Huth et al v. Midea America Corp. et al
Filing
22
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 10 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; denying 15 Motion to Remand. Signed by District Judge Daniel D. Crabtree on 03/26/2024. (kmc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
WILLIAM HUTH and DEBORAH
HUTH,
Case No. 23-4031-DDC-GEB
Plaintiffs,
v.
MIDEA AMERICA CORP.,
GUANGDONG MIDEA AIRCONDITIONING EQUIPLMENT CO.,
LTD., and MIDEA GROUP CO., LTD.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the court on defendant Midea America Corp.’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 10) for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs William and Deborah Huth sued
Midea America and two other defendants in Kansas state court after a Frigidaire humidifier—
which, plaintiffs allege, defendants manufactured and sold—malfunctioned and damaged
plaintiffs’ property. Midea America removed this case to federal court. It then filed a Motion to
Dismiss, arguing that this court lacks personal jurisdiction because Midea America doesn’t
manufacture or sell Frigidaire humidifiers, and it doesn’t have any meaningful contacts with
Kansas. Plaintiffs oppose the motion, asking the court to permit jurisdictional discovery or to
remand the case to state court so plaintiffs can resolve their claims against the remaining two
defendants in plaintiffs’ selected forum. For the reasons below, the court grants Midea
America’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) and denies plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (Doc. 15).
I.
Factual Allegations and Procedural History
Plaintiffs William and Deborah Huth live in Emporia, Kansas. Doc. 1-1 at 1 (Pet. ¶ 1).
In their home, plaintiffs used a Frigidaire dehumidifier. Id. (Pet. ¶ 2). In November 2019, the
dehumidifier malfunctioned and caused smoke damage to plaintiffs’ real and personal property.
Id. Plaintiffs allege that defendants Midea America Corp. (Midea America), Guangdong Midea
Air-Conditioning Equipment Co., Ltd. (Guangdong Midea), and Midea Group Co., Ltd. (Midea
Group) each sold, warranted, distributed, and manufactured the dehumidifier that damaged their
property. Id. at 2 (Pet. ¶ 3).
Plaintiffs sued defendants in state court, specifically, the District Court of Lyon County,
Kansas. They asserted claims for negligence, breach of contract, strict liability, and for violating
the Kansas Consumer Protection Act. Doc. 1-1 (Pet.). Midea America removed the case to
federal court, invoking the court’s diversity jurisdiction. Doc. 1. Midea America then filed a
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Midea America asserts that it lacks ties to the specific product at issue and to the state of
Kansas. Midea America is a Florida corporation with its headquarters in New Jersey.1 Doc. 112 at 2 (Teixeira Aff. ¶¶ 6–7). It denies having manufactured, distributed, or sold the Frigidaire
dehumidifier that allegedly damaged plaintiffs’ property. Id. at 3 (Teixeira Aff. ¶ 11). Midea
America doesn’t have any offices or employees in Kansas. Id. (Teixeira Aff. ¶¶ 14–15). And
Midea America isn’t registered to do business in Kansas. Id. (Teixeira Aff. ¶ 17). Midea
America stores inventory in a Kansas warehouse, but it doesn’t own or rent the warehouse. Id.
(Teixeira Aff. ¶ 18).
1
Where, as here, the court decides a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without an
evidentiary hearing, the court may consider affidavits and other written materials that the parties submit.
See Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503, 1505 (10th Cir. 1995).
2
Plaintiffs oppose Midea America’s Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 14. They ask the court to
permit them to conduct jurisdictional discovery about Midea America’s relationship with the
dehumidifier and the state of Kansas. Id. at 4; Doc. 15. Alternatively, should the court grant
Midea America’s Motion to Dismiss, plaintiffs ask the court to remand the case to state court so
they can pursue their claims against Guangdong Midea and Midea Group in plaintiffs’ chosen
forum. Doc. 15.
II.
Legal Standard
Midea America contends this court lacks personal jurisdiction over it. Rule 12(b)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. The
plaintiff bears the burden to establish personal jurisdiction over each defendant named in the
action. Rockwood Select Asset Fund XI (6)-1, LLC v. Devine, Millimet & Branch, 750 F.3d
1178, 1179–80 (10th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). But in a case’s preliminary stages, a
plaintiff’s burden to prove personal jurisdiction is a light one. AST Sports Sci., Inc. v. CLF
Distrib. Ltd., 514 F.3d 1054, 1056 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Where, as here, a defendant asks the court to decide a pretrial Motion to Dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction without conducting an evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff must make only a
prima facie showing of jurisdiction. Id. at 1056–57 (citing OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co.
of Can., 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir. 1998)). “The plaintiff may make this prima facie
showing by demonstrating, via affidavit or other written materials, facts that if true would
support jurisdiction over the defendant.” OMI Holdings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1091.
