Lane v. English

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ENTERED: This petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. Signed by District Judge John W. Lungstrum on 06/23/17. Mailed to pro se party Charles Edward Lane, Jr. by regular mail. (smnd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

CHARLES EDWARD LANE, JR.,
Petitioner,
v.

CASE NO. 17-3040-JWL

N.C. ENGLISH, Warden,
USP-Leavenworth,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Petitioner, a prisoner in federal custody at USP-Leavenworth (“USPL”), proceeds pro se.
Petitioner challenges the calculation of his federal sentence. The Court issued an Order to Show
Cause (Doc. 3), Respondent filed an Answer and Return (Doc. 6), Petitioner filed a Traverse
(Doc. 7), and the matter is ready for resolution. The Court finds that Petitioner does not allege
facts establishing a federal constitutional violation and denies relief.
I. Background
Petitioner is incarcerated with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) at USPL.
Petitioner was sentenced in the Southern District of Iowa on October 27, 2006, and is currently
serving a 262 month term of imprisonment for Conspiracy to Distribute Crack Cocaine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A). (Doc. 6–1, at 2.) Petitioner has a projected
release date of February 2, 2015, via good conduct time release.

Id. at 10.

II. Facts
Petitioner was arrested by the Clinton County Police Department on November 10, 2005,
for an outstanding warrant in State v. Charles Edward Lane, Jr., Case No. 07231AGCR050103,
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Clinton County, Iowa. Id. at 56. On November 14, 2005, the Clinton County Court released
Petitioner on bond. Id.
On January 24, 2006, a Criminal Complaint was filed in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa stating Petitioner knowingly and intentionally conspired to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute fifty (50) grams and more of a mixture and
substance containing cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. On that same date,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa issued an Arrest Warrant. Id. at
62. On January 31, 2006, Petitioner was arrested by the Drug Enforcement Administration
(“DEA”) and was turned over to the United States Marshals (“USM”) on February 1, 2006, and
detained.
On October 27, 2006, Petitioner was sentenced in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa in case number 3:06-cr-502, consisting of a 262-month term of
imprisonment for Conspiracy to Distribute Crack Cocaine in violation of Title 21 U.S.C. §§ 846
and 841. Petitioner was remanded to the custody of the USM after sentencing, to begin service
of the sentence.
Petitioner received prior custody credit for time spent in custody of Clinton County,
Iowa, from November 10, 2005, the date of his arrest for an outstanding warrant, to
November 14, 2005, the date he was released on bond. Id. at 12. Petitioner received prior
custody credit from January 31, 2006, the date he was arrested by DEA, to October 26, 2006, the
day before his federal sentence was imposed. Id. Petitioner received a total of 274 days of prior
custody credit. Based on Petitioner’s sentencing date of October 27, 2006, and his 274-day prior
custody credit, the BOP determined that the end of Petitioner’s first year in prison was
January 25, 2007. Id. at 6.

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As of April 24, 2017, Petitioner had served eleven years, two months, and twenty-eight
days and had no disallowance of Good Conduct Time (“GCT”). Id. at 12. Petitioner had served
a full eleven years, earning him 594 days of GCT, or 54 days per year.

Per the BOP’s

calculations, if Petitioner maintains good behavior, he is projected to earn 1027 days of GCT
over the course of his confinement. Id. Specifically, on January 26, 2025, Petitioner will have
served nineteen full years, and earned 1026 days of GCT (19 x 54), shortening his sentence by
over two years. As of January 26, 2025, Petitioner will have eight days remaining on his
sentence, earning him a prorated GCT of one day. Petitioner would therefore serve seven days in
his final year, giving him a projected release date of February 2, 2025. Id. at 11.
III. Discussion
1. Exhaustion
Generally, a federal prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies before
commencing a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Williams v. O’Brien, 792 F.2d
986, 987 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). The BOP’s four-part administrative remedy program is
codified at 28 C.F.R. § 542.

Respondent acknowledges that Petitioner has exhausted his

administrative remedies with respect to the issues presented in his Petition. (Doc. 6, at 3.)
2. Standard of Review
To obtain habeas corpus relief, an inmate must demonstrate that “[h]e is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S. C. § 2241(c)(3).
3. Sentence Computation
Petitioner alleges that the BOP improperly calculated his federal sentence. Petitioner
argues that: 1) he did not receive jail credit from November 15, 2005, to January 30, 2006; and

