Vestring et al v. Halla et al
Filing
36
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying as moot 16 defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; granting 19 defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; denying as moot 16 defendants' Motion to Change Venue; granting 21 defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; and granting 23 defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by District Judge J. Thomas Marten on 1/30/2013. (mss)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
ANNA GRAVES VESTRING and
ROBERT VESTRING,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No. 12-4094-JTM
CARL “BUNGE” HALLA; H BAR CATTLE
COMPANY; EAGLE CREEK GENERAL STORE;
UNITED AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE, INC.;
and FARMERS COOPERATIVE OF EL CAMPO,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The court has before it several motions to dismiss by the defendants. Defendants
United Agricultural Cooperative, Inc., f/k/a/ Farmers Cooperative of El Campo, and
Eagle Lake General Store (incorrectly sued as “Eagle Creek General Store”) (collectively
referred to herein as “defendants” or “United Ag”), filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction and improper venue (Dkt. 16) as well as a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim (Dkt. 19). Defendant H Bar also filed a motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction and improper venue (Dkt. 21), which defendant Carl “Bunge”
Halla incorporated in his own motion to dismiss (Dkt. 23). The court grants all of the
defendants’ motions to dismiss for the reasons below.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiffs Anna Graves Vestring and Robert Vestring are Kansas residents who
claim to have entered into a contract in September 2011 with defendant Carl “Bunge”
Halla, a Texas resident and employee of defendant United Ag. Plaintiffs were in Kansas
when they accepted Halla’s offer over the phone. Under the contract, Halla agreed to
provide agricultural services and serve as a bailee for certain lightweight cattle
purchased by plaintiffs. All of the cattle were bought in Texas.
After the cattle were purchased, they were sheltered at facilities owned and
operated by H Bar Cattle Company in Texas. At the H Bar facilities, the cattle suffered a
death rate of 25%, which plaintiffs claim is significantly higher than the industry
average. Plaintiffs allege that Halla and H Bar caused them damage by breaching the
duty to properly care for, feed, and maintain the cattle in a reasonable and workmanlike
manner. Plaintiffs ask this court to hold Halla and H Bar jointly and severally liable for
damages in excess of $75,000 and to order recoupment of all plaintiffs’ payments.
Additionally, to pay for the services associated with the purchase and care of
these cattle, plaintiffs obtained a $350,000 line of credit from the Cooperative Finance
Association, Inc., a corporation located in Kansas City, Missouri. Mr. Vestring
completed, signed, and faxed an application to Untied Ag for an account to acquire
goods on store credit. United Ag set up a store account for Mr. Vestring. Plaintiffs
instructed Bunge not to incur expenses exceeding $350,000 in caring for, feeding, and
maintaining the cattle. Plaintiffs claim that notwithstanding their instruction, Bunge
had defendants H Bar, Eagle Lake, Farmers Cooperative, and United Ag bill plaintiffs
for a total substantially in excess of the line of credit for services, materials, and supplies
for the cattle. Plaintiff asks this court to enter judgment against defendants for (1) an
accounting of all amounts claimed to arise out of the care, feeding, and maintenance of
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the cattle and (2) an accounting of cattle purchased and sold including all cattle which
died while in defendants’ care and control.
Defendant United Ag challenges the sufficiency of the pleadings set forth in the
complaint. All defendants challenge whether Kansas has personal jurisdiction over
them and whether venue is proper. Alternatively, they request the case be transferred to
the Southern District of Texas.
II. Failure to State a Claim
A. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The
complaint must give the defendant adequate notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and
the grounds of that claim. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
“In reviewing a motion to dismiss, this court must look for plausibility in the
complaint . . . . Under this standard, a complaint must include enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.“ Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566
F.3d 1219, 1223–24 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In
addition to the allegations contained in the complaint, the court may consider attached
exhibits and documents incorporated into the complaint, so long as the parties do not
dispute the documents’ authenticity. See Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th
Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (clarifying and affirming
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Twombly’s probability standard). Allegations that raise the specter of mere speculation
are not enough. Corder, 566 F.3d at 1223–24.
While the factual allegations need not be detailed, the claims “must set forth the
grounds for plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief through more than labels, conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” In re Motor Fuel Temperature
Sales Practices Litig., 534 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1216 (D. Kan. 2008). The court must assume
that all allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 589. “The issue in
resolving a motion such as this is ‘not whether [the] plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but
whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.’ “ Bean v.