To defeat a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, defendants “must present a
compelling case demonstrating ‘that the presence of some other considerations would render
jurisdiction unreasonable.’” Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477
(1985)). When defendant fails to controvert plaintiff’s allegations with affidavits or other
3
evidence, the court must accept the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and resolve
any factual disputes in plaintiff’s favor. Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503, 1505 (10th Cir.
1995); Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008)
(describing well-pled facts as “plausible, non-conclusory, and non-speculative” (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. 544)).
“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction
over persons.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(k)(1)(A)). In a diversity action like this one, the plaintiff must show that exercising
jurisdiction is proper under the laws of the forum state and that doing so comports with the
Constitution’s due process requirements. Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v. Kootenai Elec. Coop., 17 F.3d 1302, 1304–05 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
But Kansas’s long-arm statute is construed liberally to permit any exercise of jurisdiction
that comports with the United States Constitution. Id. at 1305; see also Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60308(b)(1)(L) & (b)(2). Thus, it’s unnecessary to conduct a separate personal jurisdiction analysis
under Kansas law. Instead, the court may proceed directly to the due process inquiry. Federated
Rural Elec. Ins. Corp., 17 F.3d at 1305; see also Niemi v. Lasshofer, 770 F.3d 1331, 1348 (10th
Cir. 2014) (explaining that where a state’s long-arm statute “confers the maximum jurisdiction
permissible consistent with the Due Process Clause . . . the first, statutory, inquiry effectively
collapses into the second, constitutional, analysis” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
The due process analysis uses its own two-step inquiry. First, the court must determine
whether the defendant has “minimum contacts with the forum state such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” AST Sports Sci., Inc., 514 F.3d at 1057
4
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, if the defendant’s actions establish such
minimum contacts, the court then must decide “whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
the defendant offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, neither party argues this second step—fair play
and substantial justice. So, following the parties’ lead, the court only explores the minimum
contacts question.
The Due Process Clause permits the court to assert personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant so long as the defendant purposefully has established “minimum contacts”
with the forum state. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474. The “minimum contacts” standard is
satisfied by establishing either (1) specific jurisdiction or (2) general jurisdiction. Rockwood
Select Asset Fund, 750 F.3d at 1179. A court may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant “‘if the defendant has “purposefully directed” his activities at residents of the forum,
and the litigation results from alleged injuries that “arise out of or relate to” those activities.’”
OMI Holdings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1090–91 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472). Alternatively,
if “a court’s exercise of jurisdiction does not directly arise from a defendant’s forum-related
activities, the court may nonetheless maintain general personal jurisdiction over the defendant
based on the defendant’s general business contacts with the forum state.” Id. at 1091 (citation
omitted).
III.
Analysis
As already mentioned, “[p]ersonal jurisdiction can be general or specific.” Rockwood
Select Asset Fund, 750 F.3d at 1179. The court begins with general jurisdiction—briefly—
because the parties don’t appear to dispute that the court lacks general personal jurisdiction over
Midea America. The court then turns to specific jurisdiction, the heart of the controversy here.
And, last, the court evaluates plaintiffs’ remand request.
5
A.
General Jurisdiction
Courts may exercise general jurisdiction if a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are
“‘so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.’”
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Thyssen Mining Constr. Can., Ltd., 703 F.3d 488, 493 (10th Cir.
2012) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
General jurisdiction doesn’t arise directly from a defendant’s forum-related activities; instead,
the court may assert general personal jurisdiction over the defendant based on the defendant’s
business contacts with the forum state. OMI Holdings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1091 (citation omitted).
But, because general jurisdiction isn’t tied to the particular events giving rise to the suit, courts
must impose “a more stringent minimum contacts test[.]” Id. This more stringent test
“requir[es] the plaintiff to demonstrate the defendant’s continuous and systematic general
business contacts” with the forum state. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The paradigmatic “forums for a corporation are its place of incorporation and principal
place of business.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 359 (2021).
Outside those two forums, courts can consider:
(1) whether the corporation solicits business in the state through a local
office or agents; (2) whether the corporation sends agents into the state on
a regular basis to solicit business; (3) the extent to which the corporation
holds itself out as doing business in the forum state, through advertisements,
listings or bank accounts; and (4) the volume of business conducted in the
state by the corporation.
Trierweiler v. Croxton Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1533 (10th Cir. 1996).
