Blake (ID 96323) v. JPay et al

Filing 91

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 81 MOTION for Reconsideration; denying 82 MOTION for Summary Judgment and/or MOTION for Default Judgment. Signed by Chief District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 6/27/2022. Mailed to pro se party Shaidon Blake by regular mail. (kas)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

SHAIDON BLAKE,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 18-3146-EFM

JPAY, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court are several motions by Plaintiff Shaidon Blake. His first Motion is
captioned as a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Memorandum and Order Granting the
Joint Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Paul Snyder and Joe Norwood (Doc. 81). His
second is captioned as a Motion for Summary Judgment/Default Judgment against Defendant JPay
LLC (Doc. 82). Because Plaintiff’s recent Notice of Interlocutory Appeal (Doc. 88) has divested
the Court of jurisdiction, the Court must deny both Motions.
I.

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed suit against Norwood, Snyder, and JPay on account of the censoring, by the
Kansas Department of Corrections, of the cover of his self-published book, “Doggystyle
Confessions of a Serial Cheater,” which he attempted to receive while in Kansas state prison. On

March 21, 2022, this Court granted Norwood and Snyder’s Motions for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of that Order seven days later. He has since filed several
“supplements” to his Motion for Reconsideration.
Up until quite recently, Defendant JPay had not engaged in this litigation nor had counsel
made an appearance on its behalf. On February 24, 2022, Plaintiff asked the Court to order an
entry of default against JPay, on account of its failure to engage in the litigation. The Court issued
an Order requiring JPay to show cause as to why the Court should not order the entry of default
against it. JPay timely responded, and the Court found that it had shown good cause for its failure
to appear up to that point. The Court ordered JPay to respond to Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint within seven days. JPay filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration within that time frame.
The Court found that this satisfied its Order and granted the motion on April 26, 2022. Before the
Court issued its Order, Plaintiff again moved for “Summary Judgment/Default Judgment” against
JPay.
On May 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, seeking to appeal the
Court’s Order granting Norwood and Snyder’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
II.

Jurisdiction

The Court must first address whether it retains jurisdiction to grant relief with respect to
the instant motions.1 Generally, “when a litigant files a notice of appeal, the district court loses
jurisdiction over the case, save for ‘collateral matters not involved in the appeal.’ ”2 However,

1

Even though the parties do not raise this issue of jurisdiction, the Court must consider the matter sua sponte.
Okla. Tpk. Auth. v. Bruner, 259 F.3d 1236, 1241 (10th Cir. 2001).
2
McKissick v. Yuen, 618 F.3d 1177, 1196 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lancaster v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 5, 149
F.3d 1228, 1237 (10th Cir. 1998)).

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when a “timely Rule 59(e) motion is pending,” a notice of appeal is “ineffective to confer
jurisdiction on a court of appeals.”3 A corollary to this principle is that, under these circumstances,
the district court retains jurisdiction over the case until the Rule 59(e) motion is resolved.4 Both
Plaintiff and Defendants seem to agree that his Motion to Reconsider is properly treated as a Rule
59(e) motion. This, however, is not self-evident.
Rule 59(e) permits a party to “request reconsideration of a final judgment.”5 There has
been no final judgment, however, where the Court’s order has not disposed of all claims by all
parties.6 The Court’s Order granting summary judgment to Norwood and Snyder did not dispose
of Plaintiff’s claims against JPay, and thus a motion for reconsideration of that order is not a motion
for reconsideration of a final judgment under Rule 59(e).
Plaintiff’s request is more properly construed as a motion for reconsideration under Rule
54(b), which states that “any order or other decision . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the claims
or rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . may be revised at any time before the entry
of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.”7 Other courts
in this circuit have held that “[a]uthority to reconsider an interlocutory order . . . exists solely under

3
Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing Griggs v. Provident Consumer
Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982)).
4

D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. #497, 2002 WL 31296445, at *1 (D. Kan. 2002).

5

Haulmark v. Kansas, 2021 WL 5711929, at *1 (D. Kan. 2021) (emphasis added). See also Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.”)
(emphasis added); Nelson v. City of Albuquerque, 925 F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 2019) (Hartz, J., dissenting) (“All
Rule 59 (e) motions are filed after entry of final judgment.”).
6

New Mexico v. Trujillo, 813 F.3d 1308, 1316 (10th Cir. 2016).

7

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

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Rule 54(b).”8 Accordingly, the Court views Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration as one under
Rule 54(b).
This is relevant to the question of the Court’s jurisdiction because, while certain motions,
including under Rule 59(e), toll the time to file a notice of appeal and thus prevent a filed notice
of appeal from divesting the district court of jurisdiction,9 a motion under Rule 54(b) does not do
so.10 Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider under Rule 54(b) cannot prevent the divestiture of the
Court’s jurisdiction over this case as a result of his later Notice of Appeal. The Court has no
jurisdiction to grant the relief Plaintiff seeks, and thus must deny both of his pending motions.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 81)
and “Motion for Summary Judgment/Default Judgment” (Doc. 82) are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 27th day of June, 2022.

ERIC F. MELGREN
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8

Ziegler v. Dale, 2019 WL 1882679, at *1 (D. Wyo. 2019) (citing SFF-TIR, LLC v. Stephenson, 264 F. Supp.
3d 1148, 1218-19 (N.D. Okla. 2017)).
9

See Skagerberg, 797 F.2d at 883 (“Under Rule 4(a)(4), a timely Rule 59(e) motion tolls the time for filing
a notice of appeal from a district court judgment. A notice of appeal filed while a timely Rule 59(e) motion is pending
is ineffective to confer jurisdiction on a court of appeals.”) (citations omitted).
10

See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) (listing the motions that toll the time to file a notice of appeal).

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