasonable Limitations
claim. Doc. 58 at 40–41. The court also granted summary judgment against plaintiffs’ Equal Terms claim to the
extent they based it on the University of Kansas Hospital Authority as a similarly situated secular entity. Id. at 41.
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“No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious
assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc(b)(1).
2
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injunction, if issued, will not adversely affect the public interest.” Fisher v. Okla. Health Care
Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1180 (10th Cir. 2003); Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Wagnon, 476
F.3d 818, 822 (10th Cir. 2007). In fashioning a permanent injunction, the court must tailor the
remedy narrowly to conform to the harm shown. Garrison v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations,
Inc., 287 F.3d 955, 962 (10th Cir. 2002).
The court applies these four requirements in the “Discussion” portion of this order, which
follows.
III.
Discussion
A.
Success on the Merits
Plaintiffs have achieved an actual success on the merits: At trial, the jury found for
plaintiffs on their Equal Terms claim. Doc. 86 at 1. Defendant aims to modulate this outcome,
arguing that plaintiffs achieved only “limited success on the merits” because the jury did not find
for plaintiffs on their other four claims. Defendant does not cite any case law recognizing its
theory that limited success differs from actual success. The court is unpersuaded by defendant’s
argument. Indeed, other courts have rejected it implicitly. See Rocky Mountain Christian
Church v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1160 (D. Colo. 2009) (concluding
plaintiff had achieved success on the merits when jury entered favorable verdict on three out of
plaintiff’s four RLUIPA claims). The court holds that plaintiffs have succeeded on the merits
because the jury returned a verdict in plaintiffs’ favor on their Equal Terms claim.
B.
Irreparable Harm
The favorable Equal Terms verdict supports a finding that plaintiffs are suffering
irreparable harm. Defendant’s argument to the contrary is unavailing. Defendant contends that
plaintiffs have not shown irreparable harm because the jury entered a favorable verdict for
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plaintiffs on their Equal Terms claim but not on their Substantial Burden claim. Defendant
concedes that unequal treatment is a cognizable harm protected by RLUIPA. But, defendant
contends that success on an Equal Terms claim alone does not necessarily support a finding of
irreparable harm.
The court rejects the premise that plaintiffs’ favorable verdict on their Equal Terms claim
alone cannot satisfy the irreparable harm standard. In Rocky Mountain, the court considered
whether favorable jury verdicts for plaintiff’s Substantial Burden, Equal Terms, and
Unreasonable Limitations claims under RLUIPA satisfied the irreparable harm prong of the
inquiry. 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1160. The court concluded that the favorable RLUIPA verdicts
sufficed:
The violation of one’s right to the free exercise of religion
necessarily constitutes irreparable harm. O Centro Espirita
Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 1008
(10th Cir. 2004). . . . The fact that the [Rocky Mountain Christian
Church’s (“RMCC”)] free exercise rights in this case are based on
statutory claims under the RLUIPA rather than on constitutional
provisions does not alter the irreparable harm analysis. See, e.g.,
Kikumara v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 963 (10th Cir. 2001) (“courts
have held that a plaintiff satisfies the irreparable harm analaysis by
alleging a violation of RFRA”); Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 482
([2d] Cir. 1996) (“although plaintiff’s free exercise claim is statutory
rather than constitutional, the denial of the plaintiff’s right to the free
exercise of his religious beliefs is a harm that cannot be adequately
compensated monetarily”).
The RMCC has demonstrated
irreparable harm.
Id.
The analysis here is the same as in Rocky Mountain. The jury entered a favorable verdict
on plaintiffs’ Equal Terms claim under RLUIPA. Following Rocky Mountain, which did not
distinguish among the plaintiff’s favorable RLUIPA verdicts, defendant’s violation of plaintiffs’
statutory right of free exercise constitutes irreparable harm. An Equal Terms violation is not a
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second-class RLUIPA claim. Instead, “RLUIPA identifies ‘the use, building, or conversion of
real property for the purpose of religious exercise [as] religious exercise of the person or entity
that uses or intend to use the property for that purpose.’ § 2000cc-5(7).” Christian Fellowship
Ctrs. of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Canton, No. 8:19-CV-191 (LEK/DJS), 2019 WL 1428344, at *12
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019) (emphasis in original) (considering whether irreparable harm
requirement is met under an Equal Terms claim alone). So, “every day the [religious institution]
cannot use ‘the property’ it bought for religious purposes prevents it from engaging in ‘religious
exercise’ in Congress’s eyes.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
The lone appellate court to reach the issue has rejected defendant’s argument that
plaintiff must secure a favorable Substantial Burden verdict to satisfy the irreparable harm prong.
In Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, 697 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2012), a church
congregation challenged a city zoning ordinance, which had prevented the church from
renovating a leased property into a church. Id. at 282–83. The plaintiff church filed a motion for
preliminary injunction asking the district court to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance. Id. at
284. The district court concluded that the church had failed to show irreparable harm and thus
denied the plaintiff’s injunction request. Id. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the
church had satisfied the preliminary injunction requirements based solely on the plaintiff’s
RLUIPA Equal Terms claim. Id. at 288–89. It held that the district court had erred in its
irreparable harm analysis, “[m]ost basically . . . because [the church had] alleged violations of its
First Amendment and RLUIPA rights.” Id. at 295. And, the Fifth Circuit squarely rejected the
argument that defendant makes here. Specifically, the municipal defendant in Opulent Life
argued that the church could not establish irreparable harm because it had failed to demonstrate a
substantial burden. Id. at 296 n.18. But the Fifth Circuit rejected this proposition:
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[The defendant] cites authority for the proposition that substantial
burdens amount to irreparable harm and then concludes
“[c]onversely, if no substantial burden, then no irreparable injury.”
But this argument fails because it rests on a logical fallacy. A
substantial burden may well be (and probably is) sufficient to
establish irreparable injury, but it surely is not necessary.
Id. at 296 n.18; see also Christian Fellowship Ctrs., 2019 WL 1428344, at *12–13 (finding
Opulent Life persuasive and concluding irreparable harm standard met on plaintiff’s Equal Terms
claim alone).
The court finds the reasoning applied in Opulent Life highly persuasive. It is consistent
with Rocky Mountain: Together, the two cases recognize that a RLUIPA violation—whether
based on the statute’s Substantial Burden, Equal Terms, or Nondiscrimination provisions—
infringes on the free exercise of religion. A favorable verdict on plaintiffs’ Substantial Burden
claim might have bolstered the irreparable harm showing; but the court concludes—as did the
Fifth Circuit—that such an outcome is not a necessary condition to establish irreparable harm.
C.
Balance of Harms
The balance of harms weighs in plaintiffs’ favor. This factor weighs the plaintiffs’ injury
against the harm that an injunction might impose on the defendant. The jury concluded that
defendant had infringed on plaintiffs’ statutorily protected right under RLUIPA’s Equal Terms
provision, and a RLUIPA violation is a substantial harm. See Rocky Mountain, 612 F. Supp. 2d
at 1160–61.
Again, defendant argues that plaintiffs’ suffered harm here is “far weaker” than that
sustained by the plaintiff in Rocky Mountain. And, again, defendant rests its proposition on
plaintiffs’ success on only their Equal Terms claim. But this argument, even if correct, misses
the more important point. The question isn’t whether plaintiffs claimed they had sustained a
greater RLUIPA injury than the jury ultimately found. Instead, the correct question asks whether
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plaintiffs have sustained sufficient harm to merit injunctive relief. And, putting an even finer
point on it, the question under the third factor asks whether “the threatened injury outweighs the
harm that the injunction may cause the opposing party.” Fisher, 335 F.3d at 1180.
Again, the court finds the analysis of this factor in Opulent Life highly persuasive. There,
just as the court must consider here, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the balance of harms
favored the plaintiff church when the harm resulted solely from RLUIPA’s Equal Terms
provision. The Fifth Circuit had concluded that the plaintiff church had satisfied the irreparable
harm standard. Given this outcome, the Fifth Circuit held, the defendant “would need to present
powerful evidence of harm to its interests to prevent [the church] from meeting [the balance of
harms] requirement” of the injunction analysis. Opulent Life, 697 F.3d at 297.
