Karrick v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, KS
Filing
87
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 72 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge John W. Lungstrum on 06/05/2018. (ses)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF KANSAS
Tracey Karrick,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 17-cv-2225-JWL
Unified Government of Wyandotte
County/Kansas City, Kansas,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiff Tracey Karrick filed this lawsuit against defendant, her former employer, asserting
that defendant discriminated against her on the basis of gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1), and
that it discriminated against her on the basis of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Plaintiff also asserts that defendant retaliated against
her in violation of Title VII. This matter is presently before the court on defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on all claims (doc. 72). As explained below, the motion is denied in its
entirety.
I.
Facts
The following facts are uncontroverted, stipulated in the pretrial order, or related in the
light most favorable to plaintiff as the nonmoving party. The Board of Public Utilities (“BPU”)
is a public utility that provides potable water and electrical services to its customers. It is an
administrative agency of the defendant Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City,
Kansas. As a municipal utility, the BPU has its own Department of Fleet Maintenance that
coordinates the vehicle maintenance of BPU’s company vehicles and trucks. The Department of
Fleet Maintenance is located in two garages—the “Service Center Garage,” which is the main
garage for electrical repair work, and “Muncie.”
In August 2007, defendant promoted plaintiff (who was first hired by defendant in May
1986) from Supervisor of Vehicle Maintenance to Superintendent of Transportation. Her title
subsequently changed from Superintendent of Transportation to Superintendent of Fleet
Maintenance. As the Superintendent of Fleet Maintenance, plaintiff was responsible for ensuring
proper and reliable transportation, suitably equipped at the least cost, with adequate controls to
provide proper fleet administration. Plaintiff was also responsible for keeping accurate records
relating to inventory. In this position, plaintiff reported to Bill Johnson, the Manager of Electric
Operations and Technology. Beginning in early 2015, plaintiff began voicing concerns to Mr.
Johnson about her compensation as a Superintendent as compared to the compensation received
by male BPU Superintendents. On February 2, 2015, plaintiff and Mr. Johnson met for more than
one hour to discuss her salary concerns as well as concerns relating to Mr. Johnson’s treatment of
plaintiff as compared to her male counterparts with respect to company phones, compensatory
time off and the use of company vehicles.
On Tuesday, May 17, 2016, plaintiff was attempting to leave the Service Center Garage to
attend a wake around 4pm. When plaintiff’s personal vehicle would not start, she asked another
employee, Chris Park, to “jump start” her car, which allowed plaintiff to drive her vehicle. Mr.
Park advised plaintiff that he believed that the BPU’s storeroom had a battery that would fit in her
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vehicle. After leaving the wake, plaintiff called Mr. Park at the Service Center Garage, who
confirmed that the garage had a battery in stock that would fit in her vehicle. Plaintiff asked Mr.
Park whether he would install the battery for her and advised him that she would pay for the
battery the following day. Mr. Park agreed to do so and plaintiff returned to the garage. Mr. Park
installed the battery in plaintiff’s vehicle and plaintiff again advised him that she would pay for
the battery the next day.
At that time, Factory Motor Parts (“FMP”) was the exclusive supplier of car batteries to
the BPU. After the installation of the battery in plaintiff’s vehicle, plaintiff had a discussion with
FMP’s battery representative, Mike Olson, about the cost of the battery. Ultimately, Mr. Olson
agreed to sell the battery to plaintiff at FMP’s cost and indicated that he would need to invoice the
BPU for the battery to secure that pricing for plaintiff. Accordingly, on May 24, 2016, FMP
generated an invoice to the BPU for the car battery that was installed in plaintiff’s vehicle.
Plaintiff told Mr. Olson that she would pay the invoice personally. As of May 31, 2016, plaintiff
had not yet paid the invoice. The parties dispute when plaintiff actually obtained the invoice and
who provided the invoice to her, but those facts are not critical to the disposition of the motion.
On June 1, 2016, a grievance meeting was held concerning disciplinary action taken by
plaintiff against one of her subordinates. The meeting was attended by plaintiff; Bill Johnson; the
subordinate who was challenging the action; a union representative; Jason McVay, the Fleet
Maintenance Supervisor; and Sam DeLeon, BPU’s Human Resources Director. During this
meeting, Mr. Johnson became aware that Mr. Park, on BPU time, had installed a battery from the
BPU’s inventory into plaintiff’s personal vehicle. It is unclear whether Mr. Johnson knew at this
time that plaintiff had not yet paid the invoice for the battery. In any event, immediately after the
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grievance meeting, plaintiff called Sara Bryant, the Lead Garage Clerk, and told her that she
needed the invoice to pay for the battery. Ms. Bryant located the invoice, provided it to plaintiff
and advised her to call FMP representative Donna Brammer with her credit card number. The
record reflects that plaintiff called FMP on June 1, 2016 at 3pm and that she left a message for
Ms. Brammer. Plaintiff’s evidence reflects that she then returned the invoice to Ms. Bryant and
asked Ms. Bryant to contact Ms. Brammer and to pay the invoice with plaintiff’s credit card
information. Ms. Bryant did not note any attempt to call FMP until June 7, 2016, when she left a
message for Ms. Brammer and returned the invoice to plaintiff.
