Clark et al v. Shawnee, Kansas, City of

Filing 140

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 86 , 128 Motions for Partial Summary Judgment; denying 124 , 134 Motions for Review; denying 130 Motion to Strike; granting 108 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by U.S. District Senior Judge Sam A. Crow on 1/5/17. Mailed to pro se parties Eric Clark, Jonathan Clark by regular mail (msb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JONATHAN CLARK
and ERIC S. CLARK,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. 15-4965-SAC

THE CITY OF SHAWNEE, KANSAS,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The case comes before the court on the following motions that
are ripe for decision: the motion for partial summary judgment (Dk. 86) by
the plaintiffs Jonathan and Eric Clark; the defendant City of Shawnee’s,
(“City’s”), motion for summary judgment (Dk. 108); the plaintiffs’ motion for
review (Dk. 124); the plaintiffs’ second motion for partial summary
judgment (Dk. 128); the City’s motion to strike (Dk. 130); and the plaintiffs’
motion to review (Dk. 134). While docketed as a motion for review, the
plaintiffs’ filing (Dk. 124) simply asks the court to substitute “primary” for
“second” on page four of their filed response (Dk. 120) to the defendant’s
summary judgment motion. The defendant does not oppose this change. The
court summarily grants the plaintiffs’ motion (Dk. 124) requesting this
change. The court also summarily denies the City’s motion to strike (Dk.
130), because many of the arguments are similar to those substantively
rejected in the court’s prior order of October 4, 2016, (Dk. 107), and

because a decision on the other arguments will not materially advance the
disposition of the case. Finally, the court summarily denies the plaintiffs’ last
motion for review (Dk. 138), because it fails to make an arguable showing
that the magistrate’s order denying their motion to compel was erroneous or
contrary to law. Thus, the court will decide the three pending summary
judgment motions by narrowing its focus to the common dispositive issues.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
“Summary judgment is appropriate only if ‘the movant shows
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Tolan v. Cotton, ––– U.S. ––––,
134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014)(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a)). A factual dispute is “material” only if it “might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). A “genuine” factual dispute requires more than a mere scintilla
of evidence in support of a party's position. Id. at 252.
The moving party has the initial burden of showing “the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact,” and, if carried, the non-moving party
then “must bring forward specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial as
to those dispositive matters for which [it] carries the burden of proof.”
National American Ins. Co. v. American Re-Insurance Co., 358 F.3d 736,
739 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). At the
summary judgment stage, the court is not to be weighing evidence, crediting
2

some over other, or determining the truth of disputed matters, but is only to
be deciding if a genuine issue for trial exists. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866. The
court performs this task with a view of the evidence that favors most the
party opposing summary judgment. Id. Summary judgment may be granted
if the nonmoving party's evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly
probative. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250–51. Essentially, the inquiry is
“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must
prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251–52.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 2, 2013, within the limits of the City of Shawnee,
Kansas, the defendant Jonathan Clark was driving his truck which was
pulling a trailer loaded with wooden pallets. Nathan Karlin, a police officer
with the City of Shawnee, was driving his patrol car when he saw Jonathan’s
truck and trailer ahead. As it began to pull over to the side of the road,
Officer Karlin activated his emergency lights and stopped behind Jonathan’s
truck and trailer. Officer Karlin stopped because the trailer’s load was not
secured. Officer Karlin also believed the trailer was one that required a
license plate, and he saw none.
Officer Karlin asked Jonathan to produce proof of insurance.
When Jonathan opened the driver’s-side door of his truck, Officer Karlin saw
a handgun in the door well. The handgun was not encased, but holstered,
3

and it appeared to be loaded. At this point, Officer Karlin grabbed the
handgun from the door well and ordered Jonathan who was in the cab to put
his hands up. Thinking the situation was threatening, Officer Karlin ordered
Jonathan to go to the front of the truck and to get on the ground. Jonathan
complied, and Officer Karlin handcuffed him without incident and asked him
if he had a concealed carry permit. Jonathan told the officer that he did not
have a permit.
Jonathan was later placed in a second officer’s vehicle while his
truck was searched. Officer Karlin found in the truck cab another loaded
handgun which also was not encased. Officer Karlin provided Jonathan with
a notice to appear for three ordinance violations: (1) unlawful use of a
firearm; (2) spilling loads on highway due to failure to secure load, and (3)
no registration on the trailer. About 50 minutes after the initial stop, Officer
Karlin released Jonathan at the scene, but Jonathan’s firearms were seized
by Officer Karlin. The court has previously summarized the procedural
disposition of these violations in a prior order. (Dk. 16, pp. 10-11). In short,
Jonathan was convicted in municipal court of the firearm and spilling
violations. Before the district court, Jonathan was convicted of the spilling
violation but the city dismissed the firearm violation.
Eric Clark was not a passenger in the truck, was not at the scene
of the arrest, and was not with Jonathan immediately before, during or after
the traffic stop, arrest and search. Eric has never been detained or charged
4

with violating the firearm ordinance in question. Eric does not have a conceal
carry permit. Eric stated in his deposition that there was “about a dozen”
times when he did not carry any firearm while in the City of Shawnee during
the period between December 2, 2013, the date of Jonathan’s traffic stop,
and August 25, 2014, the repeal date of the firearm ordinance. (Dk. 109-3,
p. 6). Eric also testified that “once or twice” during the same time period he
“carried a loaded unencased firearm[] in the City of Shawnee.” Id. at p. 5.
The firearm ordinance in question is the City of Shawnee’s §
9.13.040 Criminal Possession of a Firearm (“Ordinance”), that was in force
on December 2, 2013, and that made it an unlawful act prohibited within the
City to criminally possess a firearm by “Transporting a Firearm in any air,
land, or water vehicle, unless the Firearm is unloaded and encased in a
container which completely encloses the Firearm.” (Dk. 87-1, pp. 9-10). This
Ordinance was repealed on August 25, 2014, as a result of a state law
making all ordinances null and void which were adopted prior to July 1,
2014, and which governed the “transporting of firearms or ammunition.”
(Dk. 87-1, p. 21).
STANDING OF ERIC CLARK
This will be the court’s third chance to consider this issue. The
plaintiff Eric has been afforded a full opportunity to present the factual and
legal merits to his somewhat unusual position. In effect, Eric is bringing “a
pre-enforcement challenge to a city criminal ordinance that has since been
5

repealed.” (Dk. 16, p. 6). The uncontested record fully establishes that he no
longer faces any credible threat of prosecution under the ordinance. State
law now forecloses the City from having an ordinance that governs the
transportation of firearms. Consequently, the plaintiffs’ second amended
complaint seeks relief only in the form of compensatory damages and makes
no claim for injunctive or declaratory relief. In the same vein, the plaintiffs’
summary judgment filings reiterate that they “are not seeking to have any
ordinance or regulation declared as unconstitutional, nor seeking injunctive
or prospective relief.” (Dk. 87, p. 29)(emphasis in original). Eric’s standing,
therefore, is determined solely by his claim of compensatory damages for
injuries allegedly sustained because the ordinance was in effect from
December 2, 2013, through August 24, 2014, even though it was never
enforced against him. Count one of the second amended complaint does
allege that the “plaintiff Uncle Eric . . . has suffered damages including
emotional distress, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life.” (Dk. 45,
¶ 42).
In his summary judgement filings, Eric explains his injuries to
result from the ordinance’s impact on his decisions to act and on his related
emotional experiences. He has testified that there were “about a dozen”
times when the ordinance influenced or chilled his behavior so that he did
not carry any firearm while in the City of Shawnee. (Dk. 111-3, p. 7). There
also were one or two times when, notwithstanding the ordinance, he decided
6

