Brown v. Kansas Department of Corrections et al

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ENTERED: The motion for extension of time filed by the Kansas Department of Corrections 5 is denied as moot. Plaintiff's motion for default judgment 10 is denied. Signed by U.S. Senior District Judge Sam A. Crow on 09/25/18. (smnd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

EUGENE EDWARD BROWN, III,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 18-3118-SAC

KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is a civil action filed by a prisoner in state
custody. Plaintiff seeks relief from the denial of his application
for a change in classification under K.S.A. § 22-3730. On May 25, 2018,
the Court directed service of process under its electronic service
agreement in effect with the Kansas Department of Corrections and
directed KDOC to prepare and file a report under Martinez v. Aaron,
570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978). This matter is before the Court on the
motion of the Kansas Department of Corrections for an extension of
time to file the Martinez report (Doc. #5) and the plaintiff’s motion
for default judgment (Doc. #10).
First, the motion for extension of time is denied as moot as the
Martinez report was filed on August 5, 2018 (Doc. #7).
Next, plaintiff’s motion for default judgment asserts that
defendants have failed to timely answer this action. Defendants
respond that the time to file an answer is sixty days after the filing
of the Martinez report and state that they will file that pleading
on or before October 5, 2018.
Under Rule 55 of the Federal Rules a Civil Procedure, a two -step

process exists for a default judgment. First, a party must obtain an
entry of default from the Clerk of the Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a);
Watkins v. Donnelly, 551 F. App’x 953, 958 (10th Cir. 2014)(unpublished
order)(“Entry of default by the clerk is a necessary prerequisite that
must be performed before a district court is permitted to issue a
default judgment.”). Then, the party must either seek default judgment
from the Clerk where the claim is for “a sum certain or a sum that
can be made certain by computation”, or “[i]n all other cases, the
party must apply to the court for a default judgment.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 55(b)(1)-(2).
In deciding whether to enter default judgment, the court should
consider factors including (1) the degree of actual prejudice to the
defendant; (2) the degree of interference with the judicial
proceeding; (3) the culpability of the non-moving party; (4) whether
the court warned the party that dismissal was a likely consequence;
and (5) the efficacy of other sanctions. Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965
F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992)(internal citations omitted).
The entry of default judgment is a viewed as a “harsh sanction”
and is disfavored. The Tenth Circuit has stated:
[S]trong policies favor resolution of disputes on their
merits: the default judgment must normally be viewed as
available only when the adversary process has been halted
because of an essentially unresponsive party. In that
instance, the diligent party must be protected lest he be
faced with interminable delay and continued uncertainty as
to his rights. The default judgment remedy serves as such
a protection.
In re Rains, 046 F.2d 731, 732-33 (10th Cir. 1991)(citations omitted).
Having considered the record, the Court declines to enter default
judgment in this matter. This matter is subject to the electronic

service agreement in effect between the Kansas Department of
Corrections and the Court. Under that agreement, state defendants have
sixty days following the filing of the Martinez report to answer, as
stated in the Service Order (Doc. #3)1. Given that timeline and the
lack of any evidence that the defendants have been dilatory or
otherwise uncooperative, the Court concludes that the motion for
default judgment must be denied.
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED the motion for extension
of time filed by the Kansas Department of Corrections (Doc. #5) is
denied as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED plaintiff’s motion for default judgment
(Doc. #10) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

This 25th day of September, 2018, at Topeka, Kansas.

S/ Sam A. Crow
SAM A. CROW
U.S. Senior District Judge

The Court recognizes that the order directing service of process (Doc. #2)
incorrectly states that the answer is due thirty days after the report. While that
period is standard in cases in which a Martinez report is ordered, in cases under
the electronic service agreement, the Kansas Department of Corrections has been
granted a longer period of time.
1