Here, defendant argues, it has made the requisite showing and tipped the balance of
harms in its favor. Defendant claims that an injunction mandating that defendant approve
plaintiffs’ 2016 application would create noise and this noise could disrupt the neighboring
residents’ quiet enjoyment of their homes. Doc. 91 at 6. This argument replicates an argument
rejected twice in the Rocky Mountain case.
In Rocky Mountain, the defendant argued that permitting the church’s expansion would
“cause the negative impacts predicted by certain witnesses who testified at trial.” 612 F. Supp.
2d at 1161. And, “[i]n fact, some witnesses at trial did testify that they anticipated certain
negative impacts if the RMCC [was] allowed to expand its facilities as proposed in its special use
application.” Id. But, the court concluded that plaintiff’s statutorily protected right to free
exercise of religion, on balance, outweighed the harms advanced by the defendant. Id. On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding: “Contrary to the [defendant’s]
claims, the district court plainly weighed the County’s zoning interest: the court did not agree
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that [plaintiff’s] special use application violated the County Land Use Code, and found that
RMCC’s statutory right to free exercise of religion outweighed the negative impacts of
expansion on the community.” Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 613
F.3d 1229, 1240 (10th Cir. 2010).
The court reaches the same conclusion on the facts established here. The court is mindful
of defendant’s interest in providing quiet enjoyment of property to its residents. And, defendant
indeed presented some trial evidence that noise from the meeting house concerned some of
defendant’s residents. But in the end, the harm imposed on plaintiffs’ RLUIPA rights exceeds
the concerns expressed by nearby residents. The jury found that defendant had permitted
comparable uses of private property within its borders despite similar residential concerns.
Specifically, the trial evidence showed that defendant had permitted Pembroke to expand use of
recreational facilities over objections that this would interfere with residents’ quiet enjoyment of
their properties. And the court’s use of the word “permitted” is purposeful, for defendant
formally approved Pembroke’s land use requests. Given defendant’s manifest conclusion that
quiet enjoyment concerns weren’t paramount in that setting, defendant’s argument is
unpersuasive here. Plaintiffs have sustained their burden on this third prong. Defendant has not.
D.
Public Interest
The court also concludes that the injunction is not adverse to the public interest.
“‘Vindicating First Amendment freedoms is clearly in the public interest.’” Rocky Mountain,
612 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (quoting Pacific Frontier v. Pleasant Grove City, 414 F.3d 1221, 1237
(10th Cir. 2005)). “This principle applies equally to injunctions protecting RLUIPA rights
because . . . RLUIPA enforces the First Amendment and must be construed broadly.” Opulent
Life Church, 697 F.3d at 298.
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Defendant argues, based on the verdict, that the public interest does not favor an
injunction requiring defendant to grant plaintiffs’ land use application. Instead, defendant argues
that the “evidence may have led the jury to conclude that [t]he City would have best served its
residents by denying all the requests of both Pembroke and plaintiffs.” Doc. 91 at 7. This
argument has no merit. It is undisputed: Defendant approved three Pembroke land use
applications, and no sleight of hand can change those facts. RLUIPA does not permit the jury or
the court to decide whether defendant might have served its residents better by denying all of
Pembroke’s requests and these plaintiffs’ request as well. Rather, as RLUIPA dictates, the court
instructed the jury to consider whether the land use requests submitted by plaintiffs and
Pembroke made them “similarly situated.” And, if so, whether defendant had treated Pembroke
more favorably. The jury found for plaintiffs on both questions. Nothing about the jury’s
verdict implies that injunctive relief is adverse to the public interest.
Defendant also contends that the public interest disfavors the injunction because
defendant must protect the residential character of the cul-de-sac and the health, safety, and
welfare of its residents. Plaintiffs respond, arguing that “the jury’s determination that the
Church’s and Pembroke’s land use requests were similarly situated entails the conclusion that the
City could both protect its residents and approve the Church’s proposed meeting house—just like
it approved Pembroke’s athletic complex.” Doc. 95 at 8. The court agrees with plaintiffs.
Given the RLUIPA right at issue here, the court finds that the public interest favors issuing the
injunction.
E.