to carry a loaded and non-encased firearm while in the City of Shawnee.
(Dk. 109-3, pp. 5-6). Eric expands his allegations of a chilling impact by
arguing that he even felt compelled to not carry a loaded firearm from his
house across his curtilage before climbing into his vehicle and driving away.
(Dk. 118-1, pp. 3-6).1 As far as transporting a firearm in compliance with
the former ordinance, Eric opines that transporting an unloaded and encased
firearm would have been more detrimental to his safety than transporting no
weapon. Id. Eric attributes his injuries not only from not carrying a firearm
under the threat of being arrested but also from the “suffering of mental
anguish similar to those of being held against your will (or worse) which is
never a pleasant feeling and when it is backed by threat of arrest which
means potential death during the process, it exacerbates the mental anguish
all the more.” Id. at p. 6. Eric’s filings are replete with his conjecture over
fears, apprehensions, threats and injuries that this ordinance caused him
during this nine-month period.
Article III limits federal court jurisdiction to cases and
controversies in the understanding that “the traditional role of AngloAmerican courts, . . . is to redress or prevent actual or imminently
threatened injury to persons caused by private or official violation of law.”
As the City points out, Eric has failed to show that he lived in the City of
Shawnee during the relevant period, and he lists his current address as
being in Williamsburg, Kansas. The court agrees with the City that Eric’s use
of “second home” to describe Jonathan Clark’s residence in Shawnee is a
conclusion that lacks meaning and needs evidentiary support and
explanation, and none has been provided.
1

7

Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009). This doctrine
of standing demands that a federal court satisfy itself “that the plaintiff has
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.” Id. at 493 (internal
quotation marks, citations, and italics omitted). The burden rests with the
plaintiff to show “standing for each type of relief sought.” Id. (citation
omitted). For retrospective relief like compensatory damages, standing is
based on past injuries. Dias v. City and County of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169,
1176 (10th Cir. 2009); PETA, Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Rasmussen,
298 F.3d 1198, 1201-03 (10th Cir. 2002) (Standing for compensatory
damages resulting from officers directly threatening the plaintiff protestors
at the scene with arrest if they did not cease, and the protestors left). “A
plaintiff seeking retrospective relief, on the other hand, satisfies the ‘injury
in fact’ requirement if she suffered a past injury that is concrete and
particularized.” Tandy v. Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1284 (10th Cir. 2004)
(citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S 200, 210-11 (1995))
(Standing for compensatory damages resulting from the actual past invasion
of statutory rights in having been denied access to public transportation).
Eric’s burden entails “three showings: that . . . [he] suffered an
injury in fact which is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent;
second, that there is a causal connection between the injury and the
challenged conduct; and third, that the injury is likely to be redressed by a
8

favorable decision.” Dias v. City and County of Denver, 567 F.3d at 1176
(citation omitted); see Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, ––– U.S. ––––,
134 S.Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014). The plaintiff's injury, moreover, must be
“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). “Since they are not mere pleading requirements but rather an
indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case, each element must be supported in
the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of
proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the
successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (citations
omitted). Thus, on a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff “must set forth
by affidavit or other evidence specific facts, . . ., which for purposes of the
summary judgment motion will be taken to be true.” Id. As this court has
recently said, “’[f]ederal courts scrupulously guard the boundaries of their
jurisdiction; they are duty-bound not to permit a standing determination to
rest on speculation or conjecture.’” Clark v. Lynch, ---F. Supp. 3d---, 2016
WL 5466389 at *3 (D. Kan. Sep. 29, 2016) (quoting New Mexico Off–
Highway Vehicle Alliance v. U.S. Forest Service, 645 Fed. Appx. 795, 804
(10th Cir. 2016)). Standing is analyzed from the facts existing when the
complaint is filed. Tandy v. Wichita, 380 F.3d at 1284.
Based on the ordinance’s repeal, the City contends that Eric
cannot show any existing credible threat of prosecution for purposes of pre9

enforcement challenge and cannot show an injury in fact. Indeed, the repeal
of a challenged law generally moots a constitutional challenge and claim for
declaratory or injunctive relief. See, e.g., Markadonatos v. Village of
Woodridge, 760 F.3d 545, 546 (7th Cir. 2014); Coalition for Abolition of Mar.
v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2000). The City summarily
denies that Eric sustained an injury in fact because the ordinance was never
enforced against him. Eric, however, claims that he actually experienced “a
credible imminent threat” of arrest during the relevant period and that this
restrained him from exercising his Second Amendment right. (Dk. 87, p.
28). Eric’s written arguments work at blurring the legal concepts involved:
While “credible imminent threat” is often tied to future (prospective)
relief claims, in the present case it is tied to a past injury because
without physical restraint, a credible imminent threat had to exist at
the time of the injury. That credible imminent threat was a threat of
physical restraint initiated because of exercising a fundamental right
and is supported by contemporaneous physical restraint of Plaintiff
Jonathan Clark. In other words, “credible imminent threat” does not
represent a future possibility but a past actuality. Mention of prior
restraint as it applies to past injuries can undoubtedly be less than
clear, but “past actuality” is the intended meaning for plaintiff’s
statements, such as, “erecting a threat of arrest [i.e., prior restraint]
for both Plaintiffs” (See Doc. #1 at ¶ 36) and; such mentions should
be interpreted as retrospective claims only, that is, as acting as a prior
restraint at specific time(s) in the past (i.e. between Dec. 2, 2013 and
August 24, 2014). A prior restraint is analogous in many ways to a
seizure under the Fourth Amendment in that it occurs when
government actors have, “by means of physical force or show of
authority, . . . in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen,” . . .
except excluding the means of physical force and the liberty not
necessarily being freedom of movement but freedom to exercise any
fundamental right.

10

(Dk. 87, pp. 28-29). In sum, the court understands Eric to base his standing
on having experienced what he alleges to be a credible imminent threat
created by a combination of circumstances. First, the City had the authority
to enforce this Ordinance against anyone traveling within its City limits.
Second, Eric occasionally traveled in the City of Shawnee. Finally, upon
learning of the firearm charges against his nephew, Eric felt restrained from
exercising his Second Amendment rights to carry a loaded and non-encased
firearm in his vehicle. Despite multiple pending dispositive motions, the City
has avoided addressing this specific standing argument by Eric.
Nevertheless, because standing “requires federal courts to satisfy
themselves that the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to warrant invocation of federal-court
jurisdiction,” Summers, 555 U.S. at 492–93, the court will address this
issue.
Other than learning about the ordinance from his nephew’s
charges, Eric grounds his standing and seeks damages on having
experienced the same general enforcement threat that faced anyone in the
City of Shawnee transporting a firearm in a vehicle. Besides not coming
forward with any legal authority that recognizes standing/damages on the
basis of this general threat alone, Eric does not have the facts to support a
sufficient imminent threat here. On the injury-in-fact requirement in a preenforcement setting, the Supreme Court has said there must be,
11

