Walker v. Sedgwick County Board of Commissioners et al
Filing
115
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER overruling 105 Motion for Review; granting 114 Motion for Leave to File. Signed by District Judge Monti L. Belot on 7/14/2011. (rs)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JOHN WALKER,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF SEDGWICK COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION
No.
09-1316-MLB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the court on defendants’ objections to
Chief Magistrate Judge Karen Humphreys’ May 27, 2011, order of
monetary sanctions (Doc. 100) against defendants.
(Doc. 105).
The
objections have been fully briefed and the matter is ripe for
decision.
(Docs. 108, 112).1
The objections are OVERRULED for the
reasons stated herein.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 24, 2011, Judge Humphreys granted plaintiff’s motion
to compel and ordered defendants to produce by February 4 the complete
department file for Patricia Harris, all supervision notes by Dr. Lear
and any actual or proposed disciplinary actions by anyone against
Patricia Harris.
(Doc. 58).
Defense counsel asked plaintiff’s
counsel to extend the deadline to February 8 and plaintiff’s counsel
agreed.
The documents were not produced on the eighth due to illness
and a snow storm.
1
On February 9, defense counsel produced various
Plaintiff’s motion to exceed the page limit of her response
brief is granted. (Doc. 114).
documents.
Those documents, however, were not fully compliant with
Judge Humphrey’s order.
On February 10, plaintiff’s counsel received
documentation of complaints made about Patricia Harris via witness
Sarah Harkness.
2011.2
The “Harkness reports” were dated January 14 and 21,
These reports were not produced by defendants.
On February
11, 2011, plaintiff’s counsel obtained an affidavit from “EW” who
stated that she was denied medication and grief counseling by Harris
and that she complained to Dr. Lear on December 10, 2010.
complaint was not produced to plaintiff.
This
On February 16, plaintiff’s
counsel faxed a letter to defense counsel listing fifteen items which
were not disclosed.
Defense counsel then forwarded the letter to
defendants.
On February 24, counsel met to discuss the items in dispute.
Defense counsel stated that he had been absent due to illness and
therefore, did not have an opportunity to respond to counsel’s letter.
Plaintiff’s counsel informed defense counsel that she would file a
motion for sanctions on March 1 if the discovery materials had not
been produced.
Plaintiff’s counsel notified the court of events.
On
March 1, defense counsel produced 46 pages of records but was unable
to address all fifteen items in dispute.
Plaintiff’s counsel filed
the motion for sanctions with the court.
Judge Humphreys determined that there were “serious questions
concerning the thoroughness of defendants’ search for documents
responsive to plaintiff’s discovery requests” but that there was not
2
Interestingly, as noted by Judge Humphreys, these items were
disclosed by Harkness directly to plaintiff’s counsel and Harkness
surreptitiously recorded an investigation by defendants and defense
counsel into the disclosure of the records. (Doc. 100 at n. 3).
-2-
sufficient evidence to conclude that Dr. Lear and Marilyn Cook have
withheld documents.
(Doc. 100 at 8, 9).
Judge Humphreys concluded
that defendants did not comply with the court’s January 24 order in
a timely manner and therefore, sanctions were warranted.
Judge
Humphreys ordered monetary sanctions due to the delays and unnecessary
expenditure of resources.
Defendants assert that the order of
sanctions was clearly erroneous and/or contrary to law.
II.
ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 governs the procedure for
making, and the standard of review for ruling on, objections to orders
of magistrate judges.
Rule 72(a) states that magistrate orders
regarding nondispositive matters shall be modified or set aside when
they are “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”
72(a).
Fed. R. Civ. P.
A matter is nondispositive when it is a “pretrial matter, not
dispositive of a claim or defense of a party.”
Id.
Defendants’
motion for protective order dealt with discovery of documents.
discovery
request
of
this
nature
is
a
nondispositive
A
matter.
Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 566 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Discovery
is a nondispositive matter. . . .”).
Magistrate judges are afforded
broad discretion when resolving discovery disputes.
Soma Med. Int’l
v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999);
Smith v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 137 F.R.D. 25, 27 (D. Kan. 1991).
Under the “clearly erroneous” standard set forth above, the court
will affirm the magistrate judge’s ruling “unless it ‘on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.’”
Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d
1458, 1464 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. United States
-3-
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
An order is “contrary to law”
when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law or
Botta v. Barnhart, 475 F. Supp.2d 174, 185
rules of procedure.
(E.D.N.Y. 2007).
First, defendants assert that sanctions should not have been
awarded because plaintiff’s counsel did not meet and confer in good
faith. D. Kan. Rule 37.2 requires counsel to make a reasonable effort
to
confer.
Although
plaintiff’s
counsel
gave
defense
counsel
sufficient notice of her intent to file the motion and met with
counsel in person, defendants assert that this was not a reasonable
effort because plaintiff’s counsel was not willing to give defense
counsel an additional extension and counsel “unilaterally imposed” a
deadline of March 1.
Defendants, however, fail to cite to any
authority which supports their position that plaintiff’s counsel did
not meet and confer in good faith.
Judge Humphreys found that
plaintiff’s counsel satisfied Rule 37.2 and defendants’ arguments to
the
contrary
are
not
enough
to
convince
the
court
that
Judge
Humphreys’ decision was erroneous or contrary to law.
Next,
defendants
assert
that
the
failure
to
disclose
the
“Harkness reports,” the Board of Nursing subpoenas and EW’s report,
were not a sufficient basis to award sanctions.
In their brief,
defendants have separated out these discovery items and argued how the
documents are not, standing alone, a basis for sanctions. Defendants’
reasoning, however, is flawed. In awarding sanctions, Judge Humphreys
reviewed the very specific itemized list submitted by plaintiff.
The
repeated failures in disclosing several documents was the basis of the
award of sanctions.
Judge Humphreys’ discussion of individual items
-4-
explains her ultimate award of sanctions and it is clear that
sanctions were not awarded just because of the Harkness reports or the
failure
to
produce
one
item
on
the
list.
Moreover,
and
most
importantly, defendants fail to cite any authority for the basis that
Judge Humphreys’ order was contrary to law or erroneous.
Defendants’
arguments demonstrate that they simply disagree with her ultimate
decision.
Therefore, the court is not convinced that Judge Humphreys’
decision was contrary to law and is not “left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Ocelot Oil Corp.,
847 F.2d at 1464.
III.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ objections to Chief Magistrate Judge Humphreys’ May
27, 2011, Order are OVERRULED for the reasons stated herein.
105).
No motion for reconsideration will be allowed.
(Doc.
Fed. R. Civ.
P. 1.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this
14th
day of July 2011, at Wichita, Kansas.
s/ Monti Belot
Monti L. Belot
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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