Martin K. Eby Construction Company, Inc. v. OneBeacon Insurance Company
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER finding as moot 238 Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 239 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 241 Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 133 Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 236 Motion for Summary Judgment. No motions for reconsideration, however styled, may be filed. Signed by District Judge Monti L. Belot on 2/22/2013. (aa)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
INSURANCE COMPANY, )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the court are the following:
1. Travelers’ Motion for Summary Judgment against KBR
(Docs. 241, 243);
2. KBR’s Response (Doc. 255);
3. Travelers’ Reply (Doc. 266);
4. KBR’s Supplemental Response (Doc. 276); and
5. Travelers’ Supplemental Reply (Doc. 277).
The parties are thoroughly familiar with the history of this
litigation and it will be repeated here only as necessary. In light
of the court’s prior rulings and the parties’ joint statement of
counterclaim against Travelers1 is the only remaining ripe claim.
underlying Texas litigation. (Doc. 28). KBR’s counterclaim is now
based on a single insurance policy and a single area of coverage: a
2002 policy Travelers issued to Eby that included coverage for
alternatively, that the policy requirements for indemnitee coverage
are not met. KBR denies that it waived its counterclaim and argues
all of the conditions for indemnitee coverage are satisfied. (See
Doc. 272 at 2-3). The court finds that the policy conditions for
coverage of KBR’s defense costs have not been met and that KBR’s
“Travelers” is used in the pleadings and briefs to refer
collectively to Travelers Casualty and Surety Company, f/k/a The
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (TC&S), United States Fidelity
and Guaranty Company (USF&G), St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance
Company (St. Paul) and Athena Assurance Company (Athena).
KBR initially asserted coverage under several policies issued by
Travelers to Eby between 1985 and 2002, but has narrowed its claim
to a single policy, No. KK08000952, covering the period 1/1/2002 to
1/1/2003. (Doc. 243 at 2). Moreover, KBR has now waived any claim
that it was an additional insured or a “protected person” under the
2002 policy. (Doc. 255 at 3).
summary judgment will therefore be granted.
The underlying Texas suit involved property near the Bayport
Industrial Complex in Harris County, Texas. The area was occupied
by industrial plants and underground pipelines.
methanol pipeline at the site. In 1979, KBR3 contracted with the
City of Houston to design a 30-inch water pipeline at the site. The
design work was done under specifications of the Coastal Industrial
Water Authority (“CWA”), a state agency. KBR’s contract required it
to provide the CWA with engineering services, help CWA prepare a
bid package for contractors, and inspect the work of the successful
The CWA accepted Eby’s4 bid for the project. A contract for
construction of the water pipeline was entered between Eby (as
“Contractor”) and the CWA and the City of Houston. It identified
KBR as the project “Engineer.” KBR was not a party or signatory to
this contract, although its powers and duties were set forth in the
The contract was made by Brown & Root, Inc., a predecessor of
Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR). It will be referred to here as KBR.
The bid was made by Chisolm Trail Construction Co., Inc., a
predecessor of Martin K. Eby Construction Co., Inc. It will be
referred to as Eby.
provision which stated:
“The contractor [Eby] agrees that he has sole
responsibility for the protection of facilities,
structures, and properties inside and outside the limits of
construction and agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the
Owner, the Engineer [KBR], and owners of adjoining
properties from and against any and all damages, claims,
demands, suits, and judgment costs including attorney’s
fees and expenses for or on account of damage to property
of any person, firm, corporation, company, or government
agency, or death of or injury to any person or persons
(including property and employees of the Coastal Industrial
Water Authority, Brown & Root, Inc., the Contractor, and
employees of the Contractor), directly or indirectly
arising from or caused by or in connection with the
performance or failure to perform any work provided for
hereunder by the Contractor, his subcontractors, or their
or the Contractor’s agents, servants, or employees. It is
agreed and understood that in the prosecution of work under
the provisions hereof, the Contractor is and shall continue
to be an independent contractor.
(Doc. 72 at 22).
This court has determined that the above provision did not
meet the “express negligence test” of Texas law. (Doc. 270 at 1314).
