Moffit v. Social Security

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - It is ordered that judgment shall be entered pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) AFFIRMING the Commissioner's final decision. Signed by District Judge John W. Lungstrum on 01/03/2018. (ses)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

LINDA MAE SOTO MOFFIT,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
)
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
)
)
Defendant.
)
________________________________________ )

CIVIL ACTION
No. 17-4015-JWL

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff seeks review of a decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security
(hereinafter Commissioner) denying Disability Insurance benefits (DIB) and
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits under sections 216(i), 223, 1602, and
1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423, 1381a, and
1382c(a)(3)(A) (hereinafter the Act). Finding no error in the Administrative Law Judge’s
(ALJ) decision, the court ORDERS that judgment shall be entered pursuant to the fourth
sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) AFFIRMING the Commissioner’s final decision.
I.

Background
Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI benefits, alleging disability beginning December

27, 2012. (R. 12, 227, 235). Plaintiff exhausted proceedings before the Commissioner,
and now seeks judicial review of the final decision denying benefits. She argues that the

ALJ erred because in his decision he failed to address post-hearing objections to the
vocational expert’s (hereinafter, VE) testimony.
The court’s review is guided by the Act. Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052
(10th Cir. 2009). Section 405(g) of the Act provides that in judicial review “[t]he
findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court must determine whether the ALJ’s factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether he applied the
correct legal standard. Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007); accord,
White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 905 (10th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence is more than
a scintilla, but it is less than a preponderance; it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971); see also, Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052; Gossett v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 802, 804
(10th Cir. 1988).
The court may “neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that
of the agency.” Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991)); accord,
Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2005); see also, Bowling v. Shalala,
36 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1994) (The court “may not reweigh the evidence in the record,
nor try the issues de novo, nor substitute [the Court’s] judgment for the
[Commissioner’s], even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner’s]
decision.”) (quoting Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1988)). Nonetheless,
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the determination whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision is
not simply a quantitative exercise, for evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by
other evidence or if it constitutes mere conclusion. Gossett, 862 F.2d at 804-05; Ray v.
Bowen, 865 F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 1989).
The Commissioner uses the familiar five-step sequential process to evaluate a
claim for disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136,
1139 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1988)).
“If a determination can be made at any of the steps that a claimant is or is not disabled,
evaluation under a subsequent step is not necessary.” Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1139 (quoting
Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084). In the first three steps, the Commissioner determines whether
claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset, whether she
has a severe impairment(s), and whether the severity of her impairment(s) meets or equals
the severity of any impairment in the Listing of Impairments (20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt.
P, App. 1). Williams, 844 F.2d at 750-51. After evaluating step three, the Commissioner
assesses claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e),
416.920(e). This assessment is used at both step four and step five of the sequential
evaluation process. Id.
The Commissioner next evaluates steps four and five of the sequential process-determining at step four whether, in light of the RFC assessed, claimant can perform her
past relevant work; and at step five whether, when also considering the vocational factors
of age, education, and work experience, claimant is able to perform other work in the
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economy. Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1139 (quoting Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084). In steps one
through four the burden is on Plaintiff to prove a disability that prevents performance of
past relevant work. Blea v. Barnhart, 466 F.3d 903, 907 (10th Cir. 2006); accord,
Dikeman v. Halter, 245 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir. 2001); Williams, 844 F.2d at 751 n.2.
At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there are jobs in the
economy which are within the RFC assessed. Id.; Haddock v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 1084,
1088 (10th Cir. 1999).
The court finds no error in the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s objections to the
testimony of the VE, presented in her Representative’s Brief after the hearing.
II.

Discussion
Plaintiff specifically stated that before the court she does not “dispute the ALJ’s

