Wooten v. Johnson County Adult Detention Center et al

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ENTERED: Plaintiff is directed to show cause on or before May 15, 2020, why the claims alleging a wrongful placement in segregation and contact with a jail dentist should not be dismissed. In the alternative, plaintiff may submi t a second amended complaint on or before May 15, 2020, that complies with the directions set out in this order. Plaintiff's motion for change of venue (Doc. 14 ) is denied for lack of jurisdiction. Signed by U.S. Senior District Judge Sam A. Crow on 03/18/20. Mailed to pro se party Michael A. Wooten by regular mail. (smnd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
MICHAEL A. WOOTEN,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 18-3067-SAC

JOHNSON COUNTY ADULT DETENTION CENTER, et al.
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s amended complaint
(Doc. 12) and on his motion for a change of venue (Doc. 14).
Background
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the Johnson County Adult
Detention Center (JCADC) in New Century, Kansas. The Court has
surveyed the record and has constructed the following statement
outlining the background of this action.
Plaintiff is charged with aggravated indecent liberties and
sexual exploitation of a child. He was taken into custody in October
2017 and was ordered to have no contact with the juvenile victim.
However, he repeatedly contacted the victim by telephone from the
jail; in a state court proceeding, the State described the contents
of

the

calls

as

including

“extensive

witness

intimidation…the

defendant discussed with and suggested to the juvenile victim that
she commit suicide.” (Doc. 15, p. 11.) The jail became aware of these
calls and took steps to block the victim’s phone number. Despite this,
the plaintiff was able to contact the victim using different telephone
numbers that were not programmed into the jail telephone system (Id.,

p. 12.).
In December 2017, the state district court ordered that plaintiff
be prohibited from using the telephone in the JCADC. The jail responded
by placing plaintiff in a solitary confinement cell with release for
three hours daily. (Id., p. 7).
Plaintiff’s trial is currently scheduled to take place in May
20201. He has remained in solitary confinement for much of that time,
although it appears that he now has been released from that status.
See id., p. 36 (stating that the plaintiff’s request for release from
solitary confinement was denied as moot by the trial judge).
The complaint also alleges that plaintiff saw a jail dentist

for

treatment on two occasions. During these appointments, plaintiff
states that the dentist asked him to move his arm and then rubbed
against him as he leaned in. Plaintiff contends this action was
sexually motivated.
Discussion
In response to the Court’s earlier order, plaintiff has submitted
a 165-page amended complaint.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) directs the federal courts
to conduct a preliminary review of any case in which a prisoner seeks
relief from a government entity or officer. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
During that process, the Court must identify any cognizable claim and
must dismiss any claim that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b).

This information was retrieved from on-line records maintained by the District
Court of Johnson County.
1

To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff must make factual
allegations that, accepted as true, “raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). The complaint must present “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The court accepts
all well-pleaded allegations as true and construes the allegations
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 555. However, “when
the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a
[plausible] claim of entitlement to relief,” the complaint should be
dismissed. Id. at 558.
Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint
must present: “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the
court’s jurisdiction…; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for
the relief sought.” These requirements are designed to provide that
“defendants enjoy fair notice of what the claims against them are and
the grounds upon which they rest.” TV Commc’ns Network, Inc. v. ESPN,
Inc., 767 F.Supp. 1062, 1069 (D. Colo. 1991).
As a pro se litigant, plaintiff is required to comply with these
requirements. “This is so because a pro se plaintiff requires no
special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged
injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine
whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted.” Hall
v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). The Court may not
“assume the role of advocate for a pro se litigant.” Id. This means
the Court cannot “supply additional facts [or] construct a legal
theory for a plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded.”
Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not comply with Rule 8.
Rather, it contains a mix of materials, such as a judicial complaint
filed with state authorities, that does not contribute to a “short
and plain statement” or have any apparent relevance to plaintiff’s
claims.
The Court has considered the amended complaint and the two
supplements under the liberal standards governing this matter and
makes the following findings.
First, the plaintiff broadly claims there is a conspiracy among
the prosecutor, a detective and others concerning the criminal action
pending against him. Any claims related to that matter must be stayed
under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger, the United
States Supreme Court determined that a federal court should not
intervene in a state action that was begun before the commencement
of the federal lawsuit when the state proceedings are ongoing, the
proceedings implicate an important state interest, and the state
proceedings offer the plaintiff an adequate forum to present his
claims. Id. at 43. See also Joseph A. ex rel. Corrine Wolfe v. Ingram,
275 F.3d 1253,1272 (10th Cir. 2002)(stating that Younger controls
“whenever the requested relief would interfere with the state court’s
ability to conduct proceedings, regardless of whether the relief
targets the conduct of a proceeding directly.” (citations omitted)).
Here, the first condition is met because the state proceedings
against plaintiff are ongoing. The second condition also is met
because Kansas has an important interest in enforcing its criminal
laws through proceedings in the state courts. In re Troff, 488 F.3d
1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2007)(“[S]tate control over criminal justice [is]
a lynchpin in the unique balance of interests” described as “Our

