Korpas v. Hungary, Republic of

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. It is therefore ordered by the court that Plaintiff Laszlo Korpas's 7 Motion for Default Judgment is denied; his 10 Motion for Leave to File Exhibits Conventionally is therefore moot. This case is hereby dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Signed by District Judge Julie A. Robinson on 11/21/2024. (kmc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
LASZLO KORPAS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 24-2087-JAR-ADM

REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Laszlo Korpas’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 7), and
Motion for Leave to File Exhibits Conventionally (Doc. 10). After screening the motion and
operative Amended Complaint, this Court issued to Plaintiff an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) in
writing why this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1 Plaintiff
filed his response to the Court’s OSC on November 4, 2024.2 As described more fully below,
the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Therefore, Plaintiff’s pending motion
for default judgment must be denied, and his motion to file exhibits conventionally is moot.
I.

Background
Plaintiff Laszlo Korpas, who proceeds pro se, alleges in his Amended Complaint claims

against the Republic of Hungary, a foreign state.3 Specifically, he alleges that “[o]n June 26,
2017, the Hungarian state’s violent union the Hungarian police, took my son away illegally. . . .
[T]hey had no jurisdiction over my son. My human rights were severely violated.”4 He requests

1

Doc. 12.

2

Doc. 13.

3

Doc. 3.

4

Id. at 3.

a jury trial, and seeks $250 million in damages, the return of his son, and a judgment that
Hungary’s actions in taking Plaintiff’s son were unlawful.
Plaintiff filed several exhibits in support of the Amended Complaint and in support of his
motion for default judgment.5 Those exhibits set forth additional facts that form the basis for his
claims. Plaintiff alleges that his son’s mother left him in the hospital after his birth and he was
“brought up by the guardianship office,” but eventually returned to Plaintiff.6 Plaintiff then
moved to Romania and attempted to terminate his Hungarian residence, but sometimes visited
Hungary for short periods of time. On one of these trips to Hungary, “the guardianship office
restarted the child protection proceedings, unlawfully due to lack of jurisdiction.”7 The
guardianship office required a health examination for Plaintiff’s son. Plaintiff cooperated, and
the child was determined to be healthy. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved to Germany with his son, but
two weeks later, the police called him and advised that there was an Interpol warrant for his
arrest and his son was considered a missing person. Plaintiff returned to Hungary the next day,
and the guardian’s office removed Plaintiff’s son on the basis that he had not taken the child to a
doctor and “hid the son from the nurse.”8 Plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged this custody
decision in the Hungarian courts. He then moved to the United States, hoping that “the legal
system still works in America.”9 Plaintiff alleges that while in Hungarian custody, his son was
neglected and became ill, and that he has been held captive for seven years. He seeks monetary
compensation and the return of his son.

5

Docs. 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 8, 9, 11.

6

Doc. 3-1 at 1.

7

Id.

8

Id. at 2.

9

Id.

2

II.

Standards
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must therefore have a statutory or

constitutional basis for exercising jurisdiction.10 The party seeking to invoke federal subject
matter jurisdiction has the burden to establish that jurisdiction is proper,11 and “[m]ere
conclusory allegations of jurisdiction are not enough.”12 The Court has an independent duty to
assure itself of its own subject matter jurisdiction and can dismiss at any time sua sponte for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.13
28 U.S.C. § 1330 governs the Court’s jurisdiction over foreign states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign
state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for
relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not
entitled to immunity either under sections 1605–1607 of this title
or under any applicable international agreement.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) also governs this Court’s jurisdiction. Under
that statute, “[s]ubject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party
at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this
chapter.”14 “Section 1330 thus ‘works in tandem’ with the FSIA’s substantive provisions:
Section 1604 bars state and federal courts from exercising jurisdiction when a foreign state is
entitled to immunity, and section 1330 confers jurisdiction on federal district courts only if one

10

United States v. Hardage, 58 F.3d 569, 574 (10th Cir. 1995).

11

Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
12

United States ex rel. Hafter v. Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc., 190 F.3d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted).
13

See, e.g., City of Albuquerque v. Soto Enters., Inc., 864 F.3d 1089, 1093 (10th Cir. 2017); Fed. R. Civ. P.

14

28 U.S.C. § 1604.

12(h)(3).

3

of the exceptions to immunity applies.”15 If no FSIA exception applies, this Court does not have
subject matter jurisdiction.16 Where, as here, the plaintiff seeks default judgment in an action
against a foreign government, “a special duty on the part of a federal court to carefully scrutinize
the plaintiff’s claim” arises.17
III.

Discussion
In its OSC, the Court identified the following jurisdictional problems with the Amended

Complaint: (1) Plaintiff seeks a jury trial, which is not permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 1330; and (2)
there is no indication that one of the FSIA exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity applies
here.18 In his response to the OSC, Plaintiff waives his right to jury trial, which resolves the first
issue the Court identified. Liberally construing Plaintiff’s pro se response, as the Court must,19
he argues that the tortious activity, existing-treaty, and terrorism exceptions to foreign sovereign
immunity apply here.
As stated above, the FSIA establishes the rules for jurisdiction over a foreign state, and
Plaintiff does not dispute that the Republic of Hungary is a “foreign state” under the Act. 20 “The
Act creates a baseline presumption of immunity from suit. ‘[U]nless a specified exception
applies, a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign state.’”21

15
Villoldo v. Republic of Cuba, 659 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1170 (D. Colo. 2023) (quoting Vera v. Republic of
Cuba, 867 F.3d 310, 316 (2d Cir. 2017)).
16

Vera, 867 F.3d at 316.