RFC finding” (Pl. Br. 5), nor contest the VE’s expertise, but that she “fully endorse[s] the
vocational expert’s critical, and singular role in evaluating the issues raised in the post
hearing memorandum.” (Pl. Br. 8) (emphasis in Plaintiff’s Brief). Therefore, the court
accepts that the VE in this case is qualified to testify as a vocational expert and to present
the opinions she presented, as she presented them. Moreover, the court will not question
the RFC assessed by the ALJ.
Plaintiff points out that at step five it is the Commissioner’s burden to show, when
considering the RFC assessed and the vocational factors of age, education, and work
experience, that Plaintiff is able to perform other jobs existing in the economy. (Pl. Br.
6). She argues that the Commissioner’s step five burden may be met only “on the basis of
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up-to-date and ‘reliable’ job information.” Id. (citing Haddock, 196 F.3d at 1090; and
Andrade v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 985 F.2d 1045, 1051 (10th Cir. 1993)).
She argues that the Social Security Administration’s (hereinafter SSA) Hearings,
Appeals, and Litigation Manual (HALLEX) in 2015 at § I-2-5-55 required that when a
claimant raises an objection to a VE’s testimony, “the ALJ is obligated to ‘rule on the
objection and discuss any ruling in the decision.’” (Pl. Br. 7) (quoting HALLEX § I-2-555; and citing Parker v. Colvin, No. 14-35794, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21390 at *3 (9th
Cir. Mar. 12, 2015)1; McKinnie v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 907, 911 (7th Cir. 2004); Donahue
v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2002); and Soc. Sec. Ruling (SSR) 13-2p (an
ALJ is required to comply with HALLEX in decision-making). Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ failed to address the specific objections raised in her Representative’s Brief
submitted after the hearing and thereby “failed to fulfill his clear obligation to address
facially valid objections,” and “implicitly ‘played vocational expert’ in his
predetermination that the issues raised would or could not change the vocational expert’s
testimony.” (Pl. Br. 8).
She argues “the well-known fact that the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT)
is an obsolete and static database that is no longer being developed or enhanced by the
United States Department of Labor (USDOL),” that it was last updated in 1991, and that

1

Parker, is an order on the parties’ “Stipulated Motion for Remand,” and was
entered “For the Court” by the Ninth Circuit mediator. 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21390.
The court finds that as such, it is without persuasive value in this matter.
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the USDOL now provides information of that type in the Occupational Information
Network (O*NET). Id. at 9. She argues that the O*NET is cross referenced to the DOT
and, unlike the DOT, “has been updated on a regular basis through the present.” Id.
Plaintiff also asserts that the USDOL uses a “Standard Occupational Classification (SOC)
system to classify workers into occupational categories,” and that “[m]ultiple DOT codes,
through crosswalks, are assigned to SOC codes.” Id., n.5. Plaintiff argues that the
representative jobs of which the VE testified by DOT code number as available within the
economy to an individual with the RFC and vocational profile assessed by the ALJ are
not applicable within the present economy, and that the O*NET and the SOC reveal that
such jobs in the present economy require abilities beyond the RFC assessed in this case.
Id., at 9-10.
Plaintiff asserts that she is not suggesting that the vocational issues raised in her
Brief can be answered by her or by this court consulting the O*NET, the SOC, or even
the DOT and deciding whether the VE testimony was “correct.” (Pl. Br. 10). She argues,
however, that this is what the ALJ did when he did not present Plaintiff’s argument, and
these documents to the VE to resolve and explain her resolution of these issues. (Pl. Br.
10-11). Plaintiff points out that, pursuant to the case of Haddock and SSR 00-4p, an ALJ
has the affirmative duty to inquire whether there are inconsistencies between VE
testimony and the DOT, and if there are, to obtain a reasonable explanation for the
conflict. Id. at 11. She argues that her post hearing Representative Brief raised several
issues which challenged the consistency of the VE testimony with the DOT, and which
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the ALJ’s decision in this case neither acknowledged or discussed, leaving it “at best
unclear whether the ALJ met his step 5 burden.” Id.
The Commissioner argues that the VE testimony supports the ALJ’s step five
findings. She argues that the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s objections to the VE testimony,
discussed them in his decision of this case, and found that Ms. Smidt was qualified as a
VE and that there was sufficient evidentiary support for her testimony. (Comm’r Br. 6)
(citing R. 24-25). She concludes, “Because VE Smidt’s testimony amply supports the
ALJ’s step-five finding, the ALJ’s decision should be affirmed.” Id. In particular, the
Commissioner argues that “the ALJ explained that ‘[t]he Social Security Administration
has chosen to continue using the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and SCO [(Selected
Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles
(1993))] as guides and there is no reason to find that the [vocational] expert incorrectly
gave numbers under the DOT.’” Id. at 7 (brackets added by the court). She argues that
the ALJ’s finding regarding the objections was a reasonable application of agency policy
which instructs the ALJ to consider conflicts between the DOT (the agency’s primary
source of occupational information) and VE testimony. Id. at 8.
She argues that the requirement to consider conflicts does not even extend to
conflicts with other administratively noticed job data such as the Occupational Outlook
Handbook (OOH). Id. at 9 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)). She argues that “[t]he
agency has not recognized O*NET as an authoritative source on par with the DOT, and
the O*NET did not replace the DOT for Social Security purposes.” (Comm’r Br. 9)
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(citing Occupational Information Development Advisory Panel, Finding Report: A
Review of the National Academy of Sciences Report A Database for A Changing
Economy: Review of the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) 8 (June 28,
2010), available online at http://ssa.gov/oidap/Documents/COMPLETE%20FINAL-Findings%20Report%20OIDAP%20062810.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2018). She argues
that the VE “plainly referred to the DOT when she identified jobs in response to the
ALJ’s hypothetical, and did not make any reference to the O*NET or the Occupational
Outlook Handbook.” Id. at 10.
In her Reply Brief, Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner “concedes explicitly or
fails altogether to discuss each key premise” in Plaintiff’s Brief. (Reply 1). She reiterates
her key premises as: the burden of proof at step five of the sequential evaluation process
is the Commissioner’s; the ALJ must address objections in his decision; Plaintiff’s
objections were timely made; the ALJ failed to discuss Plaintiff’s arguments that the DOT
is out of date, that the O*NET contains information how jobs are performed, and that “as
currently performed, the jobs identified by the vocational expert are not unskilled jobs
and therefore are potentially not consistent with the ALJ’s RFC finding; and, the ALJ
failed to discuss Plaintiff’s objection that the finding that Plaintiff is limited to occasional
social interaction is inconsistent with the Occupational Outlook Handbook, which is a
“reliable job information” administratively noticed by the SSA. (Reply 2). She argues
that a failure to address her key premises should be deemed a waiver as to each premise,
id. (citing Berryhill v. Schriro, 137 F.3d 1073, 1075 n.2 (8th Cir. 1998)), and that since
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the court itself cannot reweigh the evidence, “remand for further proceedings is the only
appropriate disposition of this case.” Id. at 3 (citing Draper v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 1127,
1130 (8th Cir. 2005)).2
A.