Scope of the Injunction
Last, defendant contends plaintiffs have requested an injunction that is too broad and not
tailored to fit plaintiffs’ injuries. See Garrison, 287 F.3d at 962 (“It is well settled an injunction
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must be narrowly tailored to remedy the harm shown.”). Specifically, defendant asks the court to
impose time and occupancy restrictions on plaintiffs’ use of the meeting house. Plaintiffs, in
response, argue these restrictions would disregard the jury’s verdict because plaintiffs’ 2016 land
use application contained no time or occupancy restrictions. So, plaintiffs argue, the jury found
that plaintiffs and Pembroke were similarly situated in their land use requests even though
plaintiffs’ application contained no time and occupancy restrictions.3 In short, plaintiffs argue
that retroactively imposing time and occupancy restrictions on their 2016 land use application
would produce even more unequal treatment.
Plaintiffs have the better end of this argument. The outcome on this issue turns on the
Tenth Circuit’s case law governing Equal Terms claims. At trial, the court’s instructions asked
the jury to decide whether plaintiffs’ land use application was similarly situated to any of
Pembroke’s three land use applications. And, the court modeled its Equal Terms jury instruction
after the instruction the Tenth Circuit had approved in Rocky Mountain. Compare Rocky
Mountain, 613 F.3d at 1236 (“To prove [the Equal Terms] claim, the district court properly
instructed the jury that RMCC must establish ‘that [the County] treated [RMCC] less favorably
in processing, determining, and deciding the 2004 special use application of the [RMCC] than
[the County] treated a similarly situated nonreligious assembly or institution.”), with Doc. 85 at 9
(“In order to prove they were treated on less than equal terms, Plaintiffs must establish that, in
denying Plaintiffs’ request to renovate the single-family house completely, the City treated
Plaintiffs less favorably than it treated a similarly-situated secular entity.”). The court’s
instructions also directed the jury to “consider all relevant similarities and differences between
their respective requests.” Doc. 85 at 9; see Rocky Mountain, 613 F.3d at 1237.
Plaintiffs recognize they remain bound to follow defendant’s existing noise, traffic, and parking
regulations. Doc. 95 at 10.
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The court recognizes that these instructions provided the jury with the latitude to evaluate
and decide whether a religious entity and secular comparator were similarly situated in their land
use requests. Also, the court is mindful that one court has criticized the approach used by the
court’s instructions. Tree of Life Christian Sch. v. City of Upper Arlington, 905 F.3d 357 (6th
Cir. 2018). The Sixth Circuit, reviewing the various Circuit tests for Equal Terms claims, briefly
commented on the Tenth Circuit’s approach:
The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, is an outlier even when it
comes to facially neutral land-use regulations. Rather than
evaluating whether a comparator is similarly situated to a religious
entity by reference to the land-use regulation’s purpose, the Tenth
Circuit weighs whether the uses, despite not being “identical,”
exhibit “substantial similarities” that would allow “a reasonable jury
to conclude that [the entities] were similarly situated.” Rocky
Mountain Christian Church v. Board of Cty. Comm’rs, 613 F.3d
1229, 1236–38 (10th Cir. 2010).
This test, in our opinion, lacks the clear guideposts that the other
circuits have adopted for examining whether a comparator is
similarly situated to a religious entity. Because the test is not
couched in terms of the land-use regulation’s purpose, a court
applying it must determine which differences between entities are
salient and which are insubstantial. The test therefore introduces
significant subjectivity into the application of the equal terms
provision.
Id. at 370. The Sixth Circuit, adopting its own Equal Terms test, thus added its voice to the
cacophony of views about Equal Terms claims. Indeed, the appellate courts have reached no
consensus about the meaning of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision. The opposite is true: eight
Circuits have applied eight glosses to this provision in RLUIPA. Third Church of Christ,
Scientist, of N.Y.C. v. City of N.Y., 626 F.3d 667, 670 (2d Cir. 2010); Lighthouse Inst. for
Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 2007); Opulent Life, 697
F.3d at 292–93; Tree of Life Christian Sch., 905 F.3d at 369; River of Life Kingdom Ministries v.
Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 371 (7th Cir. 2010); Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas
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Nuevas v. City of Yuma, 651 F.3d 1163, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2011); Rocky Mountain, 613 F.3d at
1236–37; Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cty., 450 F.3d 1295,
1311 (11th Cir. 2006).
