Lamberty v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of
Filing
19
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: The court shall reverse defendant's decision to deny plaintiff's applications for benefits. The court shall direct that this case be remanded to the Commssioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. This remand is made under the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).Signed by District Judge Richard D. Rogers on 4/3/14. (meh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
ROSE MARIE LAMBERTY,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.
Case No.13-4072-RDR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On July 16, 2010, plaintiff filed applications for social
security disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income benefits.
date
of
June
These applications alleged a disability onset
25,
2009.
On
March
2,
conducted upon plaintiff’s applications.
2012,
a
hearing
was
The administrative law
judge (ALJ) considered the evidence and decided on March 20,
2012 that plaintiff was not qualified to receive benefits.
decision has been adopted by defendant.
This
This case is now before
the court upon plaintiff’s motion to reverse and remand the
decision to deny plaintiff’s applications for benefits.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To
establish
qualify
that
for
he
or
disability
she
was
benefits,
“disabled”
a
claimant
under
the
must
Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E), during the time when the
claimant had “insured status” under the Social Security program.
See Potter v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 905 F.2d
1346, 1347 (10th Cir. 1990); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.130, 404.131.
To
be “disabled” means that the claimant is unable “to engage in
any
substantial
determinable
gainful
physical
or
activity
mental
by
reason
impairment
of
any
which
.
medically
.
.
has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months.”
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
For supplemental security income claims, a claimant becomes
eligible in the first month where he or she is both disabled and
has an application on file.
20 C.F.R. §§ 416.202-03, 416.330,
416.335.
The court must affirm the ALJ’s decision if it is supported
by substantial evidence and if the ALJ applied the proper legal
standards.
2004).
Rebeck v. Barnhart, 317 F.Supp.2d 1263, 1271 (D.Kan.
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla;”
it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Id., quoting Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
The court must examine
the record as a whole, including whatever in the record fairly
detracts from the weight of the defendant’s decision, and on
that
basis
decide
defendant’s decision.
Cir.
1994)
(quoting
if
substantial
evidence
supports
the
Glenn v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 983, 984 (10th
Casias
v.
2
Secretary
of
Health
&
Human
Services, 933 F.2d 799, 800-01 (10th Cir. 1991)).
The court may
not reverse the defendant’s choice between two reasonable but
conflicting views, even if the court would have made a different
choice if the matter were referred to the court de novo.
Lax v.
Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Zoltanski
v. F.A.A., 372 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2004)).
II.
THE ALJ’S DECISION (Tr. 9-19).
There is a five-step evaluation process followed in these
cases which is described in the ALJ’s decision.
(Tr. 9-11).
First, it is determined whether the claimant is engaging in
substantial gainful activity.
Second, the ALJ decides whether
the claimant has a medically determinable impairment that is
“severe” or a combination of impairments which are “severe.”
At
step three, the ALJ decides whether the claimant’s impairments
or
combination
of
impairments
meet
or
medically
equal
the
criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1.
Next, the ALJ determines the claimant’s residual
functional capacity and then decides whether the claimant has
the residual functional capacity to perform the requirements of
his or her past relevant work.
Finally, at the last step of the
sequential evaluation process, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant is able to do any other work considering his or her
residual
functional
capacity,
experience.
3
age,
education
and
work
In
this
case,
the
ALJ
decided
plaintiff’s
application
should be denied on the basis of the fifth and last step of the
evaluation process.
The ALJ decided that plaintiff maintained
the residual functional capacity to perform jobs that existed in
significant numbers in the national economy.
The
ALJ
decision.
made
the
First,
following
plaintiff
specific
meets
findings
the
in
insured
his
status
requirements for Social Security benefits through September 30,
2012.
Second, plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful
activity
after
June
25,
2009,
disability.
Third,
impairments:
fibromyalgia;
the
plaintiff
has
alleged
the
degenerative
onset
date
following
joint
of
severe
disease;
back
problems; borderline intellectual functioning; depression; and
post-traumatic stress disorder.
Fourth, plaintiff does not have
an
of
impairment
or
combination
impairments
that
meet
or
medically equal the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart
P,
Appendix
1.