Applicable Law

Although the HALLEX section cited by Plaintiff, as it currently exists, does not
support her assertion, Plaintiff is correct that at the time the ALJ made his decision in this
case, HALLEX I-2-5-55 stated, “If a claimant raises an objection about a VE's opinion,
the ALJ must rule on the objection and discuss any ruling in the decision.” HALLEX I-25-55 (effective September 28, 2005, and changed effective June 16, 2016 by Transmittal
No. I-2-174) available online at: https://web.archive.org/web/20150923080051
/http://www.ssa.gov:80/OP_Home/hallex/I-02/I-2-5-55.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2018).
The current HALLEX addresses the issue of VE hearing testimony at I-2-6-74, and
requires the ALJ to ask if there are any objections to the VE testifying, and to rule on any
objections “on the record during the hearing, in narrative form as a separate exhibit, or in
the body of his or her decision.” Available online at: https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home
/hallex/I-02/I-2-6-74.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2018).

2

As decisions of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Schriro and Draper are not

precedent binding on this court. Nevertheless, the court recognizes that the Tenth Circuit
also applies principles of waiver when a defendant fails to respond to arguments raised in
the plaintiff’s Brief. However, the court finds that the Commissioner has adequately
responded to Plaintiff’s allegations of error.
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As Plaintiff asserts, and the Commissioner does not contest, the SSA “require[s]
adjudicators at all levels of administrative review to follow agency policy, as set out in
. . . the Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law manual (HALLEX).” SSR 13-2p, 2013
WL 621536, *15 (Feb. 20, 2013).
B.