By June 9, 2016, the human resources department had initiated an internal investigation
into the installation of the battery into plaintiff’s vehicle. Mr. DeLeon assigned Judy Woodruff,
one of the department’s Compliance Coordinators, to investigate plaintiff’s conduct. On the
morning of June 9, 2016, Ms. Woodruff contacted FMP and learned from Ms. Brammer that
plaintiff’s invoice remained unpaid. Ms. Woodruff then contacted plaintiff to schedule a meeting
for later that afternoon. Before that meeting took place, Ms. Bryant successfully contacted Ms.
Brammer and paid plaintiff’s invoice with plaintiff’s credit card number. Later that day, plaintiff
met with Mr. DeLeon, Mr. Johnson and Ms. Woodruff to discuss plaintiff’s removal of BPU
property from the storeroom for personal use. At the end of the meeting, plaintiff was placed on
administrative suspension with pay pending the investigation. Over the next several weeks, Ms.
Woodruff interviewed numerous BPU employees about the incident. At the end of her lengthy
investigative report, Ms. Woodruff concluded that an unwritten procedure exists within the BPU
that permits employees to purchase merchandise from the BPU warehouse or BPU vendors but
that the employee is required to pay for the merchandise at the time of the order or at the time the
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merchandise is picked up. Ms. Woodruff concluded that plaintiff violated this unwritten policy
by paying for the battery at a later date and that plaintiff should not have asked a BPU employee
to install the battery in her personal vehicle while on BPU time. Ms. Woodruff’s investigation
also uncovered that plaintiff, in June 2014, had been in an accident in her company vehicle and,
in violation of company policy, had never reported the accident. Plaintiff’s evidence, however,
reflects that the “accident” did not result in any damage to the company vehicle and, accordingly,
did not require completion of an accident report.
On July 25, 2016, Bill Johnson issued a “Conduct Memorandum” to plaintiff. A Conduct
Memorandum is the BPU’s response to an employee’s violation of a company rule or policy. In
the Conduct Memorandum, Mr. Johnson explained that he was recommending the termination of
plaintiff’s employment based on two rule violations—theft of BPU property and “failure to report
the unsafe operation and incident of a vehicle on Company business.” The following day, Mr.
DeLeon sent plaintiff a letter informing her of the BPU’s determination that she had violated two
rules and that her employment had been terminated effective July 26, 2016. Since plaintiff’s
termination, Jason McVay has served as the Acting Superintendent of Fleet Maintenance and is
receiving “step up” pay for those additional responsibilities. Mr. McVay is substantially younger
than plaintiff, who was nearing eligibility for full retirement.
Additional facts will be provided as they relate to the specific arguments raised by the
parties in their submissions.
II.
Summary Judgment Standard
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“Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, other discovery materials,
and affidavits demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Water Pik, Inc. v. Med–Systems, Inc., 726 F.3d
1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual issue is
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Water Pik, Inc., 726 F.3d at 1143 (quotation omitted). “The nonmoving party is entitled
to all reasonable inferences from the record; but if the nonmovant bears the burden of persuasion
on a claim at trial, summary judgment may be warranted if the movant points out a lack of
evidence to support an essential element of that claim and the nonmovant cannot identify specific
facts that would create a genuine issue.” Id. at 1143-44.
III.
Gender and Age Discrimination
In the pretrial order, plaintiff contends that defendant discriminated against her on the basis
of gender and age in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. 1 As plaintiff has
no direct evidence of discrimination, her claims are analyzed using the burden-shifting framework
set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Daniels v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 701 F.3d 620, 627 (10th Cir. 2012). Under McDonnell Douglas, plaintiff has
the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. To set forth a prima
facie case of discrimination, plaintiff must establish “(1) membership in a protected class and (2)
Plaintiff also asserts a gender discrimination claim under the Equal Pay Act, which the court
addresses separately.
