Collins v. Norwood et al

Filing 29

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ENTERED: Defendants' motion to dismiss 25 is granted. This action is hereby dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendants' motion to stay discovery 27 is denied as moot. Signed by U.S. Senior District Judge Sam A. Crow on 06/28/18. Mailed to pro se party Justin Jade Collins by regular mail. (smnd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

JUSTIN JADE COLLINS,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 17-3189-SAC

JOE NORWOOD, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 25). Plaintiff has
filed no response to the motion. For the reasons described herein, Defendants’ motion to dismiss
is granted.
I.

Background
Mr. Collins served as a confidential source in a wide-spread corruption investigation at the

Lansing Correctional Facility in Lansing, Kansas (“LCF”) which occurred in 2015. Doc. 1-1 at
16. He was transferred away from LCF on October 8, 2015. See KASPER Profile for Plaintiff,
Doc. 21-1 at 3. Then, at some point, his identity as a confidential informant was leaked by an
unidentified KDOC employee to security threat groups (“STGs”) at LCF implicated in the
corruption investigation and was revealed in a LCF employee’s civil service appeal of
administrative action taken based on the investigation. Doc. 1 at 2. Mr. Collins was transferred
back to LCF on August 22, 2017. See KASPER Profile for Plaintiff, Doc. 21-1 at 3. The next
day, he met with Ron Erwin, Special Agent Supervisor for the Enforcement, Apprehension and
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Investigative Unit at LCF, and reported he had been labeled a snitch by his fellow inmates and
“green lighted” for attack by the STGs. Doc. 1-1 at 16. On August 24, 2017, Mr. Erwin prepared
an Administrative Segregation Report recommending restrictive housing for Mr. Collins until he
could be approved for transfer out of state pursuant to interstate compact.

Id.

Plaintiff

subsequently made repeated requests for the out of state transfer, but he had not received a response
to his requests at the time he filed this lawsuit on October 30, 2017. Doc. 1-1 at 2-4, 6, 9, 11-14.
Plaintiff was transferred to a detention facility in Missouri on November 15, 2017. See KASPER
Profile, Doc. 21-1 at 3.
II.

Complaint
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by

failing to respond appropriately to the leaking of his identity as a confidential informant. Mr.
Collins alleged he was not safe in long term protective custody and furthermore should not be
required to spend the remainder of his confinement (approximately three more years) in
segregation. He sought injunctive relief in the form of an order directing his transfer to an out of
state prison, as well as punitive damages in the amount of $1 million.
III.

Motion to Dismiss
In their motion to dismiss (Doc. 25) and memorandum in support (Doc. 26), Defendants

argue Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for a number of reasons. First, they point out that
Plaintiff received the primary relief he was requesting, transfer out of state, thus making his
complaint moot and depriving the Court of jurisdiction. They also argue the Eleventh Amendment
bars claims against Defendants in their official capacities, and that Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity as well because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that any defendant acted with

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deliberate indifference. Last, Defendants claim the lack of personal participation by the named
defendants in the alleged constitutional violation requires dismissal.
IV.

Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows dismissal of a complaint where the facts

alleged fail to state a claim to relief “that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. at 678. All well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and viewed
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff for purposes of determining whether the complaint states
a plausible claim for relief. Id.; Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). The
Court’s job is to assess whether the plaintiff’s complaint, along with any attached exhibits, is
legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Smith, 561 F.2d at 1098.
In this case, the Court ordered the Kansas Department of Corrections to file a Martinez
report. For purposes of a motion to dismiss, any factual allegations contained in the Martinez
report that conflict with Plaintiff’s factual allegations cannot be considered by the Court.
V.

Discussion
A. Mootness of claim for injunctive relief
Defendants argue that the primary relief Plaintiff requested in his complaint was an

injunction ordering his transfer to an out of state prison. Since Plaintiff has received the requested
transfer, his claim is moot. The Court agrees. Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief became moot
when he was transferred to a facility in Missouri, and that claim must be dismissed. See Cleveland
v. Martin, 590 F. App’x 726, 729 (10th Cir. 2014); Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013).