The ALJ’s Decision

The court begins, as it must, with the ALJ’s decision as he characterized it, not as
Plaintiff or as the Commissioner view it. This is so because if the record evidence will
support two or more conclusions, and one of those is the conclusion reached in the
decision at issue, the court must affirm the decision. “The possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s
findings from being supported by substantial evidence. [The court] may not displace the
agency’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would
justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.” Lax, 489
F.3d at 1084 (citations, quotations, and bracket omitted); see also, Consolo v. Fed.
Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
The ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s Representative’s Brief in the decision at issue:
Pursuant to SSR 00-4p, the undersigned has determined that the vocational
expert’s testimony is consistent with the information contained in the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles, as supplemented with the expert’s
experience and workplace observations, as applicable.
The representative has made several objections to the testimony of the
vocational expert, documented at Exhibit 15E. In particular, Ms. Troop
[(along with Mr. Youngman, one of Plaintiff’s non-attorney representatives
before the ALJ)] objects to the expert’s experience and qualifications. She
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alleges her testimony about methodology were ambiguous and not
understandable. Ms. Troop objects to the cited jobs and asserts they do not
exist in significant numbers in the national economy, and asserts the
requirements of the jobs exceed the hypothetical residual functional
capacity.
Considering these arguments, the undersigned finds that the expert is
qualified to cite numbers and, based on the totality of evidence, there is
enough evidence to support the vocational expert’s testimony that a
significant number of jobs exists for the occupations identified. While the
vocational expert’s numbers may not be exact, the numbers are significant
in total, totaling over 200,000 jobs nationally. Therefore, the motion for
supplemental hearing is denied. There is no helpful evidence to be gained
from such delays or request. The Social Security Administration has
chosen to continue using the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and SCO as
guides and there is no reason to find that the expert incorrectly gave
numbers under the DOT. In our Regulations, the Social Security
Administration takes administrative notice as reliable the job information
provided by various governmental and other publications, including the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles. (20 CFR 404.1566(d), 416.966(d).
Additionally, the impartial vocational expert has been determined by the
Commissioner to be sufficiently qualified to provide vocational evidence in
this matter. (See 20 CFR 405.10). To the extent conflicts exist between the
information contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and the
vocational expert’s testimony, the undersigned is satisfied that the
vocational expert’s testimony is well-founded upon her experience in job
placement, which Social Security Ruling 00-4p notes to be a reasonable
explanation for conflicts in occupational information. In sum, the
undersigned finds the arguments advanced by the claimant’s representative
to be without merit; therefore, the objections are overruled.
The undersigned denies the representative’s motion for a supplemental
hearing as requested in their brief in exhibit 15E. The undersigned finds
that the representative fails to provide any alternative residual functional
capacity evidence that supports disability. A further hearing to argue
concerning jobs cited in response to the only RFC opinions in the record
done by DDS seems to overlook the basic fact that the representative has
failed to establish a case for disability under the regulations. A
supplemental hearing would not aide the undersigned in making a decision
based upon the regulations.

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Based on the testimony of the vocational expert, the undersigned concludes
that, considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, the claimant is capable of making a successful
adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national
economy. A finding of “not disabled” is therefore appropriate under the
framework of the above-cited rule.
(R. 24-25).
C.

Analysis

Plaintiff has specifically abandoned her argument that the VE in this case was not
qualified as an expert, or that the RFC assessed is erroneous. Therefore, the court
addresses only her specific objections that the DOT is out of date and should not be used,
that the O*NET should be preferred to the DOT because it contains up-to-date, reliable
information on how jobs are currently performed in the economy, that the jobs identified
by the VE are not unskilled jobs, and that the jobs identified require more than occasional
interaction with coworkers or supervisors, contrary to the RFC assessed by the ALJ.
The court agrees with Plaintiff that the Commissioner has conceded, as she must,
that she has the step five burden to prove that jobs exist in the economy which are within
the RFC assessed, and that the ALJ must discuss and rule on objections to the VE
testimony. Moreover, she has not argued, and has thereby waived, the argument that the
objections presented in Plaintiff’s Representative’s Brief after the hearing were untimely.
However, the Commissioner has not conceded that the DOT is out of date and
should not be used, that the O*NET should be preferred to the DOT because it contains
up-to-date, reliable information on how jobs are currently performed in the economy, that

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the jobs identified by the VE are not unskilled jobs, and that the jobs identified require
more than occasional interaction with coworkers or supervisors, contrary to the RFC
assessed by the ALJ. Rather, she argues that the Commissioner has specifically
promulgated regulations and rulings recognizing the DOT as reliable job information and
as the primary source of occupational information to be used in disability cases, but has
not done so for the O*NET, and has disclaimed use of the O*NET. She does not dispute
that the information presented by Plaintiff is contained in the sources cited by Plaintiff,
but argues that in the circumstances, there is no conflict between the VE testimony and
the DOT, the ALJ was justified to rely on the DOT, and specifically found that “there is
no reason to find that the expert incorrectly gave numbers under the DOT.” (R. 24)
(emphasis added).
As the Commissioner’s argument suggests, the standard the court must apply in
reviewing any decision of the Commissioner is whether the Commissioner applied the
correct legal standard, and whether substantial evidence in the record supports her
findings. Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084; accord, White, 287 F.3d at 905. In essence, she is
arguing that, as the ALJ found, the VE testimony does not conflict with the DOT or the
SCO, that the record contains conflicting vocational evidence in the form of the VE
testimony, the DOT and the SCO and the evidence relied upon by Plaintiff from the
O*NET, the SOC codes, and the OOH, and that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
determination to accord greater weight to the DOT and the VE testimony than to the
evidence relied upon by Plaintiff. As the Commissioner suggests, the ALJ applied the
13

