Robertson (ID 76205) v. McCullough et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ENTERED: This matter is dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction 7 is denied as moot. Signed by U.S. Senior District Judge Sam A. Crow on 12/22/17. Mailed to pro se party Joshua J. Robertson by regular mail. (smnd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

JOSHUA J. ROBERTSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 17-3211-SAC

ALEYCIA McCULLOUGH, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is a civil action filed under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§2000cc-1 to -5
(RLUIPA), by a prisoner in state custody. Plaintiff proceeds pro se
and in forma pauperis.
Screening
A federal court must conduct a preliminary review of any case
in which a prisoner seeks relief against a governmental entity or an
officer or employee of such an entity. See 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a).
Following this review, the court must dismiss any portion of the
complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant
who is immune from that relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
In screening, a court liberally construes pleadings filed by a
party proceeding pro se and applies “less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007).
Background
Plaintiff, a Messianic Jew, seeks to donate a kidney to an unknown
female prisoner he saw in a prison medical clinic on August 30, 2017.

Because the female prisoner was present for dialysis, plaintiff
believes an organ transplant is needed. He states that the proposed
organ donation is his “religious exer[c]ise of curing diseases and
providing healing” (Doc. #1, p.5).
Prison authorities, citing regulations prohibiting
inmate-to-inmate organ transplants, have denied his request.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and costs.
Analysis
RLUIPA provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o government shall
impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person
residing in or confined to an institution, … unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person … is in
furtherance of a compelling government interest, and … is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
In imposing this standard, Congress “anticipated that courts
would apply [RLUIPA] with ‘due deference to the experience and
expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary
regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and
discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited
resources.’” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005)(quoting
S.Rep. No. 103-111, at 10, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1993, pp.
1892, 1899, 1900)(footnote omitted).
Under Tenth Circuit case law, a plaintiff’s religious exercise
is substantially burdened where the government requires the plaintiff
to participate in an activity that is prohibited by a sincerely held
religious belief; prevents the plaintiff from participating in an
activity that is motivated by a sincerely held religious belief; or

unduly pressures a plaintiff to violate a sincerely held religious
belief. Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 49, 55 (10th Cir. 2014).
Accepting plaintiff’s desire to supply an organ for transplant
as sincerely-held and rooted in his religious beliefs, and accepting
that he will be unable to do so under the regulation, the Court
nevertheless finds the decision of corrections officials should be
sustained. The decision to ban inmate-to-inmate transplants rests on
the expertise of prison officials who serve as the managers of inmate
welfare, as arbiters of policy, and as stewards of limited financial
resources. In the present case, the Court concludes that the denial
of plaintiff’s request to donate an organ to another prisoner pursuant
to regulatoins of the Kansas Department of Corrections must be upheld.
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED this matter is dismissed
for failure to state a claim for relief.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED plaintiff’s motion for preliminary
injunction (Doc. #7) is denied as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

This 22nd day of December, 2017, at Topeka, Kansas.

S/ Sam A. Crow
SAM A. CROW
U.S. Senior District Judge