Williams (ID 0113715) v. Kansas Department of Corrections et al
Filing
8
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ENTERED: This matter is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Signed by U.S. Senior District Judge Sam A. Crow on 06/07/17. Mailed to pro se party Timothy L. Williams, Jr. by regular mail. (smnd)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
TIMOTHY L. WILLIAMS JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CASE NO.16-3203-SAC-DJW
KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is a civil rights action filed pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
By order of April 19, 2017, the undersigned
directed Plaintiff to show cause why this matter should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
In lieu of a response, Plaintiff filed an amended
complaint on May 30, 2017.
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that a party may amend its pleading
once as a matter of course within 21 days of service of the
original pleading.
Because this is Plaintiff’s first amended
complaint and because the original complaint has not been served
on Defendants, Plaintiff is in compliance with Rule 15, and the
Court will consider his amended complaint.
1
Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The
Court
is
required
to
screen
complaints
brought
by
prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an
officer or employee of such entity to determine whether summary
dismissal is appropriate.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
Additionally,
with any litigant, such as Plaintiff, who is proceeding in forma
pauperis,
the
Court
has
determine its sufficiency.
a
duty
to
screen
the
complaint
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
to
Upon
completion of this screening, the Court must dismiss any claim
that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a
defendant
who
is
immune
from
such
relief.
28
U.S.C.
§§
1915A(b), 1915(e)(2)(B).
To survive this review, the plaintiff must plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell
Atl.
Corp.
v.
Twombly,
550
U.S.
544,
570
(2007).
In
applying the Twombly standard, the Court must assume the truth
of all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and
construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
See
Leverington v. City of Colo. Springs, 643 F.3d 719, 723 (10th
Cir. 2011).
While
a
pro
se
plaintiff’s
complaint
must
be
liberally
construed, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), pro se
2
status does not relieve the plaintiff of “the burden of alleging
sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be
based.”
The
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Court
need
pleaded facts.”
(10th Cir. 1990).
not
accept
“mere
conclusions
characterizing
Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1390
“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause
of
action
will
not
do.”
Twombly,
550
U.S.
at
555
(internal quotation marks omitted).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d
1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992).
In addressing a claim brought
under § 1983, the analysis begins by identifying the specific
constitutional right allegedly infringed.
U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).
Graham v. Connor, 490
The validity of the claim then must
be judged by reference to the specific constitutional standard
which governs that right. Id.
Complaint
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff names two defendants:
Officer M. Steen and Corizon Healthcare (“Corizon”).
3
Plaintiff
alleges that on September 18, 2016, he was struck in the chest
by a sally port door as a result of the actions of Defendant
Steen.
Plaintiff had been in the medication line at the time,
and Defendant Steen was operating the control system for the
door.
He directed the prisoners in line to proceed through the
door.
Plaintiff was walking through the door when it began to
close, striking Plaintiff in the center of the chest.
Plaintiff
backed up into the housing unit to avoid further contact with
the door.
When he brought the incident to Defendant Steen’s
attention,
Plaintiff
alleges
Officer
Steen
became
very
aggressive, irate, and defensive, yelling at him that he “should
have waited until the door was completely opened.”
Plaintiff
complained to the shift sergeant, who was present, and later
filed a formal grievance.
After being advised by the Court that negligent acts cannot
form
the
basis
of
a
constitutional
violation,
Plaintiff
now
alleges Defendant Steen intentionally caused the door to close
on him.
Plaintiff did not otherwise change his description of
the event.
Plaintiff
assessed
by
adds
Corizon
allegations
staff
that
members
he
after
was
the
not
properly
incident.
He
complains that no x-rays were taken of his chest.
Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from chronic chest and
back pain, post-traumatic stress disorder, and a phobia of sally
4
port doors as a result of the incident.
He requests damages in
the amount of $133,666.13.
Analysis
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s amended complaint with
the standards set out above in mind.
While Plaintiff has cured
some of the deficiencies noted in the order to show cause, he
still fails to state an actionable § 1983 claim.
Count I
Count I of Plaintiff’s amended complaint is based on the
incident where Defendant Steen closed the sally port door on
him.
Plaintiff
Amendment rights.
claims
Defendant
Steen
violated
his
Eighth
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction
of “cruel and unusual” punishment.
See U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
A prison guard's use of force is “cruel and unusual” only if it
involves
“the
unnecessary
and
wanton
infliction
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
of
pain.”
The force must
have been applied “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992).
Plaintiff alleged in his initial complaint that Defendant
Steen was negligent in his actions.
As discussed in the order
to show cause, negligence on the part of a prison guard, even
where
an
injury
results,
constitutional violation.
does
not
rise
to
the
level
of
a
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347
(1986), citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986).
5
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges at one point
that
Defendant
Steen
acted
intentionally
(Doc.
#7,
However, his description of the event continues to
p.
4).
refer to
Defendant Steen’s “negligence” (Doc. #7, pp. 1, 3) and “poor
attention to detail” (Doc. #7, p.3).
Plaintiff also mentions
that
could
there
is
a
“blind
spot”
that
be
addressed
“[alleviate] the problem in the future” (Doc. #7, p. 3).
to
In
addition, he describes Defendant Steen’s initial response when
confronted as telling Plaintiff he should have waited until the
door was completely open to attempt to pass through, when the
door had been completely open and was closing.
This indicates
Defendant Steen did not even see the incident occur.
Plaintiff
has not provided any additional facts to make the allegation of
intent plausible, such as a history of conflict with Defendant
Steen.
Plaintiff's allegations do not contain facts supporting
a plausible claim that Defendant Steen acted wantonly.
Even
if
Plaintiff’s
allegation
of
intentional
action
on
Defendant Steen’s part is taken as true, Plaintiff has still
failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim.