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an adverse employment action (3) that took place under circumstances giving rise to an inference
of discrimination.” Id. (citing EEOC v. PVNF, LLC, 487 F.3d 790, 800 (10th Cir. 2007)). If she
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to defendant to assert a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. If defendant meets this burden,
summary judgment against plaintiff is warranted unless she introduces evidence “that the stated
nondiscriminatory reason is merely a pretext for discriminatory intent.” Id. (citing Simmons v.
Sykes Enters., 647 F.3d 943, 947 (10th Cir. 2011)).
A.
Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case
In its motion for summary judgment, defendant concedes that plaintiff has established a
prima facie case of gender discrimination but contends that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie
case of age discrimination. According to defendant, plaintiff must establish as part of her prima
facie case of age discrimination that she was performing satisfactory work at the time of her
termination and that she was replaced by a younger employee. Defendant then contends that
plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because plaintiff’s termination for theft necessarily
means that plaintiff was not performing satisfactory work and her position was never filled.
The court rejects defendant’s arguments. First, plaintiff is not necessarily required to
establish that she was performing satisfactory work or that she was replaced as part of her prima
facie case. See Bennett v. Windstream Communications, Inc., 792 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir.
2015) (plaintiff must show only that adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to
an inference of discrimination). In any event, because defendant contends that it terminated
plaintiff’s employment for theft, the court will not consider at the prima facie stage whether the
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alleged theft rendered plaintiff’s work unsatisfactory.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Horizon/CMS
Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1192–94 (10th Cir. 2000) (requiring plaintiff to disprove
defendant’s proffered reason for employment decision to establish prima facie case would
inappropriately short circuit McDonnell Douglas analysis).
Finally, plaintiff’s evidence
demonstrates that Jason McVay, a younger employee, assumed plaintiff’s responsibilities (if not
her official title) immediately after the termination of plaintiff’s employment and that Mr. McVay
is presently the “Acting” Superintendent of Fleet Maintenance. Defendant, then, has not satisfied
its burden of showing an absence of disputed material facts with respect to plaintiff’s prima facie
case of age discrimination.
B.
The Pretext Analysis
The court turns to whether defendant has met its burden to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s discharge. “This burden is one of production, not
persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment.” Carter v. Pathfinder Energy Servs., Inc.,
662 F.3d 1134, 1149 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 142 (2000)). The Tenth Circuit has characterized this burden as “exceedingly light,”
and the court finds that defendant has carried it here. See id. According to defendant, Mr. Johnson
decided to terminate plaintiff’s employment because he concluded, based on the results of the
investigation, that plaintiff had no intention of paying for the battery and that she finally paid for
the battery on June 9, 2016 only because she had been summoned to a meeting to discuss the
issue. The “Conduct Memorandum” authored by Mr. Johnson further indicates that plaintiff’s
failure to report the June 3, 2014 incident involving damage to her vehicle was considered in the
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termination decision. The burden of proof, then, shifts back to plaintiff to show that defendant’s
proffered reasons are pretextual.2
Evidence of pretext “may take a variety of forms,” including evidence tending to show
“that the defendant’s stated reason for the adverse employment action was false” and evidence
tending to show “that the defendant acted contrary to a written company policy prescribing the
action to be taken by the defendant under the circumstances.” Id. at 1150 (quoting Kendrick, 220
F.3d at 1230). A plaintiff may also show pretext with evidence that the defendant had “shifted
rationales” or that it had treated similarly situated employees differently. Crowe v. ADT Servs.,
Inc., 649 F.3d 1189, 1197 (10th Cir. 2011). In essence, a plaintiff shows pretext by presenting
evidence of “weakness, implausibility, inconsistency, incoherency, or contradiction in the
employer’s stated reasons, such that a reasonable jury could find them unconvincing.” Debord v.
Mercy Health System of Kansas, Inc., 737 F.3d 642, 655 (10th Cir. 2013). In determining whether
the proffered reason is pretextual, the court examines “the facts as they appear to the person
making the decision, not as they appear to the plaintiff.” Id. (emphasis in original). The court
does not “ask whether the employer’s proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct” but only
whether “the employer honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those
beliefs.” Id. The court analyzes plaintiff’s pretext evidence below.
In its motion, defendant contends that plaintiff, in addition to establishing pretext, must
“overcome the presumption that administrative officials act with honesty and integrity” and the
presumption that government officials act in good faith. The cases relied upon by defendant
involve public officials serving as adjudicators and are clearly distinguishable. See, e.g., Withrow
v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (a person claiming bias on the part of an administrative tribunal
“must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators”).