correct legal standard. He considered the plaintiff’s objections to the VE testimony,
overruled them, and explained in his decision the bases for doing so--because the VE’s
numbers, although potentially not exact, are significant in total, because the VE testimony
does not conflict with the DOT, because the VE is qualified within the meaning of the
regulations to testify, and because to the extent conflicts may exist, the VE’s testimony is
well-founded upon her experience. The ALJ applied the correct legal standard.
The remaining question is whether substantial record evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision. This is a not-uncommon situation, where the evidence is conflicting and the
ALJ must decide which evidence to credit. As noted above even if the record evidence
will support two conflicting results, there is no error if one of the results supported is that
reached by the Commissioner. Plaintiff argues that the record evidence will not support
the decision reached by the Commissioner because the DOT is outdated and unreliable,
and the O*NET, SOC codes, and OOH contain updated and reliable information which
must be used instead of the DOT information and the VE testimony.
The court does not agree. As the Commissioner points out, she has promulgated
regulations by notice and comment rulemaking explaining that she takes administrative
notice of the DOT as reliable job information. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(d), 416.966(d).
Moreover, in its Policy Interpretation regarding using occupational information at steps 4
and 5 of the sequential evaluation process, the SSA has explained that “[i]n making
disability determinations, we rely primarily on the DOT (including its companion
publication, the SCO) for information about the requirements of work in the national
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economy,” and that it also may use VEs “to resolve complex vocational issues.” SSR 004p, 2000 WL 1898704, *2 (Dec. 4, 2000). And, while SSR 00-4p, and the Haddock
decision require that an ALJ must investigate and elicit a reasonable explanation for any
conflict between the DOT and the VE testimony; SSR 00-4p; Haddock, 196 F.3d at 1091;
they do not require the ALJ to resolve conflicts between VE testimony and other
vocational publications or information. Poe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149,
158 (6th Cir. 2009).
Moreover, the SSA commissioned the Occupational Information Development
Advisory Panel (hereinafter OIDAP) to review a report by the National Academy of
Sciences (hereinafter NAS) regarding the O*NET. See Occupational Information
Development Advisory Panel, Finding Report: A Review of the National Academy of
Sciences Report A Database For A Changing Economy: Review Of The Occupational
Information Network (O*NET) (June 28, 2010), available for download at
http://ssa.gov/oidap/Documents/COMPLETE%20FINAL--Findings%20Report
%20OIDAP%20062810.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2018). The first finding of the OIDAP,
was that it agreed with the NAS “that the O*NET in its current form is not suitable for
disability adjudication.” Id., Executive Summary, at 1 (citing, in n.2, p. 161 of the NAS
report), and at 8. The SSA realizes that its disability claims process requires evaluation of
work information, and it has begun to develop an Occupational Information System
(OIS). https://www.socialsecurity.gov/disabilityresearch/occupational_info_systems.html
(last visited Jan. 3, 2018). SSA anticipates that it will implement “the new OIS in
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calendar year 2020.” Id. The SSA has established a frequently asked questions (FAQ)
website regarding OIS. https://www.ssa.gov/disabilityresearch/ois_project_faqs.html
(last visited Jan. 3, 2018).
Plaintiff’s reliance upon the Seventh Circuit cases of McKinnie, 368 F.3d at 911,
and Donahue, 279 F.3d at 446 do not change the court’s conclusion. Those cases require,
as Plaintiff asserts, that when the basis of the VE opinions is questioned, “then the ALJ
should make an inquiry . . . to find out whether the purported expert’s conclusions are
reliable.” Id., 368 F.3d at 911. That is precisely what the ALJ did here, and he found that
those conclusions were consistent with the DOT, and well-founded on the VE’s
experience. Plaintiff has shown no error in the decision below.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that judgment shall be entered pursuant to the
fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) AFFIRMING the Commissioner’s final decision.
Dated this 3rd day of January 2018, at Kansas City, Kansas.

s:/ John W. Lungstrum
John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge

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