Lindsay v. Conover
Filing
28
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 10 Motion for Summary Judgment. A motion for reconsideration of this order pursuant to this court's Rule 7.3 is not encouraged. Any such motion shall not exceed three pages and shall strictly comply with the standards enunciated by this court in Comeau v. Rupp. The response to any motion for reconsideration shall not exceed three pages. No reply shall be filed. Signed by District Judge Monti L. Belot on 1/24/2013. (aa)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
SPENCER L. LINDSAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
EMMALEE CONOVER,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION
No.
12-3167-MLB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case comes before the court on defendant’s motion for
summary judgment.1
(Doc. 10).
is ripe for decision.
The motion has been fully briefed and
(Docs. 11, 19, 20, 22, 25, 27).
Defendant’s
motion is granted for the reasons herein.
I.
Facts
In 2011, plaintiff was incarcerated at Winfield Correctional
Facility (“Winfield”).
Winfield.
Defendant Emmalle Conover was the Warden of
On April 8, 2011, the Kansas Court of Appeals issued an
unpublished decision vacating plaintiff’s sentence, which was a term
42 months, and remanding the case to the Russell County District Court
for resentencing.
The mandate was not issued until May 12, 2011.
April 19, the district court proceeded with resentencing.
district court judge resentenced plaintiff to 40 months.
On
The
At that
time, plaintiff had been incarcerated since approximately April 15,
2009.
1
The court converted defendant’s motion to dismiss to one for
summary judgment on October 30, 2012. (Doc. 21). The parties were
then provided with additional time to supplement their briefing and
attach additional exhibits.
After returning to Winfield, plaintiff filed a grievance to the
records department asserting that he should be immediately released
because his sentence was reduced to 40 months.
Plaintiff’s request
was denied on the basis that the journal entry had not been received
and his sentence had not been recalculated.
Plaintiff’s request was
not submitted to defendant. On April 26, plaintiff filed an emergency
grievance with defendant.
office on April 27.
The grievance was received by defendant’s
The grievance stated that plaintiff was being
detained without a valid order of detention because his current
incarceration was vacated by the Kansas Court of Appeals. Plaintiff’s
grievance stated he had attached both the appellate opinion and the
request sent to the records department for review.
The district court judgment was filed with the district court
clerk on May 3.
5.
Defendant responded to plaintiff’s grievance on May
Defendant stated that KDOC had not received any official document
from the courts at that time and that plaintiff would not be released
until the prison received notice and his release date could be
reviewed. The journal entry of the judgment was transmitted to the
Kansas Department of Corrections and received on May 5.
Prior
computation
to
the
unit
receipt
of
KDOC
of
the
journal
had
not
received
entry,
any
the
sentence
notification
plaintiff’s resentencing from the district court.
of
The sentence
computation unit of KDOC receives journal entries from district court
clerks and then calculates sentences based on applicable credits
available to inmates.
The unit then informs the facilities when an
inmate is to be released.
After receiving plaintiff’s journal entry,
the unit filled out a sentence computation worksheet.
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Plaintiff’s
earliest release date was determined to be March 25 and a latest
release date of September 25. Due to the receipt of good time credit,
plaintiff was eligible for immediate release.
Plaintiff was released from Winfield on May 5.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant alleging that
defendant violated his rights to be free from unlawful incarceration.
Defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis that there was no
unlawful detention in this case.
II.
Summary Judgment Standards
The rules applicable to the resolution of this case, now at the
summary judgment stage, are well-known and are only briefly outlined
here.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) directs the entry of
summary judgment in favor of a party who "show[s] that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
An issue is “genuine” if sufficient evidence exists so that a rational
trier of fact could resolve the issue either way and an issue is
“material” if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper
disposition of the claim.
Adamson v. Multi Community Diversified
Svcs., Inc., 514 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th Cir. 2008).
When confronted
with a fully briefed motion for summary judgment, the court must
ultimately determine "whether there is the need for a trial–whether,
in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can
be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be
resolved in favor of either party."
477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
judgment.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
If so, the court cannot grant summary
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
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III. Analysis
A.
Official Capacity Claim
Plaintiff brought claims against defendant in both her personal
and official capacity.
Defendant moves to dismiss the official
capacity claims on the basis that the State of Kansas may not be sued
for damages in section 1983 claims.
The Tenth Circuit has held that
“neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities
are ‘persons' under § 1983.” Stidham v. Peace Officer Stds. &
Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1156 (10th Cir. 2001).
judgment
in
favor
of
defendant
in
her
official
Thus, summary
capacity
is
appropriate.
B.
Personal Capacity Claim
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983, any person who “under color
of . . . [law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, . . . any
[person] . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured.”
Section 1983 was enacted to provide protections
to those persons wronged by the misuse of power.
While the statute
itself creates no substantive civil rights, it does provide an avenue
through which civil rights can be redeemed.
F.3d 1547, 1552 (10th Cir. 1995).
See Wilson v. Meeks, 52
To state a claim for relief in a
section 1983 action, plaintiff must establish that he was (1) deprived
of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States
and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of
state law. See Am. Mfr’s. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 4950 (1999).
There is no dispute that defendant was acting under color
of state law.
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Qualified Immunity
While
section
1983
permits
the
possible
vindication
of
a
plaintiff’s rights, non-meritorious suits exact a high cost upon
society and law enforcement personnel. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 638 (1987). In order to balance the competing interests,
government officials performing discretionary duties are afforded
qualified immunity shielding them from civil damages liability.
Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815, 172 L. Ed.2d 565 (2009).
Qualified immunity protects these officials unless their conduct
“violate[s] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”
Id.; Baptiste v. J.C.
Penney Co., Inc., 147 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 1998).
The defense
not only provides immunity from monetary liability, but perhaps more
importantly, from suit as well.
See Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1277.
When a defendant claims qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears
the burden of (1) coming forward with sufficient facts to show that
the defendant’s actions violated a constitutional right and (2)
demonstrating the right allegedly violated was “clearly established”
at the time the conduct occurred.
Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815-16.
As
noted in Pearson, courts are no longer required to follow the two-step
sequence mandated by Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
818.
Id. at
“The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals
should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding
which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be
addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case
at hand.”
Id.
The court will first address the clearly established
prong.
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Clearly Established Constitutional Right
The
court
must
determine
whether
the
right
at
issue
was
sufficiently clear that defendant would have understood that her
conduct violated a constitutional right that was clearly established
at the time the alleged act took place.
See Cruz v. City of Laramie,
239 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001); Watson v. University of Utah
Med. Ctr., 75 F.3d 569, 577 (10th Cir. 1996). This standard, however,
must be used in a particularized manner2 because “[o]n a very general
level,
all
constitutional
Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1278.
rights
are
clearly
established.”
Were this level of particularity not
required, Harlowe “would be transformed from a guarantee of immunity
into a rule of pleading,” that would “destroy ‘the balance
that
[Supreme Court] cases strike between the interests in vindication of
citizens’ constitutional rights and in public officials’ effective
performance of their duties.’”
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-40 (quoting
Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984)).
Plaintiff essentially contends that he was being confined in
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights and that defendant had
a constitutional obligation to investigate his claim that his sentence
had been vacated by the Kansas Court of Appeals.
The Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees the right of an individual to be free from a
deprivation of liberty without due process.
2
The question before the
The Tenth Circuit “has held that for a right to be
‘particularized,’ there must ordinarily be a Supreme Court or Tenth
Circuit decision on point, or ‘clearly established weight of
authority’ from other courts.” Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547, 1552
(10th Cir. 1995); see also Cruz v. City of Laramie, 239 F.3d 1183,
1187 (10th Cir. 2001); Horstkoetter v. Dept. of Public Safety, 159
F.3d 1265, 1278 (10th Cir. 1998).
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court is whether defendant violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights
by failing to release him after receiving plaintiff’s grievance.
Plaintiff’s original sentence was vacated by the Kansas Court of
Appeals on April 8, 2011. The appellate court, however, did not order
plaintiff’s immediate release but remanded the case for resentencing.
It also noted that on resentencing the district court could chose not
to depart when imposing the new sentence. Therefore, there is nothing
in the appellate court opinion which would require defendant to
release plaintiff from custody.
The district court proceeded with resentencing prior to the
issuance of the mandate.
The district judge sentenced plaintiff to
a reduced term of 40 months on April 19.
Plaintiff contends that he
should have been immediately released following the resentencing.
Plaintiff cites several cases for the proposition that a sentence is
effective upon is pronouncement from the bench.
(Doc. 19 at 11).
Kansas law states that the “journal entry is thus a record of the
sentence imposed; but the actual sentencing occurs when the defendant
appears in open court and the judge orally states the terms of the
sentence.”
State v. Moses, 227 Kan. 400, 402, 607 P.2d 477 (1980).
The court agrees with plaintiff that a sentence is effective when
it is pronounced.
However, Kansas law further provides as follows:
(a) When any person has been convicted of a violation
of any law of the state of Kansas and has been sentenced to
confinement, it shall be the duty of the sheriff of the
county, upon receipt of a certified copy of the journal
entry of judgment, judgment form showing conviction,
sentence, and commitment, or an order of commitment
supported by a recorded judgment of sentence, to cause such
person to be confined in accordance with the sentence.
(b) The certified copy of a judgment and sentence to
confinement or imprisonment shall be sufficient authority
for the jailer or warden or other person in charge of the
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place of confinement to detain such person for the period
of the sentence.
K.S.A. 22-3427.
Therefore, plaintiff’s sentence he was serving prior to April 19
had been calculated based on the sentence he received in 2009.
Defendant had not received any documentation, i.e. journal entry, to
support plaintiff’s request for relief.
Moreover, the sentence
plaintiff received was not a time served sentence.
In order to be
eligible for release, plaintiff must have earned good time credit
which is indisputably calculated by the sentence computation unit.
Defendant’s insistence that the journal entry be received prior to
processing
plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.
release
did
not
violate
plaintiff’s
Moreover, defendant’s failure to call the
Russell Count Clerk, as requested by plaintiff, did not violate
plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Defendant was not required by
either the Constitution or statute to investigate independently
plaintiff’s claim that he should be released.
Scull v. New Mexico,
236 F.3d 588, 598 (10th Cir. 2000).
Therefore,
defendant
is
protected
by
qualified
immunity.
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is therefore granted.
(Doc.
10).
IV.
Conclusion
Defendant’s motion is granted.
(Doc. 10).
The clerk is ordered
to enter judgment in favor of defendant.
A motion for reconsideration of this order pursuant to this
court's Rule 7.3 is not encouraged.
Any such motion shall not exceed
three pages and shall strictly comply with the standards enunciated
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by this court in Comeau v. Rupp.
The response to any motion for
reconsideration shall not exceed three pages.
No reply shall be
filed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 24th
day of January 2013, at Wichita, Kansas.
s/ Monti Belot
Monti L. Belot
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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