As such, it did not contractually obligate Eby to indemnify
KBR for its defense costs from the underlying Texas litigation. KBR
now looks to Travelers.
insurance policy (No. KK08000952) to Eby that was in effect from
January 1, 2002, to January 1, 2003. (Doc. 243, Ex. 4). This is the
policy under which KBR contends it is owed its defense costs. Eby
is the named insured on the policy. KBR now concedes it does not
qualify as an additional insured or “protected person” under this
policy, but argues it is entitled to coverage for defense costs
under the policy’s “contract liability” indemnitee provisions. See
Doc. 255 at 2-3.
The relevant 2002 Travelers policy provided in part:
Bodily injury and property damage liability. We’ll pay
amounts any protected person is legally required to pay
as damages for covered bodily injury, property damage, or
premises damage that:
happens while this agreement is in effect; and
is caused by an event.
Property damage means:
physical damage to tangible property of others,
including all resulting loss of use of that
loss of use of tangible property of others that
isn’t physically damaged.
Event means an accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to substantially the same general harmful
Contract liability. We won’t cover injury or damage for
which the protected person has assumed liability under
any contract or agreement.
But we won’t apply this exclusion to injury or damage for
which the protected person would have liability without
the contract or agreement.
Nor will we apply this exclusion to … property damage …
for which the protected person has assumed liability
under a covered contract made before the … property
damage … happens.
Also, if the protected person has agreed under the same
covered contract to defend or pay for the defense of, an
indemnitee against a claim or suit for such … property
damage …, we’ll have the duty to defend the indemnitee
against the claim or suit only if:
the indemnitee isn’t a protected person for the …
property damage …;
the claim or suit is for … property damage … for
which that protected person assumed the liability
of the indemnitee under the covered contract;
all of our indemnitee defense control and authority
requirements are fulfilled; and
all of our indemnitee defense cooperation and
notice requirements are fulfilled.
If we have the duty to defend the indemnitee under the
contract liability indemnitee defense coverage, we’ll do
We’ll defend the indemnitee against the claim or suit
even if all of the allegations of such claim or suit
are groundless, false, or fraudulent. …
However, if we don’t have a duty to defend the indemnitee
under  the contract liability indemnitee defense
coverage; … we’ll pay covered indemnitee defense expenses
assumed under contract as if they’re damages covered by
Covered contract means that part of any of the following
contracts or agreements under which you assume the
liability of another to pay damages for covered …
property damage that is sustained by others:
[listing various agreements not applicable here, such as
easements or leases]
Covered contract also means …:
that part of any other contract or agreement under
which you assume the liability of another to pay
damages for … property damage … that’s sustained by
But we won’t consider the following parts of any other
contract or agreement under which you assume the
liability of another to pay damages to be a covered
Architect, engineer, or surveyor indemnity.
Architect, engineer, or surveyor indemnity means that
part which indemnifies any architect, engineer, or
surveyor for injury or damage that results from:
the giving of or failure to give any direction or
instruction if that giving or instruction is the
primary cause of the injury or damage.
Indemnitee means any person or organization who a
protected person has agreed under a covered contract to
indemnify or hold harmless.
Indemnitee defense control and authority requirements
means the following requirements which must be fulfilled
for us to conduct and control the defense of an
indemnitee against a claim or suit under this agreement:
The protected person and the indemnitee must ask us to
conduct and control the defense of the indemnitee
against the claim or suit under this agreement.
We must determine that there’s no conflict between the
interests of the protected person and those of the
indemnitee, based on the allegations in the claim or
suit and on what we know about the factual and legal
basis for the damages being sought.
[listing additional requirements]
Indemnitee defense expenses assumed under contract means
the reasonable attorney fees and necessary litigation
are incurred by or for an indemnitee to defend itself
against a claim or suit for damages covered by this
are subject to a covered contract under which a
protected person has agreed to defend, or pay for the
defense of, the indemnitee against the claim or suit.
(Doc. 243, Ex. 4. See policy excerpts at Doc. 255, Ex. 1).
underlying suit to Travelers and Continental. KBR asserted that
Travelers owed KBR coverage as an “additional insured,” including
payment of its defense costs, under policies including KK08000952.