“circumstances that render the threatened enforcement sufficiently
imminent,” and the plaintiff must demonstrate, (1) “an intention to engage
in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but
proscribed by [the challenged] statute,” and (2) “there exists a credible
threat of prosecution thereunder.” Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S.Ct. at 2342
(quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298
(1979)). A credible threat of prosecution cannot rest on fears that are
“‘imaginary or speculative.’” United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. at 298 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). On the other hand, “an actual arrest,
prosecution, or other enforcement action is not a prerequisite to challenging”
a law on constitutional grounds. Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S.Ct. at 2342.
On those occasions when he did travel in the City of Shawnee
without transporting a firearm in violation of the ordinance, Eric’s only
burden was his compliance with the ordinance. “[P]laintiffs can’t satisfy the
credible-threat-of-prosecution test by relying on evidence of their
compliance with the challenged statute.” Colorado Outfitters Ass’n v.
Hickenlooper, 823 F.3d 537, 548 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing Susan B. Anthony
List, 134 S.Ct. at 2342). Eric does not point to any cognizable injury or costs
associated with having traveled on these occasions in compliance with the
ordinance.
As for the two times when he did travel with a firearm in
violation of the ordinance, Eric has not come forward with specific facts
12

showing a genuine issue for trial that he faced a credible threat of this
ordinance being enforced against him. The facts are uncontroverted that Eric
was never stopped, threatened with arrest, arrested, charged or prosecuted
under the ordinance. There is nothing about the circumstances of Eric’s
occasional travels in the City that makes enforcement of this ordinance
against him a credible imminent threat. Eric’s alleged injuries are merely
conjectural and hypothetical and will not satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement. See Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA, ---U.S.---, 133 S.Ct.
1138, 1147 (2013) (“Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic
concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that
the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the
injury is certainly impending.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); Hickenlooper, 823 F.3d at 554 (“’persons having no fears of state
prosecution except those that are imaginary or speculative, are not be
accepted as appropriate plaintiffs’”) (quoting Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298). The
plaintiff Eric's alleged fear and anxiety here over the ordinance’s possible
enforcement against him when he visited the City are too speculative to
satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of the standing requirement. There is nothing
about Eric’s travels in the City or about his communications with the City
that would suggest he ever received a warning or threat or ever faced a
credible threat of arrest or prosecution. This is not a First Amendment case
in which standing may arise from forced self-censorship. For that matter,
13

Eric cannot meet the high hurdles for bringing a facial challenge. See Dias v.
City and County of Denver, 567 F.3d at 1179-80. This is not a case that
warrants relaxing the standing requirements in order to facilitate a
constitutional challenge that would not otherwise be made. The plaintiff
Jonathan remains in the case and has standing as he was arrested, charged
and prosecuted under the challenged ordinance. In sum, the court finds that
as a matter of law the plaintiff Eric cannot satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement for standing on His Second Amendment claim for compensatory
damages. On this issue, the plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment are
denied, and the defendant’s motion is granted.
COUNTS 2-4
These three counts turn on the constitutionality of the City’s
firearm Ordinance. Count two claims Jonathan’s Second Amendment rights
were violated by the Ordinance. Count three claims the City’s enforcement of
the unconstitutional Ordinance resulted in a prolonged detention that
violated Jonathan’s Fourth Amendment right. Similarly, count four claims the
City’s enforcement of the unconstitutional Ordinance resulted in an
unreasonable search that violated Jonathan’s Fourth Amendment right. All of
these claims turn on the constitutionality of the City’s Ordinance. Jonathan
alleges the Ordinance is unconstitutional and either directly violates his right
under the Second Amendment or eviscerates the City’s justification for
detaining and searching him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
14

PRE-EMPTION
Jonathan first contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were
violated in that the Ordinance was unenforceable, that is, null and void,
because state law had pre-empted it prior to December 2, 2013. Jonathan
has no viable authority for his argument. The governing Kansas statute in
2013, K.S.A. § 12-16,124, prohibited a city or county from adopting an
ordinance governing the transfer of firearms except that a city or county was
not prohibited:
from adopting an ordinance, resolution or regulation requiring a
firearm transported in any air, land or water vehicle to be unloaded
and encased in a container which completely encloses the firearm or
any less restrictive provision governing the transporting of firearms,
provided such ordinance, resolution or regulation shall not apply to
persons licensed or recognized under the personal and family
protection act.
K.S.A. 12-16,124 (2013). If a state statute contains express exceptions, a
city may also regulate within the subject area as long as the city's ordinance
does not conflict with the state law. Johnson County Water Dist. No. 1 v.
City Council of Kansas City, 255 Kan. 183, 194, 871 P.2d 1256 (1994). The
City’s Ordinance in question here matches the express exception allowed in
state law by making it a crime to “transport[. . .] a firearm in any air , land,
or water vehicle, unless the Firearm is unloaded and encased in a container
which completely encloses the firearm.” City of Shawnee, Ordinance No.
3003, § 9.13.040(A)(4), (Dk. 87-1, p. 10). Paragraph B exempts a person
who is in possession of a current and valid license under the Kansas Personal
15

and Family Protection Act. Id. The court finds no conflict between the
Ordinance and the state law, because it does not authorize something that
the statute forbids and it does not forbid something that the statute
authorizes. The plaintiff’s cursory reading of the Kansas Attorney General
Opinions does not support any finding of a conflict. In fact, the cited Opinion
No. 2011-024 submitted by the plaintiff actually supports the conclusion of
no preemption. (Dk. 118-1, pp. 63-64). The defendant is entitled to
summary judgment on this claim.
Equal Protection and Due Process
The plaintiff here is arguing the Ordinance impacts a
fundamental right to self-defense, namely, his “’immediate’ access to
‘loaded’ firearms.” (Dk. 87, p. 39). The plaintiff’s premise is that his
constitutional right to self-defense includes having immediate access to an
uncased and loaded firearm while traveling in a vehicle. The court will
address this part of the plaintiff’s argument in its later discussion of the
Second Amendment and, in particular, the Supreme Court’s statements in
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008), that “the right
secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited” and is “not a right to
keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for
whatever purpose.” For now, the court briefly addresses the plaintiff’s
unusual arguments that the Ordinance violates the equal protection clause in
exempting persons who have an optional license and violates the due
16

process clause in requiring licenses from those who already have experience
and training with firearms.
The Ordinance at issue creates the offense of “Criminal
Possession of a Firearm” as defined in five separate paragraphs. (Dk. 87-1,
pp. 9-10). As relevant here, paragraph four lists as an offense the
“[t]ransporting a Firearm in any air, land, or water vehicle, unless the
Firearm is unloaded and encased in a container which completely encloses
the Firearm.” Id. For the offenses in paragraphs four and five, the Ordinance
recognizes nine separate paragraphs of exemptions for law enforcement
officers, for people on their land or in their dwelling, for various public and
private officers engaged in public safety activities, and for “[p]ersons . . .in
possession of a current and valid License” as defined by the Kansas Personal
and Family Protection Act (“KPFPA”). Id.
The plaintiff argues the KPFPA license exemption to the
Ordinance results in an unconstitutional differentiation involving two discrete
sets: first, non-resident travelers who are denied the opportunity for a
KPFPA license, and second, Kansas residents who are trained and
experienced in handling firearms but who choose not to have a KPFPA
license. Under the heading of due process, the plaintiff argues the
Ordinance is in violation for requiring licenses from persons who already
have experience with firearms. He curiously argues that a license applicant