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2) he only received 47 days GCT each year, instead of the required 54 days per year. (Doc. 7, at
2.)
a. Prior Custody Credit
In accordance with statute, the BOP determines the date a federal sentence commences as
the date in which “the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives
voluntarily to commence service at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be
served.” 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). The earliest time a sentence can commence is the date of
imposition of the federal sentence. See Isles v. Chester, Case No. 08-3028-RDR, 2009 WL
1010553, at *4 (D. Kan. April 15, 2009) (citing DeMartino v. Thompson, 1997 WL 362260, at
*2 (10th Cir. July 1, 1997) (“Logically, [a federal sentence] cannot commence prior to the date it
is pronounced, even if made concurrent with a sentence already being served.”)). The BOP
determined that Petitioner’s federal sentence commenced on October 27, 2006, the date of
imposition of his federal sentence.
Prior custody credit is provided for in Section 3585(b), which states:
A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of
imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior
to the date the sentence commences—
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was
imposed; or
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant
was arrested after the commission of the offense for which
the sentence was imposed;
that has not been credited against another sentence.
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).
Petitioner received prior custody credit for time spent in custody of Clinton County,
Iowa, from November 10, 2005, the date of his arrest for an outstanding warrant, to
November 14, 2005, the date he was released on bond (five days). Petitioner also received prior

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custody credit from January 31, 2006, the date he was arrested by DEA, to October 26, 2006, the
day before his federal sentence was imposed (269 days). Therefore, Petitioner received a total of
274 days of prior custody credit.
Petitioner argues that he should receive credit from November 15, 2005, to January 30,
2006, because he was in “federal custody” due to his federal arrest on November 15, 2005.
(Doc. 7, at 1.) However, Petitioner was arrested by the DEA on his federal case on January 31,
2006. See Doc. 6–1, at 62 (Warrant for Arrest) and 64 (Individual Custody and Detention Report
USM 129).
Petitioner was not granted presentence credit for November 15, 2005, to January 30,
2006, because he was not in official detention while on bond. “Because the words ‘official
detention’ should bear the same meaning in subsections (a) and (b) of § 3585 . . . credit for time
spent in ‘official detention’ under § 3685(b) is available only to those defendants who were
detained in a ‘penal or correctional facility,’ § 3621(b), and who were subject to BOP’s control.”
Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 58, 63 (1995) (noting that a defendant who is “detained” is
completely subject to BOP’s control—they are subject to BOP’s disciplinary procedures, subject
to summary reassignment to any other penal or correctional facility within the system, and
subject to BOP’s full discretion to control many conditions of their confinement). “For the
purpose of calculating credit for time served under 18 U.S.C. § 3585, ‘official detention’ means
imprisonment in a place of confinement, not stipulations or conditions imposed upon a person
not subject to full physical incarceration.” United States v. Woods, 888 F.2d 653, 655 (10th Cir.
1989) (holding that § 3585 does not entitle petitioner to credit for time spent at half-way while
on bond). The BOP properly calculated Petitioner’s prior custody credit.

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b. Good Conduct Time
“Federal sentencing law permits federal prison authorities to award prisoners credit
against prison time as a reward for good behavior.” Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 476
(2010). GCT is awarded in accordance with Section 3624(b), which provides:
[A] prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1
year . . . may receive credit toward the service of the prisoner’s
sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the end of
each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, beginning at the
end of the first year of the term, subject to determination by the
Bureau of Prisons that, during that year, the prisoner has displayed
exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations.
18 U.S.C. § 3624(b).
Petitioner argues that he has only received 47 days GCT each year, instead of the
required 54 days per year. It appears as though Petitioner is calculating his entitlement to GCT
based on the length of his original sentence of twenty-one years and ten month. However, the
BOP has interpreted § 3624(b) to authorize it to award GCT only for time actually served rather
than for the length of the sentence imposed. Program Statement 5880.28 provides that “[i]t is
essential to learn that GCT is not awarded on the basis of the length of the sentence imposed, but
rather on the number of days actually served.” (Doc. 6–1, at 50).
The BOP’s interpretation was upheld by the Supreme Court in Barber v. Thomas, 560
U.S. 474 (2010). The Supreme Court noted that the previous good time provision entitled a
prisoner to a deduction from the term of his sentence beginning with the day on which the
sentence commenced to run; and provided for a forfeiture if the prisoner committed an offense or
violated rules of the institution. Id. at 481. In contrast, the current statute “creates a system
under which ‘credit’ is ‘earned’ ‘at the end of’ the year based on an evaluation of behavior
‘during that year.’” Id. The Supreme Court found that the current statute reveals “a purpose to

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move from a system of prospective entitlement to a system of retrospective award.” Id. The
Supreme Court found that the BOP’s method used to calculate GCT based on the time the
prisoner actually served, rather than the length of the sentence imposed, is supported by the
statute’s language and furthers the statute’s basic purpose. Id. at 480–82; see also Wright v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 451 F.3d 1231, 1234–35 (2006) (upholding BOP’s interpretation and noting
that the statute contemplates retrospective annual assessment of a prisoner’s behavior and
prisoners cannot earn good time credits for time they are not in prison). The BOP properly
calculated Petitioner’s projected GCT.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that this petition for writ of habeas
corpus is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated in Kansas City, Kansas, on this 23rd day of June, 2017.

s/ John W. Lungstrum
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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