Midea America argues here that the court lacks general jurisdiction over it because it’s
not “at home” in Kansas. Doc. 10 at 9–11. Midea America’s headquarters are in Parsippany,
New Jersey. Doc. 11-2 at 2 (Teixeira Aff. ¶ 7). And it’s incorporated in Florida. Id. (Teixeira
Aff. ¶ 6). Midea America bases no employees in Kansas and it maintains no physical locations
6
in Kansas. Id. at 3 (Teixeira Aff. ¶¶ 14, 15). And it’s not registered to do business in Kansas.
Id. (Teixeira Aff. ¶ 16). Midea America acknowledges that it stores inventory in a Kansas
warehouse, but it doesn’t own or rent that warehouse. Id. (Teixeira Aff. ¶¶ 17–18). And the
goods it stores there don’t include Frigidaire dehumidifiers. Id. at 4 (Teixeira Aff. ¶ 19).
Plaintiffs fail to respond to Midea America’s general jurisdiction argument or provide
any reasons to conclude that Midea America has made itself at home in Kansas. See generally
Doc. 14. So, plaintiffs haven’t shouldered their burden to establish that the court possesses
general jurisdiction over Midea America. The court thus moves to the heart of the parties’
controversy: specific jurisdiction.
B.
Specific Jurisdiction
Sometimes, specific jurisdiction exists even though general jurisdiction doesn’t. Specific
jurisdiction also is called “case-linked” jurisdiction. Ford, 592 U.S. at 358. “The contacts
needed for this kind of jurisdiction often go by the name ‘purposeful availment.’” Id. at 359
(citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475). A court may exercise specific jurisdiction if: (1) the outof-state defendant “purposefully directed” its activities at residents of the forum state and (2) the
plaintiffs’ “injury arose from those purposefully directed activities[.]” Newsome v. Gallacher,
722 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
First: the “purposefully directed” requirement. Our Circuit analyzes the “purposefully
directed” requirement differently depending on the cause of action alleged. See Dudnikov, 514
F.3d at 1071. “In the tort context, [the Circuit] often ask[s] whether the nonresident defendant
‘purposefully directed’ its activities at the forum state; in contract cases, meanwhile, [the Tenth
Circuit] sometimes ask[s] whether the defendant ‘purposefully availed’ itself of the privilege of
conducting activities or consummating a transaction in the forum state.” Id. (citations omitted).
Our Circuit has explained that the “purposeful direction” requirement seeks “to ensure that an
7
out-of-state defendant is not bound to appear to account for merely ‘random, fortuitous, or
attenuated contacts’ with the forum state.” Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475).
Second: the suit-related connection requirement. To pass this part of the test, plaintiffs’
claims “must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contact with the forum.” Ford, 592 U.S. at
359 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). That is, “there must be an affiliation
between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, an activity or an occurrence that
takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.” Id. at 359–60
(citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
Midea America argues here that both components are absent because it has little to do
with Kansas. And what limited contact Midea America has with Kansas, those contacts have
nothing to do with the dehumidifier at issue here. Doc. 11 at 3. Recall that plaintiffs bring
claims based on the alleged malfunction of their “Frigidaire 70-pint capacity dehumidifier,
model number FAD704DUP[.]” Doc. 1-1 at 2 (Pet. ¶ 2). And plaintiffs allege all defendants
“sold, warranted, distributed or manufactured the dehumidifier.” Id. at 3 (Pet. ¶ 3). But Midea
America has testified via affidavit that it doesn’t manufacture, sell, or distribute any Frigidairebranded dehumidifiers in Kansas or anywhere else. Indeed, Midea America asserts, it never has.
Doc. 11-2 at 3 (Teixeira Aff. ¶ 11). Going further, Midea America testified that it “has no
involvement with any Frigidaire-branded product, including the model number FAD704DUP
dehumidifier[.]” Id. (Teixeira Aff. ¶ 13). Midea America explained that it stores some inventory
in a warehouse in Kansas—but it doesn’t operate offices or employees in Kansas. And never has
it registered to do business in Kansas. Id. (Teixeira Aff. ¶¶ 14–18). Midea America thus has
established that it hasn’t purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of Kansas law.
8
And it’s also established that this lawsuit doesn’t “arise out of or relate to” Midea America’s
Kansas contacts. Ford, 592 U.S. at 359 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Sensing thin jurisdictional ice, plaintiffs don’t respond with a law-based response.
Instead, they head for a factual floe: jurisdictional discovery. Plaintiffs argue that the court
should allow them to conduct jurisdictional discovery instead of dismissing Midea America.