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The primary reason offered by defendant for the termination decision is plaintiff’s “theft”
of company property. Specially, defendant contends that Mr. Johnson decided to terminate
plaintiff’s employment because he concluded, based on the results of the investigation, that
plaintiff had no intention of paying for the battery. But plaintiff’s evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to her, is sufficient to cast doubt on this reason. To begin, the investigation report
does not conclude that plaintiff tried to steal the battery or that she had no intention of paying for
the battery. The report concludes only that plaintiff took the battery with the intention of paying
for it later, which was inconsistent with defendant’s unwritten policy that arguably required an
employee to pay for an item purchased from the warehouse prior to taking the item. The report
sets forth specific details about plaintiff’s efforts to pay for the battery prior to June 9, 2016,
including a reference to the “first attempt to pay” on June 1, 2016 and a reference to an additional
attempt to pay on June 7, 2016. Moreover, Mr. Johnson admitted in his deposition that the
investigation report did not find that plaintiff had no intention of paying for the battery and he
admitted that he knew that the report mentioned “a few calls” made to the battery vendor,
presumably to make payment.
Plaintiff’s evidence also supports an inference that Mr. Johnson, prior to the investigation,
had already decided to terminate plaintiff’s employment. Judy Woodruff, the individual who
conducted the investigation for defendant, avers that Sam DeLeon advised her before she
completed the investigation that Mr. Johnson wanted to terminate plaintiff’s employment. Ms.
Woodruff further testified in her deposition that, during the course of the investigation, she
expressed to Mr. DeLeon that she had not been able to substantiate the idea that plaintiff had
committed theft and that he told her that Mr. Johnson wanted to fire plaintiff so “we need to make
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sure we find justification to do that.”3 Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that Mr. Johnson did not in fact rely on the investigation
report in deciding to terminate plaintiff’s employment and that he did not really believe that
plaintiff had no intention of paying for the battery. Plaintiff has cast sufficient doubt on this reason
to survive summary judgment.
Defendant also states that Mr. Johnson, in making the termination decision, considered the
fact that the investigation uncovered that plaintiff had failed to report a June 3, 2014 incident in
which her company vehicle was damaged. On the Conduct Memorandum, this incident is deemed
a violation of Rule 21 for the “Failure to report the unsafe operation and incident of a vehicle on
Company business.” But Mr. Johnson testified that the termination decision was based solely on
the battery issue. Moreover, as noted above, there is evidence that Mr. Johnson had made the
termination decision before the investigation ended in any event such that the discovery of the
June 3, 2014 incident did not factor into his decision. Finally, plaintiff’s evidence suggests that a
first-time violation of Rule 21 would result in a warning and probationary period absent
aggravating circumstances and no such circumstances are reflected in the record. To the extent,
then, that defendant is asserting that it relied on a violation of Rule 21 in deciding to terminate
plaintiff’s employment, plaintiff has cast sufficient doubt on that reason to survive summary
judgment.
Defendant objects to these statements on hearsay grounds. But the statements of Mr. Johnson
and Mr. DeLeon are not hearsay because the alleged statements concerned a matter within the
scope of their employment with defendant. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D).
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For the foregoing reasons, genuine issues of material fact exist concerning plaintiff’s
gender and age discrimination claims and those issues must be resolved by a jury.
IV.
Retaliation
In the pretrial order, plaintiff asserts that defendant, in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., terminated her employment in retaliation for
plaintiff’s opposing in good faith what she believed were discriminatory employment practices.
As plaintiff has no direct evidence of retaliation, her claim is analyzed using the burden-shifting
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Daniels v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 701 F.3d 620, 638 (10th Cir. 2012). To state a prima facie case for
retaliation, plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in protected opposition to discrimination, (2)
a reasonable worker would have considered the challenged employment action materially adverse,
and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse
action. Id. If plaintiff presents a prima facie case of retaliation, then defendant must respond with
a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the challenged action. Parker Excavating, Inc. v. Lafarge
W., Inc., 863 F.3d 1213, 1220 (10th Cir. 2017). If defendant satisfies this burden, plaintiff must
show that defendant’s reason was merely a pretext for retaliation. Id.
In its motion for summary judgment, defendant contends that plaintiff cannot establish the
first and third elements of her prima facie case of retaliation. Specifically, defendant contends
that plaintiff did not engage in protected activity because she raised only verbal concerns that were
“more than adequately addressed” at the February 2, 2015 meeting between plaintiff and Mr.