17

would be forced to commit perjury if he complied with the requirement of
saying that he “desired” a license when he actually did not “desire” a license.
The distinction between these claims is important:
The Equal Protection and Due Process clauses protect distinctly
different interests. On the one hand, the “substantive component” of
the Due Process Clause “provides heightened protection against
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty
interests,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 117 S.Ct.
2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997), even when the challenged regulation
affects all persons equally. In contrast, “the essence of the equal
protection requirement is that the state treat all those similarly
situated similarly,” Bartell v. Aurora Pub. Schs., 263 F.3d 1143, 1149
(10th Cir.2001) (quotations omitted), with its “central purpose [being]
the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race
[or other suspect classifications,]” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
239, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). As such, equal protection
only applies when the state treats two groups, or individuals,
differently.
Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544
U.S. 920 (2005). First, as he is a resident of Kansas, the plaintiff has not
alleged standing to bring an equal protection claim alleging the rights of
non-residents. If this is intended to be a facial challenge, then the court’s
later ruling against all facial challenges also will apply here. Second, the
plaintiff has not come forward with a viable equal protection claim based on
the licensing exemption. The plaintiff does not show that the licensing
exemption treats similarly situated people differently. The plaintiff does not
assert that he was precluded from obtaining a KPFPA license. The plaintiff
purports to argue that people who have training and experience with
firearms are similarly situated to those who have KPFPA licenses. The
18

plaintiff explains, “the minimal training and experience required by the
KPFPA conceal carry License application process pales in comparison to
many who have been in the military, hunted all their life, etc.” (Dk. 87, p.
44). The plaintiff proposes a less restrictive policy which would allow for
persons having alternative training or experience to prove the same with
documentation and receive a similar exemption.
“The Equal Protection Clause ‘keeps governmental decision
makers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects
alike.” Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The plaintiff cannot show that
persons having training and experience with firearms are in all relevant
respects similarly situated to those who have KPFPA licenses. Besides the
completion of a safety and training course, the licensing requirements also
addressed qualifications related to residency, federal or state prohibitions on
firearm handling, age, criminal history, and mental health findings. K.S.A.
75-7c04, 75-7c05. The license application also required “a statement that
the applicant desires a concealed handgun license as a means of lawful selfdefense.” K.S.A. 75-7c05(a)(5) (2011). By being licensed, a person becomes
part of a state database. K.S.A. 75-7c06(d). All of these circumstances
certainly establish that a person with firearm training and experience is not
for all relevant purposes similarly situated to a person having a KPFPA
license. Indeed, the license exemption matches up with the Supreme Court’s
19

holding in Heller that it was not “cast[ing] doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.”
554 U.S. at 626. It also matches up with the remedy in Heller, “[a]ssuming
that Heller is not disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights,
the District must permit him to register his handgun and must issue him a
license to carry it in the home.” 554 U.S. at 635. In short, the plaintiff has
not alleged and shown discriminatory treatment of persons similarly situated
by the Ordinance’s exemption for persons having a KPFPA license.
For his due process claim, the plaintiff’s arguments are equally
lacking in merit. He complains about the Second Amendment right being
burdened by having to go through the licensing process and disclosing
personal information particularly when a person already has firearm training
and experience. As discussed earlier, the court finds that the Ordinance’s
exemption for licensed persons has a broader purpose than insuring
experience with firearms. See Peterson v. LaCabe, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1167,
1174-75 (D. Colo. 2011) (“Colorado has a substantial interest in restricting
permits to those persons whose information [from background checks and
ongoing monitoring that is relevant to a disqualifying factor] is more readily
available; moreover, the restriction is tailored to that need.”), aff’d on other
grounds, 707 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2013). Consistent with Heller, these other
purposes are undeniably valid and constitutional reasons for licensing and
justify the licensing process and disclosures required under it. Moreover, the
20

court construes the plaintiff’s argument as no more than an indirect and
duplicative Second Amendment challenge. The court rejects this claim an
effort to raise a duplicative claim under substantive due process grounds.
See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998) (quoting
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997)(“[I]f a constitutional
claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or
Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard
appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due
process.”). The court finds no valid arguments here for a due process claim.
Facial Challenge
The plaintiff next makes a facial challenge to the statute and
opines that, “[t]here is no significant difference between a facial challenge
and an as-applied challenge except for the number of people (or sets of
people) considered in the challenge and the potential outcome.” (Dk. 87, p.
46). The plaintiff then challenges the Ordinance as unconstitutional in
restricting the Second Amendment rights of those non-exempt persons “who
are members of the people’s militia and engaged in militia duties or
activities” or who are law-abiding residents transporting a loaded firearm
“for the purpose of immediate self defense.” (Dk. 87, pp. 47-48). The
plaintiff contrasts the Ordinance with Florida law which imposes licensing
requirements but exempts law enforcement which are defined as to include
state militia. Without this exemption, the plaintiff insists the Ordinance is
21

unconstitutional and null and void. As for law-abiding residents, the plaintiff
argues the Ordinance keeps them from having the immediate defense of a
loaded firearm while at home because “it is physically impossible to unload
and encase a firearm the very instant one moves from one’s home and onto
the public road.” (Dk. 87, p. 54). None of these arguments makes out a
viable facial challenge to the Ordinance.
“Facial challenges are strong medicine.” Ward v. Utah, 398 F.3d
1239, 1246 (10th Cir. 2005). Consequently, they “’are disfavored,’ . . . , and
generally fail if any ‘set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would
be valid.’” Peterson v. LaCabe, 783 F. Supp. 3d at 1173 (quoting Washington
State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449-450
(2008)). “Facial overbreadth challenges are disfavored and permitted ‘in
relatively few settings, and, generally, on the strength of specific reasons
weighty enough to overcome [courts'] well-founded reticence.’ United States
v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 169 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Sabri v. United
States, 541 U.S. 600, 609–10 (2004)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 838 (2013).
The plaintiff’s facial challenges fail to meet the above thresholds.
He has not shown that the Ordinance lacks any “plainly legitimate sweep” in
prohibiting the transportation of loaded or non-encased firearms subject to
the stated exemptions. Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 77-78 (1st
Cir. 2012). The plaintiff does not even attempt to show the Ordinance to be
lacking any lawful application. Instead, the plaintiff wants to show the
22

statute is overbroad in not exempting militia and in implicating home
possession. As judged by related city ordinances setting forth the definition
of a law enforcement officer, § 9.13.004 (Dk. 87-1, p. 5)(“any person who
by virtue of office . . . is vested by law with a duty to maintain public
order”), and by the exemption for “persons found on their land, in their
dwelling, or fixed place of business,” § 9.13.040(B)(2), the plaintiff has not
necessarily shown the Ordinance to be overbroad. Even if he had, the court
would follow the Fourth Circuit’s approach and reject a facial challenge here:
Without entertaining the novel notion that an overbreath challenge
could be recognized “outside the limited context of the First
Amendment,” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, we conclude
that a person, such as Masciandaro, to whom a statute was
constitutionally applied, “will not be heard to challenge that statute on
the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to
others, in other situations not before the Court.” Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973).
This conclusion “reflect[s] the conviction that under our constitutional
system courts are not roving commissions assigned to pass judgment
on the validity of the Nation's laws.” Id. at 610–11, 93 S.Ct. 2908; see
also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167–68, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 167
L.Ed.2d 480 (2007) (“It is neither our obligation nor within our
traditional institutional role to resolve questions of constitutionality
with respect to each potential situation that might develop.... For this
reason, ‘[a]s-applied challenges are the basic building blocks of
constitutional adjudication’ ” (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As–
Applied and Facial Challenges and Third–Party Standing, 113 Harv. L.
Rev. 1321, 1328 (2000))); Skoien, 614 F.3d at 645 (“[a] person to
whom a statute properly applies [cannot] obtain relief based on
arguments that a differently situated person might present”).
Accordingly, we reject his facial challenge.
United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 474 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 756 (2011); United States v. Chester, 514 Fed. Appx. 393, 395,
2013 WL 1189253, p. *2 (4th Cir. Mar. 25, 2013)(“[N]o circuit has accepted
23