Plaintiffs assert they want “an opportunity to develop the relevant facts and ascertain whether
Midea America may be liable or truly has no relationship with the dehumidifier or its placement
in the stream of commerce.” Doc. 14 at 1. Plaintiffs also point out that many of the relevant
facts “are solely within the possession of Midea America.” Id. at 2. And so, plaintiffs assert,
they’ve identified a factual dispute.
“‘When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, either party should be
allowed discovery on the factual issues raised by that motion.’” GCIU-Emp. Ret. Fund v.
Coleridge Fine Arts, 700 F. App’x 865, 871 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Budde v. Ling-TemcoVought, Inc., 511 F.2d 1033, 1035 (10th Cir. 1975) (affirming decision denying request for
jurisdictional discovery)). The court “may not refuse to grant jurisdictional discovery ‘if either
the pertinent jurisdictional facts are controverted or a more satisfactory showing of the facts is
necessary.’” Proud Veterans, LLC v. Ben-Menashe, No. 12-CV-1162-JAR, 2012 WL 6681888,
at *1 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2012) (quoting Health Grades, Inc. v. Decatur Mem’l Hosp., 190 F.
App’x 586, 589 (10th Cir. 2006)).
A district court has “broad discretion” when deciding whether to allow jurisdictional
discovery. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Heliqwest Int’l, Ltd., 385 F.3d 1291, 1298–99 (10th
Cir. 2004). A “refusal to grant jurisdictional discovery constitutes an abuse of discretion if the
denial results in prejudice to the litigant and that prejudice is present where pertinent facts
9
bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory showing of
the facts is necessary.” Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort,
629 F.3d 1173, 1189 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation cleaned up). And plaintiffs, as the party
moving for discovery, bear the burden to demonstrate that they deserve it. Id. at 1189 n.11.
Plaintiffs have failed to shoulder that burden here.
Plaintiffs’ Petition alleges that “Each Defendant[]” manufactures and sells the model of
Frigidaire dehumidifier that harmed them. Doc. 1-1 at 2 (Pet. ¶ 3). Yet, Midea America
responded with an affidavit attesting that it doesn’t manufacture or sell Frigidaire
dehumidifiers—Guangdong Midea does. Doc. 11 at 2; Doc. 11-2 at 3 (Teixeira Aff. ¶ 12).
Plaintiffs admit that they “do not have detailed knowledge regarding Midea America and
[Guangdong] Midea’s manufacture and distribution of dehumidifiers,” but they “do know,
however, that Midea America does manufacture and sell dehumidifiers and that Midea America”
has issued product recalls on dehumidifiers. Doc. 14 at 3. In support, plaintiffs submitted two
exhibits: first, a series of social media posts from a Twitter account called @MideaAmerica
advertising a dehumidifier (Doc. 14 at 7–11); and second, excerpts from Midea.com, including a
product recall update on a dehumidifier (Doc. 14 at 12–18). Midea America is nonplussed. It
confirms in its Reply that it markets and sells dehumidifiers—just not Frigidaire dehumidifiers.
The dehumidifiers in plaintiffs’ exhibits, Midea America contends, are entirely different
brands—Midea branded dehumidifiers and GE branded dehumidifiers. Doc. 16 at 2–4.
The court recognizes that often, it’s proper to permit jurisdictional discovery. But this
general rule doesn’t mandate jurisdictional discovery in every case. It’s prejudicial to deny
discovery “where pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted . . . or
where a more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary.” Sizova v. Nat’l Inst. of Standards
10
& Tech., 282 F.3d 1320, 1326 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
But that’s not this case. Midea America has adduced and presented affidavit testimony sharing
facts nullifying personal jurisdiction here. Plaintiffs haven’t controverted or even challenged any
of those facts. They’re merely asking for the opportunity to look for some facts that might
controvert Midea America’s facts. That’s not enough.
Exercising its discretion, the court declines to authorize jurisdictional discovery because
plaintiffs have failed to shoulder their burden to show they’re entitled to it. Midea America’s
affidavit explains that it doesn’t manufacture or sell Frigidaire dehumidifiers. See Doc. 11-2.
Plaintiffs’ exhibits, submitted to controvert Midea America’s assertion, refer to Midea branded
and GE branded dehumidifiers—not Frigidaire dehumidifiers. Doc. 16 at 2–4. Plaintiffs identify
no evidence or other reasons to permit a plausible inference that Midea America manufactures or
sells Frigidaire dehumidifiers. The best plaintiffs can muster is conclusory assertions.