Norman, No. 008-2422, 2010 WL 420057, at *2, (D. Kan. Jan. 29, 2010) (quoting
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511).
B. Analysis
In this case, the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim
against United Ag. First, the complaint alleges that Halla owns an interest in all or part
of the United Ag entities and serves as an employee and manager for United Ag.
Second, the complaint alleges that at Halla’s request and without plaintiffs’
authorization, United Ag billed plaintiffs for an amount in excess of a line of credit
Halla knew plaintiffs had established with Cooperative Finance Association, Inc. To
state a claim for relief, plaintiffs must connect these two facts in a way that would make
United Ag liable. Although a connection is not found in the complaint, plaintiff Robert
Vestring’s affidavit provides one, and the court may rely on this. See Smith, 561 F.3d at
1098. In his affidavit, Vestring alleges that during his phone calls with Halla, Halla “was
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acting on his own behalf as well as an agent for” United Ag. Vestring also states that
Halla is a manager of one of the United Ag entities “and thus is an agent of United Ag.”
However, Vestring’s conclusory statements cannot provide a proper basis for pleading
agency.
A claim alleging an agency cause of action must allege that the agent had
authority—actual or apparent—to act on the principal’s behalf. See Mulholland v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 546 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1235 (D. Kan. May 5, 2008); see also
Bridgewater v. Carnival Corp., No. 10-22241, 2011 WL 817936, at *2 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (stating
that a complaint must allege all the necessary elements for a claim of apparent agency).
The fact that Halla was an employee of United Ag when he called plaintiffs to solicit
business does not, by itself, meet the standard of a plausible claim for agency. United
Ag is not in the business of caring for cattle, which is what Halla allegedly contracted
with plaintiffs to do. Plaintiffs have not pled any facts that show Halla had United Ag’s
authority, either actual or apparent, to enter into a contract for a business that United
Ag is not involved in. Under these circumstances, the court finds that plaintiffs have not
plead sufficient facts to support their contention that Halla acted as an agent of United
Ag.
C. Amending the Complaint
Plaintiffs contend that the proper remedy is for the court to grant them leave to
amend under F. Rule Civ. P 15(a)(2). Rule 15(a)(2) states that the court may grant leave
to amend when justice so requires. But generally, a party must file a motion to amend
before the court will grant leave to amend. Robinson v. Farmers Services L.L.C., 10-CV5
02244-JTM, 2010 WL 4067180, at *5 (D. Kan. Oct. 15, 2010) (quoting Calderon v. Kan.
Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 181 F.3d 1180, 1185–86 (10th Cir. 1999)). If a party does not
file a formal motion to amend its pleading, the Tenth Circuit provides that a request for
leave to amend must give adequate notice to the district court and to the opposing
party of the basis for the proposed amendment before the court must recognize that a
motion for leave to amend is before it. Calderon, 181 F.3d at 1186–87. However, a
plaintiff’s bare request in response to a motion to dismiss “that leave be given to the
Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint” is insufficient. Id. at 1186 (quoting Glenn v. First
Nat’l Bank, 868 F.2d 368, 370 (10th Cir. 1989).
In this case, at the end of their response to the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs
merely state that “[i]n the alternative, plaintiffs should be given leave to amend their
complaint.” Plaintiffs make no mention of what amendments might be made or how
they might cure the deficiencies of the original complaint. The court found a similar
request to amend insufficient in Robinson v. Farmers Servs. L.L.C., 10-CV-02244-JTM,
2010 WL 4067180, at *5 (D. Kan. Oct. 15, 2010), when the plaintiffs’ only request for
leave to amend came at the end of her response to defendant’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings. In Robinson, the plaintiff’s entire request stated:
“Should the Court nevertheless believe that the Plaintiff need provide [sic]
further clarity to these facts, then it is requested that the Plaintiff be
granted leave to amend her Complaint so that greater detail can be added
to the pleading so that she might nudge the Complaint across the line
from speculation to plausibility.”
Id. Plaintiffs’ bare request in this case provides even less detail than the request in
Robinson for the court to determine that amendment would be appropriate. As a result,
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the court denies the request for leave to amend and dismisses plaintiffs’ claim against
United Ag.
III. Personal Jurisdiction
A. Legal Standard
“The standard that governs a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction is well established: The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.” Edison Trust Number One v. Patillo, No. 10-1159, 2010
WL 5093831, at *1 (D. Kan. Dec. 8, 2010) (quotations omitted). The extent of the burden
depends on the stage at which the court considers the jurisdictional issue. Id. When
personal jurisdiction “is decided at a preliminary stage by reference to only the
complaint and affidavits, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of
personal jurisdiction.” Id.
