United States of America v. Coffeyville Resources Refining, et al
Filing
143
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 133 Motion for Review. See order for details. Signed by District Judge Julie A. Robinson on 5/17/23. (msb)
Case 6:04-cv-01064-JAR-KGG Document 143 Filed 05/17/23 Page 1 of 8
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and
STATE OF KANSAS ex rel. KANSAS
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
ENVIRONMENT,
Case No. 04-1064-JAR-KGG
Plaintiffs,
v.
COFFEYVILLE RESOURCES REFINING &
MARKETING, LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This civil action was brought by Plaintiffs United States of America and the State of
Kansas by and through the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (the “State”) against
Defendant Coffeyville Resources Refining & Marketing, LLC (“CRRM”) under Section 113(b)
of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) and K.S.A. § 65-3005, for violations of the CAA, the Kansas Air
Quality Act (“KAQA”), various federal and state regulations, and federal and state permits at
CRRM’s petroleum refinery located in Coffeyville, Kansas. Before the Court is Defendant’s
Motion to Review Order Granting Leave to File Second Amended Supplemental Complaint
(Doc. 133). The motion is fully briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule. As described more
fully below, the motion is denied.
I.
Background
On April 19, 2012, the parties entered into their Second Consent Decree (“2012 Consent
Decree”), which was approved by the Court.1 On June 19, 2020, pursuant to paragraph 202 of
1
Doc. 14.
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the 2012 Consent Decree, Plaintiffs demanded stipulated penalties from Defendant for violations
of federal CAA regulations. The parties engaged in informal dispute resolution as required, but
were unable to resolve the disputes informally, and Defendant sought judicial review of the
dispute. On March 30, 2022, this Court denied Defendant’s petition for judicial review. That
matter is now on appeal.
In the meantime, on December 28, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a First Supplemental Complaint
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d), alleging nine new claims “based on transactions, occurrences, and
events that occurred after the filing of the original Complaint.”2 On February 17, 2022, Plaintiffs
filed a First Amended Supplemental Complaint (“FASC”), alleging an additional eight claims.3
On October 3, 2022, this Court granted in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), dismissing the State’s claims for civil penalties under K.S.A. § 65-3018 in
Counts 1 through 17.4
The State moved for leave to amend and file a Second Amended Supplemental
Complaint (“SASC”). Defendant did not oppose amendment with one exception: the State’s
request to add claims for injunctive relief under K.S.A. § 65-3012 in Counts 1, 2, 6, 9, 11, 12, 14,
15, and 16 of the SASC. Defendant argued that K.S.A. § 65-3012(c) does not authorize such
relief in federal court. On March 30, 2023, presiding United States Magistrate Judge Kenneth G.
Gale granted the motion for leave to amend, finding that the plain language of § 65-3012 allows
the State to proceed with its demand for injunctive relief in federal court.5 Defendant seeks
review of that decision.
2
Doc. 32 ¶ 5.
3
Doc. 90.
4
Doc. 112.
5
Doc. 131.
2
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II.
Standard
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 allows a party to provide specific, written objections to a magistrate
judge’s order. The applicable standard of review depends on whether the magistrate judge’s
order relates to a dispositive or nondispositive issue. A nondispositive decision is reviewed
under a clearly erroneous or contrary to law standard, and a dispositive order is reviewed de
novo.6 The parties here agree that Judge Gale’s March 30 Order should be considered
nondispositive under Rule 72.
Under the more deferential standard that applies to this Court’s review of a
nondispositive order, the Court must affirm “unless the entire evidence leaves it ‘with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’”7 As to legal matters,
the Court conducts an independent review and determines whether
the magistrate judge ruling is contrary to law. Under this standard,
the Court conducts a plenary review and may set aside the
magistrate judge decision if it applied an incorrect legal standard or
failed to consider an element of the applicable standard.8
There is no dispute that Judge Gale considered the motion for leave to amend under the
appropriate standard. Under Rule 15(a), leave to amend a complaint is freely given when justice
so requires.9 A party is typically granted leave to amend under this rule unless there is “a
showing of undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith or dilatory motive,
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment.”10 A
6
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.