Fifth,
plaintiff
has
the
residual
functional capacity to perform:
sedentary work . . . [in that plaintiff] is able to
lift and carry 10 pounds frequently and occasionally.
She can walk/and stand for 2 hours in an 8-hour day
and can sit for up to 6 hours in an 8-hour day.
However, she is limited to simple routine repetitive
work with only occasional interaction with the public.
(Tr.
13).
restrictions
The
in
ALJ
the
also
found
activities
4
of
that
plaintiff
daily
living,
has
mild
moderate
difficulties in social functioning, and moderate difficulties in
concentration, persistence or pace.
(Tr. 12).
Sixth, plaintiff
is unable to perform any past relevant work.
plaintiff
is
significant
capable
numbers
of
in
performing
the
national
jobs
But, seventh,
that
economy,
exist
such
as:
wire
patcher, ampule sealer and administrative support worker.
18).
This
last
finding
vocational expert.
education,
The
ALJ
work
found
was
based
upon
the
testimony
in
(Tr.
of
a
The ALJ also considered plaintiff’s age,
experience
that
the
and
residual
vocational
functional
expert’s
capacity.
testimony
was
consistent with the information contained in the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (DOT).
III. THE DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE
ALJ FAILED TO PROPERLY WEIGH THE OPINIONS OF DR. MHATRE AND LYNN
WAGNER-KNIGHT.
Plaintiff’s
first
argument
to
overturn
the
denial
of
benefits is that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate certain
opinions.
Plaintiff focuses, first, upon the opinion of Dr.
Vijay Mhatre, plaintiff’s treating physician since June 3, 2010,
who has diagnosed and treated plaintiff for fibromyalgia and
other conditions, including low back pain, fatigue and insomnia.
According to the Tenth Circuit, “an ALJ must give good
reasons . . . for the weight assigned to a treating physician’s
opinion . . . [and the reasons] must be sufficiently specific to
make
clear
to
any
subsequent
5
reviewers
the
weight
the
adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and
the reasons for that weight.”
Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d
1297, 1300 (10th
Cir. 2003)(interior quotations and citations
omitted).
“’In
choosing
assessment,
an
ALJ
may
to
not
reject
make
the
treating
speculative
physician’s
inferences
from
medical reports and may reject a treating physician’s opinion
outright only on the basis of contradictory medical evidence and
not due to his own or her own credibility judgments, speculation
or lay opinion.’”
Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1082
(10th Cir. 2004)(quoting McGoffin v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 1248,
1252 (10th Cir. 2002)).
Dr. Mhatre completed a form regarding plaintiff’s ability
to
do
work-related
activities.
His
answers
indicated
that
plaintiff could stand and walk less than two hours during an 8hour day and that she could sit less than two hours during an 8hour day.
(Tr. 437).
He stated that plaintiff would need to
lie down at unpredictable intervals and every two hours, and
that she would need to be absent from work more than three times
a
month.
(Tr.
438
&
440).
These
limitations
and
others
mentioned by Dr. Mhatre were inconsistent with any substantial
gainful
activity,
according
to
the
vocational
testified during the administrative hearing.
expert
(Tr. 52).
who
The ALJ
did not dispute Dr. Mhatre’s diagnosis of fibromyalgia and low
back pain, or challenge Dr. Mhatre’s credentials or his clinical
6
or diagnostic techniques.
But, the ALJ only gave Dr. Mhatre’s
conclusions “partial weight” on the grounds that “the medical
record,
including
the
objective
evidence,
indicates
that
[plaintiff] is not so limited and can perform work consistent
with the residual functional capacity [determined by the ALJ].”
(Tr. 17).
the
Unfortunately, the ALJ did not specify which parts of
medical
record
persuasively
contradicted
Dr.
Mhatre’s
conclusions regarding plaintiff’s functional abilities, or which
parts of the medical record persuasively supported the ALJ’s
conclusions regarding plaintiff’s functional abilities.
So, the
court shall look at the ALJ’s general review of the evidence.
