Society of Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace, IFPTE Local 2001, AFL-CIO v. The Boeing Company

Filing 601

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 575 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Monti L. Belot on 6/19/2013. (aa)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL
ENGINEERING EMPLOYEES IN
AEROSPACE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BOEING CO., et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION
Nos. 05-1251-MLB
07-1043-MLB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case comes before the court on plaintiffs and Spirit
defendants’ motion of voluntary dismissal of all claims against Spirit
defendants with prejudice.

(Doc. 575).

Facts and Procedural History1

I.

Plaintiffs, which consist of unions and past Boeing employees,
brought claims against various Boeing and Spirit organizations.

The

individual plaintiffs in this case include 1999 Harkness class members
and the McCartney/Boone plaintiffs who are not members of the class.
All parties have been engaged in extensive discovery for several
years.

The pretrial order was entered on October 3, 2011, and the

dispositive motion deadline was December 9, 2011.

(Doc. 548).

The

claims against the Spirit defendants consist of breach of contract and
ERISA violations.

Essentially, plaintiffs assert that Spirit agreed

to assume the liabilities of plaintiffs’ pension and health care
benefits which accrued under the BCERP.
1

A detailed factual history of the events surrounding this
litigation may be found in this court’s December 11, 2012, memorandum
and order. (Doc. 581).

In preparing for the filing of dispositive motions, plaintiffs’
counsel met to discuss the merits of their claims against the Spirit
defendants.

After reviewing the voluminous documents and more than

40 depositions, plaintiffs’ counsel determined that they did not have
a factual basis to support their contentions. Plaintiffs’ counsel met
with Spirit’s counsel to determine a solution.
litigation

costs,

plaintiffs’

and

Spirit’s

In order to save

counsel

agreed

to

a

settlement in which plaintiffs would dismiss all claims against the
Spirit defendants with prejudice and the parties would bear their own
costs.
Plaintiffs and Spirit defendants presented the court with a
joint motion to dismiss with prejudice on September 25, 2012.
575).

(Doc.

On November 27, 2012, the court entered an order preliminarily

approving the voluntary dismissal.

(Doc. 579).

The order required

written notice to class members and afforded class members the
opportunity to submit objections to the dismissal.
On December 11, 2012, the court denied Boeing’s motion for
summary judgment on the majority of plaintiffs’ claims against Boeing.
(Doc. 581).

The parties are currently engaging in damages discovery.

The case is scheduled for mediation in Fall 2013.
In mid-January, counsel sent out the notices to all members of
the Harkness class detailing the proposed dismissal, the procedure for
filing objections and the date and location of the fairness hearing.
(Doc. 587).

On February 27, counsel re-sent the notices to the class

members for whom the initial notice was returned as undeliverable.
(Doc.

591).

Ultimately,

only

five

undeliverable after the second mailing.
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notices

were

returned

as

On March 13, 2013, Joan

Heffington

filed

an

objection

with

the

court.

(Doc.

592).

Additionally, two class members sent emails to plaintiffs’ counsel
regarding the notice.

(Doc. 598).

The court held a fairness hearing on June 17, 2013. Counsel for
all parties discussed how they reached an agreement on plaintiffs’
claims against Spirit.

Joan Heffington was the only class member who

presented objections at the hearing.
II.

Analysis
A.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)

Under Rule 23(e), claims of a certified class may be settled,
compromised or dismissed only with court approval.
23(e).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

The Court may approve a settlement upon finding that it is

fair, reasonable and adequate. See Rule 23(e)(2).

In determining

whether the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, the court
should consider the following factors:
(1) whether the proposed
honestly negotiated;

settlement

was

fairly

and

(2) whether serious questions of law and fact exist,
placing the ultimate outcome of the litigation in doubt;
(3) whether the value of an immediate recovery outweighs
the mere possibility of future relief after protracted
and expensive litigation; and
(4) the judgment of the parties that the settlement is
fair and reasonable.
Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 314 F.3d 1180, 1188 (10th
Cir. 2002). The proponents of the settlement are responsible for
providing

sufficient

settlement is fair.

evidence

to

support

a

conclusion

that

the

See In re Sprint Corp. ERISA Litig., 443 F.

Supp.2d 1249, 1256 (D. Kan. 2006).

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After a review of the submitted filings by the parties and the
statements made by all counsel at the fairness hearing, the court
finds that the proposed dismissal is fair, reasonable and adequate.
All parties conducted extensive discovery concerning plaintiffs’
claims and concluded that there is no evidentiary support for the
claims against the Spirit defendants.

Continued litigation of the

claims would result in unnecessary expense and a significant amount
of time for all involved.

The remaining claims against Boeing will

not be impacted by the dismissal and have the potential to offer all
relief sought by plaintiffs.
B.

Objections

Out of 1999 plaintiffs, only one objection was filed with the
court and presented at the hearing.

Joan Heffington’s objection

focuses on her belief that all counsel involved are engaged in a
conspiracy, committing fraud, providing ineffective assistance of
counsel and violating her Due Process rights. (Doc. 592 at 2). Based
on Ms. Heffington’s statements at the hearing and the exhibits she
tendered, the thrust of her objection is that she has not received
what she believes she is entitled to as a result of the Boeing sale.
She has not presented any persuasive evidence with respect to the
controlling factors, supra.

Plaintiffs’ counsel also received two

emails regarding the proposed dismissal.

Richard Spevak objected to

the dismissal on the basis that there is “collusion” between those
involved. (Doc. 599, exh. A). Rick De Jesus sent an email asking for
more information about the dismissal and stated why he believes he
should be compensated for the loss of his benefits.
After

thoroughly

examining
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all

objections,

Id.
including

the

statements and exhibits offered by Joan Heffington at the hearing, the
court finds that the objectors do not offer any legitimate reason why
the claims against Spirit should proceed.

The objectors’ arguments

concerning their claims for damages are not persuasive in light of the
fact that those claims are currently pending against Boeing and there
has been no evidence (after years of discovery) that Spirit agreed to
pay for those benefits.
Therefore,
overruled.
III.

the

objections

to

the

voluntary

dismissal

are

(Doc. 592).

Conclusion
Plaintiffs and the Spirit defendants’ joint motion to dismiss

all claims against the Spirit defendants with prejudice is granted.
(Doc. 575).

The parties are to bear their own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

19th

day of June 2013, at Wichita, Kansas.

s/ Monti Belot
Monti L. Belot
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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