First, intentional
acts are not necessarily wanton acts rising to the level of a
constitutional violation.
See Barber v. Grow, 929 F. Supp. 820,
823 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (guard intentionally pulling chair out from
under inmate is not wanton behavior).
Furthermore, the Eighth
Amendment “excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis
6
uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of
a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Hudson, 503 U.S.
at 9–10 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Not “every
malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause
of action.”
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.
The Court questions whether
a prison guard allowing a door to close as a prisoner attempts
to walk through even qualifies as a “use of force.”
event, it is at most a de minimis use of force.
In any
Compare Starr
v. Kober, 2015 WL 6511659, at *9 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 6, 2015),
report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 6511725 (W.D. Okla.
Oct. 28, 2015), aff'd, 642 F. App'x 914 (10th Cir. 2016) (claim
that guard pushed a steel door hard and that the door hit the
plaintiff’s left side did not state Eighth Amendment violation);
Mitchell v. Nutall, 2012 WL 967567, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 21,
2012) (“Plaintiff's isolated incident of being hit by an exit
door
does
not
meet
the
standard
for
cruel
and
unusual
punishment”); McCall v. Crosthwait, 336 F. App’x. 871, 872 (11th
Cir. 2009) (no constitutional violation occurred where officer
pushed detainee out of jail's elevator causing inmate to hit
partially open steel door and fall against plexiglass window
thereby suffering bruised shoulder and elbow); Johnson v. Moody,
206 F. App’x. 880, 885 (11th Cir. 2006) (officer's pushing or
kicking metal tray door on inmate's hand was de minimis use of
force which did not constitute Eighth Amendment violation); Hill
7
v. Kelly, 1997 WL 638402, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1997) (guard
closing door on plaintiff’s thumb is the kind of de minimis
imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned).
The Court finds Plaintiff's allegations fail to plausibly
state
an
Eighth
Amendment
claim.
Accordingly,
Plaintiff's
excessive force claim should be dismissed for failure to state a
violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment.
Count II
In
Count
II
of
his
complaint,
Plaintiff
alleges
that
Defendant Corizon failed to provide him with adequate medical
care
after
amended
the
sally
complaint,
he
port
door
incident.
was
sent
to
examined soon after the incident.
the
According
prison
to
clinic
his
to
be
The nurse on duty advised
Plaintiff to take some ibuprofen and apply an ice pack to his
chest.
Plaintiff was experiencing worse pain in his chest the
next morning, so he returned to the clinic.
The nurse on duty
prescribed the same course of treatment as the first nurse.
Plaintiff’s primary complaint is that neither nurse took “x-rays
or
photos
to
assure
threatening injuries.”
that
[Plaintiff]
did
not
have
life
(Doc. #7, p. 4).
In order for a prisoner to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for medical mistreatment, Plaintiff must allege “acts or
omissions
sufficiently
harmful
8
to
evidence
deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.”
U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
Estelle v. Gamble, 429
The “deliberate indifference” standard
includes an objective and a subjective component, both of which
must be met to prevail under § 1983 on a claim of medical
mistreatment.
2005).
Martinez v. Garden, 430 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir.
“The subjective component is met if a prison official
knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety.”
Martinez,
430
F.3d
at
1304
(quoting
Sealock
v.
Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000)).
In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged
completely disregarded.
of
assessment
and
the
his injury was
Instead, he disagrees with the method
course
of
treatment
prescribed.
The
subjective component of the deliberate indifference standard “is
not satisfied, absent an extraordinary degree of neglect, where
a
doctor
merely
exercises
his
considered
medical
Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 2006).
judgment.”
The Tenth
Circuit has found that where a health care provider exercises
medical judgment in prescribing one course of treatment over
another,
he
does
not
serious medical need.
548
(10th
Cir.
exhibit
deliberate
indifference
to
a
See Toler v. Troutt, 631 F. App’x. 545,
2015)(“The
bottom
line
is
that
Mr.
Toler
identifies no decision clearly establishing the proposition that
exercising
medical
judgment
in
prescribing
one
course
of
treatment over another constitutes deliberate indifference to a
9
serious medical need.
He cannot identify such precedent because
our controlling precedent clearly establishes the law to the
contrary.”)
As with Count I, Plaintiff is attempting to make what are
at
the
most
negligent
violations.
The
acts
Tenth
or
omissions
Circuit
has
into
made
constitutional
clear
that
“[a]
negligent failure to provide adequate medical care, even one
constituting
medical
constitutional
malpractice,
violation.”
does
Perkins
not
give
v.
rise
Kan.
to
Dep’t
a
of
Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 811 (10th Cir. 1999).
Another problem with Count II is that Plaintiff names only
Corizon as a defendant.
provides
medical
Corizon is a private corporation that
services
to
inmates.
A
corporation
acting
under color of state law cannot be held liable under a theory of
respondeat superior for the actions of its individual employees.
Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003).
It can be held liable under § 1983 only for unconstitutional
policies and practices.
established
policy
or
Id.
Plaintiff has not described any
practice
promulgated
by
Corizon
and
explained how it was applied to him in a manner that caused his
alleged
injuries.
Thus,
Plaintiff
fails
to
allege
facts
sufficient to state a claim against Corizon.
The
Court
finds
that
Count
should be dismissed.
10
II
of
Plaintiff’s
complaint
Summary
For the reasons set forth, the Court concludes this matter
must
be
dismissed
pursuant
to
28
U.S.C.
§§
1915A(b)
and
1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this matter is dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
This 7TH day of June, 2017, at Topeka, Kansas.
s/ Sam A. Crow______
SAM A. CROW
U.S. Senior District Judge
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