Perhaps clarity is forthcoming: The plaintiff in the Sixth Circuit—Tree of Life Christian
Schools—has filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. One of the issues it asks to present to the
Court is whether the Sixth Circuit applied the proper test for a RLUIPA Equal Terms claim.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Tree of Life Christian Schools, Tree of Life Christian Sch. v.
City of Upper Arlington, No. 18-844 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2019),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18- 944/80721/20190116124431732_Cert%20
Petition.Filed.pdf. But, when the court submitted this case to the jury on November 9, 2018, the
court, of course, was bound to apply Tenth Circuit precedent.
Under that precedent, the court twice considered defendant’s argument that plaintiffs’
2016 land use request and Pembroke’s three land use requests were not similarly situated—as a
matter of law—because plaintiffs did not agree to time and occupancy restrictions: once on
summary judgment and once during trial when defendant filed its Motion for Judgment as a
Matter of Law at the close of plaintiffs’ case. See Doc. 58 at 24–31; Doc. 83 at 5–6. Both times,
the court carefully evaluated defendant’s argument that plaintiffs’ failure to agree to time and
occupancy restrictions—in whole or in part—meant that no rational jury could find for plaintiffs
on their Equal Terms claim. Both times, the court rejected defendant’s argument because
plaintiffs had adduced sufficient evidence to support a finding that plaintiffs’ request and
Pembroke’s requests were similarly situated.
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For example,4 plaintiffs presented trial evidence that that their 2016 land use request and
Pembroke’s 1999 land use request to convert a vacant lot into a soccer field were similarly
situated. Both Pembroke and St. Rose were institutional landowners in Mission Woods. And
both owned property inside the defendant’s Residential District. Both sought to convert their
property to a public or semipublic use permitted within the zoning district. Neighbors expressed
concerns about parking, traffic, and noise for both projects. On parking and traffic concerns,
both Pembroke and St. Rose instructed their patrons to park in their respective parking lots.
Last, plaintiffs presented evidence that Pembroke’s soccer field would border multiple residences
while the proposed meeting house would border just one residence. So, even with some
differences in use restrictions accepted by Pembroke, a reasonable jury, the court concluded,
could find that plaintiffs and Pembroke made similarly situated land use requests.
At bottom, defendant’s argument that any injunctive relief should come with hours and
occupancy limits asks the court to nullify a significant piece of the jury’s findings. The court
instructed the jury to compare Pembroke’s applications with plaintiffs’ land use application. The
undisputed evidence showed that plaintiffs’ land use request included no hours or occupancy
restrictions. The court then asked the jury to answer a simple question: Are the two applicants
similarly situated in their land use requests? The jury found that they were. Given that finding,
returned under instructions approved by our Circuit, it is improper for the court to impose
restrictions that the jury found unnecessary to equate plaintiffs’ rejected use with Pembroke’s
approved uses.
The court does not speculate whether the jury found plaintiffs’ 2016 land use request similarly situated to
one, some, or all of Pembroke’s land use requests. Rather, the court illustrates the similarities between plaintiffs’
request and one of Pembroke’s requests based on the evidence presented at trial.
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IV.
Conclusion
Plaintiffs have met their burden on all four prongs of the permanent injunction standard.
The court also concludes that plaintiffs’ proposed injunctive relief is not too broad. The court
thus grants plaintiffs’ Motion for Permanent Injunction (Doc. 87).
Specifically, the court permanently enjoins defendant and orders it to approve plaintiffs’
2016 land use application (Pls.’ Trial Ex. 32) within 45 days of this Order. See Rocky Mountain,
612 F. Supp. 2d at 1163 (providing defendant 45 days to approve the church’s land use
application). This deadline gives defendant ample time to approve plaintiffs’ application, or,
alternatively, to seek relief from the Court of Appeals.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT plaintiffs’ Motion for
Permanent Injunction (Doc. 87) is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the court PERMANENTLY ENJOINS
defendant, ORDERING IT TO APPROVE—within 45 days of this Order—the 2016 land use
application submitted by John Watkins for the Archdiocese and identified in the record as
Plaintiffs’ Trial Exhibit 32. See Doc. 84-2 at 2.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 10th day of May, 2019, at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ Daniel D. Crabtree
Daniel D. Crabtree
United States District Judge
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