(Doc. 243-13). KBR had incurred over $1.5 million in defense costs
contractual liability indemnitee coverage provision.
Travelers acknowledged receipt of KBR’s demand on February 4,
reserving its rights and that when a review was completed Travelers
would correspond further. On February 9, 2009, Travelers moved to
add KBR as a defendant in the pending declaratory judgment action
(No. 08-2392, Doc. 56) and asserted a counterclaim seeking a ruling
that it owed KBR no coverage. Travelers provided no defense to KBR
and did not pay its defense costs.
expenses in the underlying action.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
The rules pertaining to summary judgment are well-established.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) directs the entry of summary
judgment in favor of a party who “show[s] that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue
is “genuine” if sufficient evidence exists so that a rational trier
“material” if under the substantive law it is essential to the
Diversified Svcs., Inc., 514 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th Cir.2008). When
confronted with a fully briefed motion for summary judgment, the
court must ultimately determine “whether there is the need for a
trial-whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues
that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they
may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d
202 (1986). If so, the court cannot grant summary judgment. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d
III. Construction of Insurance Contracts
The parties agree that Kansas law governs KBR’s claim for
coverage under the 2002 Travelers policy. (Doc. 262, Sec. 3(d)).
Under Kansas law, the following rules of construction are applied
to insurance contracts:
“The language of an insurance policy, like any other contract,
must, if possible, be construed in such way as to give effect to
the intention of the parties. In construing a policy of insurance,
a court should consider the instrument as a whole and endeavor to
ascertain the intention of the parties from the language used,
taking into account the situation of the parties, the nature of the
subject matter, and the purpose to be accomplished.
“Because the insurer prepares its own contracts, it has a duty
to make the meaning clear. If the insurer intends to restrict or
limit coverage under the policy, it must use clear and unambiguous
language; otherwise, the policy will be liberally construed in
favor of the insured. If an insurance policy's language is clear
and unambiguous, it must be taken in its plain, ordinary, and
popular sense. In such case, there is no need for judicial
interpretation or the application of rules of liberal construction.
The court shall not make another contract for the parties and must
enforce the contract as made.
“However, where the terms of an insurance policy are ambiguous
or uncertain, conflicting, or susceptible of more than one
construction, the construction most favorable to the insured must
“‘To be ambiguous, a contract must contain provisions or
language of doubtful or conflicting meaning, as gleaned from a
natural and reasonable interpretation of its language. Ambiguity in
a written contract does not appear until the application of
pertinent rules of interpretation to the face of the instrument
leaves it genuinely uncertain which one of two or more meanings is
the proper meaning.’
“Whether a written instrument is ambiguous is a question of
law to be decided by the courts. Courts should not strain to create
an ambiguity where, in common sense, there is not one. The test in
determining whether an insurance contract is ambiguous is not what
the insurer intends the language to mean, but what a reasonably
prudent insured would understand the language to mean.”
American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilkins, 285 Kan. 1054, 179 P.3d
1104, 1109-10 (2008) [citations omitted].
The 2002 Travelers policy provided two potential grounds for
“protected person”; or (2) coverage under the policy’s “contract
liability” provisions because KBR was a contractual indemnitee of
Eby. KBR now concedes the first ground does not apply, so the only
issue is whether the policy’s contract liability section can be
read to require payment of KBR’s defense expenses. As a preliminary
matter, the court rejects Travelers’ argument that KBR
pleadings or the pretrial order.
KBR’s initial pleading asked for a declaration that Travelers
breached a duty under the policy to defend KBR from the claims in
the underlying suit. (Doc. 28 at Pp. 18-20). Conversely, Travelers
sought a declaration that it had no duty under the policy to defend
KBR or to pay its defense expenses. (Doc. 90 at p. 38). These
claims fairly encompass the allegations now made by KBR. Moreover,
the pretrial order -- which supersedes the pleadings and controls
the course of the litigation -- now includes KBR’s contentions that
Travelers was obligated to defend it as Eby’s indemnitee under a
protest, it makes no showing of unfair surprise from having to
Inc., 502 F.Supp.2d 1170, 1176, n.2 (D. Kan. 2007) (pretrial order
is liberally construed to cover legal and factual theories embraced
by its language). Travelers’ waiver argument is therefore denied.