The
ALJ
administrative
reviewed
record.
the
He
evidence
noted
on
the
pages
14-17
following
of
points
regard to plaintiff’s physical impairments:
- An MRI in October 2010 showed normal spine
alignment;
- A whole body scan in November 2010 was unremarkable;
- In December 2010 when plaintiff appeared at a
hospital emergency room for low back pain, she
ambulated without assistance and an examination
found no motor weakness or numbness;
- Plaintiff engaged in physical therapy in 2011 and
reported improvement and interest in exercise;
- A physical examination with the Pain Center of
Kansas showed a normal gait, normal range of motion,
and normal muscle mass, tone and strength, although
an assessment of low back pain was made;
- During an emergency room visit for back pain in
December 2010, no motor weakness or numbness was
noted and bone scans were normal;
- Physical therapy notes indicated on one occasion
that plaintiff’s pain was only 0-4;
7
the
with
- Plaintiff has attended church on occasion and gone
to the grocery store accompanied by her daughter.
She can prepare simple meals, help with laundry and
dishes, and has cared for a granddaughter. She took
her granddaughter roller skating twice – plaintiff
fell and hurt her tailbone while skating.
And she
went
unaccompanied
to
Hobby
Lobby
where
an
acquaintance thought she appeared to be walking
quickly and with pleasant affect.
Among other factors, an ALJ should consider how a treating
physician’s
opinion
is
supported
by
relevant
evidence
and
consistency between that opinion and the record as a whole.
Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1301.
In this case, however, the ALJ does
not explain why the MRI, bone scan and body scan results are
inconsistent with Dr. Mhatre’s fibromyalgia diagnosis and the
doctor’s
conclusions
as
to
plaintiff’s
functional
abilities.
The ALJ may not be attempting to make this point; his opinion is
unclear.
But, in the event that he is, he cites no authority or
reasoning for finding that such test results are relevant to
fibromyalgia.1
It
is
more
likely
perhaps
that
the
ALJ
is
referring to the various scan results with regard to plaintiff’s
low back pain.
But, again, the ALJ does not explain why the
results are inconsistent with plaintiff’s complaints of low back
pain.2
Possibly,
the
ALJ
is
inferring
from
observations
of
1
Other courts have noted that “[f]ibromyalgia cannot be proved by objective
test findings.” Wyatt v. Astrue, 2011 WL 322816 *6 (D.Kan. 1/31/2011); see
also Jones v. Colvin, 2014 WL 545607 *6 (D.Kan. 2/11/2014)(there are no
laboratory tests to identify the presence or severity of fibromyalgia); Gibbs
v. Colvin, 2013 WL 823412 *3 (D.Kan. 3/6/2013)(same).
2
One MRI showed “slight disk space narrowing” and suggested early stages of
progressive degenerative disk disease in the lower lumbar spine. (Tr. 673).
8
normal gait, range of motion, and muscle mass that plaintiff is
more
active
than
Dr.
Mhatre
has
suggested.
But,
this
is
speculation, especially in light of plaintiff’s testimony and
other entries in the record showing that plaintiff’s condition
can vary significantly so that she will have good days and bad
days.3
occasion
That
is
plaintiff’s
not
pain
has
substantially
been
different
rated
from
at
0-4
Dr.
on
an
Mhatre’s
observations of pain at 2-4 “on a good day,” but 5 or 6 “on the
worst day” (Tr. 423); or pain “most of the time” at 4-5, but 6-7
at worst (Tr. 842).4
It does not disprove the conclusion that
plaintiff has too many “bad days” a month to sustain substantial
gainful employment.
Finally, the fact that plaintiff has gone
out on occasion for church or to be with her granddaughter, or
that plaintiff can provide some help around the house, is not
significantly
inconsistent
with
plaintiff’s functional abilities.
Dr.
Mhatre’s
assessment
of
See Walden v. Astrue, 2012 WL
3733305 *5 (D.Kan. 8/28/2012)(rejecting an ALJ’s discrediting of
This may have provided the basis for the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff had
degenerative joint disease.