“The plaintiff may carry this burden ‘by demonstrating, via affidavit or other
written materials, facts that if true would support jurisdiction over the defendant.’ ” Id.
(quoting TH Agric. & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace European Grp. Ltd., 488 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th
Cir. 2007)). In determining if it has personal jurisdiction over the defendants, the Court
may consider affidavits and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties. TH
Agric. & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Grp. Ltd., 488 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2007). To
the extent allegations in the complaint are uncontroverted, the Court must accept those
allegations. Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503, 1505 (10th Cir.1995). If the
jurisdictional allegations are challenged, however, the plaintiffs have a duty to support
their jurisdictional allegations by competent proof of supporting facts. Payless
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Shoesource, Inc. v. Shops at Hancock, LLC, 11-4144-KHV, 2012 WL 1344977 (D. Kan. 2012)
(citing Pytlik v. Prof‘l Res., Ltd., 887 F.2d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir.1989)). Factual disputes are
resolved in plaintiff’s favor. Id.
In a diversity action, “personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is
determined by the law of the forum state.” Caldwell-Baker Co. v. S. Ill. Railcar Co., 225 F.
Supp. 2d 1243, 1259 (D. Kan. 2002). “The proper inquiry is, therefore, whether the
exercise of jurisdiction is sanctioned by the long-arm statute of the forum state and
comports with due process requirements of the Constitution.” Federated Rural Elec. Ins.
Corp. v. Kootenai Elec. Coop., 17 F.3d 1302, 1304-05 (10th Cir. 1994). The Kansas long-arm
statute extends the personal jurisdiction analysis to the extent of the United States
Constitution; thus, this court may proceed to the due process analysis. Id. at 1305.
The due process analysis consists of two steps: (1) whether defendants have such
minimum contacts with the forum state that they should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there; and (2) if the defendants have minimum contacts with the forum
state, whether exercising personal jurisdiction over them would offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. AST Sports Sci., Inc. v. CLF Distribution Ltd.,
514 F.3d 1054, 1061 (10th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiffs assert only specific jurisdiction over the defendants in this case, so the
court does not analyze whether it has general jurisdiction. Additionally, plaintiffs argue
that Halla acted as an agent of H Bar, so this court’s jurisdiction over H Bar depends on
its jurisdiction over Halla. For this reason, the court analyzes personal jurisdiction as to
defendant Halla first.
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1. Defendant Halla
a. Minimum Contacts
The minimum contacts necessary for specific personal jurisdiction are established
when “the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ its activities toward the forum
jurisdiction and where the underlying action is based upon activities that arise out of or
relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” In re Application to Enforce Admin.
Subpoenas Duces Tecum of S.E.C. v. Knowles, 87 F.3d 413, 418 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). “Purposeful availment requires
actions by the Defendant which create a substantial connection with the forum state.”
Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Bartile Roofs, Inc., 618 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotations
omitted). The purposeful availment requirement ensures “that a defendant will not be
subject to the laws of a jurisdiction ‘solely as the result of random, fortuitous, or
attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another party or third person.’” AST
Sports Sci., 514 F.3d at 1058 (quoting Benally v. Amon Carter Museum of W. Art., 858 F.2d
618, 625 (10th Cir. 1988)). “Purposeful availment analysis turns upon whether the
defendant’s contacts are attributable to his own actions or solely to the actions of the
plaintiff . . . [and generally] requires . . . affirmative conduct by the defendant which
allows or promotes the transaction of business within the forum state.” Rambo v. Am. S.
Ins., Co., 839 F.2d 1415, 1420 (10th Cir. 1988) (internal quotations omitted).
In this case, the complaint states that plaintiffs entered into an agreement
with Halla and H Bar, wherein the latter would provide agricultural services and serve
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as bailee for certain lightweight cattle, purchased by plaintiffs, and sheltered at facilities
owned and operated by H Bar.