7
In re Motor Fuel Temp. Sales Pracs. Litig., 707 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1147–48 (D. Kan. 2010) (quoting
Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1464 (10th Cir. 1988)).
8
Id. at 1148 (citations omitted).
9
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
10
Duncan v. Manager, Dep=t of Safety, City & Cnty. of Denver, 397 F.3d 1300, 1315 (10th Cir. 2005).
3
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proposed amendment is futile if the amended complaint would be subject to dismissal.11 While
liberality of amendment is important, it is equally important that “there must be an end finally to
a particular litigation.”12
III.
Discussion
Defendant asks this Court to overturn Judge Gale’s March 30 Order and deny the State’s
request to add a claim for injunctive relief under K.S.A. § 65-3012 in Counts 1, 2, 6, 9, 11, 12,
14, 15, and 16 of the SSAC. Defendant does not argue that Judge Gale applied the incorrect
legal standard to its motion to amend. Defendant argues that, contrary to Judge Gale’s Order, the
plain language of the statute does not permit a demand for injunctive relief for violations of the
KAQA in federal court and therefore the proposed amendment was futile. The State responds
that Judge Gale’s conclusion was not contrary to law that the statute allows for injunctive relief
in this federal case.
Defendant’s futility argument required Judge Gale to construe K.S.A. § 65-3012(c),
which is part of the KAQA. K.S.A. § 65-3012 provides:
(a) Upon receipt of evidence that emissions from an air pollution
source or combination of air pollution sources presents: (1) An
imminent and substantial endangerment to public health or welfare
or to the environment; or (2) for an imminent or actual violation of
this act, any rules and regulations adopted under this act, any
orders issued under this act or any permit conditions required by
this act, the secretary may issue a temporary order not to exceed
seven days in duration, directing the owner or operator, or both, to
take such steps as necessary to prevent the act or eliminate the
practice.
(b) Upon issuance of the temporary order, the secretary may
commence an action in the district court to enjoin acts or practices
specified in subsection (a) or request the attorney general or
11
Anderson v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 521 F.3d 1278, 1288 (10th Cir. 2008).
12
Pallottino v. City of Rio Rancho, 31 F.3d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir.1994).
4
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appropriate county or district attorney to commence an action to
enjoin those acts or practices.
(c) The secretary may bring suit in any court of competent
jurisdiction to immediately restrain the acts or practices specified
in subsection (a). An action for injunction under this subsection
shall have precedence over other cases in respect to order of trial.
(d) The owner or operator, or both, aggrieved by an order of the
secretary issued pursuant to this section shall be immediately
entitled to judicial review of such agency action by filing a petition
for judicial review in district court. The aggrieved party shall not
be required to exhaust administrative remedies. A petition for
review under this subsection shall have precedence over other
cases in respect to order of trial.
The Court applies Kansas law in construing this statute.13 Under Kansas law, the Court
must first attempt to determine legislative intent “by reading the plain language of the statute[]
and giving common words their ordinary meanings.”14 In so doing, the Court is mindful that
“[w]hen a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts do not speculate as to the legislative intent
behind it and will not read the statute to add something not readily found within it. Courts need
not resort to statutory construction.”15 Nonetheless, “even when the language of the statute is
clear, [the Court] must still consider various provisions of an act in pari materia to reconcile and
bring those provisions into workable harmony, if possible.”16
Defendant argues that subsection (c) only permits the State to commence suit in state
court, while the State maintains that “any court of competent jurisdiction” includes federal court.
Judge Gale agreed with the State that the plain language of subsection (c) supports its
13
Citizens for Responsible Gov’t State Pol. Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1190 (10th Cir.