an overbreadth challenge in the Second Amendment context.”). As shown
later, the court will conclude that the Ordinance had been applied properly
and constitutionally to the plaintiff. Thus, the court rejects the plaintiff’s
facial challenges as argued in all aspects.
Second Amendment
In its prior order, the court has summarized the relevant law
governing the plaintiff’s claims of unconstitutionality under the Second
Amendment. The parties’ briefing on this issue has not shown any error in
the court’s summary of law and its approach. For ease of reference, the
court will quote extensively from its prior order:
In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the
Supreme Court recognized an individual Second Amendment right to
keep and bear arms and central to it, “the inherent right of selfdefense,” and concluded this right was violated by a statute that
effectively banned all handgun possession in the home and required
any lawful firearm to be rendered inoperable by disassembly or trigger
lock:
The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of
“arms” that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for
that lawful purpose. The prohibition extends, moreover to the
home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is
most acute. Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have
applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the
home “the most preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use
for protection of one’s home and family,” . . ., would fail
constitutional muster.
554 U.S. at 628 (citation omitted). In addressing the statute that
required weapons to be rendered inoperable, the Court added, “This
makes it impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful
purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional.” 554 U.S. at
630. The Court did not address the licensing requirement and ordered,
“Assuming that Heller is not disqualified from the exercise of Second
Amendment rights, the District must permit him to register his
24

handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home.” 554
U.S. at 635. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177
L.Ed.2d 894 (2010), the Court found the Fourteenth Amendment made
the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms fully applicable to
the States and struck down two Illinois cities’ ordinances that
effectively banned handgun possession by almost all private citizens.
One of the cities had ordinances that required valid registration
certificates for any firearm possessed and that “prohibit[ed]
registration of most handguns, thus effectively banning handgun
possession by almost all private citizens who reside in the City.” 177
L.Ed.2d at 904.
The Tenth Circuit has agreed with other circuits that Heller
follows a “two-pronged approach to Second Amendment challenges”
that entails:
Heller thus “suggests a two-pronged approach to Second
Amendment challenges” to federal statutes. United States v.
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010); see United States v.
Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641-42 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Under
this approach, a reviewing court first “ask[s] whether the
challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the
scope of the Second Amendment's guarantee.” Marzzarella, 614
F.3d at 89. “If it does not, [the court's] inquiry is complete.” Id.
“If it does, [the court] must evaluate the law under some form of
means-end scrutiny.” Id. “If the law passes muster under that
standard, it is constitutional.” Id. “If it fails, it is invalid.” Id.
United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800-01 (10th Cir. 2010). In
Reese, the circuit panel concluded the federal law prohibiting
possession of a firearm while subject to a domestic protection order
imposed a burden on the challenger’s right to possess otherwise legal
firearms.
The answer to the first step demands “an ‘historical
inquiry’ into ‘whether the conduct at issue was understood to be within
the scope of the right at the time of ratification.’” Kolbe v. Hogan, 813
F.3d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Chester, 628
F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) and citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27),
rehearing en banc granted, 2016 WL 8511670 (Mar. 4, 2016). Thus,
“’if the challenged regulation burdens conduct that was within the
scope of the Second Amendment as historically understood, then we
move to the second step of applying an appropriate form of meansend scrutiny.’” Id. The Court in Heller affirmatively establishes the
“guarantee,” pre-existing the Second Amendment, of “the individual
right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” 554 U.S.
at 592. The purpose for this right was not just to preserve the militia
25

but extended to “self-defense and hunting.” 554 U.S. at 599. While
Heller discussed the purpose of self-defense within the home, the
Tenth Circuit recently acknowledged that, “[t]he need for self-defense,
albeit less acute, certainly exists outside the home as well. Moore v.
Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935–40 (7th Cir. 2012), rehearing en banc
denied, 708 F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2013).
“The right to keep and bear arms as a matter of history
and tradition, ‘is not unlimited,’ of course, as even law-abiding citizens
do not have ‘a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any
manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.’” Kolbe, 813 F.3d at
172 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626). “Accordingly, if the government
can establish that a challenged firearms law regulates activity falling
outside the scope of the Second Amendment right as it was
understood at the relevant historical moment—1791 or 1868—then the
analysis can stop there; the regulated activity is categorically
unprotected, and the law is not subject to further Second Amendment
review.” Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702-703 (7th Cir.
2011). Common sense is apparent in the Seventh Circuit’s latest
comment on this topic:
Heller does not purport to define the full scope of the Second
Amendment. The Court has not told us what other entitlements
the Second Amendment creates or what kinds of gun regulations
legislatures may enact. Instead the Court has alerted other
judges, in Heller and again in McDonald, that the Second
Amendment “does not imperil every law regulating firearms.”
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (plurality opinion);
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n. 26, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Cautionary
language about what has been left open should not be read as if
it were part of the Constitution or answered all possible
questions. It is enough to say, as we did in [United States v.]
Skoien, 614 F.3d [638] at 641 [(7th Cir. 2010)(en banc)], that
at least some categorical limits on the kinds of weapons that can
be possessed are proper, and that they need not mirror
restrictions that were on the books in 1791.
Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Illinois, 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.
2015) cert. denied sub nom., Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Ill.,
136 S. Ct. 447 (2015).
The plaintiffs frame the right protected by the Second
Amendment and implicated by the ordinance as the general public’s
right to transport in a vehicle a firearm that is either loaded or not
encased. Reading § 9.13.040 in its full context suggests a different
framing of this right. This ordinance actually exempted from the
transportation restriction any person who was “in possession of a
26

current and valid License” under “the Kansas Personal and Family
Protection Act, pursuant to K.S.A. 75-7c01 and K.S.A. 75-7c17, to
encompass the entire act and all exemptions included therein.” (Dk.
13-1, p. 7). This statutory license would permit carrying a concealed
handgun and would be issued only after meeting various requirements
including, most notably, the completion of a safety and training course
and a criminal background check. This exemption of those licensed for
conceal carry would certainly change the right implicated here, in that
a person so licensed was not prohibited from transporting in a vehicle
a firearm that was loaded and that was not encased. See, e.g., Horsley
v. Trame, 61 F. Supp. 3d 788, 791-93 (S.D. Ill. 2014), aff’d, 808 F.3d
1126 (7th Cir. 2015). Neither side has incorporated this exemption
into their Second Amendment analysis offered in this summary
judgment proceeding.
For purposes of this motion, the court is going to follow the
approach of some circuits and simply assume Second Amendment
application and move to the second step. The defendant took this
position in its brief. The court believes this makes sense here, as the
parties have not separately analyzed the first step and as the right
implicated by this repealed ordinance has not been fully defined by the
parties and, therefore, is subject to some deliberation. See United
States v. Hosford, 82 F. Supp. 3d 660, 664-65 (D. Md. 2015). With
that said, the court recognizes that since Heller and McDonald, the
Tenth Circuit has observed the “narrowness” of the holding in Heller
and the Court’s recognition:
“Nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial
side of arms.”
Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Service, 790 F.3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27), cert. denied, 2016 WL 1078949
(Mar. 21. 2016). The Tenth Circuit also quoted the footnote attached
to this statement in Heller, “’We identify these presumptively lawful
regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be
exhaustive.’” Id. at n.1 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n. 26). These
same assurances were repeated by the Court in McDonald. Bonidy,
790 F.3d at 1124-25. Thus, the court in Bonidy concluded, “the
Second Amendment right to carry firearms does not apply to federal
buildings and adjacent parking lots. 790 F.3d at 1125.
Assuming the right implicated by the full text of the
ordinance does come within the Second Amendment, the court will
27