Plaintiffs’ basis for Halla being subject to personal jurisdiction in Kansas is
relatively straightforward. Under the Kansas long-arm statute, a party submits to
personal jurisdiction in Kansas for any claim for relief arising from transacting any
business in this state. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-308(b)(1)(A). The phrase “transaction of any
business” is all encompassing and was used by the legislature in its broadest legal sense
with the intent to authorize the personal service of summons upon a nonresident
corporate or individual defendant to the full extent of the due process clause. Woodring
v. Hall, 200 Kan. 597, 606, 438 P.2d 135, 144 (1968). Plaintiffs argue that personal
jurisdiction over Halla is proper because he called them in Kansas to solicit business,
made numerous phone calls to Kansas, and entered into a contract with plaintiffs while
they were in Kansas,1 all of which are activities that seem to fit the broad definition of
“transacting business.” See Woodring, 438 P.3d at 144 (stating that “business is
transacted within the state when an individual . . . effectuates or attempts to effectuate a
purpose to improve his economic conditions and satisfy his desires.”). Plaintiffs assert—
and defendants do not challenge—that the contract was accepted over the phone by
plaintiff Robert Vestring, who was in Kansas at the time. Soliciting business and
forming a contract in Kansas satisfy the Kansas long-arm statute’s requirement of
“transacting business.”
Under Kansas law, a contract is made where the last act necessary for its formation occurs. Novak v. Mut.
of Omaha, Ins. Co., 29 Kan. App. 2d 526, 534 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (citations omitted).
1
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Additionally, the court finds that these acts show that Halla “purposefully
directed [his] activities toward” Kansas and could have foreseen being haled into court
here. See Knowles, 87 F.3d at 418. This is not a case where defendant’s connections with
the forum state happened without his knowledge through the stream of commerce. See,
e.g., Asahi Metal Ind. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). Rather, Halla personally and
intentionally solicited Kansas residents for business over the phone and offered them a
contract, which they accepted. The court finds that Halla has purposefully availed
himself of Kansas, so he has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum.
b. Fair Play and Substantial Justice
“If the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, ‘we must still
determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.’” Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 618 F.3d at 1161 (quoting AST
Sports Sci., 514 F.3d at 1061). “[M]inimum requirements inherent in the concept of fair
play and substantial justice may defeat the reasonableness even if the defendant has
purposefully engaged in forum activities.” Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477–78. At this
point in the analysis, the defendant bears the burden of proving other considerations
would render jurisdiction unreasonable. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 618 F.3d at 1161. This
reasonableness analysis requires weighing the following five factors:
(1) the burden on the defendant, (2) the forum state’s interest in resolving
the dispute, (3) the plaintiff’s interest in receiving convenient and effective
relief, (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
efficient solution of controversies, and (5) the shared interest of the several
states in furthering fundamental social policies.
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Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1221 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Pro Axess, 428 F.3d at
1279-80). The court analyzes these factors in turn.
The court has found that Halla’s phone call establishing a contract in Kansas give
him the requisite minimum contacts with Kansas; however, “minimum” is the key
word here. The contacts here are weak because although the contract was accepted in
Kansas, the subject matter of the contract had nothing to do with this state. As all
defendants point out, the cattle at issue were bought, cared for, and sold in Texas, and
the payments plaintiffs made came from Cooperative Finance Association, Inc. in
Missouri. Every alleged breach of contract and tortious act or omission occurred outside
Kansas. Excluding the two plaintiffs, all witnesses and material documents are located
in Texas. “[T]he weaker the plaintiff’s showing on minimum contacts, the less a
defendant need show in terms of unreasonableness to defeat jurisdiction.” Trujillo, 465
F.3d at 1221 (quotations and alterations omitted). Given the weakness of the contacts
here, the burden for defendant to show unreasonableness in the fair play and
substantial justice analysis is low.
The second factor in our reasonableness inquiry is Kansas’s interest in
adjudicating this dispute. States have an important interest in providing a forum in
which their residents can seek redress for injuries caused by out-of-state actors. Burger
King Corp., 471 U.S. at 483. Plaintiffs cite to Environmental Ventures, Inc. v. Alda Servs.
Corp., 19 Kan. App. 2d 292, 868 P.2d 540 (Kan. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 1994) to support
jurisdiction here, but in that case, the defendant sold a plane to a Kansas resident, the
plane was delivered to Kansas for use in the state, and the purchase price was paid
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from Kansas. In the case at hand, the subject matter of the contract was entirely located
in Texas. Further, the acts giving rise to the negligence claim against Halla also took
place in Texas. Although plaintiffs are Kansas residents and the contract at issue was
agreed to in Kansas, Halla has no other connection with the state. Kansas has an interest
in providing a forum for plaintiffs, but it is only a moderate interest and does not weigh
heavily in plaintiffs’ favor.