3
In Burgess v. Colvin, 2013 WL 4482711 *4 (D.Kan. 8/21/2013), the court
criticized as speculation an ALJ’s reference to normal gait pattern as
objective evidence contrary to a treating physician’s opinion of limitations
from fibromyalgia.
4
Plaintiff reported pain at varying levels between 0 and 10 during the first
half of 2011 when she had physical or occupational therapy sessions.
(Tr.
814-829). Plaintiff also had therapy in January 2012 following her tailbone
injury from the skating rink fall. (Tr. 806-812). She reported relief from
pain, but she may have been referring only to her tailbone. (Tr. 43).
9
Dr.
Mhatre’s
opinion
on
the
basis
of
somewhat
similiar
activities of daily living).
In sum, the court concludes that the ALJ has failed to
adequately analyze the opinion of Dr. Mhatre.
Plaintiff
analysis
social
of
makes
the
worker
the
opinion
who
capacity evaluation.
same
of
argument
Lynn
completed
a
regarding
Wagner-Knight,
mental
the
ALJ’s
plaintiff’s
residual
functional
Ms. Wagner-Knight saw plaintiff from late
February 2011 to August 2011.
Her evaluation indicated among
other things that plaintiff would do poorly at following even
simple instructions.
(Tr. 700).
The evaluation also stated
that plaintiff would do poorly at every one of 16 abilities and
aptitudes needed to do unskilled work, including the abilities
to:
make simple work-related decisions; perform at a consistent
pace without unreasonable number and length of rest periods;
deal with normal work stress; sustain ordinary routine without
special
supervision;
segment.
Ms.
and
maintain
Wagner-Knight
attention
mentioned
the
for
side
two
hour
effects
of
plaintiff’s medication as a factor in plaintiff’s confusion and
incoherence.
The ALJ concluded that Ms. Wagner-Knight was not
an acceptable medical source and afforded her opinion minimal
weight.
He
noted
that
her
opinion
was
inconsistent
with
plaintiff’s Hobby Lobby shopping trip, with plaintiff’s fixing
simple
meals
and
helping
with
10
laundry
and
dishes,
and
with
plaintiff’s aid in raising her granddaughter and going to the
grocery store with the assistance of her daughter.
The
ALJ
“acceptable
is
correct
medical
that
source”
Ms.
Wagner-Knight
within
the
is
meaning
not
of
an
the
regulations.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a), 416.913(a)(defining the
term).
Her
opinion
“medical
opinion”
is
under
not
the
entitled
to
regulations.
consideration
But,
it
as
could
a
be
considered to show the severity of plaintiff’s limitations and
how they affected her ability to work.
Wells v. Colvin, 727
F.3d 1061, 1073-74 (10th Cir. 2013).
We agree with plaintiff that the ALJ’s dismissal of WagnerKnight’s
household
evaluation
as
activities,
undelineated
inconsistent
sporadic
assistance
in
with
trips
raising
a
reports
outside
the
of
minimal
house,
granddaughter,
and
lacks
a
clear or persuasive rationale. See Borgsmiller v. Astrue, 499
Fed.Appx.
812,
818-19
(10th
Cir.
10/17/12)(may
not
rely
on
evidence of minimal daily activities - - washing dishes and
preparing meals on “good days” - -
as substantial evidence of
no disabling pain); Krauser v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 1324, 1332-33
(10th Cir. 2011)(limited yard work, exercise, and housework are
not inconsistent with significant physical limitations); Madron
v. Astrue, 311 Fed.Appx. 170, 177 (10th Cir. 2/11/2009)(cooking,
travel to grocery store and limited household chores do not
prove ability to do substantial gainful activity); Thompson v.
11
Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1490 (10th Cir. 1993)(visiting neighbors
and light housework do not establish a person is capable of
engaging in substantial gainful activity); Broadbent v. Harris,
698 F.2d 407, 413 (10th Cir. 1983)(working in yard, performing a
few household tasks, working on cars, and taking an occasional
trip with brother in a camper, do not establish without more
evidence, an ability to perform substantial gainful activity).
