Coates (ID 89545) v. Beautner et al
Filing
38
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 24 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge J. Thomas Marten on 4/10/14. Mailed to pro se party Floyd Clifford Coates, Jr. by regular mail. (mss)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
Floyd Clifford Coates, Jr.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 13-3130-JTM
Officer Beautner, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Floyd Clifford Coates, Jr., currently an inmate of the Winfield Correction Facility,
brings the present pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging the use of excessive force by two
correctional officers, Jerry McNutt and Collen Beautner. Since the filing of this case, the
facility attorney for El Dorado Correctional Facility filed a Suggestion of Death as to
Defendant Beautner. (Dkt. 9). The only remaining defendant named in the Complaint is
Defendant McNutt, who has moved for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the
court must examine all evidence in a light most favorable to the opposing party. McKenzie
v. Mercy Hospital, 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir. 1988). The party moving for summary
judgment must demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment beyond a reasonable
doubt. Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir. 1985). The moving party
need not disprove plaintiff's claim; it need only establish that the factual allegations have
no legal significance. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323
(10th Cir. 1987).
In resisting a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rely upon
mere allegations or denials contained in its pleadings or briefs. Rather, the nonmoving
party must come forward with specific facts showing the presence of a genuine issue of
material fact for trial and significant probative evidence supporting the allegation.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Once the moving party has carried
its burden under Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment must do more than
simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. "In the language
of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with 'specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)) (emphasis in Matsushita). One of the
principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims or defenses, and the rule should be interpreted in a way that allows
it to accomplish this purpose. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
The present action arises from an incident which occurred while Coates was
incarcerated in the El Dorado Correctional Facility. According to the Complaint, McNutt
was nearby when Beautner, who was in a separate room operating the cell-door closing
mechanism, happened to close Coates’s cell door on his foot, which was then already
broken and in a cast. Defendant McNutt notified Beautner to open the cell doors and freed
Coates, who was then in a wheelchair. McNutt warned Coates that “your head will be
next.”
Cell doors in the prison can be opened one at a time or as a group by use of a touch
screen housed in the control center. It is uncontroverted that, once a door is activated, an
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electric motor opens or closes a door at a slow speed. It takes approximately five seconds
for a door to complete the operation.
If a cell door in cell house E encounters an obstruction before completing its cycle,
the door may stop, but the motor continues to attempt to close. The door operator must
stop the door by touching the screen and then select the open function to clear the door. It
is mechanically impossible for an operator in the control unit to alter the speed of a door,
and impossible for a cell door equipped with the electric motor to be “slammed.” McNutt
cannot open or close cell doors from the floor desk for security reasons; only the officer in
the control unit can open or close the doors.
Coates never filed a personal injury claim asserting that his broken foot was shut in
his cell door.
McNutt presents three rationales for summary judgment. First, Coates failed to
submit any grievance over the alleged incident, and accordingly did not exhaust his
administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a). Second, the plaintiff has failed to show any personal participation by McNutt
in the alleged physical injury. Finally, defendant argues that under the Eleventh
Amendment, Coates is precluded from obtaining monetary damages from McNutt for any
actions in his official capacity. (Dkt. 25, at 5-8).
Coates provides no response to the defendant’s Eleventh Amendment argument. He
does stress that McNutt was “the floor officer” at the time of the incident (Dkt. 34, at 1), but
the uncontroverted facts establish that, for security reasons, the floor officer has no ability
to open or close the cell doors. This mechanism is controlled through a separate control
room, and was operated by the late Officer Beautner. Because plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate any personal responsibility by McNutt for the alleged aggravated injury to
his foot, summary judgment is appropriate. See Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1227
(10th Cir. 2006).
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With respect to the exhaustion of remedies arguments, Coates asserts in his brief
that a different corrections officer, identified only as “Mr. Hoepner” told him that “because
my foot was in a cast already I could not file a personal injury claim.” Id. at 2. This is
merely plaintiff’s unsworn assertion, however, and it is insufficient to relieve the plaintiff
of his obligation to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA.
“Although we construe a pro se litigant's pleadings liberally, they must still comply
with the minimum requirements of the [summary judgment] rules. In the absence of other
evidence, an unsworn allegation does not meet the evidentiary requirements of Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Gorton v. Williams, 309 Fed.Appx. 274, 275 (10th Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). Gorton is directly relevant here. In that case, the plaintiff prison
inmate attempted to defeat the exhaustion argument of the defendants by his unsworn
assertion that he had in fact presented grievances. The Tenth Circuit held that this was
insufficient, concluding that “in light of Defendant's evidence that Plaintiff submitted no
grievances related to his claims in this case, the court's granting of summary judgment to
Defendant for failure to exhaust was appropriate.” Id.
Where, as here, the nonmovant offers no rationale for his or her failure to properly
oppose the facts alleged in connection with a summary judgment motion, the court may
consider the fact undisputed pursuant to Rule 56(e). See McGuire v. Hrabe, No. 07-3147KHV, 2008 WL 4305437, *2 (D. Kan. 2008) (“The Court does not consider facts alleged in
plaintiff's response to the first motion for summary judgment... because plaintiff has not
offered sworn testimony in support thereof”); Ellibee v. Hazlett, No. 03–3023–JAR, 2006 WL
3050801, at *2 (D.Kan. Oct. 23, 2006) (pro se litigants governed by same procedural rules
as other litigants; on summary judgment).
Of course, “the pro se prisoner's complaint” may be considered “an affidavit insofar
as it has been sworn under penalty of perjury and alleges facts based on plaintiff's personal
knowledge.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991). Here, however, Coates
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makes no claim in his Complaint that he orally tried to present an administrative grievance
and was somehow thwarted from submitting a written claim. To the contrary, the form
complaint asks if the petitioner has “previously sought informal or formal relief from the
appropriate administrative officials.” Coates answered, “No.” (Dkt. 1, at 5).
The court finds that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the grounds
sought.
IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED this 10th day of April, 2014, that the defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 24) is hereby granted.
s/ J. Thomas Marten
J. THOMAS MARTEN, JUDGE
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