Contractual liability – Indemnitees.
The contract liability section of the policy first generally
excludes coverage for “any injury or damage for which the protected
indemnitee of Eby unless some subsequent language in the policy
negates the exclusion.
The section next states that the contract liability exclusion
will not be applied “to injury or damage for which the protected
agreement.” Other than the CWA indemnity contract, no basis is
suggested by KBR (or the record) on which Eby would be liable for
therefore does not require coverage for the KBR defense costs.
The next policy provision (beginning “Nor will we apply this
exclusion”) states the exclusion will not apply “to property damage
… for which [Eby] has assumed liability under a covered contract
made before … the property damage … happens.” Leaving aside for the
moment whether the CWA indemnity provision is a “covered contract,”
expenses do not constitute physical damage to tangible property or
“property damage” for which Eby assumed liability and do not fall
within the scope of this exception.
The policy next deals specifically with contractual agreements
by Eby to defend or to pay the defense expenses of an indemnitee:
“Also, if [Eby] has agreed under the same covered contract to
defend or pay for the defense of an indemnitee against a claim or
suit for such … property damage…, we’ll have the duty to defend the
indemnitee against the claim or suit only if” certain conditions
are met. For the reasons explained below, the court concludes this
provision did not give rise to any duty on Travelers’ part to
First, any duty on Travelers’ part to defend KBR could not
have arisen unless Eby first obligated itself under an indemnity
agreement “to defend or pay for the defense of” KBR. No suggestion
is made that Eby promised “to defend” KBR. And for the reasons
explained in the court’s memorandum and order of September 17, 2012
(Doc. 270), the CWA indemnity provision imposed no obligation on
Eby to otherwise pay for KBR’s defense costs. Under the Texas law
language failed to satisfy the “express negligence test.” Pursuant
to Fisk Elec. Co. v. Constructors & Associates, Inc., 888 S.W.2d
813 (1994), that failure meant Eby had no contractual obligation to
reimburse KBR for its defense costs from the Celanese litigation.
See Fisk, 888 S.W.2d at 813-14 (“We hold that no obligation to
indemnify an indemnitee for the costs or expenses resulting from a
claim made against it for its own negligence arises unless the
And for these same reasons, the court finds Travelers had no duty
to reimburse KBR’s defense costs under the provision stating that
even if Travelers has no duty to defend the indemnitee, it will
“pay covered indemnitee defense expenses assumed under contract….”
The “assumed under contract” definition, like the duty-to-defend
provision, required a showing that Eby “agreed to defend, or pay
for the defense of, the indemnitee against the claim or suit.” As
explained below, Eby made no such agreement.
test.”). See also Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry. Co., 890 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. 1994) (if indemnity
agreement makes no mention of strict liability, it does not extend
to claims for indemnity based on strict liability).
KBR points out that an insurer has a duty to defend if there
is “any potential” for liability under the policy. See Spruill
Motors, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 212 Kan. 681, 686,
512 P.2d 403 (1973); Spivey v. Safeco Ins. Co., 254 Kan. 237, 865
P.2d 182 (1993) (“[A]n insurer must look beyond the effect of the
pleadings and must consider any facts brought to its attention or
any facts which it could reasonably discover in determining whether
it has a duty to defend. If those facts give rise to a ‘potential
of liability,’ even if remote, under the policy, the insurer bears
a duty to defend.”). Moreover, the duty to defend is generally
determined from the pleadings and facts known to the insurer when
litigation. American Motorists Ins. v. General Host Corp., 946 F.2d
1482, 1486 (10th Cir. 1991); New Coleman Holdings, Inc. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 1995 WL 708684 (D. Kan., Nov. 3, 1995). From these
points, KBR argues that: 1) Travelers cannot rely on this court’s
ultimate finding that Eby had no contractual duty to indemnify KBR
“to prove retroactively” that it had no duty to defend KBR; and 2)
that the pleadings and information available to Travelers when it
received notice of the suit against KBR “did not foreclose the
contract.’” KBR says the latter point is driven home by a prior
ruling from this court finding that Eby had a duty to indemnify
KBR. (Doc. 276 at 2-3).