While these cases concern an evaluation of the disabling effects
of pain, they also demonstrate that occasional household tasks
or other activities do not prove an aptitude to do unskilled
work under the stress and pace demanded by most employers.
In sum, the court does not believe the sporadic activities
described by the ALJ are inconsistent with Ms. Wagner-Knight’s
assessment that plaintiff would be unable to perform unskilled
work.
Since the ALJ bases his rejection of Ms. Wagner-Knight’s
opinion on this ground, the court finds that the ALJ improperly
considered her opinion.5
5
The ALJ gave “weight” to the opinion of Dr. Robert Barnett a licensed
psychologist and an acceptable medical source under the regulations and
“significant weight” to the assessments of state agency consultants whose
findings were considered consistent with Dr. Barnett’s findings. Dr. Barnett
performed a mental status examination of plaintiff in October 2010.
He
concluded that plaintiff functioned in the borderline range and “showed
pronounced difficulty with both attention and concentration during the
interview.”
(Tr. 444).
He concluded that plaintiff appeared “cognitively
capable of simple repetitive work tasks but her ability to perform complex
tasks would be limited by her low intellectual functioning as well as her
symptoms of depression and anxiety.” It might be reasonable for the ALJ to
reject Ms. Wagner-Knight’s opinion as inconsistent with that of Dr. Barnett
and other sources.
Wells, 727 F.3d at 1074.
However, this was not the
reason with the ALJ gave for discrediting Ms. Wagner-Knight’s opinion.
Moreover, the concentration problems noted by Dr. Barnett and other sources
12
IV. THE DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS MUST ALSO BE REVERSED BECAUSE
THE ALJ IMPROPERLY ANALYZED PLAINTIFF’S CREDIBILITY.
The ALJ’s analysis of plaintiff’s credibility relied on the
same
points
as
the
ALJ’s
evaluation
Mhatre and Ms. Wagner-Knight.
of
the
opinions
of
Dr.
In general, the ALJ found that
plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably
be
expected
to
cause
the
alleged
symptoms;
however,
the
[plaintiff’s] statements concerning the intensity, persistence
and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the
extent
they
are
inconsistent
functional capacity assessment.”
Plaintiff
asserts
that
the
with
the
[ALJ’s]
residual
(Tr. 15).
ALJ’s
analysis
was
improper
because:
the ALJ ignored plaintiff’s persistent attempts to
find
relief;
pain
the
ALJ
overlooked
plaintiff’s
use
of
an
assistive device; the ALJ failed to consider how plaintiff’s
psychiatric impairments might affect her complaints of pain; the
ALJ
misconstrued
the
significance
of
plaintiff’s
daily
activities; the ALJ failed to acknowledge the extensive amount
and negative effects of plaintiff’s medications; and the ALJ
unfairly
portrayed
portions
of
the
record
as
damaging
to
plaintiff’s credibility.
(Tr. 444, 610, 612, and 614), and given credence by the ALJ (Tr. 12), could
impact plaintiff’s ability to perform even simple work.
Bowers v. Astrue,
271 Fed.Appx. 731, 733-34 (10th Cir. 3/26/2008); Wiederholt v. Barnhart, 121
Fed.Appx. 833, 839 (10th Cir. 2/8/2005); Price v. Colvin, 2014 WL 1246762 *4
(D.Kan. 3/26/2014).
There is no indication that the vocational expert
considered these limitations.
13
As discussed above, the court believes that the ALJ has
relied
too
heavily
upon
plaintiff’s
daily
and
occasional
activities to support his conclusions and analysis.
Remand for
reconsideration of plaintiff’s credibility is justified for this
reason alone.
In addition, the ALJ did not refer to or inquire
in any detail as to the side effects of plaintiff’s medication.
Plaintiff takes a large number of medications.
260-61).
of
(Tr. 844-45,
Plaintiff has reported fatigue and sleepiness because
medication
(Tr.
261),
and
she
stated
that
she
could
not
return to her former employment because of the strong narcotics
she was taking.
(Tr. 32).
Ms. Wagner-Knight commented that
plaintiff’s strong pain medication had “extreme negative side
effects” and left her “very disoriented.”
