Lynn (ID 64377) v. McCurrie et al

Filing 83

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 80 Motion for Hearing; denying 80 Motion for Law Library Access. Please see order for details. Signed by District Judge John W. Broomes on 09/24/2018. Mailed to pro se party Patrick C. Lynn at LANSING Correctional Facility by regular mail. (aa)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

PATRICK C. LYNN,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 17-3041-JWB-KGG

ANTHONY McCURRIE, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Patrick C. Lynn, is a prisoner currently housed at Lansing Correctional Facility
in Lansing, Kansas (“LCF”). Plaintiff proceeds pro se and has paid the filing fee in full. This
matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s motion for telephone hearing and law library access
(Doc. 80.)
Plaintiff filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on March 14, 2017. Plaintiff
filed a motion (Doc. 44) seeking an extension of time to file an amended complaint. The court
entered an Order granting an extension of time to October 20, 2017, and cautioned Plaintiff that
he must follow Rules 18 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when filing his amended
complaint. (Doc. 46, at 3–4.) Plaintiff filed another motion for extension of time (Doc. 49), and
the court entered an Order (Doc. 50) granting Plaintiff an extension of time to November 20, 2017,
to file his amended complaint. Plaintiff filed another motion for extension of time (Doc. 59), and
the court entered an Order (Doc. 61) granting Plaintiff an extension of time to December 30, 2017,
to file his amended complaint. Plaintiff again filed another motion for extension of time (Doc. 62),

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and the court entered an Order (Doc. 63) granting an extension to February 2, 2018, and noting
that no further extensions would be granted.
Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. 64) on February 2, 2018,
naming approximately 311 defendants, including approximately 98 John Does. The court entered
a Memorandum and Order (Doc. 73) finding that, despite the court’s previous orders, the FAC was
not in compliance with D. Kan. Rule 9.1(a) and Rules 8, 18 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The court held that “Plaintiff’s defiance of the prior order probably merits immediate
dismissal; however, since the prior order did not expressly warn Plaintiff of this possible
consequence, the court will make it clear now. Failure to comply with this order will likely
result in dismissal of this case without further notice.” (Doc. 73, at 8.)

The Memorandum

and Order allows Plaintiff one more opportunity to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Local Rules and this court’s orders, by granting Plaintiff until July 20, 2018, to file
a proper second amended complaint. The court subsequently granted Plaintiff’s request for an
extension of time to October 19, 2018, to submit his second amended complaint. (Doc. 77.)
Plaintiff has now filed a motion seeking a telephonic hearing regarding his access to the
law library. (Doc. 80.) Plaintiff alleges that he is limited to checking out one legal case at a time,
it takes a minimum of ten days to receive cases, and he is in segregation and is denied reference
materials that are available to the general population. Plaintiff alleges that the other KDOC prisons
do not practice the same abuses as those practiced at LCF. Plaintiff requests a hearing to address
these issues and “to validate his fierce protests above & obtain relief due, including a possible
additional time extension, & referral to the grand jury per 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a).”
The court denies Plaintiff’s motion for a telephonic hearing. Requests for relief, such as
an extension of time, must be made by filing a motion with the court. See D. Kan. Rule 6.1(a)

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(requirements for motions for an extension of time); D. Kan. Rule 7.1(a) (“All motions, unless
made during a hearing or at trial, must be filed in writing with the clerk.”). However, Plaintiff
was cautioned in the court’s Memorandum and Order that he “should refrain from filing any
pleadings other than a proper second amended complaint. Plaintiff’s practice of continuing to file
voluminous pleadings delays the screening process.” (Doc. 73, at 9.) Moreover, to the extent
Plaintiff is seeking access to the law library for research in this action, the court fails to see
Plaintiff’s need to conduct extensive research. Plaintiff’s complaint was voluminous, as discussed
above. The court ordered Plaintiff to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and submit
a short, plain statement of his related claims. To do so, Plaintiff was required to eliminate unrelated
claims and unrelated defendants from his lengthy complaint. The court fails to see how this task
would require extensive research.
In any event, Plaintiff must submit his claim regarding library access to the facility and
otherwise comply with LCF’s grievance procedures. Claims regarding access to the courts must
be exhausted through the prison’s administrative grievance procedures, giving the facility an
opportunity to resolve Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff does not allege that he filed a formal grievance
and followed the procedures to exhaust his claim.
Furthermore, even if Plaintiff’s claim was exhausted and otherwise properly before the
court, he has failed to allege an actual injury. Although it is well-established that a prison inmate
has a constitutional right of access to the courts, it is equally well-settled that in order “[t]o present
a viable claim for denial of access to courts, . . . an inmate must allege and prove prejudice arising
from the defendants’ actions.” Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 1998) (citations
omitted); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (“The requirement that an inmate . . . show
actual injury derives ultimately from the doctrine of standing.”).

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An inmate may satisfy the actual-injury requirement by demonstrating that the alleged acts
or shortcomings of defendants “hindered his efforts to pursue” a non-frivolous legal claim. Lewis,
518 U.S. at 351-53; see also Burnett v. Jones, 437 F. App’x 736, 744 (10th Cir. 2011) (“To state
a claim for violation of the constitutional right to access the courts, a prisoner ‘must demonstrate
actual injury . . .—that is, that the prisoner was frustrated or impeded in his efforts to pursue a
nonfrivolous legal claim concerning his conviction or his conditions of confinement.’”) (quoting
Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1191 (10th Cir. 2010)).
The Supreme Court plainly held in Lewis that “the injury requirement is not satisfied by
just any type of frustrated legal claim.” Lewis, 518 at 354. Rather, the injury occurs only when
prisoners are prevented from attacking “their sentences, directly or collaterally” or challenging
“the conditions of their confinement.” Id. at 355. “Impairment of any other litigating capacity is
simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and
incarceration.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also Carper v. DeLand, 54 F.3d 613, 617 (10th Cir.
1995) (“[A]n inmate’s right of access does not require the state to supply legal assistance beyond
the preparation of initial pleadings in a civil rights action regarding current confinement or a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”) (citations omitted).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for telephone hearing and law
library access (Doc. 80) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 24th day of September 2018, in Wichita, Kansas.

s/ John W. Broomes
JOHN W. BROOMES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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