Even if Travelers’ duty to defend KBR is determined only from
the allegations made in the Celanese litigation and from the facts
known to Travelers when it learned of KBR’s demand for a defense,
contractual obligation on Eby’s part to indemnify KBR. The Celanese
complaint alleged that KBR’s failure to properly plan, monitor and
oversee the installation of the CWA pipeline, its fraud in failing
to report known damage, and its strict liability under federal and
state law for the release of hazardous substances all rendered KBR
liable for the resulting damage. But the CWA indemnity provision
said nothing about Eby agreeing to indemnify or defend KBR from
suits or claims alleging that KBR committed negligence, fraud or
requiring explicit language to shift legal responsibility for such
claims to another party, Eby simply had no contractual obligation
to indemnify KBR for its defense costs in the Celanese suit. And
absent such a contractual obligation Travelers could have no duty
to defend KBR.
Under the allegations of the Celanese suit, the language of
the CWA indemnity provision, and the Texas law governing indemnity
contracts, there was no potential -- remote or otherwise -- for
coverage of KBR’s defense expenses when KBR made a demand upon
Travelers. Fisk itself counsels that the determination of whether
Eby had any indemnity obligation “should be established as a matter
of law from the pleadings” -- not from the outcome of the Celanese
suit or the outcome of this suit -- and “[e]ither the indemnity
agreement is clear and enforceable or it is not.” Here the CWA
indemnity agreement was not enforceable: it had no express language
of any kind obligating Eby to indemnify KBR for claims such as
those made in Celanese suit. That fact was as true before this
court’s final ruling on the indemnity question as it was after, and
it operated to preclude any potential claim by KBR for coverage
under the Travelers’ contractual indemnitee provision.
The facts known to Travelers at the time of KBR’s demand thus
precluded any duty to defend KBR. Even so, the court notes that
determination of the indemnity question as precluding any claim of
a duty to defend KBR. Kansas courts have applied “the ultimate
showing test” in some circumstances in deciding whether an insurer
had a duty to defend. Under that test, “an insurer’s duty to defend
is dependent on a showing that the defendant to the action is
insured under the policy.” South Kansas Health Ins. v. Harden &
Co., 278 Kan. 347, 353, 97 P.3d 1031, 1035 (2004). Kansas courts
have applied this test when there is some question whether the
party claiming the benefit of a duty to defend actually qualifies
as an insured under the policy.
In Williams v. Community Drive-In Theatre, Inc., 3 Kan.App.2d
352, 595 P.2d 724 (1979), the court explained why the ultimate
outcome of the litigation was controlling when deciding whether the
party sued was entitled to a defense under the policy: “[B]efore
the general principle regarding the duty to defend applies, it must
be shown that under the policy the defendant is in fact an insured,
named or omnibus. This must be so because the insurer’s obligation
is not to provide a defense for a stranger merely because the
plaintiff alleges that the defendant is an insured or alleges facts
which, if true, would make him an insured. While an insurer may not
decline the defense of an insured against an ultimately groundless
claim, neither may it be compelled to defend an action against a
party not entitled thereto under the policy provisions.” Williams,
3 Kan.App.2d at 354. At least in these limited circumstances, “if
the insurer’s position is ultimately shown to be correct, then it
should not be penalized by being forced to bear an expense which it
did not contractually obligate itself to incur.” In Williams the
court concluded the insurer had no duty to defend because the jury
in the underlying litigation ultimately found the defendant was
acting outside the scope of her employment. That fact precluded her
from being considered an insured under the policy. Williams, 3
Kan.App.2d at 353 (“the insurance company vigorously argues that
the jury verdict ‘laid to rest’ any claim that it owed [defendant]
a defense. We agree.”). See also South Kansas Health Ins., 278 Kan.
at 353 (citing Williams with approval); Murphy v. Silver Creek Oil
& Gas, Inc., 17 Kan.App.2d 213, 837 P.2d 1319 (1992) (“Where the
contested issue is whether a person is in fact insured, we have
adopted an ultimate showing or retrospective test. Before the duty
to defend applies, it must be shown that the person was in fact an
insured under the policy.”).6
Travelers does not expressly cite the ultimate outcome test or
the above cases, although it does invoke the underlying rationale.