evaluate the ordinance using a means-end scrutiny. The Tenth Circuit
recently stated, “If Second Amendment rights apply outside the home,
we believe they would be measured by the traditional test of
intermediate scrutiny. See United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802
(10th Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a Second
Amendment as-applied challenged to § 922(g)(8)).” Bonidy, 790 F.3d
at 1126. The Bonidy panel expressed a rationale for this test that is on
all fours with the circumstances here:
Intermediate scrutiny makes sense in the Second Amendment
context. The right to carry weapons in public for self-defense
poses inherent risks to others. Firearms may create or
exacerbate accidents or deadly encounters, as the longstanding
bans on private firearms in airports and courthouses illustrate.
The risk inherent in firearms and other weapons distinguishes
the Second Amendment right from other fundamental rights that
have been held to be evaluated under a strict scrutiny test, such
as the right to marry and the right to be free from viewpoint
discrimination, which can be exercised without creating a direct
risk to others. Intermediate scrutiny appropriately places the
burden on the government to justify its restrictions, while also
giving governments considerable flexibility to regulate gun
safety.
790 F.3d at 1126. The Tenth Circuit precedent compels this court to
apply the traditional test of intermediate scrutiny. Thus, “[t]o pass
constitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny, the government has
the burden of demonstrating that its objective is an important one and
that its objective is advanced by means substantially related to that
objective.” United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d at 802 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
The court is not convinced from reading the parties’ briefs
that the defendant will not be able to carry its burden at this step as a
matter of law. Indeed, the defendant argues several possible public
safety aims that are important, that seem to be aims of the ordinance,
and that seem to be advanced by substantially related means. Pointing
uncased firearms and/or using loaded firearms during the operation of
vehicles on public roadways plainly carry safety risks that go beyond
those commonly associated with the firearm itself. Additionally, the
defendant describes such conduct as associated with “road rage”
incidents so that prohibiting this conduct could prevent escalation into
these incidents and all the safety risks involved with them. The
defendant borrows some of the reasoning from United States v.
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 473-74, which found no Second Amendment
violation in the application of a federal regulation that prohibited
28

carrying or possessing a loaded handgun in a motor vehicle within a
national park:
Loaded firearms are surely more dangerous than unloaded
firearms, as they could fire accidentally or be fired before a
potential victim has the opportunity to flee. The Secretary could
have reasonably concluded that, when concealed within a motor
vehicle, a loaded weapon becomes even more dangerous. In this
respect, § 2.4(b) is analogous to the litany of state concealed
carry prohibitions specifically identified as valid in Heller. See
128 S. Ct. at 2816–17. By permitting park patrons to carry
unloaded firearms within their vehicles, § 2.4(b) leaves largely
intact the right to “possess and carry weapons in case of
confrontation.” Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2797. While it is true that the
need to load a firearm impinges on the need for armed selfdefense, see Volokh, Implementing the Right for Self–Defense,
56 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1518–19, intermediate scrutiny does not
require that a regulation be the least intrusive means of
achieving the relevant government objective, or that there be no
burden whatsoever on the individual right in question. See
United States v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837, 847 (4th Cir. 1995).
Moreover, because the United States Park Police patrol
Daingerfield Island, the Secretary could conclude that the need
for armed self-defense is less acute there than in the context of
one's home.
638 F.3d at 473-74. The defendant highlights the increased danger of
transporting loaded firearms and the reduced need for self-defense as
the public roadways are patrolled by law enforcement officers. The
defendant also notes that the ordinance does not utterly foreclose
armed self-defense, nor must the ordinance be the least intrusive
means of attaining the governmental objective. The ordinance permits
the possession of an unloaded and encased weapon, and nothing
prevents a person from pulling over a vehicle and then uncasing and
loading a vehicle for self-defense use outside of the vehicle. This would
serve the public safety purpose of preventing the exchange of gunfire
between vehicles operating on public roadways and all of the safety
risks associated with these incidents. Thus, the defendant asks the
court to find that the ordinance survives intermediate scrutiny and that
it does not violate the plaintiff’s Second Amendment rights.
Because the constitutionality issue had not been properly
framed for the court’s final ruling at this time, because the parties
have not been afforded a full opportunity to brief all of the matters
related to this issue, some of which are noted above, and because the
29

parties now have a legal template for advancing their arguments, the
court will withhold its ruling at this time.
(Dk. 26, pp. 10-19).
On the first prong, the defendant contends the Ordinance does
not burden conduct falling within the Second Amendment, because
“[n]either the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit has ever acknowledged
that Second Amendment rights exist outside of the home.” (Dk. 109, p. 11).
The defendant contrasts the Ordinance with the restrictive laws essentially
banning handguns in the home that were struck down in Heller. The
Ordinance is “hardly a serious burden” in that it allows someone to transport
an unloaded firearm in an unlocked case with ammunition stored right next
to the gun. (Dk. 109, p. 13). Even assuming this to be a constitutional
burden, Ordinance gives one the option of obtaining a KPFPA conceal carry
license so as to be exempt from the burden. Finally, the defendant proposes
recognizing a correspondence between the transportation of firearms in a
vehicle and the carrying of a concealed firearm. The defendant points to
Heller’s observation that state law prohibitions against the carrying of
concealed weapons have withstood Second Amendment challenges and also
points to the Tenth Circuit holding that rejects a Second Amendment right to
carry a concealed weapon.
The Tenth Circuit in Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197 (10th
Cir. 2013), in construing and applying Heller, concluded on the first prong
that the Second Amendment did not provide the right to carry a concealed
30

weapon. Id. at 1209. The Tenth Circuit explained its conclusion in these
terms:
[T]he Heller opinion notes that, “[l]ike most rights, the right secured
by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through
the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained
that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” 554
U.S. at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783. As an example of the limited nature of
the Second Amendment right to keep and carry arms, the Court
observed that “the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the
question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were
lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.” Id. And the
Court stressed that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast
doubt on longstanding prohibitions.” Id.
There can be little doubt that bans on the concealed carrying of
firearms are longstanding. In Heller, the Supreme Court cited several
early cases in support of the statement that most nineteenth century
courts approved of such prohibitions. . . .
. . . Given this lengthy history of regulation, restrictions on
concealed carry qualify as “longstanding” and thus “presumptively
lawful regulatory measures.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 & n. 26, 128
S.Ct. 2783; see also National Rifle Association of America, Inc. v.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 196
(5th Cir. 2012) (“Heller demonstrates that a regulation can be deemed
‘longstanding’ even if it cannot boast a precise founding-era
analogue.... Heller considered firearm possession bans on felons and
the mentally ill to be longstanding, yet the current versions of these
bans are of mid–20th century vintage.” (citations omitted)).
. . . Given the dicta in Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281–82, 17 S.Ct.
326, and the Supreme Court's admonition in Heller that “nothing in our
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions,”
554 U.S. at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783, we conclude that Peterson's Second
Amendment claim fails at step one of our two-step analysis: the
Second Amendment does not confer a right to carry concealed
weapons.
Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d at 1210-11. The Tenth Circuit later in Bonidy
held “that the Second Amendment right to carry firearms does not apply to
federal buildings, such as post offices,” or to the parking lot that exclusively
31

served the federal building and is therefore “part of” the federal building.
790 F.3d at 1125-26. As the First Circuit has observed, the Supreme Court
in Heller and McDonald, “did not say, and to date has not said, that publicly
carrying a firearm unconnected to defense of hearth and home and
unconnected to militia service is a definitive right of private citizens
protected under the Second Amendment.” Powell v. Tompkins, 783 F.3d
332, 348 (1st Cir. 2015) (“Debate continues among courts.” citations
omitted), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1448 (2016). Recently, a federal district
court summarized the state of this debate with two circuits, the Seventh and
Ninth, “hav[ing] expressly recognized a Second Amendment right to bear
arms for self-defense that extends beyond the home” while the remaining
circuits are content with assuming without deciding that this right exists.
Chesney v. City of Jackson, 171 F. Supp. 3d 605, 622 (E.D. Mich. 2016).2 As
far as this debate, the Tenth Circuit has taken its position of assuming
without deciding both in Peterson when it rejected the more specific Second
Amendment right to carry outside of the home a concealed weapon and in
Bonidy when it rejected the right to carry a firearm in federal buildings.
At the same time, the court recognizes the need for self-defense
extends beyond the home and implicates the right to bear arms for that
purpose. The Tenth Circuit recognizes this point, as well, in Bonidy:
Since Chesney, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc changed its position to the
“Second Amendment may or may not protect, to some degree, a right of a
member of the general public to carry firearms in public.” Peruta v. County
of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 927 (9th Cir. 2016).
2