17

Villoldo, 659 F. Supp. 3d at 1171 (quoting Sullivan v. Republic of Cuba, 289 F. Supp. 3d 231, 242 (D.
Me. 2017), aff’d, 891 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2018)).
18

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605–1607.

19

See Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173 (10th Cir. 1997).

20

See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)–(b).

21
Fed. Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U.S. 169, 176 (2021) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993)).

4

Below, the Court considers each of the FSIA exceptions identified by Plaintiff and concludes
that they do not apply here.
A.

Tortious Activity Exception

First, Plaintiff asserts that the tortious activity exception applies. That exception allows
jurisdiction where:
[M]oney damages are sought against a foreign state for personal
injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the
United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that
foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state
while acting within the scope of his office or employment; except
this paragraph shall not apply to—
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
regardless of whether the discretion be abused, or
(B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or
interference with contract rights . . . .22
The Supreme Court has explained that this exception “is limited by its terms . . . to those cases in
which the damage to or loss of property occurs in the United States.”23
Plaintiff’s allegations in the exhibits attached to his Amended Complaint demonstrate
that his injury occurred in Hungary, where Plaintiff’s son was allegedly taken from him, not in
the United States. Moreover, any allegation that Hungarian officials acted without jurisdiction in
rendering a custodial decision would be exempt from the tortious-activity exception under
§ 1605(a)(5)(A). Likewise, Plaintiff’s allegation that he was subject to wrongful criminal
convictions in Hungary would be subject to the malicious prosecution and abuse of process
exemptions in subparagraph (B).

22

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).

23

Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439–40 (1989) (emphasis omitted).

5

Plaintiff cites Villoldo v. Republic of Cuba24 and Vera v. Republic of Cuba25 for the
proposition that foreign states are “not immune under the FSIA when their actions directly
caused harm to U.S.-based individuals.”26 But Plaintiff misreads these cases. Villoldo and Vera
considered only one exception to foreign sovereign immunity—the state-sponsored acts of
terrorism exception.27 These cases neither considered nor applied the tortious-activity exception.
This Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction under the tortious activity exception to the
FSIA because Plaintiff’s injury occurred in Hungary, and because the discretionary function or
malicious-prosecution exemptions to this exception would apply.
B.

Existing-Treaty Exception

Next, Plaintiff claims that the Court has jurisdiction because his claims arise under the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Hague
Convention”).28 28 U.S.C. § 1604 provides that foreign sovereign immunity is “[s]ubject to
existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of
[the FSIA].” As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]his exception applies when international
agreements ‘expressly conflic[t]’ with the immunity provisions of the FSIA,” and does not apply
if the treaty does not create a private right of action in the United States.29

24

659 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1170 (D. Colo. 2023).

25

867 F.3d 310, 316 (2d Cir. 2017).

26

Doc. 13 at 1.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A; Vera, 867 F.3d at 316 (“The only exception urged in this case is for statesponsored acts of terrorism.”); Villoldo, 659 F. Supp. 3d at 1171–83 (considering only the FSIA’s terrorism
exception).
27

28

Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 22514 U.N.T.S. 98 [hereinafter Hague Convention].

29

Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 442 (alteration in original) (1989).

6

The Hague Convention is a multilateral treaty adopted “[t]o address ‘the problem of
international child abductions during domestic disputes.’”30 Congress passed the International
Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”) after it ratified the Hague Convention, which
implements the Convention.31 The Court cannot construe Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as a
petition under the Hague Convention. There is no domestic dispute at issue in Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint. And under Article 12 of the Hague Convention, if “a court determines a
child has been wrongfully removed . . . the child is to be returned ‘forthwith,’ as long as the
proceedings have been ‘commenced’ in the ‘judicial or administrative authority of the
Contracting State where the child is’ less than one year before the date of wrongful removal.”32
Plaintiff alleges in the Amended Complaint and elsewhere that his son was wrongfully taken in
Hungary, and that he has been there for seven years. Thus, under the Treaty, Plaintiff was
required to seek relief in Hungary, not in the United States, and there is no conflict between any
immunity provisions in the Hague Convention and the FSIA.
C.

Terrorism Exception

Finally, Plaintiff references in his Amended Complaint human rights abuses, terror, and
persecution in Hungary. He argues in his response to the OSC that these facts confer jurisdiction
on the Court. The Court liberally construes this argument as invoking the terrorism exception to
the FSIA under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. But this exception does not apply because it requires that

30
Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 4 (2014) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S.
1, 8 (2010)).
31

Id.; see 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9011.

32

Monzon v. De La Roca, 910 F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Hague Convention, art. 12); see also 22
U.S.C. § 9003(b) (“Any person seeking to initiate judicial proceedings under the Convention for the return of a child
or for arrangements for organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of access to a child may do so by
commencing a civil action by filing a petition for the relief sought in any court which has jurisdiction of such action
and which is authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in the place where the child is located at the time the petition is
filed.” (emphasis added)).

7

the foreign state be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.33 The Republic of Hungary is
not.34 Therefore, this exception cannot apply.
In sum, the Court finds that the Republic of Hungary is immune from suit as a foreign
state, and therefore the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Because the
Court lacks jurisdiction, it must deny Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff Laszlo Korpas’s
Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 7) is denied; his Motion for Leave to File Exhibits
Conventionally (Doc. 10) is therefore moot. This case is hereby dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 21, 2024
S/ Julie A. Robinson
JULIE A. ROBINSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

33

See, e.g., Villoldo v. Republic of Cuba, 659 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1171–72 (D. Colo. 2023).

See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(6) (stating that “state sponsor of terrorism” requires designation by the
Secretary of State); Bureau of Counterterrorism, State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State,
https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2024) (listing Cuba, North Korea, Iran, and
Syria).
34

8