It bemoans the “absurd” result of KBR, “a complete stranger to the
policies, who paid no premiums, [being] entitled to a full defense
from Travelers” when this court has determined that KBR was not
entitled to indemnity from Eby. (Doc. 277 at 4). Although the court
finds no Kansas authorities applying the ultimate outcome test in
these circumstances, the rationale of Williams seems to apply here
with full force. KBR was not an insured of Travelers and paid no
Cf. Insurance Claims & Disputes 5th, Allan D. Windt, §4:1
(Westlaw 2012): “A duty to defend should not exist until it is
shown that the person claiming coverage was, in fact, an insured
under the policy. If an indemnity claim is made against an insured,
the insurer is not, therefore, obligated to pay for the alleged
indemnitee’s defense costs, since the alleged indemnitee is not an
insured. The insurer would not be obligated to pay for the
indemnitee’s defense costs until it is determined that the insured
owes indemnity. Until then, the insured is not obligated to pay for
the indemnitee’s defense costs.”
The court recognizes the above commentary does not strictly
apply here, since the Travelers’ policy had a provision promising
to defend the insured’s indemnitee under certain conditions.
premiums to obtain the benefits of this policy. It was entitled to
a defense only upon a showing that it had entered into an indemnity
agreement under which Eby promised to pay its defense costs. The
finding of this court that there was no such indemnity agreement
means KBR was essentially a stranger to the policy who should not
be entitled to claim its benefits.
Even if, contrary to the holding above, the court could find
there was a “remote potential” for coverage of KBR’s defense costs
at the time KBR made its demand on Travelers, the court would be
forced to predict that the Kansas Supreme Court would apply “the
ultimate showing test” in deciding whether Travelers had any duty
to defend KBR. See Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co. v. Choren, 393
law). The question of whether KBR was an indemnitee entitled to a
defense under the policy is comparable to the Kansas cases deciding
whether an unnamed person qualifies for a defense as an additional
insured. Applying the “ultimate showing test” here would lead to
the conclusion that Travelers had no duty to defend KBR.
The parties raise a number of other issues, including whether
various exclusions and conditions in the policy would otherwise
preclude or limit KBR’s claim for defense costs. In view of the
conclusion above that Travelers had no duty to defend KBR or to pay
its defense costs, the court declines to address these additional
Joint Statement (Doc. 272), this ruling disposes of all remaining
claims in the case and warrants entry of final judgment.
Travelers’ Motion for Summary Judgment against KBR (Doc. 241)
is GRANTED. KBR shall take nothing on its counterclaim against
Travelers; KBR’s counterclaim is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Travelers’ cross-claim seeking declaratory judgment against KBR is
hereby granted. The court finds that Travelers had no duty to
defend KBR and owes no coverage to KBR arising out of the claims in
the underlying Celanese suit.
KBR’s Motion for Summary Judgment against Eby (Doc. 133) is
DENIED as moot. (See Doc. 272 at 2). KBR shall take nothing on its
Travelers’ Motion for Summary Judgment against Eby (Doc. 239)
is DENIED as moot. Travelers’ claims against Eby are dismissed
without prejudice. (See Doc. 272 at 3-4).
Eby’s Motion for Summary Judgment against OneBeacon Insurance
Company (Doc. 236) and Eby’s Motion for Summary Judgment against
Travelers (Doc. 238) are DENIED as moot. As a result the following
claims are dismissed without prejudice: Eby’s claim that OneBeacon
and/or Travelers was obligated to defend KBR; OneBeacon’s claim for
declaratory judgment against Eby; and OneBeacon’s alternative claim
against Travelers for contribution. (See Doc. 272 at 4).
The clerk will enter judgment accordingly.
No motions for reconsideration, however styled, may be filed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 22nd day of February, 2013, at Wichita, Kansas.
Monti L. Belot
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?