Federalism.”)(citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44). The third condition is
met because the Kansas courts provide plaintiff with an adequate forum
to present his constitutional claims by way of pretrial proceedings,
trial, and, if he is convicted, by direct appeal and post-conviction
remedies. See Capps v. Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350, 354 n. 2 (10th Cir.
1993)(“[F]ederal courts should abstain from the exercise of …
jurisdiction if the issues raised…may be resolved either by trial on
the

merits

in

state

procedures.”)(quotation

court

or

by

omitted).

To

other

(available)

overcome

this

state

exception,

plaintiff must show either “bad faith”, “harassment”, or “irreparable
injury.” Amanatullah v. Col. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 187 F.3d 1160, 1165
(10th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff’s claims do not persuade the Court that
an exception to Younger abstention is warranted.
Applying a liberal reading to the balance of the complaint, the
Court construes it to allege violations of plaintiff’s rights arising
from his placement in segregation and from contact with a jail dentist.
Placement in segregation
As a pretrial detainee, plaintiff is protected from punishment
without due process. Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers, 422 F.3d 1090,
1106 (10th Cir. 2005)(citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1970)).
A pretrial detainee still may be subjected to restrictions while
incarcerated, but the conditions and restrictions impose may not
constitute

punishment.

Id.

The

core

question

is

whether

the

restriction is “imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it
is incident to some other legitimate government purpose.” Id.
(citation omitted). Thus, if a pretrial detainee is placed in
segregation for a managerial purpose and not for punishment, no
process is required. Id. at 1106 (citation omitted).

In this case, it is apparent that plaintiff was placed in
segregation as a managerial measure imposed due to his persistence
in contacting the juvenile victim in his criminal case. The jail took
this action after the state trial court ordered the jail to prohibit
plaintiff

from

using

the

telephones.

While

the

conditions

of

plaintiff’s detention no doubt were made more difficult by his
segregation, the placement decision is supported by a legitimate
penological purpose.
Contact with dentist
The Tenth Circuit has observed that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decisions in Twombly and Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) set
out a new standard of review for dismissals under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir.
2007)(citations omitted). Following those decisions, courts “look to
the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they
plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218
(quotation marks and internal citations omitted). A plaintiff “must
nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Smith
v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). In this
context, “plausible” refers “to the scope of the allegations in a
complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath
of conduct much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged
[the] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins
v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (citing Twombly at 1974).
Here, the events described by plaintiff are of the type so general
that they do not plausibly state a claim for relief. In the ordinary
course, a dental practitioner would lean over a patient and might ask
that patient to adjust slightly for a better approach. While it is

conceivable

that

a

practitioner

might

abuse

that

situation,

plaintiff’s bare claims do not present a plausible scenario.
Order to Show Cause
For the reasons set forth, the Court directs plaintiff to show
cause why his claims concerning his placement in segregation and his
contact with the jail dentist should not be dismissed. In the
alternative, plaintiff may file a second amended complaint.
An amended complaint is not an addendum or supplement to the
original complaint but completely supersedes it. Therefore, any
claims or allegations not presented in the amended complaint are no
longer before the Court. Plaintiff may not simply refer to an earlier
pleading; instead, the complaint must contain all allegations and
claims that plaintiff intends to present in the action, including
those to be retained from the original complaint. Plaintiff must
include the case number of this action on the first page of the amended
complaint.
Plaintiff must name every defendant in the caption of the amended
complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff must refer to each
defendant in the body of the complaint and must allege specific facts
that the describe the allegedly unconstitutional acts or omissions
by each defendant, including dates, locations, and circumstances.
Motion to Change Venue
Finally, the Court considers plaintiff’s motion to change venue.
Plaintiff moves for a change of venue from Johnson County to Atchison
County so that he “can have a fair and impartial trial.” This motion
appears to be directed to the criminal proceedings pending in Johnson
County and should be presented to the presiding judge in that matter.
This Court has no jurisdiction to issue orders in that matter and must

deny the motion on that ground.
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED plaintiff is directed to
show cause on or before May 15, 2020, why the claims alleging a wrongful
placement in segregation and contact with a jail dentist should not
be dismissed for the reasons stated. In the alternative, plaintiff
may submit a second amended complaint on or before May 15, 2020, that
complies with the directions set out in this order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED plaintiff’s motion for change of venue
(Doc. 14) is denied for lack of jurisdiction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

This 18th day of March, 2020, at Topeka, Kansas.

S/ Sam A. Crow
SAM A. CROW
U.S. Senior District Judge