2000) (citing Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1071 n.23 (10th Cir.1995)).
14
N. Nat. Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Servs. Co., 296 P.3d 1106, 1115 (Kan. 2013) (citing Padron v. Lopez,
220 P.3d 345, 352 (Kan. 2009)).
15
Kansas v. Casey, 211 P.3d 847, 849, Syl. 2 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009).
16
Bruce v. Kelly, 514 P.3d 1007, 1012 (Kan. 2022) (first citing Neighbor v. Westar Energy, Inc., 349 P.3d
469, 471–72 (Kan. 2015); and then citing N. Nat. Gas Co., 296 P.3d at 1115).
5
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interpretation. K.S.A. § 65-3012(a) makes clear that the statute applies where there is either (1)
an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health and welfare; or (2) “an imminent or
actual violation of this act, any rules and regulations adopted under this act, any orders issued
under this act or any permit conditions required by this act.” The State then may either issue a
temporary order and “commence an action in the district court to enjoin acts or practices
specified in subsection (a),” or proceed under subsection (c), which allows the State to “bring
suit in any court of competent jurisdiction to immediately restrain the acts or practices specified
in subsection (a).” Judge Gale’s conclusion that subsection (c) allows the State to bring its
injunctive relief demands in federal court is not contrary to law for several reasons.
First, as Judge Gale explained, the plain meaning of subsection (c) supports the State’s
position. It states that “[t]he secretary may bring suit in any court of competent jurisdiction to
immediately restrain the acts or practices specified in subsection (a).” This language clearly
does not require the State to bring suit seeking injunctive relief in state court. The language “any
court of competent jurisdiction” is not qualified by words like “state” or even “district.” The
legislature’s use of the word “any” clearly evinces an intent to allow the State to bring suit in
federal or state court if jurisdiction is otherwise present.
Second, Judge Gale did not err in declining to find that the doctrine of in pari materia
changes the plain meaning of subsection (c). Defendant maintains that when read in conjunction
with subsections (b) and (d), the language “any court of competent jurisdiction” in subsection (c)
must refer to state court in order to read the statute in harmony. According to Defendant, since
these other provisions refer to the State seeking relief in “district court,” which it maintains is a
clear reference to state court, the legislature must have intended subsection (c) to refer to state
proceedings as well. Assuming without deciding that the statutory references to “district court”
6
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means state court, the Court disagrees with Defendant’s position and finds that the references in
subsections (b) and (d) to district court makes clear that the legislature knew how to limit
jurisdiction but intentionally chose to use different language in subsection (c). The Court will
not read into the statute something not readily found within it. Instead, the Court infers that the
legislature intended to use different language in these subsections. And this makes sense:
subsections (b) and (d) are provisions relating to the KDHE Secretary’s issuance of a temporary
order. Subsection (b) sets forth the Secretary’s option to bring suit following the issuance of a
temporary order; subjection (d) sets forth the owner and/or operator’s option to seek judicial
review following the issuance of the Secretary’s temporary order. In contrast, subsection (c)
governs when the State “opts to bring suit . . . to immediately restrain the acts or practices
specified in subsection (a)” instead of pursuing a temporary order. The Court need not utilize the
doctrine of in pari materia to harmonize these provisions.
Third, the Court’s prior ruling on the civil penalty claims is not relevant here. That ruling
considered a different statute: K.S.A. § 65-3018, which governs the Secretary’s ability to impose
civil penalties for violations of the KAQA. It has no bearing on this Court’s review of Judge
Gale’s Order construing a different statutory provision.
For all of these reasons, the Court overrules and denies Defendant’s motion to review and
overturn Judge Gale’s March 30 Order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Defendant’s Motion to
Review Order Granting Leave to File Second Amended Supplemental Complaint (Doc. 133) is
denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 17, 2023
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S/ Julie A. Robinson
JULIE A. ROBINSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
8
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