Third, the court analyzes whether plaintiffs may receive convenient and effective
relief in another forum. OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1097
(10th Cir. 1998). This factor may weigh heavily in cases where the plaintiff’s chances of
recovery will be greatly diminished by forcing him to litigate in another forum because
of that forum’s laws or because the burden may be so overwhelming as to practically
foreclose pursuit of the lawsuit. See Pacific Atlantic Trading Co. v. M/V Main Express, 758
F.2d 1325, 1331 (9th Cir. 1985). Plaintiffs have provided no facts for the court to find this
danger present in this case.
The fourth factor in our reasonableness inquiry examines whether the forum
state is the most efficient place to litigate the dispute. Key to this inquiry are the location
of witnesses, where the wrong underlying the lawsuit occurred, what forum's
substantive law governs the case, and whether jurisdiction is necessary to prevent
piecemeal litigation. OMI Holdings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1097. The court finds that this factor
weighs in favor of defendants. The record does not contain evidence supporting the
position that Kansas is the most efficient forum in which to litigate this dispute. Except
for the plaintiffs, all witnesses, documents, and relevant locations are in Texas, Texas
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law applies to at least one of the claims, and jurisdiction in Kansas is not necessary to
prevent piecemeal litigation. The court is convinced that a forum in the state of Texas
would be more efficient.
Fifth, we consider the interests of the several states in addition to the forum state,
in advancing fundamental substantive social policies. The court has no reason to believe
that either state’s fundamental substantive social policies will be adversely affected by
this case, wherever it may be tried. Accordingly, the court finds that this factor is
neutral.
In conclusion, the court finds that exercising personal jurisdiction over Halla
based on the contacts in this case would offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. Halla’s burden for showing unreasonableness is low because of the
weakness of his contacts with Kansas. Kansas has only a small interest in the case, while
Texas has a much greater interest in the outcome. Finally, a forum in Texas will be more
efficient considering that the contract was performed there, and the alleged negligent
actions occurred there. As a result, exercise of personal jurisdiction over Halla by this
court would offend due process. Additionally, without personal jurisdiction over Halla,
the court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant H Bar, which only had
contacts with Kansas through Halla allegedly acting as its agent. As the court has
determined it has no jurisdiction over Halla, the same must apply to H Bar.2
2Although
the court has already dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against United Ag for failure to state a claim,
the alleged connection between United Ag and Kansas also relied on Halla acting as its agent. As such,
this court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over United Ag even if plaintiffs had properly stated a
claim against it.
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B. Jurisdictional Discovery
Plaintiffs ask for leave to conduct discovery on these issues. The district court has
broad discretion to determine whether discovery should be permitted, and its discretion
is not reversed unless that discretion is abused. Grynberg v. Ivanhoe Energy, Inc., 2012 WL
2855777, at *13 (10th Cir. July 12, 2012). “The burden of demonstrating a legal
entitlement to jurisdictional discovery—and the related prejudice flowing from the
discovery’s denial—is on the party seeking discovery.” Id. Although the court abuses its
discretion if the plaintiff suffers prejudice as a result of the denial of discovery,
“prejudice exists where pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are
controverted . . . or where a more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary.”
Lemaster v. Collins Indus., Inc, 2011 WL 5966911, at *5 (D. Kan. Nov. 29, 2011).
Plaintiffs do not argue that the facts regarding Halla’s contacts with Kansas are
controverted or require a more satisfactory showing. Their response merely asks that
the court deny the defendants’ jurisdiction claims or, “in the alternative, give plaintiffs
leave to conduct discovery on these issues.” The court is not convinced that any further
discovery regarding jurisdiction is necessary. The facts regarding Halla’s entering into a
contract with plaintiffs in Kansas, as well as the dearth of any other contacts between
Halla and Kansas, are not in dispute. The dispute was whether these facts establish
personal jurisdiction in this state, and the court holds that they do not. Therefore, the
court denies plaintiffs’ request for additional discovery. Additionally, the court need
not address defendants’ arguments regarding venue and forum non conveniens.
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IV. Conclusion
The court holds that the complaint failed to meet the Rule 8 pleading standard
regarding the plaintiffs’ claim against United Ag. The court also finds that it lacks
personal jurisdiction over defendant Halla and defendant H Bar by extension.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED this 30th day of January, 2013, that the following
motions are granted: United Ag’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Dkt. 19);
H Bar’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue (Dkt.
21); and Halla’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 23). The court denies as moot United Ag’s
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue (Dkt. 16).
s/J. Thomas Marten
J. THOMAS MARTEN, JUDGE
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