Plaintiffs’ only response to Midea America’s Motion to Dismiss requests jurisdictional
discovery. Without jurisdictional discovery, plaintiffs are back on thin ice. They’ve failed to
allege that Midea America purposefully availed itself of Kansas law. Nor have they alleged that
Midea had any contacts with Kansas that could have given rise to this lawsuit. Plaintiffs simply
have failed to “demonstrate[e] . . . facts that if true would support jurisdiction over” Midea
America. OMI Holdings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1091. The court thus grants Midea America’s Motion
to Dismiss (Doc. 10) and turns to plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (Doc. 15).
IV.
Motion to Remand
Plaintiffs have asked the court to remand the case if it grants Midea America’s Motion to
Dismiss—as it’s done—so they can litigate their claims against Guangdong Midea and Midea
Group in plaintiffs’ original choice of forum. Doc. 15. Plaintiffs point out that Midea America
removed the case and, if Midea America is dismissed, they argue that their “choice to proceed in
11
state court should have weight[.]” Doc. 14 at 5. This is an unusual request and plaintiffs cite no
authority for it. Plaintiffs don’t assert that Midea America removed this case to federal court
improperly. That is, plaintiffs don’t challenge that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.2
And if federal courts have jurisdiction over a case, they bear a “‘virtually unflagging
obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them.’” D.A. Osguthorpe Fam. P’ship v. ASC
Utah, Inc., 705 F.3d 1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817); see
also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821) (“We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.”).
Plaintiffs don’t support their remand request with any legal authority. Plaintiffs ask the
court to remand the case to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447. And they argue that “this Court
should let [plaintiffs] continue their recovery for the damage to their home in their chosen
forum” because “there are other defendants named in this case”—Guangdong Midea and Midea
Group. Doc. 14 at 4. But a “federal court presented with a motion to remand is limited solely to
the question of its authority to hear the case, consistent with the restrictions imposed by the
removal statute.” 14C Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure
§ 3739 (4th ed. 2023). Plaintiffs don’t question this court’s authority to hear this case. And
nowhere does § 1447 empower courts to remand a case based on a litigant’s preference for state
court. So, plaintiffs’ argument that they’d prefer to litigate in state court, after defendants
2
Nor could they. Midea America’s removal invokes the court’s diversity jurisdiction. For a
federal court to exercise diversity jurisdiction, the parties must be completely diverse and the amount in
controversy must exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Midea America asserts that the parties are
completely diverse because both plaintiffs are citizens of the State of Kansas, and none of the three
defendants are citizens of Kansas. Doc. 1 at 2. The two remaining defendants—Guangdong Midea and
Midea Group—are Chinese business entities. Id. And plaintiffs seek nearly $400,000 from defendants,
satisfying the amount in controversy requirement. Id.
12
properly removed the case, doesn’t convince the court to cede its “virtually unflagging”
jurisdictional responsibility to host a case properly removed to our court.3
Midea America properly removed the case to federal court under § 1441, invoking the
court’s diversity jurisdiction. See Doc. 1. This removal properly established the court’s subject
matter jurisdiction over this case. So, remand under § 1447(c) is improper. The court thus
denies plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (Doc. 15).
V.
Conclusion
The court grants Midea America’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) for lack of personal
jurisdiction and dismisses Midea America without prejudice. It denies plaintiffs’ Motion to
Remand (Doc. 15).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT defendant Midea America
Corp.’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (Doc. 15) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
3
Other federal courts have taken a conservative approach to remanding properly removed cases.
See Buchner v. F.D.I.C., 981 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[A] [federal district] court has no discretion to
remand a case over which it has subject-matter jurisdiction[.]”); Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45
F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 1995) (“It is apparent, then, that § 1441(c) grants the district court only a limited
authority to remand a case.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Mangold v. Analytic Servs.,
Inc., 77 F.3d 1442, 1453 (4th Cir. 1996) (overruling district court’s decision to exercise its discretion to
remand a case because “the court did not have that power but was obliged to exercise its removal
jurisdiction”); Thomas v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-00797-PAB-KMT, 2012 WL 1431224, at *2 (D.
Colo. Apr. 25, 2012) (“[T]he Court is satisfied that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over this case,
remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is improper.”); Bohanna v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
848 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1013 (W.D. Mo. 2012) (“Remand of the action is inappropriate where, as here, the
action has been properly removed to this Court based on diversity.” (citations omitted)); Hubbard v.
Union Oil Co. of Cal., 601 F. Supp. 790, 792 (S.D. W. Va. 1985) (concluding neither prejudice to
plaintiff nor duplication of judicial time and effort qualified as grounds for remand because removal
otherwise was proper). The court finds these cases persuasive.
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Dated this 26th day of March, 2024, at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ Daniel D. Crabtree
Daniel D. Crabtree
United States District Judge
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