Wooten v. Johnson County Adult Detention Center et al

Filing 6

NOTICE AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ENTERED: Plaintiff is granted until May 17, 2018, to show good cause, in writing, to the Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District Judge, why plaintiff's claims should not be dismissed. Signed by U.S. Senior District Judge Sam A. Crow on 04/17/18. Mailed to pro se party Michael A. Wooten by regular mail. (smnd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

MICHAEL A. WOOTEN,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 18-CV-3067-SAC

JOHNSON COUNTY ADULT
DETENTION CENTER, et al.,
Defendants.

NOTICE AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
This pro se civil rights action was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a pre-trial detainee
confined at the Johnson County Adult Detention Center in New Century, Kansas. Plaintiff
proceeds in forma pauperis1 and alleges that constitutional violations occurred during his pre-trial
confinement. He brings suit against the Johnson County Adult Detention Center and the Johnson
County Sheriff’s Department and seeks removal from segregation and unspecified compensatory
damages.
I. Allegations in the Complaint
Plaintiff alleges that beginning November 28, 2017,2 he was placed in administrative
segregation, where he has remained for at least 94 days. He states that he has filed at least six
grievances making classification and housing requests. Plaintiff alleges that some of his grievances
Based upon the affidavit included with plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
the court granted plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of fees and assessed
no initial partial filing fee because plaintiff has insufficient funds with which to do so. (Doc. 5).
Plaintiff remains obligated to make monthly payments under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) until he pays
the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee.
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The complaint states that plaintiff’s confinement began November 28, 2018, which the court
presumes is an error.
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have gone unanswered, and that the last response he received denied his request and stated that
“the priviledges [sic] you have, you earned while in general population.”
II.

Screening Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are
legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that
seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–
(2).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)
(citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court
liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th
Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise
a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are
insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to
relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

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cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint’s “factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a
complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did
it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff
believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163
(10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s
complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d
1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and
Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v.
Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States,
561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the
complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at
1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the
line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in
this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in
a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it
innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S.
Ct. at 1974).

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I.

Analysis
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Having considered plaintiff’s allegations, the court finds that the complaint is subject to

dismissal because it appears that plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies. Under 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a), “a prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing a lawsuit
regarding prison conditions in federal court.” Id. This exhaustion requirement “is mandatory, and
the district court [is] not authorized to dispense with it.” Beaudry v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 331
F.3d 1164, 1167 n. 5 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1118 (2004); Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d
1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff alleges that he filed multiple grievances addressing his
administrative segregation classification, but he provides no evidence or information that he
complied with all of the steps of the facility’s grievance procedure. Beginning the grievance
process is insufficient – the inmate must complete it. Brooks v. Johnson, 307 Fed.Appx. 247, 249
(10th Cir., 2009). Plaintiff’s complaint is therefore subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
B. Immunity
Additionally, the named defendants are not subject to suit under § 1983. A governmental
entity may not be held liable under § 1983 unless the entity itself supported the violation of rights
alleged. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). As such,
liability generally attaches to a governmental entity when the alleged injury is caused by the
entity’s policy or custom. Id., at 694. Plaintiff makes no such allegation in his complaint, and as
such, his claim against these defendants is subject to dismissal.
C. Failure to State a Claim
Finally, the court finds that plaintiff’s substantive complaint about the length of his

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confinement in administrative segregation is subject to dismissal because it states no constitutional
violation. Because a pretrial detainee cannot be punished before a lawful conviction, whether a
condition of pretrial detention violates the constitution depends on whether the condition is
imposed for purposes of punishment or whether it is related to a legitimate governmental purpose.
Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctr., 42 F.3d 1090, 1106 (10th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff makes no allegation that
his confinement in administrative segregation was intended as a punishment. Accordingly, his
complaint is subject to dismissal.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that plaintiff is granted until May
17, 2018, to show good cause, in writing, to the Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District
Judge, why plaintiff’s claims should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 17th day of April, 2018, at Topeka, Kansas.
s/Sam A. Crow
U. S. Senior District Judge

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