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Plaintiff also requests “monetary/punitive damages” in the amount of $1,000,000. The
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides in pertinent part that “[n]o Federal civil action may
be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(e). Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered any physical injury, but the Tenth Circuit has
held that the PLRA does not bar recovery of punitive damages or nominal damages. See Searles
v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 881 (10th Cir. 2001); Perkins v. Kansas Dep't of Corrs., 165 F.3d
803, 808 n.6 (10th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the Court must consider whether Plaintiff’s claim for
punitive damages may proceed.
B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The State of Kansas and its agencies, such as the KDOC, are absolutely immune to suit for
money damages under the Eleventh Amendment. Consequently, suits against the State and its
agencies are barred, absent consent, regardless of the relief sought. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and
Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993). Eleventh Amendment
immunity applies not only to suits against states and state agencies, but also to damage suits
brought against state officials in their official capacities. Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236, 1255-56
(10th Cir. 2007); Ellis v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186, 1196 (10th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff’s claim for damages against Defendants is barred insofar as he is suing them in
their official capacities. Allen v. Zaravas, 474 F. App’x 741, 743-44 (10th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff’s
official capacity claims are hereby dismissed.
C. Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity “protects government officials from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

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rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231
(2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted). To defeat a claim of qualified immunity, a
plaintiff must show both: “(1) that the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional or statutory
right, and (2) that the law governing the conduct was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation.” Eaton v. Meneley, 379 F.3d 949, 954 (10th Cir. 2004). If a plaintiff fails to demonstrate
either part of the inquiry, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Id.; Medina v. Cram,
252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that any defendant violated his
constitutional rights. Plaintiff essentially alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment
rights by being deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm from his fellow inmates. Prison
officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment “to protect prisoners from violence at the hands
of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). However, the failure of a
prison official to meet that duty only rises to the level of a constitutional violation if the evidence
shows the defendants acted with “wanton or obdurate disregard for or deliberate indifference to”
the protection of prisoners' lives. Harris v. Maynard, 843 F.2d 414, 416 (10th Cir. 1988);
Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1525 (10th Cir. 1992).
The test for deliberate indifference has both an objective and a subjective component.
Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009); Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205,
1209 (10th Cir. 2000). “The objective component of the test is met if the ‘harm suffered rises to a
level sufficiently serious to be cognizable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause’ of the
Eighth Amendment.” Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 752–53
(10th Cir. 2005)). “To prevail on the subjective component, the prisoner must show that the
defendants ‘knew he faced a substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk, by failing to take

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reasonable measures to abate it.’” Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Kikumura v. Osagie, 461 F.3d 1269, 1293 (10th Cir. 2006)).
Applying the test for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s case, the Court finds Plaintiff has
failed to meet his burden under the subjective component because he fails to show that Defendants
disregarded the risk of harm to him. When Plaintiff returned to LCF in August of 2017, he was
kept in restricted housing for his protection and, within a day, the process to transfer him out of
state pursuant to interstate compact was begun. While the transfer had not occurred by October
30, 2017, when Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, it did occur on November 15, 2017. Defendants only
have a duty to take reasonable measures to protect prisoners from harm; they are not required to
guarantee total safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; see Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489,
1499 (10th Cir. 1990). “[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health
or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm
ultimately was not averted. A prison official's duty under the Eighth Amendment is to ensure
‘reasonable safety,’ a standard that incorporates due regard for prison officials' unenviable task of
keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45
(internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff’s complaint shows prison officials did not simply
turn a blind eye to his situation. The Court cannot find Plaintiff has stated a claim that Defendants
acted with deliberate indifference. Rather, it appears they fulfilled their duty to ensure Plaintiff
“reasonable safety.” See id.
It is worth noting that this is not a case where the plaintiff is bringing a claim based on the
disclosure of his name as a confidential informant. Each of Plaintiff’s three counts is based on
alleged deficiencies in the named defendants’ response to his identification as a confidential
informant. This distinguishes Plaintiff’s situation from cases which have found that prison staff

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labeling a prisoner a “snitch” or otherwise informing other prisoners that he cooperated with law
enforcement constitutes deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267,
1271 (10th Cir. 2001).
Because the Court finds that Defendants’ conduct did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Eaton, 379 F.3d at 954. Moreover,
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Plaintiff’s complaint must be
dismissed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 25) is
GRANTED. The action is hereby dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to stay discovery (Doc. 27) is
denied as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: This 28th day of June, 2018, at Topeka, Kansas.

s/_Sam A. Crow_____
SAM A. CROW
U.S. Senior District Judge

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