32

This alternative holding assumes that the right to bear arms
recognized in Heller in the home would also apply, although with less
force, outside the home. This seems like a reasonable assumption
because the Second Amendment right is “to keep and bear” arms, and
“bear” certainly implies the possibility and even the likelihood that the
arms will be carried outside the home. Also, the Second Amendment
right recognized by the Supreme Court is predicated on the right of
self-defense. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The need for
self-defense, albeit less acute, certainly exists outside the home as
well. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935–40 (7th Cir.2012)
Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d at 1125 (footnote omitted). There is
nothing in the case law to date that would justify departing from Tenth
Circuit precedent. Thus, the court will assume the Second Amendment
protects to some degree a right to bear arms in public.
This brings us to the more specific argument on applying the
Tenth Circuit’s holding in Peterson that there is no Second Amendment right
for members of the public to carry concealed weapons in public. 707 F.3d at
1211; see Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 927 (9th Cir.
2016). “If the government establishes that the challenged law regulates
activity outside the scope of the Second Amendment as understood at the
time of the framing of the Bill of Rights, the activity is unprotected and the
law is not subject to further constitutional scrutiny.” Tyler v. Hillsdale County
Sheriff’s Dept., 837 F.3d 678, 685-86 (6th Cir. 2016). There is no question
that the Ordinance here addresses the public carry of firearms, as with
Peterson. In that context, the distinction recognized is “between open carry
of a handgun—such as in a visibly exposed belt holster—and concealed
carry—such as hidden from view under clothing or in a pocket.” Drake v.
33

Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 440 (3rd Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2134
(2014).
The Ordinance does not refer to the transportation offense as a
concealed carry regulation, but it does recognize that someone with a
conceal carry license is exempt from this offense. Nor does the Ordinance
incorporate an element or make a distinction based on whether the
transported firearm is visible or not to someone outside of the vehicle.
Nonetheless, there is no serious question that firearms being transported in
a vehicle are most typically not visible to others outside of the vehicle.
United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 790 (E.D. Va. 2009)
(“Heller 's approval of concealed weapons bans provides further support for
rejecting Masciandaro's as-applied challenge, as carrying a loaded weapon in
a motor vehicle—an act which, by definition, is almost always outside the
view of those nearby—presents the sort of compelling safety risk more
adequately resolved by legislation than judicial ipse dixit.”), aff’d, 638 F.3d
45 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011). The court agrees that
firearms transported in vehicles will “almost always” not be open but hidden
from the view of others outside of the vehicle.
Thus, the Ordinance fairly represents the defendant’s effort to
regulate activity similar to or in kind with the concealed carry of firearms.
This conclusion is supported by the Ordinance’s very operation. It groups
transporting a firearm in a vehicle and carrying a firearm concealed on one’s
34

