Williams (ID 0113715) v. Kansas Department of Corrections et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ENTERED: This matter is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Signed by U.S. Senior District Judge Sam A. Crow on 06/07/17. Mailed to pro se party Timothy L. Williams, Jr. by regular mail. (smnd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

TIMOTHY L. WILLIAMS JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO.16-3203-SAC-DJW

KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is a civil rights action filed pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.

By order of April 19, 2017, the undersigned

directed Plaintiff to show cause why this matter should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.

In lieu of a response, Plaintiff filed an amended

complaint on May 30, 2017.

Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure provides that a party may amend its pleading
once as a matter of course within 21 days of service of the
original pleading.

Because this is Plaintiff’s first amended

complaint and because the original complaint has not been served
on Defendants, Plaintiff is in compliance with Rule 15, and the
Court will consider his amended complaint.
1

Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The

Court

is

required

to

screen

complaints

brought

by

prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an
officer or employee of such entity to determine whether summary
dismissal is appropriate.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

Additionally,

with any litigant, such as Plaintiff, who is proceeding in forma
pauperis,

the

Court

has

determine its sufficiency.

a

duty

to

screen

the

complaint

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

to

Upon

completion of this screening, the Court must dismiss any claim
that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a
defendant

who

is

immune

from

such

relief.

28

U.S.C.

§§

1915A(b), 1915(e)(2)(B).
To survive this review, the plaintiff must plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell

Atl.

Corp.

v.

Twombly,

550

U.S.

544,

570

(2007).

In

applying the Twombly standard, the Court must assume the truth
of all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and
construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

See

Leverington v. City of Colo. Springs, 643 F.3d 719, 723 (10th
Cir. 2011).
While

a

pro

se

plaintiff’s

complaint

must

be

liberally

construed, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), pro se
2

status does not relieve the plaintiff of “the burden of alleging
sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be
based.”
The

Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).

Court

need

pleaded facts.”
(10th Cir. 1990).

not

accept

“mere

conclusions

characterizing

Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1390
“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the

grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause

of

action

will

not

do.”

Twombly,

550

U.S.

at

555

(internal quotation marks omitted).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d
1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992).

In addressing a claim brought

under § 1983, the analysis begins by identifying the specific
constitutional right allegedly infringed.
U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

Graham v. Connor, 490

The validity of the claim then must

be judged by reference to the specific constitutional standard
which governs that right. Id.
Complaint
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff names two defendants:
Officer M. Steen and Corizon Healthcare (“Corizon”).
3

Plaintiff

alleges that on September 18, 2016, he was struck in the chest
by a sally port door as a result of the actions of Defendant
Steen.

Plaintiff had been in the medication line at the time,

and Defendant Steen was operating the control system for the
door.

He directed the prisoners in line to proceed through the

door.

Plaintiff was walking through the door when it began to

close, striking Plaintiff in the center of the chest.

Plaintiff

backed up into the housing unit to avoid further contact with
the door.

When he brought the incident to Defendant Steen’s

attention,

Plaintiff

alleges

Officer

Steen

became

very

aggressive, irate, and defensive, yelling at him that he “should
have waited until the door was completely opened.”

Plaintiff

complained to the shift sergeant, who was present, and later
filed a formal grievance.
After being advised by the Court that negligent acts cannot
form

the

basis

of

a

constitutional

violation,

Plaintiff

now

alleges Defendant Steen intentionally caused the door to close
on him.

Plaintiff did not otherwise change his description of

the event.
Plaintiff
assessed

by

adds

Corizon

allegations
staff

that

members

he

after

was
the

not

properly

incident.

He

complains that no x-rays were taken of his chest.
Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from chronic chest and
back pain, post-traumatic stress disorder, and a phobia of sally
4

port doors as a result of the incident.

He requests damages in

the amount of $133,666.13.
Analysis
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s amended complaint with
the standards set out above in mind.

While Plaintiff has cured

some of the deficiencies noted in the order to show cause, he
still fails to state an actionable § 1983 claim.
Count I
Count I of Plaintiff’s amended complaint is based on the
incident where Defendant Steen closed the sally port door on
him.

Plaintiff

Amendment rights.

claims

Defendant

Steen

violated

his

Eighth

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction

of “cruel and unusual” punishment.

See U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

A prison guard's use of force is “cruel and unusual” only if it
involves

“the

unnecessary

and

wanton

infliction

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).

of

pain.”

The force must

have been applied “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992).
Plaintiff alleged in his initial complaint that Defendant
Steen was negligent in his actions.

As discussed in the order

to show cause, negligence on the part of a prison guard, even
where

an

injury

results,

constitutional violation.

does

not

rise

to

the

level

of

a

Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347

(1986), citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986).
5

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges at one point
that

Defendant

Steen

acted

intentionally

(Doc.

#7,

However, his description of the event continues to

p.

4).

refer to

Defendant Steen’s “negligence” (Doc. #7, pp. 1, 3) and “poor
attention to detail” (Doc. #7, p.3).

Plaintiff also mentions

that

could

there

is

a

“blind

spot”

that

be

addressed

“[alleviate] the problem in the future” (Doc. #7, p. 3).

to
In

addition, he describes Defendant Steen’s initial response when
confronted as telling Plaintiff he should have waited until the
door was completely open to attempt to pass through, when the
door had been completely open and was closing.

This indicates

Defendant Steen did not even see the incident occur.

Plaintiff

has not provided any additional facts to make the allegation of
intent plausible, such as a history of conflict with Defendant
Steen.

Plaintiff's allegations do not contain facts supporting

a plausible claim that Defendant Steen acted wantonly.
Even

if

Plaintiff’s

allegation

of

intentional

action

on

Defendant Steen’s part is taken as true, Plaintiff has still
failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim.