(Tr. 700).
While an
ALJ is not obliged to engage in a point-by-point discussion of
every factor relating to credibility (Poppa v. Astrue, 569 F.3d
1167, 1171 (10th Cir. 2009)), we believe remand is warranted when
the record indicates that the ALJ did not properly consider at
least
two
relevant
factors
as
to
credibility,
such
as
plaintiff’s daily activities and plaintiff’s use of medication
and its side effects.
See SSR 96–7p, 1996 WL 374186 at *3
(listing factors for consideration in determining credibility).
The remainder of the ALJ’s credibility analysis is not so
persuasive as to convince the court that the ALJ’s findings are
closely
linked
to
substantial
14
evidence,
even
though
we
acknowledge
that
credibility
province of the ALJ.
determinations
are
normally
the
The ALJ attempted to draw a distinction
between plaintiff’s former employer not holding a job open for
her and plaintiff not being physically able to perform the job,
when plaintiff’s testimony on this subject appears to combine
the two points.6
The ALJ also suggested that plaintiff linked
her pain to a specific tailbone injury at one point in her
testimony, in contradiction to her later testimony that her pain
was not linked to a specific injury.
Plaintiff’s testimony,
however, was not clearly contradictory.
She stated that her
pain is worse in her lower back “by my tail bone area,” and that
the pain has been there a long time.
having a specific tailbone injury.
(Tr. 34).
She also denied
When questioned later about
the roller skating fall in October 2011, she seemed to indicate
that the fall caused her tailbone to hurt, but that was not the
source
of
her
previous
pain.
(Tr.
43).
Plaintiff
stated:
“[W]hat bothers me isn’t my tail bone, it’s my - - I have L4-5
and something, L3, 4 and 5 that’s messed up, it’s not the tail
bone.
So they asked me what was hurting, and that had never
6
Plaintiff stated: “A. But it took [the doctors] a long time to figure it
out [that plaintiff had fibromyalgia] and I was off past the required time
they . . . were required to hold my position. And so they said my position
was no longer available, and that because I had to take pain pills all the
time for the pain, that I wasn’t able to do my job under strong narcotics, so
they wouldn’t give me the position back.
Q. Exhibit 6[E] page 4 is a statement they completed. It says here on
page 4 ‘took 12 weeks of leave for medical reasons and still not able to meet
physical requirements to return to work.’ Is that what you’re talking about?
A. Yeah.”
(Tr. 32-33).
15
hurt before.”
Id.
Again, while the court honors the ALJ’s
authority to make credibility decisions, we do not believe the
inconsistencies
credibility
in
testimony
analysis
may
are
so
overcome
blatant
the
that
other
the
ALJ’s
deficiencies
described in this opinion.
V.
OTHER POINTS TO CONSIDER ON REMAND
Because the court believes that remand is necessary for the
reasons already stated, the court will not decide plaintiff’s
other arguments for remand.
that
as
alleged
by
The court would comment, however,
plaintiff,
the
ALJ
did
not
specifically
address the functional limitations which plaintiff might suffer
from foot problems and her obesity.
these
issues
be
given
specific
The court recommends that
consideration
by
the
ALJ
on
remand.
VI.
THE COURT SHALL NOT DIRECT AN IMMEDIATE AWARD OF BENEFITS.
While the court has discretion to reverse and remand for an
award of benefits, the court shall not do so because the court
believes that additional fact finding and analysis may clarify
the
nature
impairments.
and
extent
of
plaintiff’s
physical
and
mental
The court further notes that this action is in
accord with the relief requested in plaintiff’s reply brief.
Doc. No. 17 at p. 15.
16
VII.
CONCLUSION
The
court
shall
reverse
defendant’s
plaintiff’s applications for benefits.
that
this
case
be
remanded
to
the
decision
to
The court shall direct
Commissioner
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
for
further
This remand is made
under the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 3rd day of April, 2014, at Topeka, Kansas.
s/Richard D. Rogers
Richard D. Rogers
United States District Judge
17
deny
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