Johnson, nearly 18 months before her termination. To the extent that defendant is suggesting that
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plaintiff was required to make a discrimination complaint in writing to satisfy the “protected
activity” requirement, that argument is rejected. See Hertz v. Luzenac Am., Inc., 370 F.3d 1014,
1015 (10th Cir. 2004) (“protected activity” can include voicing informal complaints to
supervisors). And while defendant argues that the vast majority of plaintiff’s concerns had
nothing to do with alleged discrimination, defendant concedes that plaintiff raised concerns about
her pay compared to the pay of male Superintendents employed by defendant. Finally, plaintiff’s
evidence demonstrates that plaintiff’s concerns were not resolved on February 2, 2015 but that
she continued to articulate complaints about potentially discriminatory pay practices. Mr. Johnson
testified in his deposition that he and plaintiff discussed her assertion that male superintendents
were making more money than her “many times” after the February 2, 2015 discussion and that
plaintiff was raising concerns about her pay “over a span of time” including during 2016. He
testified that he heard more from plaintiff about her dissatisfaction with her compensation than he
did from any other employee. Plaintiff’s interrogatory responses indicate that she met with Mr.
Johnson about her compensation as late as April 28, 2016. The court, then, rejects defendant’s
argument that plaintiff’s complaints were fully resolved by February 2015.
And because
plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to show that her concerns about potentially discriminatory pay
practices were expressed to Mr. Johnson on an ongoing basis and not resolved at the time of her
termination, she has satisfied her prima facie case.
The court turns, then, to the rest of the McDonnell Douglas framework. In support of her
retaliation claim, plaintiff relies on the same “pretext” evidence that she does to support her
discrimination claims. As described above in connection with plaintiff’s discrimination claims,
that evidence is sufficient to cast doubt on defendant’s proffered reason for terminating plaintiff’s
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employment. For those same reasons, plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to survive summary
judgment on her retaliation claim. Summary judgment on this claim is denied.
V.
Equal Pay Act
Plaintiff asserts that defendant violated the Equal Pay Act (EPA) by paying her a lower
salary than it paid her male counterparts for equal work. The EPA provides, in relevant part, that:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed,
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the
opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under
similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a
seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor
other than sex.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). To establish a prima facie case under the EPA, plaintiff has the burden of
proving that she was performing work which was “substantially equal” to that of male
superintendents considering the skills, duties, supervision, effort and responsibilities of the jobs;
that the conditions where the work was performed were basically the same; and that male
superintendents were paid more under such circumstances. See Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc.,
129 F.3d 1355, 1364 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Tidwell v. Fort Howard Corp., 989 F.2d 406, 409
(10th Cir. 1993) (citing Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974))); accord Riser v.
QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 2015). If plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,
then defendant “must undertake the burden of persuading the jury” that the pay differential was
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premised on a factor other than sex. See Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1364 (citing Tidwell, 989 F.2d at
409).
Defendant contends that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case under the EPA
because she cannot show that she was performing work substantially equal to the work performed
by male superintendents.4 Work is “substantially equal” for purposes of the EPA if it requires
“equal skill, effort, and responsibility.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). “This determination turns on the
actual content of the job—not mere job descriptions or titles.” Riser, 776 F.3d at 1196. “What
constitutes equal skill, equal effort, or equal responsibility cannot be precisely defined,” but must
take into consideration “the broad remedial purpose of the law.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1620.14).
Thus, “[i]nsubstantial or minor differences in the degree or amount of skill, or effort, or
responsibility required for the performance of jobs will not render the equal pay standard
inapplicable.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1620.14).
In support of its motion, defendant argues that plaintiff’s position has no comparator
because no one else held the specific position held by plaintiff—Superintendent of Fleet
Maintenance. As noted above, the “substantially equal” determination does not turn on job titles
and, thus, this argument is summarily rejected. Defendant also asserts in conclusory fashion and
without citation to the record that the duties and responsibilities of plaintiff’s position as
Superintendent of Fleet Maintenance were “substantially different” than those required for other
superintendent positions. Defendant does not direct the court to any evidence concerning the
Defendant also contends that plaintiff’s EPA claim must fail because plaintiff was “highly
compensated” for the work she performed and because she received pay increases over the course
of her employment. Defendant offers no indication of how these facts undermine her claim or
bear on the elements of her prima facie case. These arguments are rejected.
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duties and responsibilities of the various superintendent positions and, accordingly, has not shown
that it is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Because defendant has not met its initial
burden on summary judgment of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,
defendant’s motion is denied with respect to plaintiff’s EPA claim.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT defendant’s motion for
summary judgment (doc. 72) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 5th day of June, 2018, at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ John W.Lungstrum
John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge
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