First, intentional

acts are not necessarily wanton acts rising to the level of a
constitutional violation.

See Barber v. Grow, 929 F. Supp. 820,

823 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (guard intentionally pulling chair out from
under inmate is not wanton behavior).

Furthermore, the Eighth

Amendment “excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis
6

uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of
a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Hudson, 503 U.S.
at 9–10 (citations and internal quotations omitted).

Not “every

malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause
of action.”

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.

The Court questions whether

a prison guard allowing a door to close as a prisoner attempts
to walk through even qualifies as a “use of force.”
event, it is at most a de minimis use of force.

In any

Compare Starr

v. Kober, 2015 WL 6511659, at *9 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 6, 2015),
report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 6511725 (W.D. Okla.
Oct. 28, 2015), aff'd, 642 F. App'x 914 (10th Cir. 2016) (claim
that guard pushed a steel door hard and that the door hit the
plaintiff’s left side did not state Eighth Amendment violation);
Mitchell v. Nutall, 2012 WL 967567, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 21,
2012) (“Plaintiff's isolated incident of being hit by an exit
door

does

not

meet

the

standard

for

cruel

and

unusual

punishment”); McCall v. Crosthwait, 336 F. App’x. 871, 872 (11th
Cir. 2009) (no constitutional violation occurred where officer
pushed detainee out of jail's elevator causing inmate to hit
partially open steel door and fall against plexiglass window
thereby suffering bruised shoulder and elbow); Johnson v. Moody,
206 F. App’x. 880, 885 (11th Cir. 2006) (officer's pushing or
kicking metal tray door on inmate's hand was de minimis use of
force which did not constitute Eighth Amendment violation); Hill
7

v. Kelly, 1997 WL 638402, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1997) (guard
closing door on plaintiff’s thumb is the kind of de minimis
imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned).
The Court finds Plaintiff's allegations fail to plausibly
state

an

Eighth

Amendment

claim.

Accordingly,

Plaintiff's

excessive force claim should be dismissed for failure to state a
violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment.
Count II
In

Count

II

of

his

complaint,

Plaintiff

alleges

that

Defendant Corizon failed to provide him with adequate medical
care

after

amended

the

sally

complaint,

he

port

door

incident.

was

sent

to

examined soon after the incident.

the

According

prison

to

clinic

his

to

be

The nurse on duty advised

Plaintiff to take some ibuprofen and apply an ice pack to his
chest.

Plaintiff was experiencing worse pain in his chest the

next morning, so he returned to the clinic.

The nurse on duty

prescribed the same course of treatment as the first nurse.
Plaintiff’s primary complaint is that neither nurse took “x-rays
or

photos

to

assure

threatening injuries.”

that

[Plaintiff]

did

not

have

life

(Doc. #7, p. 4).

In order for a prisoner to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for medical mistreatment, Plaintiff must allege “acts or
omissions

sufficiently

harmful
8

to

evidence

deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs.”
U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

Estelle v. Gamble, 429

The “deliberate indifference” standard

includes an objective and a subjective component, both of which
must be met to prevail under § 1983 on a claim of medical
mistreatment.
2005).

Martinez v. Garden, 430 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir.

“The subjective component is met if a prison official

knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety.”

Martinez,

430

F.3d

at

1304

(quoting

Sealock

v.

Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000)).
In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged
completely disregarded.
of

assessment

and

the

his injury was

Instead, he disagrees with the method
course

of

treatment

prescribed.

The

subjective component of the deliberate indifference standard “is
not satisfied, absent an extraordinary degree of neglect, where
a

doctor

merely

exercises

his

considered

medical

Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 2006).

judgment.”
The Tenth

Circuit has found that where a health care provider exercises
medical judgment in prescribing one course of treatment over
another,

he

does

not

serious medical need.
548

(10th

Cir.

exhibit

deliberate

indifference

to

a

See Toler v. Troutt, 631 F. App’x. 545,

2015)(“The

bottom

line

is

that

Mr.

Toler

identifies no decision clearly establishing the proposition that
exercising

medical

judgment

in

prescribing

one

course

of

treatment over another constitutes deliberate indifference to a
9

serious medical need.

He cannot identify such precedent because

our controlling precedent clearly establishes the law to the
contrary.”)
As with Count I, Plaintiff is attempting to make what are
at

the

most

negligent

violations.

The

acts

Tenth

or

omissions

Circuit

has

into

made

constitutional

clear

that

“[a]

negligent failure to provide adequate medical care, even one
constituting

medical

constitutional

malpractice,

violation.”

does

Perkins

not

give

v.

rise

Kan.

to

Dep’t

a
of

Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 811 (10th Cir. 1999).
Another problem with Count II is that Plaintiff names only
Corizon as a defendant.
provides

medical

Corizon is a private corporation that

services

to

inmates.

A

corporation

acting

under color of state law cannot be held liable under a theory of
respondeat superior for the actions of its individual employees.
Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003).
It can be held liable under § 1983 only for unconstitutional
policies and practices.
established

policy

or

Id.

Plaintiff has not described any

practice

promulgated

by

Corizon

and

explained how it was applied to him in a manner that caused his
alleged

injuries.

Thus,

Plaintiff

fails

to

allege

facts

sufficient to state a claim against Corizon.
The

Court

finds

that

Count

should be dismissed.
10

II

of

Plaintiff’s

complaint

Summary
For the reasons set forth, the Court concludes this matter
must

be

dismissed

pursuant

to

28

U.S.C.

§§

1915A(b)

and

1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this matter is dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

This 7TH day of June, 2017, at Topeka, Kansas.

s/ Sam A. Crow______
SAM A. CROW
U.S. Senior District Judge

11