Mangold (ID 91042) v. Stone et al

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ENTERED: Plaintiff is granted until July 6, 2018, in which to show good cause, in writing, to the Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District Judge, why Plaintiff's Complaint should not be dismissed. Signed by U.S. Senior District Judge Sam A. Crow on 08/15/18. Mailed to pro se party Jonathan Levi Mangold by regular mail. (smnd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

JONATHAN LEVI MANGOLD,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 18-3020-SAC

MIKE STONE, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff Jonathan Levi Mangold is hereby required to show good cause, in writing, to the
Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District Judge, why this action should not be dismissed
due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Complaint that are discussed herein.
I. Nature of the Matter before the Court
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is
incarcerated at the Norton Correctional Facility in Norton, Kansas. The Court granted Plaintiff
leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Plaintiff’s allegations in his Complaint involve his state criminal proceedings. See Case
Nos. 17-cr-124 and 17-cr-133 in Marion County District Court. Plaintiff sues the state court
judge, the prosecuting attorney, Marion Police Department Officer Mike Stone, and the Marion
Police Department Chief of Police. Plaintiff alleges that around June 3, 2017, he was illegally
searched when he was a passenger in a truck involved in an auto accident. He alleges that
Officer Stone used excessive force, resulting in physical injuries. Plaintiff alleges that Officer
Stone threatened Plaintiff and his family, rendering his guilty plea involuntary. Plaintiff alleges
that the Chief of Police failed to do a proper background check on Officer White. Plaintiff
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alleges that county prosecutor Courtney Boehm, and District Court Judge Michael Powers,
denied his appeal bond and his motions to withdraw pleas. Plaintiff also asks this Court to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.
Plaintiff seeks $7.5 million in damages for “mental distress, emotional distress, physical
distress and scarring, lack of employment due to false search, nightmares.” (Doc. 1, at 8.) In an
attachment to his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks $10 million in compensatory damages, as well as
declaratory relief, an injunction ordering Defendant Boehm to set an appeal bond or to overturn
Plaintiff’s sentence, $5 million in punitive damages; and nominal damages.
An online Kansas District Court Records Search indicates that in both of his state
criminal cases, Plaintiff pleaded guilty, was sentenced, unsuccessfully sought to withdraw his
pleas, and appealed. The appeals in both cases were consolidated on March 22, 2018. See State
of Kansas v. Mangold, Case No. 118996 (Kansas Ct. App.). The consolidated appeal is currently
pending and Appellant’s brief is due June 22, 2018.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised
claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)

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(citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court
liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th
Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not
raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are
insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to
relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint’s “factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court,
a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant
did it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the
plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d
1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round
out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New
Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and
Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v.

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Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States,
561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the
complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at
1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the
line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in
this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in
a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it
innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S.
Ct. at 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
1. Younger Abstention
The Court may be prohibited from hearing Plaintiff’s claims relating to his state criminal
case under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). “The Younger doctrine requires a federal
court to abstain from hearing a case where . . . (1) state judicial proceedings are ongoing; (2)
[that] implicate an important state interest; and (3) the state proceedings offer an adequate
opportunity to litigate federal constitutional issues.” Buck v. Myers, 244 F. App’x 193, 197 (10th
Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (citing Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Stovall, 341 F.3d 1202, 1204 (10th
Cir. 2003); see also Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982)). “Once these three conditions are met, Younger abstention is non-discretionary and,
absent extraordinary circumstances, a district court is required to abstain.” Buck, 244 F. App’x
at 197 (citing Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th
Cir. 2003)).

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It appears as though the first condition is met. Plaintiff’s state court criminal proceedings
are pending on appeal. The second condition would be met because Kansas undoubtedly has an
important interest in enforcing its criminal laws through criminal proceedings in the state’s
courts. In re Troff, 488 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[S]tate control over criminal justice
[is] a lynchpin in the unique balance of interests” described as “Our Federalism.”) (citing
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44). Likewise, the third condition would be met because Kansas courts
provide Plaintiff with an adequate forum to litigate his constitutional claims by way of pretrial
proceedings, trial, and direct appeal after conviction and sentence, as well as post-conviction
remedies. See Capps v. Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350, 354 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[F]ederal courts should
abstain from the exercise of . . . jurisdiction if the issues raised . . . may be resolved either by trial
on the merits in the state court or by other [available] state procedures.”) (quotation omitted); see
Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1984) (state courts have obligation ‘to guard, enforce, and
protect every right granted or secured by the constitution of the United States . . . .’”); Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1974) (pendant state proceeding, in all but unusual cases,
would provide federal plaintiff with necessary vehicle for vindicating constitutional rights).
“[T]he Younger doctrine extends to federal claims for monetary relief when a judgment
for the plaintiff would have preclusive effects on a pending state-court proceeding.” D.L. v.
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2004); see Buck, 244 F. App’x at 198.
“[I]t is the plaintiff’s ‘heavy burden’ to overcome the bar of Younger abstention.” Phelps v.
Hamilton, 122 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 1997).
In responding to this Memorandum and Order and Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff should
clarify whether or not state criminal proceedings are ongoing. If Plaintiff has been convicted and
a judgment on Plaintiff’s claim in this case would necessarily imply the invalidity of that

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conviction, the claim may be barred by Heck. In Heck v. Humphrey, the United States Supreme
Court held that when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 action, the district court must
consider the following:
whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity
of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a § 1983
damages claim that necessarily implicates the validity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence is
not cognizable unless and until the conviction or sentence is overturned, either on appeal, in a
collateral proceeding, or by executive order. Id. at 486–87.
2. Request to have His State Criminal Charges Dismissed
To the extent Plaintiff challenges the validity of his sentence or conviction, his federal
claim must be presented in habeas corpus. However, a petition for habeas corpus is premature
until Plaintiff has exhausted available state court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)
(requiring exhaustion of available state court remedies).
3. Immunity
A. State Court Judge
Judge Powers is entitled to personal immunity. “Personal immunities . . . are immunities
derived from common law which attach to certain governmental officials in order that they not
be inhibited from ‘proper performance of their duties.’” Russ v. Uppah, 972 F.2d 300, 302–03
(10th Cir. 1992) (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223, 225 (1988)).
Plaintiff’s claim against the state court judge should be dismissed on the basis of judicial
immunity. A state judge is absolutely immune from § 1983 liability except when the judge acts
“in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978)
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(articulating broad immunity rule that a “judge will not be deprived of immunity because the
action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority . . . .”); Hunt
v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1994). Only actions taken outside a judge’s judicial
capacity will deprive the judge of judicial immunity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356–57. Plaintiff
alleges no facts whatsoever to suggest that Judge Powers acted outside of his judicial capacities.
B. Marion County Attorney
Plaintiff’s claims against Marion County Attorney Boehm fail on the ground of
prosecutorial immunity. Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for damages in actions
asserted against them for actions taken “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s
case.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). Plaintiff’s claims concerning his criminal
case fall squarely within the prosecutorial function. Plaintiff is directed to show cause why his
claims against Marion County Attorney Boehm should not be dismissed based on prosecutorial
immunity.
V. Response Required
Plaintiff is required to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for
the reasons stated herein.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Plaintiff is granted until July 6, 2018, in
which to show good cause, in writing, to the Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District
Judge, why Plaintiff’s Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated in Topeka, Kansas, on this 15th day of June, 2018.
s/ Sam A. Crow
Sam A. Crow
U.S. Senior District Judge

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