body in applying the exemptions listed in subsection B. There is nothing
unusual about this legislative grouping and treating together the activities of
firearms being transported in vehicles and firearms being carried concealed
on one’s body. See, e.g., United States v. Bridges, 2016 WL 3922354, at *6
(E.D. Mich. Jul. 21, 2016); Banks v. Gallagher, 2010 WL 5862994 at *10
(M.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2010), adopted in part and rejected in part, 2011 WL
718632 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2011). The Fourth Circuit described a federal
regulation prohibiting the possession of loaded weapons in a motor vehicle
on national park areas as “analogous to the litany of state concealed carry
prohibitions specifically identified as valid in Heller.” United States v.
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 474 (4th Cir. 2011).
On the other hand, the court realizes the apparent policy
interests behind the Ordinance do not squarely match up with those
historically expressed for regulating concealed carry, Peterson, 707 F.3d at
1210-11. Yet, the court is satisfied in that they share a common concern for
preserving the right to self-defense without creating untoward and unseemly
circumstances that go beyond self-defense. As stated in Peterson, the right
“is calculated to incite men to a manly and noble defence of themselves, if
necessary, and of their country, without any tendency to secret advantages
and unmanly assassinations.” 707 F.3d at 1210 (quoting State v. Chandler,
5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850)). The Ordinance exempts someone with a KPFPA
license which is obtained only after the applicant states that the concealed
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handgun license is desired “as a means of lawful self-defense.” K.S.A. 757c05(a)(5) (2013). Thus, not unlike in Peterson, the Ordinance works to
preserve a person’s need to have a firearm for self-defense through
licensing. And even if someone does not want a license, the Ordinance does
not prevent the self-defense use of a firearm, but only after the serious risk
from firearms fired from vehicles on public roads is reduced by stopping and
exiting the vehicle. The court finds the similarities between concealed carry
and vehicular transportation to be sufficient in terms of regulatory effect,
kind and purpose as to justify applying Peterson here. Thus, the court
concludes that the fair, logical and reasonable application of Peterson here
means that there is no Second Amendment right for members of the public
to transport loaded and non-encased firearms in their vehicles without a
concealed carry permit. In sum, the plaintiff has failed to make a strong
showing that his circumstances are sufficiently distinguishable “from those of
persons historically excluded from Second Amendment protections.”
Binderup v. Atty. Gen. U.S. of America, 836 F.3d 336, 347 (3rd Cir. 2016).
Assuming the right implicated by the Ordinance comes within the
Second Amendment and jumping over this first prong, as appellate courts
have sometimes “deemed it prudent to” do, Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d
865, 875 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013), the court would
evaluate the Ordinance using the traditional test of intermediate scrutiny
followed by Tenth Circuit precedent, Bonidy, 790 F.3d at 1126. The court
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does not consider this level of means-end scrutiny to be an open question,
as the Tenth Circuit’s holding is clear and indistinguishable from this case
and is consistent with its precedent, United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792,
802 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011), and with that of
other circuits, see, e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Dept., 837 F.3d
678, 692-93 (6th Cir. 2016)(“Many of our sister circuits have also held that
intermediate scrutiny is applicable.”); Binderup v. Atty. Gen. U.S. of
America, 836 F.3d 336, 353 (3rd Cir. 2016); Jackson v. City and County of
San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 963-65 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.
Ct. 2799 (2015); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 875 (4th Cir. 2013);
United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 1538 (2012). The Tenth Circuit found in Bonidy that this level of
scrutiny “makes sense” because firearms create “inherent risks to others.”
790 F.3d at 1126. This risk distinguishes the Second Amendment right from
the other fundamental constitutional rights that receive strict scrutiny. Id.
“Intermediate scrutiny appropriately places the burden on the government
to justify its restrictions, while also giving governments considerable
flexibility to regulate gun safety.” Id. Intermediate scrutiny is appropriate
here, because it does not burden the core Second Amendment right of
responsible, law-abiding citizens to self-defense within their homes, see
Tyler, 837 F.3d at 691-92, and because the burden here, in light of the
license exemption, is anything but substantial.
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Despite some varying vocabulary between the circuits on
intermediate scrutiny in Second Amendment cases, the Tenth Circuit
generally follows other circuits, “’To pass constitutional muster under
intermediate scrutiny, the government has the burden of demonstrating that
its objective is an important one and that its objective is advanced by means
substantially related to that objective.’” United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d at
802 (quoting United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 562 U.S. 1092 (2010)); United States v Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d
1164, 1169 (10th Cir.) (“Under this standard a law is sustained if the
government shows that it is ‘substantially related’ to an ‘important’ official
end.”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 289 (2012). In looking at the government’s
interest, the courts recognize the generalizations involved with law-making
on “threat to public safety—but general laws deal in generalities.” HuitronGuizar, 678 F.3d at 1170. “The bottom line is that crime control and public
safety are indisputably ‘important’ interests.” Id. As far as the relationship
between the objective and the means, “’[a]ll that is required is “a fit that is
not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the
single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest
served.”’” Tyler, 837 F.3d at 693 (quoting Neinast v. Bd. of Trs. of Columbus
Metro. Library, 346 F.3d 585, 594 (6th Cir. 2003)(quoting in turn Bd. of Trs.
of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)), cert. denied, 541
U.S. 990 (2004)). “To be sure, substantial relation does not require every
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individual in the class to exemplify the important objective.” Bonidy, 790
F.3d at 1134 (Tymkovich J., dissenting) (citing Huitron v. Guizar, 678 F.3d
at 1169 (prohibition of firearms to illegal aliens passes intermediate scrutiny
even if the illegal alien has been in the United States for decades). Put
another way, “[i]ntermediate scrutiny does not require a perfect fit between
a rule’s objectives and the circumstances of each individual subject to the
rule.” Bonidy, 790 F.3d at 1127.
The defendant City observes that the Ordinance does not ban
the transport of firearms in vehicles but regulates the transport for safety
purposes. More specifically, the Ordinance may alleviate fears of law
enforcement officers that vehicle occupants who have not been subjected to
concealed carry permit background checks also do not have immediate
access to loaded firearms. This would not only protect officers upon an initial
traffic stop and but upon any escalation of danger during the stop. Handling
loaded firearms in a moving vehicle on a public roadway presents an obvious
safety risk not only to the occupants of the vehicle but also to the public
traveling on the roadway. The safe and secure transport of firearms would
deter those immediate and emotionally charged responses that mark
dangerous, even fatal, road rage incidents.
The City of Shawnee is not alone in recognizing these important
public interests. Indeed, the Legislature of the State of Kansas certainly
affirmed these same apparent public interests by exempting this very
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circumstance from its general prohibition on city and county regulation of
firearms. See K.S.A. 12-16,125(b)(4). Safety for those riding in a vehicle,
for others on the road and for law enforcement officers is without question a
significant, substantial and important governmental interest. The animating
interests here are important in ensuring firearms are safely transported, in
protecting against loaded firearms being immediately accessible to vehicle
occupants who have not received firearm training and have not been
subjected to a criminal and mental background check as part of the KPFPA
licensing process, and in reducing the risk of loaded firearms becoming a
part of a traffic stop or a road rage incident.
The plaintiff Clark wants to focus on what specific intent was
expressed by the City in enacting this Ordinance. The plaintiff also wants to
debate whether those having criminal intent would abide with this
Ordinance. Finally, the plaintiff wants empirical evidence from the City to
support that this Ordinance will serve these stated objectives. Because this
Ordinance expressly embodies an exemption created by the Kansas
Legislature and because this Ordinance plainly addresses substantial and
important governmental interests, the court deems this debate unnecessary.
As for proof that the Ordinance employs means substantially related to the
objectives being advanced, this is apparent from the face of the Ordinance,
from the evidence presented in the defendant’s brief, and from other cases.

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The court finds the Ordinance is reasonably tailored and adapted
to meet its objectives. The licensing exemption plainly serves the safety
interests advanced by firearm training and background checks and also
insures that those needing immediate access to loaded firearms for selfdefense are able to secure it. The balance of the Ordinance imposes
restrictions that are reasonable and have a scope in proportion to the
interests served. Firearms, even if cased and unloaded, remain available for
one’s self-defense and may still be transported in a vehicle. The Ordinance
restricts only the manner in which they may be transported. The Ordinance
reasonably addresses the danger of carrying and firing loaded weapons from
a vehicle on a public roadway. The Ordinance’s resulting delay to immediate
access to a loaded weapon is not unreasonable or disproportionate to
achieving the important governmental interests.
The court also has considered the defendant’s statistical
evidence on officers killed and assaulted in the line of duty and during traffic
stops. Finally, the court is persuaded by the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in
Masciandaro upholding a federal regulation that prohibited carrying or
possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle within the national park
areas. The court found:
We also conclude that § 2.4(b)'s narrow prohibition is reasonably
adapted to that substantial governmental interest. Under § 2.4(b),
national parks patrons are prohibited from possessing loaded firearms,
and only then within their motor vehicles. 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b)
(“Carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle, vessel,
or other mode of transportation is prohibited”). We have no occasion
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in this case to address a regulation of unloaded firearms. Loaded
firearms are surely more dangerous than unloaded firearms, as they
could fire accidentally or be fired before a potential victim has the
opportunity to flee. The Secretary could have reasonably concluded
that, when concealed within a motor vehicle, a loaded weapon
becomes even more dangerous. In this respect, § 2.4(b) is analogous
to the litany of state concealed carry prohibitions specifically *474
identified as valid in Heller. See 128 S.Ct. at 2816–17.
By permitting park patrons to carry unloaded firearms within
their vehicles, § 2.4(b) leaves largely intact the right to “possess and
carry weapons in case of confrontation.” Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2797.
While it is true that the need to load a firearm impinges on the need
for armed self-defense, see Volokh, Implementing the Right for Self–
Defense, 56 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1518–19, intermediate scrutiny does
not require that a regulation be the least intrusive means of achieving
the relevant government objective, or that there be no burden
whatsoever on the individual right in question. See United States v.
Baker, 45 F.3d 837, 847 (4th Cir. 1995). Moreover, because the
United States Park Police patrol Daingerfield Island, the Secretary
could conclude that the need for armed self-defense is less acute there
than in the context of one's home.
Accordingly, we hold that, on Masciandaro's as-applied challenge
under the Second Amendment, § 2.4(b) satisfies the intermediate
scrutiny standard.
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 473–74. The Fourth Circuit’s means-end scrutiny
fairly parallels and supports the court’s evaluation of the Ordinance here.
The court concludes that the Ordinance satisfies the intermediate scrutiny
standard and prevails against Clark’s as-applied challenge on this second
prong too. Suffice it to say, this same analysis would necessarily satisfy the
rational basis scrutiny as well. Finally, to reiterate an earlier point, the court
also follows Masciandaro in rejecting Clark’s facial overbreadth challenge to
the Ordinance. Id. at 474.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ motion for partial
summary judgment (Dk. 86), the plaintiffs’ second motion for partial
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summary judgment (Dk. 128), the plaintiffs’ motions for review (Dks. 124
and 134), and the City’s motion to strike (Dk. 130) are denied;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the City’s motion for summary
judgment (Dk. 108) is granted. The clerk of the court shall enter judgment
for the defendant City.
Dated this 5th day of January, 2017, Topeka, Kansas.
s/Sam A. Crow
Sam A. Crow, U.S. District Senior Judge

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